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Summary
What do a Canadian ban on the exportation of hazardous wastes, California’s
remediation requirements for open-pit mines, and the Municipality of Lima’s clo-
sure of a pasta factory have in common? They are all government measures that
have been the subject of investor-state disputes resolved in international invest-
ment arbitration. The ability of foreign investors, as private actors in global pol-
itics, to sue a state in an international forum is a significant development in both
international relations and international law. It challenges many of the common
assumptions of traditional theories in both disciplines and has profound impli-
cations for the future of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, this phenomenon had
garnered very little attention in academic or policy circles until recently.
Investors gain access to international investment arbitration through clauses
in state contracts (agreements negotiated directly between an investor and a state)
and international investment agreements (IIAs) (agreements negotiated between
two or more states which provide protection for investors hailing from one state
party and operating in the territory of another state party). The most common
form of IIA is the bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The first known BIT was
signed in 1959 between West Germany and Pakistan, but it is only recently that
these agreements have proliferated. By the end of 2005, nearly 2500 BITs had
been signed. Investment protection provisions can also be found in more than 230
regional trade and economic cooperation agreements.
Over the last decade, there has been an explosive increase of cases of in-
vestment arbitration. As of November 2006, the cumulative number of all known
treaty-based investor-state disputes was 255 and at least 70 governments had faced
investment arbitration. However, it is not only the number of disputes that have
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arisen and the number of states that have been involved that is noteworthy. The
novel types of dispute that have emerged are also significant. Rather than solely
involving straightforward incidences of nationalization or breach of contract, the
new generation of disputes often revolve around public policy measures and im-
plicate sensitive issues such as access to drinking water, development on sacred
indigenous sites, and the protection of biodiversity.
This study explores the implications of investment arbitration for one particu-
larly topical area of public policy: the protection of the environment. The existing
literature on the relationship between investment protection and environmental
protection is generally written either from the perspective of investment lawyers,
who often overlook many issues that are critical to the effective regulation of the
environment, or from the perspective of environmental lawyers who are not al-
ways adequately versed in the highly specialized field of investment law. This
study aims to fill this scholarly lacuna by providing a more comprehensive treat-
ment of both investment law and environmental regulation. Furthermore, it adds
a distinctly political dimension to a topic that often remains within the purview
of legal studies. The guiding theoretical approach in the study is drawn mainly
from international relations/international political economy scholarship, and par-
ticularly from critical studies of globalization that adopt a neo-Gramscian per-
spective.
Problem Definition and Research Question
Over the last two decades, the mantra that foreign direct investment (FDI) is vi-
tal in the effort to reduce the gap between wealthy and poor nations has become
pervasive in international policy discussions. FDI is also increasingly touted as
a key ingredient for the achievement of sustainable development. However, de-
spite the uncritical approach to FDI found in many international organizations
and think tanks, academic debate on the investment-development nexus is long-
standing and unresolved. When the discussion is shifted to incorporate the social
and environmental concerns that make up the more recent and amorphous concept
of sustainable development, it is unsurprising that an academic consensus on the
costs and benefits of FDI has failed to emerge.
Some scholars argue that foreign firms will use clean(er) technology and adopt
vhome country standards or international best practices in their operations, and that
positive spillovers to the domestic arena will result. Others point out that that
while foreign companies may be familiar with high standards and have access to
state-of-the-art technology, it is too optimistic to assume that they will automati-
cally adopt best practices in their operations in every country. Furthermore, it has
been argued that even if foreign firms are relatively cleaner they are also generally
larger than their domestic counterparts in developing countries, and thus have the
potential to make an overall greater environmental impact.
While the debate over the relationship between sustainable development and
FDI continues, it would appear that one broadly accepted conclusion that has
emerged is that the regulatory context in which the investment is situated is criti-
cal. In the absence of binding global rules on corporate conduct, the national level
remains the primary site for the regulation of foreign investment. However, when
domestic regulation negatively impacts an investment, for example by increas-
ing operating costs, conflicts between a foreign investor and the host state may
emerge. If an investor is protected by a state contract or IIA, he may respond to
such a conflict by initiating, or threatening to initiate, investment arbitration pro-
ceedings. Such actions may, in turn, have short-term and long-term implications
for environmental governance.
This study examines the outcome of several cases of investor-state conflict
over environmental policy. In addition to analysing the pleadings of parties and
decisions of arbitral tribunals in disputes that have been resolved in arbitration, the
influence that investment arbitration has had in negotiated outcomes to conflicts
is also explored. While conflicts in developed countries are discussed, a special
focus is given to the issues and concerns that are specific to the developing world.
Against this backdrop, the overarching research question of the study is:
What implications does the protection of foreign investment through
international investment agreements and state contracts have for
environmental governance, particularly in developing countries?
The Institution of Investment Protection
The constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that are found in state
contracts, IIAs, and sets of arbitral rules, collectively make up what is described
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in this study as the transnational institution of investment protection. This is a
hybrid public-private institution that operates simultaneously at the international,
national, and subnational levels. While the norms and rules are primarily gener-
ated by public actors (states), private actors (arbitrators) are delegated the author-
ity to ‘interpret’ and apply these rules to specific disputes. Furthermore, private
actors (foreign investors) are constituted as de facto subjects of international law
capable of independently bringing a claim against a state. An investor can claim
that measures taken by any level of government (municipal, provincial, etc.) are
in conflict with the rules and norms of the institution, although it is ultimately the
national government that assumes liability and will have to defend the measures
in arbitration.
In environmentally relevant disputes, the pertinent regulative norms and rules
are those covering national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, the inter-
national minimum standard/fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, perfor-
mance requirements, stability of host country law, and observance of obligations
(umbrella clauses). Procedural norms and rules concern the formation of tribunals,
the conduct of arbitral proceedings, and the production and distribution of arbitral
awards.
The regulative norms and rules of investment protection are decidedly vague
and open to a significant degree of interpretation. There is the clear potential for
environmental policy or court proceedings on environmental matters to be inter-
preted as conflicting with these norms and rules. However, the emergence and
outcome of disputes remains difficult to predict given the broad scope for inter-
pretation and the absence of any system of precedent. Serious procedural issues,
including the lack of transparency and accountability in investment arbitration,
compound this uncertainty. Furthermore, particular challenges exist for develop-
ing countries, which lack the financial and technical resources to deal with com-
plex and costly arbitral proceedings.
Investor-State Disputes
To date a number of conflicts between investors and states related to environmen-
tal policy have been resolved in arbitration. These disputes have concerned a wide
range of regulatory actions and several different environmental issues (e.g. haz-
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ardous waste, biodiversity, air/water pollution). Disputes in Canada, Costa Rica,
Mexico, Peru, and the United States are discussed in the first part of the empirical
portion of the study.
The decisions made by arbitral tribunals in these cases are inconsistent. Al-
though the circumstances of each case differ substantially, this alone does not
account for the divergence in tribunal decisions. This is not to claim that the cir-
cumstances of a case are immaterial, but only to suggest that the viewpoints and
perspective of arbitrators are also relevant. This makes the outcome of cases more
difficult for states to predict. However, despite the inconsistencies, several trends
in arbitral practice are identifiable. First of all, tribunals are not likely to accept
a state’s purported reasons for adopting an environmental measure on its face,
but will instead assess the measure’s legitimacy. In this respect, science plays an
important role, but the precautionary principle appears to be absent from the rea-
soning of tribunals. Another significant development is the growing acceptance
of positive obligations of investment protection. Thus, protecting investment no
longer solely requires a state to refrain from taking certain actions; it also man-
dates compliance with good governance principles such as transparency and pre-
dictability.
The cases also indicate that investment protection could potentially have con-
sequences for multilevel governance. While investment arbitration is only acces-
sible to national governments, a great deal of responsibility for the regulation of
the environment in both developed and developing countries is delegated to sub-
national levels of government. This dichotomy could lead to conflict between
levels of government and efforts to re-centralize power. Investment protection
may also affect the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements, re-
quiring governments to take measures that are least inconsistent with investment
protection, perhaps at the expense of the efficiency and effectiveness of environ-
mental regulation.
The Threat of Arbitration
While most research on the relationship between investment law and environ-
mental law and policy focuses on disputes that are resolved in international ar-
bitration, many conflicts between investors and states will likely never reach this
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stage. Arbitration is a high-risk, high-cost option for both governments and in-
vestors. Furthermore, states are concerned with the effect that formal disputes
may have on their reputation as investor-friendly hosts. The second part of the
empirical portion of the study makes a significant contribution to the literature
by providing a detailed examination of investor-state conflicts that were resolved
without recourse to arbitration, but where the existence of investment protection
nevertheless played an important role in the outcome. Conflicts between investors
and states concerning both environmental policy (in Ghana, Indonesia, and Costa
Rica) and domestic court proceedings (in Indonesia and Ecuador) are assessed.
The analysis focuses on the role that the threat of arbitration played in the out-
come of each conflict.
Some of the cases suggest that the existence of investment protection adds a
new dimension to the regulatory chill hypothesis, which originally emerged in the
context of the pollution havens debate. In addition to concerns about the exit of
investors (‘industrial flight’), governments may also be wary of improving envi-
ronmental regulation because of concerns that they will face costly arbitration as
a result. At the other end of the spectrum, some of the cases suggest that gov-
ernments might use the existence of commitments to investment protection as an
excuse or political cover for its failure to improve environmental regulation. In
this respect, it is important to consider the internal politics in the government, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that investment agreements are negotiated by different
ministries (economic, foreign affairs) than those that deal directly with the pro-
tection of the environment. Finally, the cases concerning environmental liability
show that in addition to influencing government behaviour, investment protection
also has the potential to influence the decisions of domestic courts (judicial chill).
A Period of Change
The period over which this study was conducted was one of rapid development
in the field of investment law and arbitration practice. The substantial increase
in the use of investment arbitration has led to greater scrutiny of the regulative
and procedural norms and rules of investment protection, and in some cases, to a
re-evaluation of the purpose and function of these rules and norms. States, arbitral
supervisory bodies, arbitrators, and NGOs have all played a role in bringing about
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change.
The most dramatic changes have occurred in the procedures of investment
arbitration. Many arbitral awards are now made publicly available, and amicus
curiae submissions to tribunals are becoming more frequent. Some countries,
particularly Canada and the United States, have also revised their model BITs
and have taken up the practice of conducting environmental impact assessments
of new investment agreements. However, these changes are largely cosmetic and
fail to address the key issues of accountability, predictability, and the capacity of
developing countries to handle disputes. Furthermore, the involvement of NGOs
in the arbitration process may only serve to lend the institution of investment
protection an unmerited air of legitimacy.
More substantial proposals for reform, such as the development of an appel-
late body or a multilateral investment agreement for sustainable development, are
also limited in both scope and viability. In particular, it is unlikely in the current
political climate that a multilateral agreement on investment - sustainable or not -
could be negotiated.
Many countries appear to be unwilling to wait for the institution of investment
protection to change, and instead have decided to opt out of it. However, the back-
lash against investment protection will only have implications for environmental
governance if it is uniform, and not restricted to disputes over the economic re-
turns from natural resource exploitation.
The Expropriation of Environmental Governance
With the advent of the institution of investment protection, and with the expansion
of substantive norms and rules within this institution to cover aspects of environ-
mental protection, elements of environmental governance have been taken over,
or expropriated, by international arbitral tribunals. Arbitrated outcomes may be
positive or negative from the perspective of the parties to the dispute, but the larger
issue is whether tribunals should be granted the authority to regulate the regula-
tors.
The expropriation of environmental governance by arbitral tribunals has led,
or will lead, to a loss of democratic accountability in environmental decision-
making. It is acceptable in democratic countries for domestic courts to check
xthe power of the legislature, because the judiciary is considered reasonably free
from political influence. On the other hand, as a governance system, investment
arbitration is fundamentally undemocratic and its neutrality is questionable. The
procedural rules and norms of investment protection were established to deal with
commercial disputes where confidentiality was considered paramount, and con-
sistency irrelevant. Such a system is inappropriate when states are involved in
disputes and especially when sensitive issues of public policy, such as environ-
mental regulation, are at stake.
The institution of investment protection has also shifted a significant degree of
the risk that is inherent in foreign investment from investors to host states and has
created considerable uncertainty for regulators. The regulative rules and norms
of investment protection are ambiguous, and vary in their specific wording from
treaty to treaty. When arbitral tribunals attempt to throw light upon the meaning
of these rules and norms, their interpretations are controversial and inconsistent.
Transparency is increasing, but confidentiality is still ubiquitous, making it more
difficult for states to evaluate how disputes have been treated in arbitration. When
the outcome of arbitration is uncertain, states that are faced with a threat of arbi-
tration are more likely to settle, often at the expense of public policy.
Finally, the institution of investment protection will lead to a decrease in the
amount, and/or the effectiveness, of environmental policy in host states. Invest-
ment protection dictates how and when states are to exert control over investors,
and places limits the number of tools in the ‘policy toolbox’. Furthermore, in addi-
tion to directly castigating states, arbitrators also influence regulators and judges.
Just as any good judicial system will prevent as well as punish crime, the system
of investment arbitration dissuades regulatory or judicial misconduct by states.
The problem is that it may also deter policy development and court proceedings
that are in the interests of the public good.
Special Issues for Developing Countries
Developing countries sign the vast majority of IIAs and state contracts, and yet
these countries are often poorly prepared to negotiate international agreements.
In addition to signing more agreements, developing countries are often the only
parties with real obligations under IIAs. In theory, inter-state investment agree-
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ments are reciprocal in that they require each state party to protect the investors
of each other state party when they are operating within their territory. However,
this theoretical reciprocity is not sustained in practice. This is because in the ma-
jority of investment agreements, state parties are asymmetrically related in terms
of investment flows; that is, one state in the relationship exports capital, while the
other(s) import capital. This is the case whether the agreement is between a de-
veloped country and one or more developing countries or economies in transition,
as is the case in that majority of agreements, or if it is between two or more tran-
sition/developing economies. Instances of agreements between capital-exporting
states are rare, and developed countries are not frequently exposed to investor
claims.
With respect to the protection of the environment, developing countries are
likely to face more investor-state conflicts than their developed counterparts be-
cause: environmental policy is more likely to change and to change more rapidly,
leading to conflicts (there is a lower baseline level of regulation and considerable
pressure to ‘catch-up’ with international standards); there is less coherence in na-
tional policy and thus a higher likelihood of conflicts arising between policies
developed to protect investors and policies developed to protect the environment;
there is a higher instance of corruption and thus investors may be given greater
concessions that may in turn lead to conflicts in the future and; the courts are less
respected and trusted and therefore court proceedings are more likely to be chal-
lenged for lack of due process. Furthermore, when conflicts arise it is more likely
that they will be resolved in, or influenced by, investment arbitration than when
comparable conflicts arise in developed countries because developing countries:
have made more commitments to investment protection; cannot as easily absorb
the costs of arbitration (both financial and reputational); and have a lower capacity
to deal with disputes.
One could nevertheless conclude that an increase in investor-state conflicts is
an acceptable trade-off for the benefits of increased flows of FDI. However, estab-
lishing a causal connection between the conclusion of an IIA and increased foreign
investment flows is notoriously difficult and this issue remains highly contested in
the literature. Furthermore, any gains made by developing countries in attracting
investment through IIAs will be largely at the expense of other developing coun-
tries, because the system is based on competition, and thus overall welfare will not
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improve even if specific flows increase. Additionally there is the question of the
actual benefit to the host state of increased inflows of foreign investment if they
do materialize. In particular, there is the issue of the value of foreign investment
in the form that is promoted in IIAs and state contracts, given the fact that these
agreements seem to emphasize the encouragement of foreign investment as if it
were an end in itself, rather than a means to achieving sustainable development.
Contribution to Theory
The institution of investment protection is viewed in this study as a key component
of what neo-Gramscians call the ‘new constitutionalism’. The new constitution-
alism encompasses the structural and ideological constraints that are imposed on
states by a transnational historic bloc made up of corporate and governmental
elites. The concept helps to explain why states are voluntarily ceding authority
to tribunals and it also captures the way in which the constraints of investment
protection can be ‘locked-in’, resulting in a loss of democratic accountability.
The study benefited from the application of neo-Gramscian insights and it
also, in turn, contributed to neo-Gramscian scholarship. While the major writings
in the field are largely focused at the macroeconomic and macropolitical level, this
study focused on one specific area and gave considerable attention to domestic
interactions. The study also drew links between neo-Gramscian theory and other
theories/hypotheses (e.g. regulatory chill, political cover). These hypotheses and
theories are consistent with neo-Gramscian thought and both enrich and help to
operationalize a neo-Gramscian framework.
Recommendations
Absent the creation of an entirely new mechanism of investor-state dispute settle-
ment, such as an investment court, it would seem that the most sensible option for
governments is to restrict access to arbitration to states only, and provide investors
recourse to only domestic remedies. In addition to (or in lieu of) avoiding the
current system of investment arbitration, reference to the international minimum
standard/fair and equitable should not be included in new IIAs. The standard is
simply too broad and has been interpreted too expansively by tribunals. Further-
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more, state contracts, if they are to be employed by states, should not include sta-
bilization clauses. Given the fact that in many developing countries environmen-
tal regulation of foreign investment is minimal to begin with, agreeing to general
or specific commitments to stability of the environmental regulatory framework
could lock a country into deteriorating environmental conditions.
When drafting IIAs and state contracts, governments should ensure that it is
explicitly stated that the purpose of these agreements is to promote and protect
investment that contributes to sustainable development. However, considering the
amorphous nature of this concept, governments should also incorporate in the text
of IIAs the most important and relevant principles of international environmental
law. Additionally, states should increase transparency and participation in contract
and treaty negotiation. Developing countries should also make efforts to cooperate
to a greater extent on investment issues to avoid the bidding wars that competition
for investment can create. Finally, international organizations, research institu-
tions, lawyers, NGOs, and states should collaborate to create a legal assistance
centre for developing countries.
De Onteigening van Milieubestuur
Bescherming van buitenlandse investeerders ten koste van
overheidsbeleid
Samenvatting
Wat hebben een Canadees exportverbod op gevaarlijk afval, Californische
herstelverplichtingen voor de dagmijnbouw en de sluiting van een pastafabriek
in Lima met elkaar gemeen? Dit zijn voorbeelden van overheidsmaatregelen die
leidden tot geschillen tussen investeerders en overheden in internationale invester-
ingsarbitrage. Dat buitenlandse investeerders de nationale overheid van een staat
kunnen dagen voor een internationaal tribunaal is een zeer belangrijke ontwikke-
ling voor internationale betrekkingen en in het internationaal recht. Het gaat in
tegen de heersende veronderstellingen in beide disciplines en kan verstrekkende
gevolgen hebben voor de toekomst van de soevereiniteit van de staat. Toch heeft
dit fenomeen tot voor kort weinig aandacht gekregen in academische en beleid-
skringen.
Investeerders hebben middels twee wegen toegang tot internationale arbitrage:
via bepalingen in overheidscontracten (overeenkomsten tussen een investeerder en
de nationale overheid) en via internationale investeringsverdragen (overeenkom-
sten tussen staten waarbij bescherming wordt geboden voor investeerders die op-
ereren op het grondgebied van een andere staat). De meest voorkomende vorm
van internationale investeringsverdragen is het bilaterale investeringsverdrag. Het
eerste bilaterale investeringsverdrag werd in 1959 gesloten tussen West-Duitsland
en Pakistan. Het aantal verdragen is recentelijk sterk gegroeid: eind 2005 waren er
al bijna 2500 verdragen afgesloten. Daarnaast kunnen internationaal-rechtelijke
bepalingen over investeringsbescherming ook teruggevonden worden in de meer
dan 230 regionale handels- en economische samenwerkingsverdragen.
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In de afgelopen tien jaar is er een explosieve groei geweest in het aantal
gevallen van investeringsarbitrage. In november 2006 waren er 255 gevallen van
conflicten tussen investeerders en overheden bekend, waarbij ten minste 70 ver-
schillende landen waren gedaagd. Naast de toename van het aantal geschillen en
betrokken overheden is er een opvallende ontwikkeling in het soort geschillen dat
ontstaat. Het gaat namelijk niet meer alleen om geschillen over nationalisering
of contractbreuk, maar vaak om maatregelen van overheidsbeleid over gevoelige
kwesties zoals de toegang tot drinkwater, ontwikkeling op heilige plaatsen en de
bescherming van biodiversiteit.
Dit proefschrift verkent de gevolgen van investeringsarbitrage voor een be-
langrijk beleidsonderwerp: milieubescherming. Auteurs die zelf uit de hoek van
het investeringsrecht komen en rapporteren over de relatie tussen de bescherming
van investeringen en milieubescherming, gaan vaak voorbij aan kwesties die van
wezenlijk belang zijn voor effectieve milieuregelgeving. Daartegenover zijn mi-
lieujuristen niet altijd voldoende op de hoogte van de ingewikkelde kwesties in
het internationale investeringsrecht. Dit proefschrift heeft als doel deze weten-
schappelijke lacunes te vullen door middel van een uitgebreide behandeling van
zowel investerings- als milieurecht. Daarnaast voegt het een specifieke politieke
dimensie toe aan een onderwerp dat vaak slechts behandeld wordt door rechts-
geleerden. De voornaamste theoretische benadering voor dit proefschrift komt
voort uit de studie van internationale betrekkingen en de studie van internationale
politieke economie. In het bijzonder wordt voortgebouwd op kritische studies
over globalisering waarin een neo-Gramsciaans perspectief wordt gehanteerd.
Probleemstelling en Onderzoeksvraag
In de laatste twee decennia is de opvatting dat directe buitenlandse investeringen
van fundamenteel belang zijn bij het verminderen van de kloof tussen arme en
rijke landen diep doorgedrongen in internationale beleidskringen. Directe buiten-
landse investeringen worden ook gezien als een belangrijk aspect voor het bereiken
van duurzame ontwikkeling. Hoewel de benadering van directe buitenlandse in-
vesteringen in internationale organisaties en denktanks veelal wordt gezien als kri-
tiekloos, is er een hevig academisch debat gaande over de relatie tussen investerin-
gen en ontwikkeling. Nu deze discussie tevens de sociale en milieuaspecten van
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het vage concept van duurzame ontwikkeling raakt, is het niet geheel verrassend
dat er geen academische consensus is over de kosten en baten van directe buiten-
landse investeringen.
Sommige wetenschappers betogen dat buitenlandse ondernemingen schone(re)
technologien gebruiken en de hoge standaarden van het thuisland en de interna-
tionaal beste geldende praktijken overnemen, wat zal leiden tot hoogwaardige in-
vesteringen in het gastland. Anderen wijzen er juist op dat hoewel buitenlandse
ondernemingen bekend zijn met deze hoge standaarden en toegang hebben tot de
nieuwste technologiee¨n, het te optimistisch is te veronderstellen dat deze prakti-
jken daadwerkelijk worden toegepast in het land waarin ze opereren. Daarnaast
wordt betoogd dat zelfs wanneer buitenlandse bedrijven schoner werken, zij zo-
danig groter in omvang zijn dan binnenlandse ondernemingen dat ze potentieel
een grotere indruk op het milieu teweegbrengen.
Hoewel het debat over de relatie tussen duurzame ontwikkeling en directe
buitenlandse investeringen nog volop gaande is, lijkt het er op dat het alom aan-
vaard is dat de regelgevende context van de investeringen van wezenlijk belang
is. Aangezien er geen bindende internationale regels zijn voor het gedrag van
multinationale ondernemingen blijft het nationale beleid het belangrijkst voor de
regulering van buitenlandse investeringen. Wanneer nationale wetgeving nadelige
gevolgen heeft voor investeringen, bijvoorbeeld door het verhogen van de kosten
van de bedrijfsvoering, kan het tot een conflict komen tussen de buitenlandse in-
vesteerder en het gastland. Als een investeerder beschermd wordt door een over-
heidscontract of een internationaal investeringsverdrag kan hij reageren door het
starten van een internationale arbitrageprocedure - of het dreigen daarmee. Zulke
acties kunnen op hun beurt gevolgen hebben voor milieubestuur op de korte en de
lange termijn.
Dit proefschrift is een analyse van de resultaten van een aantal geschillen
tussen overheden en investeerders op het gebied van milieubeleid. De pleidooien
van partijen en beslissingen van arbitragetribunalen in een aantal geschillen zijn
hiervoor bestudeerd. Tevens wordt gekeken naar de invloed van investerings-
arbitrage op schikkingen. Hoewel geschillen in ontwikkelde landen ook worden
besproken, wordt er in het bijzonder aandacht geschonken aan kwesties die van
belang zijn voor ontwikkelingslanden.
Tegen deze achtergrond is de overkoepelende onderzoeksvraag van dit proef-
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schrift:
Wat zijn de gevolgen van investeringsbescherming door middel van
internationale investeringsverdragen en overheidscontracten voor milieu-
bestuur, met name in ontwikkelingslanden?
De Praktijk van Investeringsbescherming
De constitutieve, regelgevende en procedurele normen die gevonden kunnen wor-
den in overheidscontracten, internationale investeringsverdragen en arbitragereg-
els vormen samen de transnationale praktijk van investeringsbescherming. Dit is
een hybride publiek-private praktijk die zich tegelijkertijd afspeelt op het interna-
tionale, nationale en lokale niveau. Hoewel de normen met name afkomstig zijn
van publieke actoren (overheden), hebben private actoren (arbiters) de bevoegd-
heid om deze normen te interpreteren en toe te passen op specifieke gevallen.
Daarnaast zijn andere private actoren (buitenlandse investeerders) de rechtssub-
jecten die bevoegd zijn om een klacht tegen een staat in te dienen. Een investeerder
kan stellen dat bepaalde (lokale of nationale) overheidsmaatregelen in strijd zijn
met de normen van het investeringsrecht. Uiteindelijk kan de nationale over-
heid aansprakelijk worden gesteld en dient het de maatregelen in de arbitrage te
verdedigen.
In milieugerelateerde geschillen zijn de voornaamste regels het vereiste van
nationale behandeling, het “most-favoured-nation treatment” beginsel, de ver-
plichting van de internationale minimumstandaard/redelijke en billijke behandel-
ing, onteigening, prestatievereisten, stabiliteitsbepalingen, en het nakomen van
verplichtingen (de zogeheten parpaplu-bepaling). Procedurele regels betreffen de
samenstelling van tribunalen, de uitvoering van de arbitrageprocedure en het op-
stellen en verspreiden van arbitrale uitspraken.
De normen op het gebied van investeringsbescherming zijn vaag en kunnen op
zeer verschillende wijzen worden genterpreteerd. Er is een niet geringe kans dat
milieubeleid of juridische beslissingen over het milieu worden gezien als in strijd
zijnde met deze normen. Het blijft moeilijk te voorspellen hoezeer deze geschillen
zich voordoen en wat hun uitkomst zal zijn gezien de ruime interpretatiemogelijk-
heden en het ontbreken van een precedentensysteem. Belangrijke procedurele
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kwesties, waaronder het gebrek aan openheid en verantwoordingsmogelijkheden
in investeringsarbitrage, vergroten deze onzekerheid. Daarnaast zijn er specifieke
moeilijkheden voor ontwikkelingslanden, die niet de financie¨le en technische mid-
delen hebben om met ingewikkelde en dure arbitrageprocedures om te gaan.
Geschillen tussen Investeerders en Overheden
Inmiddels is een aantal geschillen tussen investeerders en overheden met betrekk-
ing tot milieubeleid beslecht door middel van arbitrage. Deze geschillen hadden
betrekking op een verscheidenheid aan overheidsmaatregelen en milieukwesties
(bijvoorbeeld gevaarlijk afval, biodiversiteit en lucht- en watervervuiling). Geschil-
len in Canada, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru en de Verenigde Staten worden bespro-
ken in het eerste deel van het empirische gedeelte van dit proefschrift.
De uitspraken van arbitragetribunalen in deze kwesties zijn niet consequent.
De variatie in de uitspraken van de tribunalen kan niet geheel verklaard worden
door de verschillende omstandigheden van iedere zaak. Daarmee wil niet gezegd
worden dat de specifieke omstandigheden er niet toe doen, maar wel dat ook
de persoonlijke standpunten van arbiters een rol lijken te spelen. Dit zorgt er-
voor dat de uitkomst van de geschillen moeilijk te voorspellen is voor overheden.
Niettemin kunnen bepaalde ontwikkelingen in de arbitragepraktijk onderscheiden
worden. Ten eerste zullen tribunalen niet snel de motivatie van een staat voor
milieumaatregelen klakkeloos overnemen, maar met name kijken naar de legit-
imiteit van een maatregel. Om deze reden speelt de wetenschap een belangrijke
rol, maar het voorzorgsbeginsel lijkt geen belangrijke rol te spelen in de motiver-
ing van tribunalen. Een tweede belangrijke ontwikkeling is de toenemende aan-
vaarding van positieve verplichtingen op het gebied van investeringsbescherming.
Het beschermen van investeringen vereist dus niet alleen dat staten afzien van
bepaalde activiteiten, maar verplicht ze ook om beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur,
zoals openheid en voorspelbaarheid, na te leven.
De geschillen geven ook een aanwijzing dat de bescherming van investeringen
mogelijk gevolgen heeft voor het bestuur op verschillende niveaus. Hoewel alleen
nationale overheden partij kunnen zijn in arbitrageprocedures, ligt de verantwo-
ordelijkheid voor milieubeleid in zowel ontwikkelde als ontwikkelingslanden in
grote mate bij lokale overheden. Deze tweedeling zou tot botsingen tussen ver-
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schillende overheidsniveaus kunnen leiden, alsmede tot pogingen van de nationale
overheid om de macht weer naar zich toe te trekken. Investeringsbescherming kan
tevens de tenuitvoerlegging van internationale milieuverdragen benvloeden om-
dat van overheden verwacht wordt dat ze maatregelen nemen die zo min mogelijk
gevolgen hebben voor investeringsbescherming, ook al gaat dat ten koste van de
effectiviteit van milieubeleid.
De Dreiging van Arbitrage
Alhoewel het meeste onderzoek over de relatie tussen milieu- en investeringsrecht
zich toespitst op geschillen die beslecht worden door international arbitrage, is het
waarschijnlijk dat veel geschillen tussen investeerders en staten dit stadium niet
eens bereiken. Arbitrage brengt hoge risico’s en kosten met zich mee voor zowel
overheden als investeerders. Daarnaast zijn overheden bezorgd over de gevolgen
van geschillen voor hun reputatie als gastland voor investeerders. Het tweede
deel van het empirische gedeelte van het proefschrift levert een belangrijke bij-
drage aan de literatuur door een gedetailleerde analyse te geven van geschillen
tussen investeerders en overheden die nooit zijn beslecht door arbitrage, maar
waar investeringsbescherming niettemin een belangrijke rol speelde in de uitein-
delijke uitkomst. Geschillen tussen investeerders en overheden over milieubeleid
(in Ghana, Indonesie¨ en Costa Rica) en nationale rechtsprocedures (in Indonesi
en Ecuador) worden doorgelicht. De analyse richt zich op de rol die de dreiging
van arbitrage speelt bij de uitkomst van een geschil.
Sommige gevallen wijzen erop dat investeringsbescherming een nieuwe di-
mensie geeft aan de “regulatory chill” hypothese. Naast zorgen over het vertrek
van investeerders kunnen overheden ook afzien van het verbeteren van milieu-
wetgeving vanwege de kosten van mogelijke arbitrageprocedures. Andere gevallen
suggereren weer dat overheden het bestaan van hun verplichtingen op het gebied
van investeringsbescherming als een rechtvaardiging gebruiken voor het gebrek
aan verbeterd milieuregelgeving. Daarom is het belangrijk om de binnenlandse
politiek mee te nemen in de analyse, met name omdat investeringsverdragen wor-
den afgesloten door andere ministeries (economische en buitenlandse zaken) dan
de ministeries die direct betrokken zijn bij milieubescherming. Tenslotte laten de
gevallen die betrekking hebben op milieuaansprakelijkheid zien dat investerings-
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bescherming niet alleen overheidsbesluiten beı¨nvloedt, maar ook de beslissingen
van de rechterlijke macht (“judicial chill”).
Een Overgangsperiode
De periode waarin het onderzoek voor dit proefschrift is uitgevoerd werd geken-
merkt door een snelle ontwikkeling op het gebied van investeringsrecht en de arbi-
tragepraktijk. De aanzienlijke toename van het gebruik van investeringsarbitrage
heeft geleid tot meer toezicht op de materile en procedurele regels met betrekking
tot investeringsbescherming en, in enkele gevallen, tot een heroverweging van het
doel en de functie van deze regels. Overheden, arbitrale overzichtsorganen, ar-
biters en niet-gouvernmentele organisaties hebben allemaal een rol gespeeld bij
het totstandkomen van deze veranderingen.
De meest ingrijpende veranderingen hebben plaatsgevonden op het gebied
van arbitrageprocedures. Veel uitspraken worden inmiddels openbaar gemaakt,
en steeds vaker worden er “amicus curiae briefs” ingediend bij tribunalen. Som-
mige landen, zoals Canada en de Verenigde Staten, hebben hun model voor bi-
laterale investeringsverdragen aangepast en beoordelen nu ook de milieueffecten
van nieuwe investeringsverdragen. Deze veranderingen betreffen echter niet de
belangrijke kwesties van verantwoording, voorspelbaarheid en de capaciteit in on-
twikkelingslanden voor het omgaan met geschillen. Daarnaast kan het betrekken
van niet-gouvernmentele organisaties zorgen voor een ongerechtvaardigde legit-
imering van de praktijk van investeringsbescherming.
Andere hervormingsvoorstellen, zoals het instellen van een beroepsorgaan of
het onderhandelen van een multilateraal investeringsverdrag voor duurzame on-
twikkeling zijn ook beperkt in reikwijdte en politieke vatbaarheid. In het huidige
politieke klimaat is het onwaarschijnlijk dat een multilateraal investeringsverdrag
gesloten kan worden - duurzaam of niet.
Veel landen lijken niet te willen wachten totdat de praktijk van investerings-
bescherming verandert en hebben er voor gekozen om er niet meer aan deel te ne-
men. Deze weerstand zal echter alleen maar gevolgen hebben voor milieubestuur
als het eenduidig is en niet slechts beperkt blijft tot geschillen over de inkomsten
van het gebruik van natuurlijke hulpbronnen.
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De Onteigening van Milieubestuur
Met de opkomst van de praktijk van investeringsbescherming en de uitbreiding
van bijbehorende normen die betrekking hebben op het milieu worden onderdelen
van milieubestuur overgenomen, of beter gezegd onteigend, door internationale
arbitragetribunalen. Arbitrale uitkomsten kunnen zowel voor- als nadelig zijn va-
nuit het perspectief van de deelnemende partijen, maar de meer essentile vraag is
of tribunalen de bevoegdheid zouden moeten krijgen om de regels te maken waar
regelgevers zich aan zouden moeten houden.
De onteigening van milieubestuur door arbitragetribunalen heeft geleid, of
zal leiden tot een verlies van democratische verantwoording in de besluitvorm-
ing over milieukwesties. Het is algemeen aanvaard in democratische landen dat
rechters de wetgever controleren, aangezien de rechterlijke macht gezien wordt
als onafhankelijk van politieke invloeden. In vergelijking hiermee is invester-
ingsarbitrage als een bestuurssysteem fundamenteel ondemocratisch en kan de
neutraliteit van dit systeem in twijfel getrokken worden. De procedurele regels
van investeringsbescherming zijn vastgesteld om met commercile geschillen om
te gaan waarbij vertrouwelijkheid van groot belang is en consistentie niet relevant.
Dit systeem is niet geschikt voor geschillen waarin staten betrokken zijn en waar
gevoelige kwesties van overheidsbeleid, zoals milieubeleid, op het spel staan.
De praktijk van investeringsbescherming heeft ook in belangrijke mate geleid
tot een verschuiving in wie het risico draagt voor buitenlandse investeringen. In
plaats van de investeerders ligt dit risico nu meer bij de gastlanden, wat zorgt voor
onzekerheid bij overheden. De normen van investeringsbescherming zijn niet een-
duidig en de bewoording verschilt per verdrag. Wanneer arbitragetribunalen de
betekenis van deze normen proberen te verduidelijken zijn de interpretaties vaak
controversieel en inconsistent. Hoewel de openheid is toegenomen, is geheimhoud-
ing nog de norm. Dit maakt het lastig voor overheden om te beoordelen hoe
geschillen behandeld worden in arbitrageprocedures. Als de uitkomst van dreigen-
de arbitrage onzeker is, zullen overheden sneller een minnelijke schikking zoeken,
wat vaak weer ten koste gaat van het overheidsbeleid.
Tenslotte zal de praktijk van investeringsbescherming leiden tot een vermin-
dering van de hoeveelheid en de effectiviteit van het milieubeleid in de gast-
landen. Investeringsbescherming bepaalt hoe en wanneer staten controle kunnen
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uitoefenen op investeerders en beperkt de beleidsruimte. Daarnaast beı¨nvloeden
arbiters de wetgevers en rechters in het gastland. Zoals ieder rechtssysteem mis-
daad voorkomt en bestraft, zo zorgt het systeem van investeringsarbitrage er voor
dat staten afzien van wangedrag door wetgevers en rechters. Het probleem is
echter dat het ook overheidsbeleid en rechterlijke beslissingen in het algemeen
belang kan afschrikken.
Specifieke Kwesties voor Ontwikkelingslanden
Landen in de Derde Wereld zijn betrokken bij het grootste gedeelte van de in-
ternationale investeringsverdragen en overheidscontracten, terwijl zij vaak slecht
zijn voorbereid op het onderhandelen van internationale verdragen. Daarnaast
zijn ontwikkelingslanden ook vaak de enige partijen die echte verplichtingen op
zich nemen in dit soort verdragen. Theoretisch zijn interstatelijke investeringsver-
dragen wederkerig in de zin dat ze van alle deelnemende staten vereisen dat ze
investeerders uit een andere staat beschermen wanneer deze op hun grondgebied
opereren. Deze theoretische wederkerigheid geldt echter niet in de praktijk, om-
dat in de meeste gevallen staten niet dezelfde positie hebben met betrekking tot
investeringsstromen: waar de ene staat kapitaal uitvoert, voert een andere staat
kapitaal in. Dit is het geval wanneer het een verdrag betreft tussen een ontwikkeld
land en e´e´n of meer ontwikkelingslanden of landen met een overgangseconomie,
zoals in het merendeel van de verdragen, of wanneer het gaat om verdragen tussen
ontwikkelingslanden of landen met een overgangseconomie. Verdragen tussen
kapitaaluitvoerende staten zijn zeldzaam en ontwikkelde landen worden dus niet
vaak gedaagd door investeerders.
Het is waarschijnlijker dat ontwikkelingslanden verzeild raken in geschillen
over milieubescherming in vergelijking met ontwikkelde landen om de volgende
redenen: 1) milieubeleid is meer onderhevig aan (snelle) veranderingen, wat kan
leiden tot geschillen (bij gebrek aan milieubeleid is er aanzienlijke druk om in-
ternationale standaarden in te halen); 2) er is minder samenhang in nationaal
beleid en daarmee dus een grotere kans op interne strijdigheid tussen het beleid
om investeerders te beschermen en het beleid ter bescherming van het milieu; 3)
er is een hogere mate van corruptie waardoor er meer concessies gedaan wor-
den aan investeerders, wat weer kan leiden tot mogelijke toekomstige geschillen;
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en 4) de rechterlijke macht wordt minder gerespecteerd en vertrouwd, waardoor
rechterlijke uitspraken sneller kunnen worden betwist bij gebrek aan een behoor-
lijke procesgang. Daarnaast is het belangrijk dat als geschillen zich voordoen,
het waarschijnlijker is dat deze worden opgelost of beı¨nvloed door investerings-
arbitrage in vergelijking met geschillen in ontwikkelde landen omdat: ontwikkel-
ingslanden meer verplichtingen op zich hebben genomen om investeringen te
beschermen; minder mogelijkheden hebben om de kosten van geschillen op zich
te nemen (zowel op financieel gebied als met betrekking tot de reputatie); en min-
der capaciteit hebben om met geschillen om te gaan.
Desondanks kan geconcludeerd worden dat een toename in geschillen tussen
investeerders en overheden aanvaardbaar is in verband met de voordelen van grot-
ere investeringsstromen. Het is echter zeer moeilijk om een causaal verband vast
te stellen tussen het afsluiten van internationale investeringsverdragen en een toe-
name in directe buitenlandse investeringsstromen en de literatuur blijft verdeeld
over deze kwestie. Daarnaast gaan de voordelen die behaald worden door on-
twikkelingslanden als gevolg van het binnenhalen van investeringen grotendeels
ten koste van andere ontwikkelingslanden. Dit kan verklaard worden doordat
het een op concurrentie gebaseerd systeem betreft. Dit betekent dat de alge-
hele welvaart niet zal verbeteren, zelfs als bepaalde investeringsstromen toene-
men. Daarnaast is het de vraag of de voordelen van de buitenlandse investeringen
ook daadwerkelijk gerealiseerd worden. Internationale investeringsverdragen en
overheidscontracten lijken er van uit te gaan dat het bevorderen van buitenlandse
investeringen op zichzelf het doel is, in plaats van een middel om duurzame on-
twikkeling te realiseren.
Bijdrage aan Theorievorming
De praktijk van investeringsbescherming wordt in dit proefschrift gezien als een
belangrijk onderdeel van het neo-Gramsciaanse “new constitutionalism”. Dit con-
cept omvat de structurele en ideologische beperkingen voor overheden, die door
een transnationale historische bedrijfs- en overheidselite zijn opgelegd. Met be-
hulp van dit concept kan worden uitgelegd waarom overheden vrijwillig de be-
voegdheid aan tribunalen overlaten. Tevens kan hiermee worden verklaard hoe de
beperkingen van investeringsbescherming voortduren, met als gevolg een vermin-
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dering van de democratische verantwoording.
Dit proefschrift heeft baat gehad bij de toepassing van neo-Gramsciaanse
inzichten en heeft tegelijkertijd bijgedragen aan de neo-Gramsciaans wetenschap.
Waar de belangrijkste bijdragen op dit gebied zich geconcentreerd hebben op
het macro-economische en macropolitieke niveau, heeft dit proefschrift zich op
n bepaald studiegebied gericht en veel aandacht geschonken aan nationale inter-
acties. Het proefschrift legt ook relaties tussen neo-Gramsciaanse theorien en
andere theorien en hypotheses (zoals “regulatory chill”). Deze hypotheses en the-
orien komen overeen met het neo-Gramsciaanse gedachtengoed en helpen om het
neo-Gramsciaanse kader te verrijken en te operationaliseren.
Aanbevelingen
Bij gebrek aan nieuwe mechanismen om geschillen tussen investeerders en over-
heden te beslechten, zoals de instelling van een investeringsrechtbank, lijkt het
er op dat de meest verstandige optie is om de toegang tot arbitrage te beperken
tot overheden en geschillen met investeerders te laten beslechten door nationale
rechtsmiddelen. Daarnaast zouden verwijzingen naar de internationale minimum-
standaard/redelijke en billijke behandeling niet opgenomen moeten worden in nie-
uwe internationale investeringsverdragen. De standaard is simpelweg te ruim
en is ook zo genterpreteerd door tribunalen. Daarnaast dienen overheidscon-
tracten geen stabiliseringsbepalingen te bevatten. Omdat in veel ontwikkelings-
landen de milieugerelateerde regulering van buitenlandse investeringen minimaal
is, kan het overeenkomen van dit soort bepalingen de milieuwetgeving van een
land blokkeren, leidend tot verslechterde milieuomstandigheden.
Bij het ontwerpen van internationale investeringsverdragen en overheidscon-
tracten dienen overheden er voor te zorgen dat duidelijk wordt gemaakt dat het
doel van die overeenkomsten is om duurzame investeringen te bevorderen en te
beschermen. Gezien het vage karakter van het concept van duurzame ontwikkel-
ing, is het nodig dat overheden de belangrijkste en meest relevante beginselen
van internationaal milieurecht in internationale investeringsverdragen opnemen.
Daarnaast moeten overheden bij het afsluiten van contracten en verdragen open-
heid van zaken geven en participatie bevorderen. Ontwikkelingslanden dienen
tevens meer samen te werken op het gebied van investeringskwesties in plaats
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van met elkaar te concurreren voor investeringen. Tenslotte zouden internationale
organisaties, onderzoeksinstanties, juristen, niet-gouvernmentele organisaties en
overheden moeten samenwerken om een rechtshulporganisatie voor ontwikkel-
ingslanden op te zetten.
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Introduction 1
What do a Canadian ban on the exportation of hazardous wastes, California’s
remediation requirements for open-pit mines, and the Municipality of Lima’s clo-
sure of a pasta factory have in common? They are all government measures that
have been the subject of investor-state disputes resolved in international invest-
ment arbitration. The ability of foreign investors, as private actors in global pol-
itics, to sue a state in an international forum is a significant development in both
international relations and international law. It challenges many of the common
assumptions of traditional theories in both disciplines and has profound implica-
tions for the future of the state sovereignty. Nevertheless, this phenomenon had
garnered very little attention in academic or policy circles until recently.
Over the last decade, there has been an explosive increase of cases of invest-
ment arbitration as a result of the rapid proliferation of international investment
agreements which provide legal protection to foreign investors. This is signifi-
cant, not only in terms of the number of disputes that have arisen and the number
of states that have been involved, but also with a view to the novel types of dis-
pute that have emerged. Rather than solely involving straightforward incidences
of nationalization or breach of contract, the new generation of disputes often re-
volve around public policy measures and implicate sensitive issues such as access
to drinking water, development on sacred indigenous sites, and the protection of
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biodiversity.
This study explores the implications of investment arbitration for one particu-
larly topical area of public policy: the protection of the environment. This subject
is addressed through an analysis of the outcome of several conflicts which arose
between investors and states as a result of either the introduction of new envi-
ronmental regulations or the initiation of domestic court proceedings related to
corporate liability for environmental damage.
The existing literature on the relationship between investment protection and
environmental protection is generally written either from the perspective of in-
vestment lawyers, who often neglect many issues that are critical to the effective
regulation of the environment, or from the perspective of environmental lawyers
who are not always adequately versed in the highly specialized field of investment
law. This study aims to fill this scholarly lacuna by providing a more comprehen-
sive treatment of both investment law and environmental regulation. Furthermore,
it adds a distinctly political dimension to a topic that often remains within the
purview of legal studies. The guiding theoretical approach in the study is drawn
mainly from international relations/international political economy scholarship,
and particularly from critical studies of globalization that adopt a neo-Gramscian
perspective.
This chapter provides an introduction to the relationship between foreign in-
vestment and sustainable development. It explains the various strategies available
to investors when they are faced with a conflict with a host state, and reviews the
existing literature on the most widely studied strategy of exit (‘industrial flight’).
It then addresses the alternative strategy of voice. With this discussion as a back-
drop, the problem definition and overarching research question of the study are
presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the methodology employed
in the empirical portion of the study.
1.1 Background
Foreign investment can be defined as, “[t]he transfer of tangible or intangible as-
sets from one country into another for the purpose of their use in that country
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to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of the assets.”1
This definition encompasses both foreign direct investment (FDI), the transfer of
physical property, and ‘portfolio investment’ which involves only the movement
of money through the purchase of shares in foreign corporations.2
Policy-makers, international development organizations and scholars have em-
phasized the importance of FDI in reducing the global gap between wealthy and
poor nations.3 FDI flows have rapidly increased in recent history, and while
downturns have periodically occurred, on average FDI flows have multiplied more
rapidly than trade flows.4 While still largely concentrated in the ‘triad’ of Western
Europe, North America and Japan, the share of FDI flows directed to developing
countries has increased in the last decade.5 However, this fact masks the real-
ity that only a small group of developing countries - particularly China, Mexico,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Brazil - are really benefiting from these increased flows
while other countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, are increasingly
marginalized.6 Nevertheless, it would seem that the increases in investment flows,
despite their uneven distribution, have strengthened the belief among many devel-
oping countries that FDI can be beneficial to development and can help reduce
resource, technology, and foreign exchange gaps.7
FDI is also increasingly considered a key ingredient for achieving sustainable
1Sornarajah 2004a, at 7.
2Ibid. Portfolio investment composes an increasingly large share of global flows of investment, but
this study focuses on FDI which has a greater potential to contribute to development.
3For example, see the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for De-
velopment, 18-22 March 2002, Monterrey, Mexico, http://www.un.org/esa. See also the series of
World Investment Reports produced annually by the United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment (UNCTAD), http://www.unctad.org.
4Cohn 2004, at 313.
5This study adopts the categorizations provided by UNCTAD which identifies ‘developed’ areas as
Western Europe, North America, and ‘other’ (Australia, Israel, Japan, Malta, New Zealand). ‘De-
veloping areas and territories’, on the other hand, include Africa, East, South and South-East Asia
(excluding Japan), West Asia (excluding Israel), Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean,
and the Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand). Central and Eastern Europe are categorized
separately as ‘economies in transition’.
6Cohn 2004, at 325.
7Mosoti 2005, at 95.
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development.8 For example, Cosbey et al. argue that sustainable development
requires structural economic change, which can only be brought about by invest-
ment, and in developing countries this is most likely to come in the form of foreign
(rather than domestic) investment.9 In fact, they attest that it is “hard to overstate
the importance of investment for sustainable development.”10
Unlike some forms of economic activity, FDI is generally long-term in nature,
which is important for sustainable development.11 FDI can also facilitate tech-
nology transfer, which can be crucial for mitigating environmental damage.12 For
example, in discussions on climate change there has been considerable emphasis
on the role that foreign investment can play in enabling developing countries to
‘leapfrog’ to the use of modern technologies in order to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.13 In addition to the fact that foreign companies generally have greater
access to clean(er) technology, they are also familiar with higher standards (home
country standards or international best practices), and they are more likely to want
to retain a positive reputation internationally through corporate social responsibil-
ity initiatives. Foreign investors may even be required by the institutions financing
their foreign investment projects to meet certain standards or take certain mea-
sures, such as conducting an environmental impact assessment (EIA). This leads
many commentators to conclude that domestic investors are in general ‘dirtier’
than foreign ones.
Nevertheless, it is also widely recognized that foreign investment can cause
significant environmental degradation in host countries. In particular, there is the
‘scale impact’ of FDI, which means that even if foreign firms are relatively cleaner
they are also generally larger than their domestic counterparts, and thus have the
potential to make an overall greater environmental impact.14 In some sectors,
such as mining, only foreign companies will have the resources required to carry
8Sustainable development is defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED) 1987, at 43, as “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”
9Cosbey et al. 2004, at v.
10Ibid., at 1. See also: Mann 2003, at 248; von Moltke 2002b, at 145; Zarsky 2000, at 2.
11Cosbey et al. 2004, at 1.
12OECD 1997, at 6-7.
13See generally Hedger et al. 2000; Mansley et al. 2000.
14Zarsky 1999.
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out large-scale projects in small developing countries, often in remote areas that
otherwise would remain pristine.15 Furthermore, while foreign companies may
be familiar with high standards and have access to state-of-the-art technology, as
Gallagher and Zarsky note, the assumption that investors will automatically adopt
best practices for their operations in every country is “too optimistic.”16
The only overarching conclusion that has emerged from research on the rela-
tionship between foreign investment and the environment appears to be that con-
text is important.17 Particularly relevant is the regulatory context in which the
investment is situated. As Peterson argues:
Foreign investment is most likely to contribute to sustainable development
in contexts where governments are free to regulate and/or tax that invest-
ment so that it can be harnessed to domestic policy objectives such as social
services, environmental protection, poverty-alleviation or the provision of
other public goods - at the same time that investors enjoy sufficient certainty
that they can invest under predictable terms.18
1.1.1 Protecting Foreign Investment
As there is not an unlimited supply of foreign investment that is equally distributed
around the world, it is often argued that states must compete for FDI, and one of
the ‘necessary conditions’ to create an ‘attractive’ or ‘friendly’ investment climate
is the existence of adequate legal protection for investors.19 Foreign investment
is inherently risky, and investors perceive risk as particularly high in developing
countries.20 Foreign investors tend to distrust the local legal systems in many
countries to protect them from unjustified interference in their operations by the
15Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 209
16Gallagher and Zarsky 2007, at 30.
17Brooks et al. 2004, at 8; Mann and Araya 2002, at 164; Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 219; Subedi 1998, at
415.
18Peterson 2004b, at 7-8.
19Vagts 1987, at 2, explains that the concept of an ‘investment climate’ is “in effect, a way of ex-
pressing the level of risk of adverse future governmental action which present or potential foreign
investors perceive as existing in the nation in question.”
20Head 2007, at 477.
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government. Consequently, political risk may hinder flows of investment to the
countries that need it the most.
The purported solution to this problem has been the creation of agreements
that govern the relationship between investors and governments and shift dispute
resolution out of local courts and into international arbitration. Traditionally, in-
vestment was mainly protected through investor-state agreements, variously re-
ferred to in the literature as ‘host government agreements’, ‘economic develop-
ment agreements’, or ‘state contracts’. State contracts are still used extensively in
developing countries, especially in the natural resource sectors, and are given par-
ticular attention in this study. However, in addition to state contracts, which cover
only specific investments, protection can also be more generally provided through
international agreements. While there is no multilateral agreement on investment,
regional and sectoral agreements, as well as bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
are abundant.21 In this study, agreements negotiated between two or more states
concerning the protection of investors hailing from one country party (the ‘home
state’) when that investor operates in another country party (the ‘host state’) are
collectively referred to as international investment agreements (IIAs). IIAs may
be stand-alone agreements, or they may be only one part of a broader trade or
economic cooperation agreement.
IIAs outline requirements for the state that is hosting investment. While IIAs
are reciprocal (with each state able to act as a ‘home’ and ‘host’ to investors) the
asymmetry of investment flows that often exists between parties to an IIA means
that, in practice, only one state has real obligations under the agreement. For
example, imagine that an agreement is signed between State A and State B: on the
one hand, State A is an exporter of capital, with investors operating in State B; on
the other hand, State B is primarily an importer of capital, and has no investors
operating in State A. In this scenario, only State B has categorical obligations.
21Regional investment agreements cover many sectors and involve more than two states bound within
a geographic area. Sectoral agreements cover only one sector of investment (e.g., energy) but in-
volve more than two states. Finally, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) involve only two states. It
should be noted that the Energy Charter Treaty, which contains a chapter on investment, is a signif-
icant sectoral investment agreement, but it is not discussed further in this study. For a discussion of
the Energy Charter Treaty with specific reference to the relationship between investment protection
and environmental protection see Chalker 2006; Wa¨lde 1998b.
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Developing countries, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Brazil, China, India,
and Malaysia) are, at present, primarily importers and not significant exporters of
capital.22
Whether the protection of foreign investment through IIAs is, in fact, responsi-
ble for increased flows of FDI to the developing world is a topic of much scholarly
debate. Empirically, there are examples that raise doubts about the effect of IIAs.
For example, Brazil is a recipient of a large amount of FDI and yet has not ratified
any BIT.23 Conversely, many African countries that have ratified numerous BITs
remain marginalized in terms of global investment flows. This is consistent with
the mixed anecdotal evidence of investor awareness of, and interest in, IIAs.24
In recent years, several studies have attempted to prove statistical correlation,
or lack thereof, between IIAs and investment flows. Franck divides these studies
into those which represent a ‘market protagonist’ view (IIAs have a minor impact
on FDI and market forces are far more critical determinants of flows), and those
that take a ‘treaty protagonist’ stance (IIAs play an important role in attracting
FDI).25 One study, conducted by a World Bank economist, falls into the former
category.26 Hallward-Driemeier assessed twenty years of FDI flows from Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to develop-
ing countries and found that there is little evidence that BITs have stimulated ad-
ditional investment.27 Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, in a 2004 study, also found the
relationship between BITs and FDI to be weak.28 However, in 2006 the same au-
thors reported that they had developed a more sophisticated model and concluded,
in contradiction with their previous results, that BITs do have a positive impact
on FDI flows to developing countries.29 Nevertheless, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman
qualify this finding by noting that the impact of BITs is highly dependent on the
22Mosoti 2005, at 97.
23Newcombe 2007a, at 372.
24Franck 2007, at 347-8.
25Ibid., at 349.
26Hallward-Driemeier 2003.
27For another study reaching similar conclusions, see UNCTAD 1998.
28Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005.
29Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2006.
8 Introduction
political and economic environment in the host country.30 Furthermore, they sug-
gest that as the global coverage of BITs increases, the marginal effect of one
country’s BITs on its FDI inflows will decline.31 In a more overtly treaty protag-
onist study, Neumayer and Spess critique Hallward-Driemeier’s methodology (as
well as that employed by others) and argue that BITs do live up to their purported
purpose of fostering FDI flows.32 Other studies have also come to this conclusion,
though they have at times produced conflicting results. For example, Salacuse and
Sullivan found that if a country signed a BIT with the United States (US) it would
receive more FDI from that country, whereas Gallagher and Birch found that the
total number of BITs signed by a country can be positively correlated to greater
FDI flows, but that specifically signing a US BIT had no impact on inflows of US
FDI.33
Unlike the vast majority of research on investment agreements in political sci-
ence, the problem to be addressed in this study is not the attraction of FDI. While
the extent that IIAs live up to their purported purpose is certainly a critical issue,
it is not possible to incorporate this complex and potentially intractable debate
into this study.34 Instead the focus is on the challenges that governments face in
terms of regulating foreign investment in this new ‘enabling’ legal environment; a
subject scarcely touched on in the literature to date.35
1.1.2 Protecting the Environment
Regulating foreign investment has been a key concern of countries, particularly
in the developing world, for the last half century. In the last thirty years, the
issue of regulating foreign investment for the protection of the environment has
30Ibid., at 4.
31Ibid.
32Neumayer and Spess 2005.
33Salacuse and Sullivan 2005; Gallagher and Birch 2006.
34Vandevelde 1998, at 524, suggests that, “[i]t is unlikely that any causal connection between the
conclusion of BITs and increased foreign investment flows could ever be established using statistical
correlations.”
35IIAs and state contracts are ‘enabling’ in the sense that they are designed to facilitate investment by
providing rights to private parties and defining the obligations of the state, but not vice versa. See
Levy and Egan 1998.
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become particularly prominent, as a result of both domestic opposition to environ-
mentally damaging activities and the development of international commitments
aimed at protecting the global commons and preventing transboundary environ-
mental harm.
The focus of discussions on the international regulation of foreign investment
has tended to be on transnational corporations (TNCs),36 given their dominance
over global investment flows37 as well as their capacity to develop large-scale,
and therefore potentially more environmentally-damaging, investment projects.38
There are strong economic and environmental arguments both for and against the
international regulation of TNCs. On the one hand, advocates argue that interna-
tional rules will mitigate a series of adverse environmental effects of FDI and that
without such regulation environmentally responsible countries and companies will
lose competitiveness.39 On the other hand, opponents suggest that international
regulation is economically sub-optimal as it prevents countries from exploiting
comparative advantages associated with their higher ‘assimilative capacity’ for
pollution, and that there is also a danger that international rules will become a
cover for protectionism.40 Nevertheless, Hansen concludes that, on balance, in-
ternational regulation of TNCs is desirable to guarantee salient environmental val-
ues and minimum standards, to compensate for regulatory failure at the national
level, to encourage high environmental performance and innovation in TNCs, and
to facilitate FDI in developing countries.41 With regard to the last point, Hansen
suggests that international rules on TNC conduct might appease public concerns
about investment projects, which can pose an obstacle to their operation, level the
playing field amongst competing companies, and reduce some of the uncertainty
surrounding environmental regulation in developing countries.42
To date, very little has been accomplished at the international level in terms
36Brewer and Young 1998, at 11, define a TNC as “an enterprise which owns (in whole or in part),
controls, and manages value-adding activities in more than one country.” TNCs are also commonly
referred to as multinational corporations (MNCs) or multinational enterprises (MNEs).
37TNCs control approximately two-thirds of global trade and investment.
38Plahe and Gaag 2000, at 229.
39Hansen 2002, at 170.
40Ibid.
41Ibid., at 170-1.
42Ibid.
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of binding environmental standards for TNCs. In fact, as is noted in a textbook
on global business law, when it comes to the regulation of foreign investors “it is
probably accurate to say that mulilateral rules that are of a directly binding charac-
ter are virtually nonexistent.”43 Hence, unlike the legal protection of investment,
the regulation of investment with a view to protecting the environment remains an
issue of largely domestic purview.
1.2 Investor Strategies to Deal with Conflicts with the Host
State
Increasingly, domestic environmental regulation and opposition to investment pro-
jects from communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are seen as
major political risks for foreign investment.44 As such, it is ever more likely that
conflicts between investors and host states will occur. For example, the imposition
of a new environmental policy can be costly, particularly if the development was
not anticipated by the investor and therefore was not taken into account in the
cost-profit analysis that informed the decision to invest in the first place.45 In such
a situation, there are three possible strategies for an investor to pursue: to accept
the environmental policy and associated costs; to relocate to another jurisdiction;
or to contest the policy through lobbying, litigation, etc.46
An investor may accept the environmental policy for a variety of reasons: it
may not significantly interfere with his investment; he may be concerned with
damaging his relationship with the government by ‘kicking up a fuss’; he may
be aiming to improve his image as an environmental leader in the industry; or he
may fear reprisals from domestic or international NGOs if he does not accept the
policy. In any event, the investor’s decision to not act presumably has no negative
implications for environmental governance.
However, the issue is far more complicated in cases where an investor does
act. The two active strategies for investors described above - to leave the host
43Head 2007, at 500.
44Wa¨lde 1998b, at 245; Bastida 2001, at 42.
45Bekhechi 2001, at 86.
46Murphy 2004, at 87.
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state or to try to contest the policy - can be more succinctly termed ‘exit’ and
‘voice’ respectively. These concepts were developed by Hirschman in his analy-
sis of the decline in firms, organizations, and states.47 However, these concepts
readily apply to conflicts between investors and states as well. One can draw a
parallel between a customer who is unhappy with a change in a firm’s product and
an investor who is dissatisfied with a change in a host state’s environmental policy.
Similarly, just as customers have alternative products that they may choose to pur-
chase if they are unhappy with a company, investors have alternative (attractive)
jurisdictions that they may choose to invest in. This is especially the case in this
globalized era when capital is mobile and states compete for investment, as firms
do for customers.48 The loss of customers can be damaging to a firm’s profits;
similarly, the loss of investors can be damaging to a state’s economy.
Hirschman argues that “exit requires nothing but a clearcut either-or decision,”
but voice is “a far more ‘messy concept’ because it can be graduated, all the way
from faint grumbling to violent protest.”49 Hirschman describes the difference
between exit and voice as follows:
To resort to voice, rather than exit, is for the customer or member to make
an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from
which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs. Voice is here
defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an ob-
jectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition
to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher manage-
ment, or through various types of actions and protests including those that
are meant to mobilize public opinion.50
The definition of voice adopted in this study follows as any attempt by a foreign
investor to change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs.
Despite the fact that exit and voice are two distinct options, Hirschman em-
phasizes how they are interrelated, noting that the voice option will more likely
be taken at an early stage, while the decision to exit is “taken in the light of the
47Hirschman 1970.
48Strange 1996, at 110.
49Hirschman 1970, at 43 and 16.
50Ibid., at 30.
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prospects for the effective use of voice.”51 In Hirschman’s view, the two categories
of exit and voice “reflect more a fundamental schism: that between economics and
politics. Exit belongs to the former realm, voice to the latter.”52 In the study of the
relationship between investment and the environment, exit has been the primary
focus of research, which indeed has been dominated by economic analysis. While
it is voice and a political perspective that are the main interest in this study, it is
worth briefly examining the substantial literature on investor exit.
1.2.1 The Exit Option
Foreign investors are generally motivated by the availability of natural resources
(resource-seeking FDI), access to new markets for goods and services (market-
seeking FDI), and/or cost minimization (efficiency-seeking FDI).53 Thus, investors
may exit a jurisdiction when resources are exhausted or when a market is too small
to support production. However, it is the notion that investors will exit a jurisdic-
tion for reasons of cost, more commonly referred to as ‘industrial flight’, that has
been the subject of significant scholarly attention.
The reason for this attention is the link between cost minimization and reg-
ulation. For example, labour laws, health and safety standards, and environ-
mental regulation all impose costs on investors. Furthermore, these standards
are not harmonized across states, or even in some cases across sub-state juris-
dictions (e.g., provinces). As such, it has been hypothesized that investors will
leave jurisdictions with stringent regulation in favour of those with more lenient
rules for efficiency reasons. This sparked concern within highly regulated juris-
dictions (mainly developed countries) over potential job losses. It also led some
observers to postulate that, in an attempt to keep or regain investment, countries
would lower their labour, health, and environmental standards leading to a ‘race
to the bottom’.54
51Ibid., at 37.
52Ibid., at 15.
53Dunning 1993, cited in Caspary and Berghaus 2004, at 684.
54As Porter 1999, at 136, indicates, the term ‘race to the bottom’ does not imply that standards liter-
ally fall to the bottom, but only that standards are reduced to a suboptimal level and are therefore
“inefficient for the entire system of jurisdictions in the sense of causing distortion in the allocation
of resources.”
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Pollution Havens
Research that has specifically addressed the relationship between the locational
decisions of foreign investors and environmental regulation comprises the ‘pollu-
tion havens’ debate.55 The debate is over whether or not investors will migrate
to jurisdictions (e.g., developing countries) with lax environmental standards. Ac-
cording to Neumayer, there is a popular misconception that “any country with less
strict environmental standards than one’s own country is guilty of providing a pol-
lution haven.”56 Neumayer argues that such a definition is inappropriate because
countries cannot be expected to have the same levels of environmental regulation,
particularly given the wide disparities in wealth and resources between developing
and developed states. He therefore provides the following definition of a pollution
haven:
A country provides a pollution haven if it sets its environmental standards
below the socially efficient level or fails to enforce its standards in order to
attract foreign investment from countries with higher standards or countries
that better enforce their standards.57
Similarly, according to Wheeler, “[w]hat really counts for the pollution havens
debate is neither market ownership nor market location, but the willingness of the
host government to ‘play the environment card’ to promote growth.”58
By the mid-1980s, researchers had concluded that the new strict environmen-
tal regulations in developed countries had not resulted in industrial flight, and thus
rejected the validity of the pollution haven hypothesis as a whole.59 By way of
explanation it was argued that environmental costs make up only a small propor-
tion of a company’s total costs, and therefore they have little impact on a firm’s
locational decisions, particularly in comparison to other factors such as the size of
the domestic market or the level of infrastructure in a country.60 Furthermore, it
55For an overview of pollution havens literature see OCED 1997, and the special issue of Global
Environmental Politics (vol. 2, issue 2) devoted to this topic.
56Neumayer 2001b, at 147.
57Ibid., at 148.
58Wheeler 2002, at 1.
59Strohm 2002, at 31.
60Kelemen 2004, at 289.
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Figure 1.1: The Race to the Bottom
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was suggested that governments in developed countries respond to high levels of
public demand for environmental protection, which counteracts any inclination to
lower standards to keep or attract investment, thus precluding a race to the bottom.
Despite the initial lack of empirical evidence, research in the area continued
and recently several studies, using more sophisticated techniques, have found “sta-
tistically significant pollution haven effects of reasonable magnitude.”61 Addition-
ally, scholars have begun to critique early pollution havens research on a number
of levels.
Methodologically, observers have pointed out problems such as unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity in early studies.62 However, there is also a broader
criticism of the dominance of economic analysis in the field. Strohm notes that:
Economists rely on statistical information and theoretical models, often re-
jecting case studies as non-technical anecdotes. Environmentalists question
the assumptions, omissions, and relevance of economic models, preferring
instead the careful documentation of specific stories.63
Clapp suggests that “[i]nstead of searching for statistical proof that pollution havens
exist within the current, narrow and economistic framework, a broader, more nu-
anced approach to the issue should be taken.”64
In terms of the scope of the debate, it has been narrowly confined by the
definition of ‘dirty industry’ adopted by most researchers. The primary focus has
been on the manufacturing sector, rather than the extractive industries that make
up the bulk of investment flowing to many low-income countries.65 Neumayer
notes that:
Especially in the mining and other resource extraction sectors, multinational
corporations also at times do take advantage of low environmental standards
in the host country - an impact on the environment that is outside the pollu-
tion haven hypothesis proper.66
61Brunnermeier and Levinson 2004, at 38.
62Ibid.
63Strohm 2002, at 33.
64Clapp 2002, at 17.
65Ibid., at 12, and Mabey and McNally 1998, at 11.
66Neumayer 2001b, at 173.
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Environmental costs are also very narrowly defined. The data used to determine
which sectors are highly polluting largely consists of emissions data or informa-
tion on expenditures related to emission controls.67 Habitat destruction, biodi-
versity loss, and numerous other environmental impacts are not captured by this
limited scope. Additionally, Mabey and McNally point out that environmental
assets are generally undervalued by governments:
With regulation universally low, and environmental costs representing only
a small fraction of operating costs, firms’ locational preferences will be
less influenced by environmental standards. If external environmental costs
were truly internalized the cost of compliance would increase significantly
... [and] variations in environmental regulation would become a more signif-
icant factor in a firm’s choice of investment location. Therefore, empirical
research cannot measure the impact of competition for FDI on environmen-
tal standards merely by searching for the existence of pollution havens.68
The focus of the majority of pollution havens research has been restricted even
further by a preoccupation with industrial flight and the concerns within developed
countries about potential job losses.69 This bias toward concern for the impact on
developed countries has skewed the findings. Even if existing evidence does not
support the industrial flight hypothesis, some authors argue that research indicates
that environmental regulation does in fact influence some firms’ locational deci-
sions, particularly in resource and pollution-intensive sectors.70 Moreover, while
competitive pressure to attract FDI may be counteracted in developed countries
where governments are responsive to high levels of demand for environmental
quality, the situation may be considerably different in developing countries.71
Regulatory Chill
Many authors who are disparaging of the pollution havens debate have suggested
that the regulatory chill hypothesis offers a new avenue of research. This hy-
67Clapp 2002, at 12.
68Mabey and McNally 1998, at 31.
69Clapp 2002, at 11; Strohm 2002, at 29; and Mabey and McNally 1998, at 30.
70Ibid.
71Porter 1999, at 134.
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pothesis suggests that countries fear raising environmental standards because they
believe that it may deter new investment or lead to industrial flight. Porter notes
that:
Regardless of the empirical evidence of the impact of standards on trade
competitiveness and firm location ... many officials of industrial firms as
well as government officials clearly believe differences in environmental
costs affect competitiveness and investment decisions and tend to act ac-
cordingly.72
Similarly, Neumayer argues that “what really matters is what policy makers be-
lieve, not what economic theory and evidence says, and there can be no doubt that
they actually do believe that countries compete with each other.”73
The result of regulatory chill is therefore not a race to the bottom, but the
maintenance of the status quo. As Clapp rightly notes:
If the status quo is as stringent as environmental regulations are going to get,
then the effect will be an entrenchment of poor quality regulations, and the
entrenchment of differences in the stringency of those regulations between
rich and poor countries.74
This entrenchment has alternatively been referred to as the ‘stuck at the bottom’
effect,75 or the ‘stuck in the mud’ phenomenon.76 Even Vogel, who has argued
that economic integration can lead to ‘trading up’ in environmental and labour
standards,77 makes the important qualification about races to the top or bottom
that “[e]ven if a race exists, not all countries may be contestants.”78 Hence, some
countries may sprint to the top or bottom while other countries make no, or hardly
any, headway in either direction.
Empirically, the regulatory chill hypothesis is very difficult to prove because
as Mabey and McNally cogently remark, “evidence is needed of what has not
72Ibid., at 136.
73Neumayer 2001a, at 20-21.
74Clapp 2002, at 17.
75Porter 1999, at 134
76Zarsky 1997.
77Vogel 1995.
78Vogel and Kagan 2004, at 17.
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Figure 1.2: Stuck at the Bottom
happened.”79
1.2.2 The Voice Option
Hirschman suggests that the power of the consumer is “usually believed to origi-
nate in the fact that he can take his business elsewhere and can thus ‘punish’ the
firm which does not pay heed to his preferences.” This same notion is reflected
in the belief that the power of the foreign investor originates in his ability to take
his investment elsewhere. But Hirschman goes on to suggest that “another kind of
79Mabey and McNally 1998, at 40, emphasis added.
Investor Strategies to Deal with Conflicts with the Host State 19
power resides in the consumer who cannot take his business elsewhere and who
has therefore the maximum incentive to cajole, threaten, and otherwise induce the
firm to pay attention to his needs and tastes.” 80
Exit is not always a viable option for investors, particularly for those who
have large ‘sunk costs’ and therefore cannot pick up and leave a jurisdiction with-
out considerable loss.81 Furthermore, investors may have several projects in a
country (and only be in conflict in respect of one) or may have an interest in future
investment opportunities, which would be ruled out by a strategy of exit. For these
investors, the strategy of voice may be more attractive. However, as Hirschman
notes, voice can be costly; time and money must be spent to achieve change in the
firm or organization (in this case the organization being the state).82 Voice is also
conditioned on the influence and bargaining power of the customer or member,
or in this case the investor, that is utilizing it.83 Finally, Hirschman also remarks
that the successful employment of voice depends to some extent on the “invention
of such institutions and mechanisms as can communicate complaints cheaply and
effectively.”84
The fact that foreign investors lack formal political representation (i.e. they
cannot vote in host states) is sometimes equated with an absence of voice.85 How-
ever, this argument is based on a much narrower conception of voice than that
applied in this study. Here it is suggested that investors faced with a conflict with
the host state have several voice options. An investor may, for example: lobby
or negotiate directly with the government; delegate resolution of the conflict to a
third party; utilize reputation and shame sanctions86; enlist the assistance of its
home state; and/or threaten to exit or to utilize one of the measures listed above.
Within the category of delegation to a third party, the investor may have several
choices. Depending on the circumstances, an investor could litigate (i.e. pursue
a case in the local courts of the host state or in foreign courts), arbitrate (in in-
80Hirschman 1970, at 65-66.
81Newcombe 2007b, at 439-40; Murphy 2004, at 88.
82Hirschman 1970, at 39.
83Ibid., at 40.
84Ibid., at 43, emphasis added.
85Newcombe 2007b, at 439.
86Ginsburg 2005, at 107.
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ternational investment arbitration), or instead seek to resolve the conflict through
conciliation or mediation mechanisms. It is the use of, or the threat to use, inter-
national investment arbitration that is the focus of this study. There are no claims
made about the number of conflicts resolved through the other mechanisms, or the
relative merits of the different fora available to investors.
Investment Arbitration and the Threat to Arbitrate
When an investor opts to delegate responsibility for the resolution of a conflict to
an arbitral tribunal it is not clear that this is, in every case, an expression of voice
in the sense that Hirschman meant (i.e. that the purpose is to change an objec-
tionable state of affairs). If the objectionable state of affairs relates to the higher
cost of operations under a new environmental policy, then seeking compensation
through arbitration is consistent with Hirschman’s notion of voice. However, if
the objectionable state of affairs is the complete destruction of the viability of an
investment, then the change that investors would be seeking is a reversal of, or
exemption from, the culpable policy. As arbitral tribunals are wary of awarding
restitution (see Section 4.2.2), such an outcome is unlikely to occur unless a state
opts to settle before (or after) the issuing of an award. In this type of situation,
recourse to arbitration will most likely be employed to facilitate exit by allowing
the investor to recoup sunk costs. In fact, it has been suggested that in most cases
arbitration is only employed by investors who wish to exit the state’s jurisdiction.
As Otto and Cordes note, “[r]esort to contested arbitration or litigation is a high
risk, high cost option,” therefore this option is often “reserved only for the most
serious situations where investors had little else to lose.”87
In cases where the investor is more interested in retaining relations with the
state in question than with recouping material losses, negotiation is a more likely
strategy, at least at the outset. Wells and Ahmed suggest, in their study on Indone-
sia, that investors interested in retaining or exploring investment opportunities
anywhere in the developing world (i.e. not just in the host state) might favour
negotiation over arbitration, while those that viewed their venture into the Third
World as a mistake, would “collect what they could and run.”88 However, while
87Otto and Cordes 2002, at V-16.
88Wells and Ahmed 2007, at 10.
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the use of arbitration and the decision to exit are closely connected, investors who
do not aim to exit may still adopt an arbitration strategy when they are convinced
that negotiation is unlikely to produce an acceptable outcome.89
In contrast to arbitration, which is risky and costly for investors, the threat of
arbitration is cheap, does not lead to exit from the jurisdiction, and is nevertheless
a potentially potent use of voice. Otto and Cordes suggest that arbitration may
be used as “an offensive weapon to harass or intimidate,”90 and Peterson notes
that “practicing lawyers do admit that they hear rumours of investors applying
informal pressure upon host states while brandishing an investment treaty as a
potential legal stick.”91 Even Wa¨lde, a strong advocate of investment arbitration
and sometime arbitrator, has noted that due to the high risks of litigation (for
investors), “[t]he impact of the arbitration clause is ... less in its actual use, as in
its implicit threat to both parties.”92 Significantly, unlike an arbitral award which
will generally only require a state to compensate an investor, a threat of arbitration
can lead to the reversal of environmental policies or regulatory chill.
Regulatory Chill
As noted above, the regulatory chill hypothesis suggests that states fear raising
standards because it may deter new investment or result in industrial flight. Hence,
the hypothesis is based on the implicit threat of exit (or non-entry), and possibly
also encompasses the explicit threat of exit.93 This traditional notion of regulatory
chill can be extended even further to include the fear that states have of breaching
commitments in state contracts and IIAs.94 This fear may be based on a concern
about the direct cost of arbitration, and/or the potentially negative impact that
89Ibid., at 270.
90Otto and Cordes 2002, at V-34.
91Peterson 2004, at 139
92Wa¨lde 1998a.
93Hirschman 1970, at 82, notes that “[t]he chances for voice to function effectively as a recuperation
mechanism are appreciably strengthened if voice is backed up by the threat of exit, whether it is
made openly or whether the possibility of exit is merely well understood to be an element in the
situation by all concerned.”
94UNCTAD 2005c, at 43; Cosbey et al. 2004; Gray 2002, at 311; Mann 2001, at 34; Neumayer
2001a, at 87.
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resort to arbitration will have on the country’s reputation, particularly amongst
prospective investors. As with the threat of exit, the threat of arbitration may be
implicit or explicit.
Some observers question the logic of applying the regulatory chill hypothesis
to investment arbitration. Coe and Rubins, for example, point out that the hy-
pothesis makes assumptions about the level of awareness that regulators have on
issues of international law, which they suggest is likely to be limited.95 The ar-
gument is that if regulators are not aware of the ramifications of their actions, it
will not be possible for their behaviour to be affected. While Coe and Rubins are
correct in assuming that many environmental regulators would be unaware of the
commitments made in IIAs and state contracts (as these agreements are generally
negotiated by separate ministries), this argument ignores the fact that regulators
can be made aware of the relevant points of international investment law by in-
vestors and their lawyers when it is in their interests to do so. In fact, a lack of
knowledge about the specificities of investment law makes the threat of arbitration
all the more potent, because regulators will be less likely to recognize when an
investor is bluffing.
Another aspect of the regulatory chill hypothesis that Coe and Rubins critique
is the notion that concerns about compensation will prevent states from producing
or enforcing regulation:
While the apprehension of international liability may prompt reflection and
careful tailoring of means to ends, it seems less likely to cause abandonment
of legislation at the heart of a government’s mandate. Indeed, to the extent
a government has the machinery to defend such claims, it might well expect
victory, since expropriation claims often fail.96
This statement seems to have been written with developed countries in mind; these
countries would have little difficulty in making compensation payments, and cer-
tainly possess the ‘machinery’ to defend claims. However, it is a different story for
developing countries. Although threats of investment arbitration have occurred in
developed states97 such threats are likely to be a much greater problem in devel-
oping countries where there is less willingness to devote scare resources to engage
95Coe and Rubins 2005, at 599.
96Ibid., emphasis added.
97E.g., Schneiderman 2001, at 524, claims that the Government of Canada has received threats to
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in arbitration.98 Furthermore, the statement that a government “might well expect
victory” assumes an awareness of the international jurisprudence, which is in con-
tradiction to the earlier statement that regulators will most likely be unaware of
the nuances of international law. This statement also fails to acknowledge that
the jurisprudence in the area is small and inconsistent, and this creates uncertainty
rather than the confidence implied by the authors (see further Chapters 4 and 5).
As with the traditional notion of regulatory chill, empirical evidence of this
particular variant of the hypothesis is difficult to collect. In this study, a significant
amount of attention is given to investor threats to arbitrate. While the cases that are
analyzed neither definitively prove nor disprove the regulatory chill hypothesis,
they do contribute significantly to this emerging area of inquiry.
1.3 Research Question and Methodology
Environmental governance can be defined as “the resolution of environmental con-
flicts through the establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutional arrange-
ments, which may either facilitate or limit the use of environmental resources.”99
Significant developments in global environmental governance have occurred in
recent years, but binding rules on corporate conduct have not yet emerged (see
Section 2.2). Host states, with varying capacities in monitoring and enforcement,
are therefore responsible for regulating foreign investment to ensure that sustain-
able development goals are met and the environment is protected. However, when
domestic regulation negatively impacts an investment, conflicts between a foreign
investor and the host state may emerge. When investors threaten to initiate arbitra-
tion proceedings to resolve these conflicts, governments may respond by rolling
back or failing to enforce regulation. When arbitration is initiated, tribunals may
decide that host states must compensate investors for regulatory actions, which
in turn can have long-term implications for environmental governance. Hence,
while there is the potential for IIAs and state contracts to contribute to sustainable
arbitrate from investors in relation to a public auto insurance plan, proposals on cigarette packaging,
and the cancellation of plans to privatize an airport. See also Section 5.1.1.
98Romano 2002, at 552.
99Adger et al., qtd. in Paterson et al. 2003, at 3.
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development, by promoting FDI flows to developing countries, there is also the
possibility that, in reducing domestic policy space or instigating regulatory chill,
IIAs will hinder progress to a more sustainable world.
Against this backdrop, the overarching question to be addressed in this study
is:
What implications does the protection of foreign investment through
international investment agreements and state contracts have for
environmental governance, particularly in developing countries?
This research question is clearly closely related to broader discussions about
neoliberal globalization and state sovereignty. Sørensen provides a distinction
between three central standpoints on the role of the state in the context of global-
ization: the ‘retreat of the state’ view; the ‘state-centric’ view and the ‘transfor-
mationalist’ view.100
Those identifying a retreat of the state see the changes taking place within the
global system as a threat to the power and authority of the state.101 It is argued
that, in order to compete for investment and trade in an increasingly open and inte-
grated global economic system, governments pursue policies that favour corporate
interests rather than social welfare. Furthermore, it is suggested that globalization
has led to an increase in the authority and power of international institutions, an
erosion of the distinction between the domestic and international spheres, and the
emergence of a transnational civil society; all of which, in the view of retreatists,
indicate a decline in state power.102 Retreatists can come from both ends of the
ideological spectrum; while neoliberals view globalization as normatively good
and the emergence of a scaled-back state as a positive development, Marxists ex-
press grave concerns over the loss of state authority. What these scholars share is
a depiction of a triumph of global markets and institutions over the state.103
Those identifying with a state-centric view are highly skeptical of these argu-
ments. These scholars have mainly relied on quantitative data to show that the
reach of globalization is far more limited than retreatists would suggest. Some
100Sørensen 2004; 2006.
101See, e.g., Strange 1996.
102Weiss 2003a, at 8.
103Phillips 2005, at 92.
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even suggest that globalization is a ‘myth’ and that states are actually guarding
and building up power and authority in many policy areas, particularly in areas of
‘high politics’ such as security.104
Scholarship in both of these schools has been subject to criticism. Weiss ar-
gues that the retreat school holds a negative-sum conception of power that is in-
appropriate in modern times.105 Similarly, Phillips argues that:
... a focus on the putative decline of states is premised on a misplaced con-
cern with the degree of state intervention rather than the type of intervention
and the nature of the active strategies pursued by states. The appropriate
question is not how much ‘stateness’ exists but rather what sorts of state-
ness emerge as a result of the variegated impact of globalization.106
As for the state-centrics, Weiss argues that their focus on proving that globaliza-
tion is limited or non-existent only serves to endorse the “win-lose premise that
‘more globalisation must equal less scope for state capacity’.”107
The transformationalist school, which arguably is where most scholars would
now situate themselves, finds a middle-ground between state-retreat and state-
centric perspectives, and is perhaps most succinctly captured by Cerny’s statement
that “[t]he nation-state, of course, is not dead, but its role has changed.”108 Schol-
ars identifying with this view suggest that in some areas states are losing authority
while in other areas they retain, or are increasing, their authority. Transformation-
alists acknowledge the continuing importance of the state, but also recognize that
it has changed and continues to change as an institution, and that new actors and
institutions have emerged that challenge the dominance of the state in the global
political system.109
There are a wide range of theoretical approaches adopted by scholars taking
a transformationalist view of globalization. This study draws heavily on the work
of neo-Gramscians (see Chapter 3). While neo-Gramscians share with Marxists
104See, e.g., Rugman 2001.
105Weiss 2003a, at 10.
106Phillips 2005, at 85, emphasis added.
107Weiss 2003a, at 14.
108Cerny 1997, at 251.
109Lipschutz and Fogel 2002, at 118.
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a concern about the increasing power of corporations and global economic in-
stitutions, they do not view states as in retreat. Rather, states are required to do
more in certain areas (such as investment protection) and potentially less in others.
Furthermore, they view the impacts of globalization as uneven and recognize the
potential for structural change.
While the transformationalist view is adopted by a broad range of scholars, the
literature remains remarkably limited to examinations of the effects of globaliza-
tion on a small group of advanced industrialized states.110 Even neo-Gramscian
studies of globalization often remain at the macro level or focus on Europe and
North America. While, in this study, macro level theory is helpful in the criti-
cal assessment of the overarching institution of investment protection (see Section
3.2), other mid-level theories and empirical research are required to show the con-
nections between this institution and political outcomes. This is particularly the
case given the special focus on developing countries.
1.3.1 A Focus on Developing Countries
As noted above, the vast majority of studies on the impacts of globalization on
the state focus on developed countries. Similarly, the bulk of research on the re-
lationship between investment protection and environmental protection addresses
investor-state disputes arising under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) (see section 2.1.3), and much of the concern in both governmental
and non-governmental circles has been on the implications of this agreement for
Canada and the US. This is understandable, in some respects, because most of the
investor-state disputes relating to the environment have been brought under the
NAFTA and because there is far more information available about these cases as a
result of a greater degree of transparency in NAFTA arbitrations (see Section 7.1).
However, there is an increasing number of disputes in developing countries which
have not been extensively researched, and there are quite a number of instances of
threats of arbitration in these countries that have been completely neglected in the
academic literature. This clear gap in research alone would be sufficient justifica-
tion for a special focus on developing countries in this study. However, there are
110Sørensen 2004: 172.
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several further arguments worth mentioning.
To begin with, the vast majority of IIAs are signed by countries in the Global
South, and yet these countries are often poorly prepared to negotiate international
agreements.111 However difficult it is for developing countries to negotiate fair
deals in the multilateral sphere, it is arguably even harder for them to negotiate
fair deals on a bilateral basis.112 Jose E. Alvarez, a former member of the Amer-
ican State Department BIT negotiating team and now a Columbia University law
professor, claims that for many countries “a BIT relationship is hardly a volun-
tary, uncoerced transaction” and that “to date the American model BIT has been
regarded as, generally-speaking, a take it or leave it proposition, with the United
States calling the shots and the BIT partner as supplicant.”113
In addition to signing more agreements, developing countries are often the
only parties with real obligations under IIAs. In theory, inter-state investment
agreements are reciprocal in that they require each state party to protect the in-
vestors of each other state party when they are operating within their territory.
However, this theoretical reciprocity is not sustained in practice. This is because
in the majority of investment agreements, state parties are asymmetrically related
in terms of investment flows; that is, one state in the relationship exports capital,
while the other(s) import capital. This is the case whether the agreement is be-
tween a developed country and one or more developing countries or economies in
transition, as is the case in that majority of agreements, or if it is between two or
more transition/developing economies. Instances of agreements between capital-
exporting states are rare, and developed countries are not frequently exposed to
investor claims.114 Given the broad range of variation in economic power amongst
developing economies, it is not surprising that there is also inequality in so-called
‘South-South’ agreements.115
The asymmetry between states is reflected in an evaluation of the claimants
and respondents in the investment arbitration cases initiated to date. As of 2005,
111For example, Gupta 2007 discusses the challenges that developing countries face in the negotiations
in the climate change regime.
112Gupta 2006.
113Qtd. in Garcia 2004, at 316.
114Van Harten 2007a, at 40.
115Bubb and Rose-Ackerman 2007, at 300; UNCTAD 2007b, at 1.
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there were only 11 known instances where developing nation firms had filed in-
vestment treaty claims.116 Of the 27 claims filed under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA
as of the start of 2007, none had been filed by an investor from NAFTA’s one
developing country member, Mexico.117 As of early 2007, 74% of the concluded
and pending cases filed under one set of arbitral rules were against ‘middle-income
developing countries,’ and another 19% against ‘low-income developing coun-
tries.’118 A mere 1.4% of cases had been filed against G-8 countries.119 Van
Harten suggests that middle-income states are particularly suseptible to claims be-
cause they are big enough to host substantial investments but not powerful enough
to refuse to conclude investment treaties in the first place.120 However, it is impor-
tant also to consider that low-income countries may have faced many threats of
arbitration that are not captured by these statistics because the governments chose
to settle, rather than risk losing an arbitration. In any event, it is clear that devel-
oping countries face the vast majority of claims. The United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) predicts that in the near future the number
of disputes will continue to rise and that developing countries “are likely to bear
the brunt” of this increase.121
The system of international investment arbitration may also be structured in
such a way that developing countries are more likely to be penalized.122 It has
often been argued that weak states will support legalism over power politics, but
as Hurrell suggests: “[w]hile it is certainly true that the international legal or-
der provides many power-leveling possibilities for weaker states, it is also true
that power influences the character of that legal order.”123 Additionally, capacity
is recognized as a central factor in the implementation of international commit-
ments.124 Kahler argues that “[d]eveloping countries often lack highly developed
116See UNCTAD 2005b, at 4.
117Chung 2007, at 956.
118Anderson and Grusky 2007, at ix.
119All of which were filed against the US under the NAFTA. Cases against Canada under the NAFTA
have been filed in another set of arbitral rules.
120Van Harten 2007a, at 33-4.
121UNCTAD 2005b, at 9.
122For an extensive discussion of this issue see Shalakany 2006.
123Hurell 2005, at 41.
124VanDeveer 2005, at 95.
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legal systems and the resources that accrue to such systems,” which in turn af-
fects their approach to legalized systems of dispute settlement such as investment
arbitration.125
Finally, because of economic and political factors, the experiences of devel-
oping countries in dealing with investment protection will be very different from
those of their more developed counterparts. Phillips argues that:
The implications of globalization look very different in regions such as sub-
Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, or Eastern and Central Europe, among many
others, where foreign capital occupies a very different place in economic de-
velopment processes, issues of credibility and competitiveness present much
greater challenges, and other constraining conditions are put in place by the
much greater prominence of multilateral agents such as the IMF and World
Bank.126
Developing countries are more desperate to attract FDI and are dependent on aid
and trade relationships with the home states of investors. These factors influence
how developing countries will perceive their options when faced with a conflict
with a foreign investor.
In sum, developing countries have more commitments to protect investors,
they have different perceptions about the world order based on economic and po-
litical realities, and they have different capacities to deal with investment arbitra-
tion. As such, it is not possible to simply transfer the experiences of developed
countries, or the theories which develop out of those experiences, to the context
of the developing world. Neither is it acceptable to ignore the particular experi-
ences of these countries. If any further justification were needed, this special focus
is also warranted by the importance of protecting the environment in developing
countries and the significant role that FDI could potentially play in sustainable
development.
1.3.2 A Focus on Investor-State Conflicts
The empirical part of this study is concerned with the role that international ar-
bitration plays in the outcome of conflicts between investors and states that are
125Kahler 2000, at 666.
126Phillips 2005, at 107-8.
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related to the environment. This issue is addressed through a number of case
studies. The aim of the case studies is to assess how a conflict is interpreted by
members of the community (investors, states, tribunal members, NGOs, etc.) as
well as the communicative action that the conflict gives rise to, such as reproaches,
excuses, justifications, etc.127
Identifying when a conflict between an investor and a state is related to the
environment is a complicated matter. If one were to define conflict at a normative
level, one would require precise definitions of the norms relevant to investment
protection and to environmental protection in order to identify when these norms
are in conflict. However, the norms of both investment protection and of environ-
mental protection are notoriously vague and require case-by-case interpretation
(see Chapter 4). As such, defining a conflict as environmentally relevant on a
normative basis is problematic.
To simplify matters, in this study a definition is adopted which establishes that
a conflict between an investor and a state pertains to the environment when one
or both of the actors subject to the conflict individually or collectively identifies
it as relating to both an environmental issue and to a state contract or an IIA. To
be clear, this definition does not require that both parties agree that the conflict
is related to an environmental issue or to a state contract/IIA. For instance a gov-
ernment could argue that a measure was introduced for the purpose of protecting
the environment, whereas an investor might conversely claim that the government
was only using environmental concern as a cover for protectionism. At the same
time, a government might argue that a state contract or an IIA is not applicable to
the investment in question, while the investor maintains that it is. The arguments
of investors and governments will be considered in the analysis of the conflicts
studied, but it simplifies matters to keep the definition rather broad at the outset.
It should also be emphasized that the focus in this study is on the outcome of
conflicts between investors and states. The impact of these conflicts is a differ-
ent matter. It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the long term effect of
a given outcome on the development of environmental policy, particularly given
that the cases discussed have either been resolved very recently, or are in fact still
pending resolution. Moreover, there are no claims as to the actual impact on the
127Hasenclever et al. 1997, at 16; Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, at 768.
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environment itself. It is a basic assumption made in this study that the progressive
development of environmental policy is necessary to achieve environmental pro-
tection; however, it cannot be assumed that, in the absence of a conflict, a given
policy would have resulted in the attainment of a specific environmental goal.
First-Order and Second-Order Cases
Further differentiation is made in this study between conflicts that are resolved
directly through international arbitration and those resolved in the shadow of in-
ternational arbitration.
A conflict that enters into an arbitration process is typically referred to in the
literature as an investor-state dispute. The outcome of an investor-state dispute
is generally an arbitral award. However, it is also possible for the parties to a
dispute to choose to settle before (or even after) an award has been issued. In-
stead of separating negotiated outcomes from arbitrated outcomes, the outcome
of investor-state disputes proper are termed first-order. These outcomes directly
involve the decisions of arbitral tribunals.
In first-order cases, the main methodology is content analysis of the legal ma-
terials of the arbitration proceedings (e.g., notices of arbitration, statements of
claim and defence, and tribunal decisions and awards) combined with a survey
of the literature, and supplemented by ‘grey’ material (newspaper articles, reports
and websites of governments, international organizations, and NGOs, etc.). The
choice of first-order cases was based on the following criteria:
• the conflict pertained to the environment (see explanation above);
• arbitral awards were made on the jurisdiction, and possibly on the merits of
the case; and
• arbitral awards were made publicly available.
Second-order cases are those where an investor publicly invoked a claim of a
breach of an investment agreement or contract or where a government made pub-
lic that it had been threatened with arbitration, but that were not resolved through
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arbitration.128 The threat must be publicized for the simple reason that, otherwise,
it would not be knowable at the stage of case selection. For this reason, no argu-
ments are made about the number or frequency of cases in which investors make
such a threat but subsequently resolve the conflict outside of arbitration; it is quite
likely that there are far more than are assessed in this study. Furthermore, nothing
can be stated about the importance of a purely implicit threat of arbitration. It is
also acknowledged that by choosing only publicly-known cases, the study is po-
tentially biased toward an examination of conflicts involving large TNCs which,
in general, receive more attention from the press. It should also be noted that only
those cases for which a reasonable amount of information, in English, could be
collected (i.e. more than one or two reports identifying a conflict) were chosen.
While the first-order cases only relate to conflicts over policy, two of the
second-order cases relate to conflicts over domestic court proceedings. Although,
in the latter category, it is the actions of domestic courts rather than governments
that are the source of conflict, it should be emphasized that only the national gov-
ernment can be held liable under IIAs and state contracts. Finally, it should be
noted that an exclusive focus was given to second-order cases in developing coun-
tries. In summary, the criteria for the selection of the second-order cases were:
• the conflict was between a foreign investor and a developing country gov-
ernment;
• the conflict pertained to the environment;
• no tribunal decision was made on the jurisdiction or the merits of the case;
and
• sufficient information on the case was publicly available.
Second-order cases can be further divided into field-cases and desk-cases. In
the two field-cases, in Indonesia and Ghana, a survey of the literature and grey
material is complemented by stakeholder interviews. These interviews were con-
ducted in May/June (Ghana) and July/August (Indonesia) of 2005. Interviewees
128The majority of the cases assessed were resolved through negotiation, though in one case the matter
was resolved in a foreign court.
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in the government, academic, non-governmental, and private sectors were con-
tacted using the ‘snowball’ method.129 First, relevant individuals were identified
based on the survey of the literature and grey material. Second, each interviewee
was asked to suggest further relevant individuals for interview. The interviews
were semi-structured; questions were open-ended to encourage discussion and to
avoid leading the interviewee.130 The average interview lasted one hour, and was
conducted upon the condition of anonymity. All interviews referred to in the text,
therefore, are accredited only to the ‘type’ of interviewee, with reference to the
date and location of the interview. Desk-cases are structured in the same manner
as field-cases, but they rely only on literature and grey material, not interviews.
In order to minimize bias in the second-order cases, multiple sources are
drawn upon and information is triangulated.131 Furthermore, in an attempt to
differentiate between the influence of the threat of arbitration and “background
noise of general political developments, ranging from the activities of other ac-
tors to more generic factors that influence behavioural changes, such as eco-
nomic changes, elections, or some form of crisis,”132 counterfactual analysis is
employed.
1.4 Summary and Overview
This chapter has introduced the complex relationship that exists between foreign
investment and sustainable development. It has been suggested that as environ-
mental regulation becomes more stringent, and thereby more costly for investors,
conflicts between investors and host states are likely to emerge. When a conflict
develops an investor may choose to exit the state’s jurisdiction. The issue of indus-
trial flight and the associated pollution havens hypothesis have been extensively
studied in the literature. However, an investor may alternatively choose to exer-
cise voice, that is to attempt to change rather than escape from the objectionable
state of affairs that has arisen. In such cases, arbitration, or the threat of arbitra-
129Minichiello et al. 1990.
130Yin 2003, at 90.
131Ibid., at 97.
132Biermann and Bauer 2004, at 191.
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tion, may be employed. One potential implication is that governments that fear
a costly arbitration will rollback or fail to develop and implement environmen-
tal policy (regulatory chill). This study aims to assess this hypothesis, as well as
to explore other possible implications of investment protection for environmental
governance.
The next chapter provides a more detailed description of the historical context
in which this study is situated. It covers the evolution of both the international ef-
forts to provide protection for foreign investors and those aimed at environmental
protection over the last century.
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical framework employed in this study. The
chapter outlines a variety of conventional and unconventional approaches in in-
ternational relations scholarship and explains why a critical approach that draws
primarily on neo-Gramscian theory was chosen to guide the research. A key con-
cept - the institution of investment protection - is defined in Chapter 3, and neo-
Gramscian theory is applied in a critical assessment of this institution.
In Chapter 4, the key norms and rules of investment protection that are relevant
to the protection of the environment are discussed and analyzed. The chapter
first explores in detail the key regulative rules covering national treatment, most-
favoured-nation treatment, the international minimum standard/fair and equitable
treatment, expropriation, performance requirements, stability of host country law,
and observance of obligations (umbrella clauses). It then examines the procedural
norms and rules of investment arbitration, including the selection of arbitrators,
conduct of proceedings, and the production, annulment, and review of awards.
Chapter 5 delves into the complexities of actual cases that have been resolved
in investment arbitration (first-order outcomes). The disputes that are reviewed
cover a wide range of regulatory actions and several different environmental issues
(e.g., hazardous waste, biodiversity, air/water pollution). Cases from developed
countries (Canada and the US) are discussed, as are cases from the developing
world (Peru, Costa Rica, and Mexico).
Chapter 6 provides a detailed examination of investor-state conflicts that were
resolved without recourse to arbitration, but where the existence of investment
protection nevertheless played an important role (second-order outcomes). Con-
flicts between investors and host states over both environmental regulation (in
Ghana, Indonesia, and Costa Rica) and domestic court proceedings on environ-
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mental matters (in Indonesia and Ecuador) are examined.
Chapter 7 addresses new developments in the field of investment law and ar-
bitration practice. The substantial increase in the use of investment arbitration
has led to greater scrutiny of the regulative and procedural norms and rules of
investment protection and, in some cases, to a re-evaluation of the purpose and
function of these norms and rules. States, arbitral supervisory bodies, arbitrators,
and NGOs have all played a role in bringing about change. This chapter reviews
these new developments as well as several proposals for further reform.
Chapter 8 provides the main conclusions of the study as well as policy rec-
ommendations, reflections on neo-Gramscian theory, and suggestions for areas in
need of further research.
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Historical Context 2
This chapter concisely traces the history of the efforts to date at the international
level both to protect foreign investors and to regulate foreign investment with a
view to the protection of the environment. The histories are divided into three
periods: the colonial period (pre-1945), the post-colonial period (1945-1980), and
the modern period (1980-present).
2.1 A Brief History of Foreign Investment Protection
2.1.1 The Colonial Period: Pre-1945
With the exception of the Dutch, who directly invested in various commercial
projects throughout Europe as early as the 17th century, prior to the 1800s most
countries were deterred from participating in FDI by the limitations of travel and
communication.1 The Industrial Revolution changed all of this. Significant cap-
ital surpluses were produced which fueled demand for the development of large
manufacturing and transportation enterprises, thus requiring and facilitating more
investment. However, the majority of this early investment was portfolio and not
1Vandevelde 1998b, at 376.
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direct investment, and was confined mainly within Europe and North America.2
This changed in the colonial period when the colonies became a major source of
the raw materials required to propel Western industrialization.
In the colonial period there was little need for the development of an interna-
tional law for the protection of foreign investment, as in many developing coun-
tries the colonial legal systems were integrated into those of the imperial powers,
and in areas that remained uncolonized the use of ‘gun-boat diplomacy’ was con-
sidered an acceptable means of protecting foreign interests abroad.3 However,
that is not to say that no concepts of appropriate treatment of foreign investors
had emerged prior to decolonization. The first Friendship Commerce and Naviga-
tion (FCN) Treaty4 (a precursor to modern IIAs) was signed between the US and
France in 1778.5 Several attempts to formulate a broader investment protection
regime were also made in the first half of the 20th century.6 Furthermore, there
were several critical developments which occurred in the specific context of re-
lations between the US and several Latin American countries which had already
gained independence.
The Calvo Doctrine and the Hull Formula
Historically, the direct taking of foreign property was one of the most significant
risks to foreign investment and usually came in the form of what is termed ‘nation-
2Ibid., at 376-7.
3Sornarajah 2004a, at 19-20; Lipson 1985, at 12.
4The American FCN treaties were primarily aimed at promoting trade, but often included investor
protections such as prohibitions on expropriation without compensation. The FCN program wound
down in the 1960s with the emergence of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See
further Guzman 1998, at 653.
5Mosoti 2005, at 108.
6Muchlinski 1999, notes the following examples: in 1929, the League of Nations held a conference
with the aim of developing an international convention on the treatment of foreigners and foreign
enterprises; in 1930, the Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law covered the
topic of state responsibility for damages caused to foreigners and their property; and in 1931 the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) launched a campaign to develop a convention on the
topic, and followed up with a draft code for the Fair Treatment of Foreign Investments in 1949. All
of these initiatives failed as a result of a lack of consensus among states. See also Van Harten 2007a,
ch. 2.
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alization’. Nationalization involves the host government performing an outright
taking of property in all economic sectors or on an industry-specific basis. In con-
trast to nationalization, ‘expropriation’ involves takings targeted at specific prop-
erties and enterprises. Capital-exporting states have long supported the notion that
there is a requirement under customary international law that a state compensate a
foreign investor whose property is expropriated or nationalized. They have further
argued that there is an international minimum standard of treatment that should be
applied to aliens even when the treatment of nationals falls below this standard.
One of the first major nationalizations in the 20th century occurred in the
Soviet Union following the Communist Revolution. Contrary to the Western view,
the Bolshevik government took the position that international law can impose no
requirement on the host state to compensate a foreign investor for expropriation
and that only the national law of the host state is relevant.7
However, it was not only socialism which challenged the dominant view on the
international minimum standard and compensation for expropriation.8 Economic
nationalism was the ideological underpinning of one of the most famous dissents
from these norms, formulated by Carlos Calvo, a distinguished jurist from Ar-
gentina, who declared in 1896 that, “[t]he responsibility of Governments towards
foreigners cannot be greater than that which these Governments have towards their
own citizens.”9 The Calvo doctrine thus rejected the notion that special interna-
tional law norms apply to the treatment of foreign nationals by a host state. It
furthermore rejected the right of home states to exercise diplomatic protection of
their nationals abroad, and challenged the very basis of international tribunals.10
Calvo clauses appeared in a number of constitutions in newly independent
Latin American states. Lipson points out that the Mexican Constitution (1917),
for example, “contained strict, and unprecedented, restraints on foreign corpora-
tions ... guaranteed free land to every landless peasant and allowed the govern-
ment to carry out expropriation at any time for the nation’s welfare.”11 It was not
until 1938 that the provisions of the Constitution were applied in practice when
7Vandevelde 1998b, at 380-1.
8Muchlinski 2001, at 117; 1999, at 48-9.
9Qtd. in Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) 2003b, at 1.
10Vandevelde 1998, at 380; Lipson 1985, at 18-9.
11Lipson 1985, at 18-9.
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the Mexican government announced that it would expropriate the property of sev-
eral American and British oil companies operating in Mexico (as well as several
agrarian properties). Both the US and the United Kingdom (UK) protested this
action, and the British went so far as to suspend diplomatic relations with Mexico.
The Americans recognized the right of the Mexican government to expropriate
property within its territory, but demanded that the companies be compensated
for their lost investment. A famous exchange of notes occurred between the the
American Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his Mexican counterpart, the Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs Eduardo Hay, and the Mexican Ambassador in Washington.
These notes were illustrative of the divide between the two countries, and more
broadly between capital-exporting and capital-importing states, on the issue of ap-
propriate treatment of foreign investors. In a note of 3 April 1940 to the Mexican
Ambassador in Washington, Hull articulated what would become known as the
Hull formula for compensation:
The Government of the US readily recognizes the right of a sovereign state
to expropriate property for public purposes. This view has been stated in a
number of communications addressed to your government during the past
two years ... On each occasion, however, it has been stated with equal em-
phasis that the right to expropriate property is coupled with and conditioned
on the obligation to make adequate, effective, and prompt compensation.
The legality of an expropriation is in fact dependent upon the observation of
this requirement.12
In summary, by the end of the colonial period there were three main views
expressed by states concerning the protection of foreign investors. Firstly, capital-
exporting states (whether following a liberal or economic nationalist policy) sup-
ported the notion of an international minimum standard of treatment, and the re-
quirement for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation (Hull formula). Sec-
ondly, socialist states, following Marxism, rejected the entire notion that inter-
national law protected foreign investment. Thirdly, the ‘Calvo states’ (developing
countries not under colonial rule, largely Latin American, and following economic
nationalism) argued that foreign investors were only entitled to the same treatment
as nationals.13 These three views would spread throughout the rest of the world
12Qtd. in Einhorn 1974, at 21, emphasis added.
13Vandevelde 1998, at 381.
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following the dissolution of the colonial empires.
2.1.2 The Post-Colonial Period: 1945-1980
A decade of expropriation in the newly socialist countries of Eastern Europe and
China followed the end of World War II, while as Vagts points out, “[i]n the mean-
time, the rest of the world remained fairly quiet.”14 The focus would shift to devel-
oping countries from 1950 onward as improvements in communication and trans-
portation facilitated FDI flows around the world. While notable expropriations
were occurring in Guatemala, Iran, Algeria, and Cuba, many economic national-
ist developing states actively sought FDI in this period under a strategy known as
import substitution industrialization, whereby they aimed to develop industries to
manufacture goods to displace imports.15
While in the 1950s many developing countries encouraged investment and
enacted investment codes, by the late 1960s many countries had become, as Akin-
sanya puts it, “more circumspect” about the value of FDI for development, leading
to further expropriations.16 The mean number of expropriations annually peaked
at 51 in the early 1970s.17 Gun-boat diplomacy was no longer a viable option
for capital-exporting states to protect property abroad. The focus then turned to
alternatives, mainly in the form of economic sanctions and the development of in-
ternational law. Developing countries also turned to international law to develop
their own position, largely in the UN General Assembly.
The Havana Charter
The Havana Charter, which laid the framework for the International Trade Or-
ganization (ITO) (intended to be the ‘third pillar’ of the Bretton Woods system),
included a provision on investment.18 The debates over the provision were heated,
14Vagts 1987, at 4.
15Vandevelde 1998b, at 381-2.
16Akinsanya 1980, at 2.
17Brewer and Young 1998, at 53.
18Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Final Act and Related Documents of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 21 November 1947-24 March 1948, Havana,
Cuba, UN Doc E/Conf. 2/78, at Art. 12.
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and Lipson argues that they “clearly demonstrated the lack of broad international
approval for traditional investment laws.”19 The final formulation of the article al-
lowed host countries significant leeway to determine investment policy, although
developing countries continued to view the provision as too lenient with respect
to TNCs.20 In any case, the Havana Charter never came into force as it was re-
peatedly rejected by the US Congress, in part because the investment provisions,
and the agreement as a whole, were viewed as a threat to the interests of American
corporations.21 Muchlinski suggests that:
The inclusion of a right of capital importing states to control the conditions
of foreign investment, and the absence of any unequivocal provision for
compensation in the case of expropriation, caused widespread opposition to
the Havana Charter among business interests and contributed to its demise.22
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which became the de facto
basis of international trade law, did not cover investment. Brewer and Young ar-
gue that the debate over investment in the ITO was significant for drawing the
lines of conflict between developed and developing countries over a series of is-
sues and for (temporarily) resolving the issue of whether international cooperation
on investment should be sought on a multilateral or bilateral basis, with the US
showing a clear preference for the latter.23
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
The notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources first emerged in the
1950s, and has since been “one of the most frequently employed legal precepts
in the debate on the relations between host States and transnational companies.”24
The concept was first elucidated in UN Resolution 626 (VII) of 21 December
1952 on the Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources. The US voted
against this Resolution because it failed to indicate that states expropriating private
19Lipson 1985, at 87.
20Dattu 2000, at 288.
21Brewer and Young 1998, at 68.
22Muchlinski 1999, at 53.
23Brewer and Young 1998, at 68.
24Paasivirta 1989, at 339.
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property should recognize rights of foreign investors under international law.25
Nevertheless the Resolution passed and was later invoked by Guatemala when the
country expropriated the assets of Compania Agricola de Guatemala (a subsidiary
of the United Fruit Company) and also in the court decisions upholding the legality
of the Iranian expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.26
From the early 1960s to the mid 1970s, developing countries pushed through
a series of resolutions in the UN General Assembly in an effort to universalize the
Calvo doctrine and to affirm a position of sovereignty of nations with respect to
foreign investment and the exploitation of natural resources.27 This included the
1962 and 1973 Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,28
the 1974 Resolution on a New International Economic Order,29 and the 1974 Res-
olution on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS).30 These
Resolutions all focused on the rights of states to regulate investment in the man-
ner that they chose, to nationalize and expropriate foreign property, and to pay
‘appropriate’ compensation to investors.31
The Responses of Capital-Exporting States
There was a variety of responses from capital-exporting countries to the sweeping
nationalization programs in many developing countries and to the General As-
sembly Resolutions. In particular, economic sanctions were employed on several
occasions to pressure governments to provide compensation to affected compa-
nies. Sanctions were made in the areas of finance (e.g., suspension of bilateral
foreign aid programs, voting against loan applications in international financial in-
stitutions, blocking/freezing of assets) and trade (e.g., denial of preferential treat-
ment).32 However, as Akinsanya points out, the response was not uniform:
25Akinsanya 1980, at 49.
26Ibid., at 50.
27Guzman 1998, at 648.
28Res. 1803 and 3171.
29Res. 3201.
30Res. 3281.
31For a comprehensive discussion of these resolutions see Schrijver 1997.
32Akinsanya 1980, at 284.
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while expropriations of alien-owned investments in the banking, insurance,
and agricultural sectors do not generate much acrimony between the host
and aliens’ home governments, expropriations of mining and petroleum cor-
porations as well as telecommunications corporations generate heated con-
troversies that more often than not bring the aliens’ home governments to
the rescue of their nationals.33
Sanctions were particularly important in American policy, and the US was
also, of course, the preeminent economy at the time.34 In 1962, the US Congress
passed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, known as the Hickenlooper
Amendment (named after a Senator from Iowa). The Amendment stipulated that
in the event of an expropriation of an American investment, if the host state did
not take ‘appropriate steps’ to compensate the investor within six months, the US
President was required to cut off aid to that country.35 In 1963, the Amendment
was invoked against Sri Lanka (then Ceylon).36
This strategy was extended in 1965, when an amendment to the Act which
authorizes the US government to make contributions to the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank Fund for Special Operations required that the US government
vote against any loan to a country to which American assistance had been sus-
pended under the Hickenlooper Amendment. The Overseas Investment Corpora-
tion (OPIC)37 was also prohibited from insuring contracts in countries that were
not in compliance with the Amendment, and similar steps were taken to suspend
import quotas under the Sugar Act to any country that made expropriation with-
out compensation.38 Finally, the US also utilized its power within the World Bank
to withhold loans. For example, it abstained from voting on a loan to upgrade
Guyana’s sea defenses, because compensation talks between the government of
Guyana and an American mining company whose assets in the country had been
33Ibid., at 176.
34The US accounted for more than half of the world stock of FDI by the late 1960s. See Brewer and
Young 1998, at 87.
35Einhorn 1974, at 23.
36Brookens 1978, at 51.
37OPIC is a US government agency that provides financing and political risk insurance for US busi-
nesses investing abroad. See http://www.opic.gov.
38Brookens 1978, at 52; Einhorn 1974, at 24.
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expropriated had not “proceeded sufficiently.”39 Similar arguments were made
when the US failed to support loans to Bolivia, Iraq, and Peru in the early 1970s.40
While Lipson argues that the US sanction techniques were remarkably effec-
tive throughout the mid-1960s, in the long-run they were not an adequate solu-
tion to the problem.41 Realizing the limitations to economic sanctions, capital-
exporting states also sought to improve the protection of foreign investors through
international law. In the period when developing countries were collectively argu-
ing for permanent sovereignty over natural resources, they were simultaneously
agreeing under bilateral terms to more traditional/Western concepts of foreign in-
vestment protection. These bilateral agreements are discussed in Section 2.1.3.
Developed countries also pushed the theory of the ‘internationalization’ of
contracts. This theory was centered around two main issues: (i) what law should
govern contracts; and (ii) what forum disputes should be settled in. In terms of the
first issue - ‘choice of law’ - it was argued by proponents of internationalization
that contracts should be governed by ‘general principles of law’42 rather than the
domestic law of the host state. In terms of the second issue, proponents of interna-
tionalization argued that disputes should be convened in international arbitration
rather than in local courts. International arbitration, in contrast to domestic judi-
cial systems, is commonly framed in the literature as a neutral and depoliticized
forum for dispute resolution.43
Private sector interests in the US, the UK, and West Germany also initiated
their own efforts to push for a broad agreement on investment protection. In 1959,
investor organizations completed the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Invest-
ment Abroad.44 The Draft Convention was described as the ‘Magna Carta’ of
39Einhorn 1974, at 86.
40Brookens 1978, at 51.
41Lipson 1985, at 108.
42UNCTAD 2004b, at 6. Also referred to as ‘principles of law recognized by civilized nations’,
‘transnational law of business’, ‘lex mercatoria’, or simply ‘international law.’
43See Coe 2005, at 925, who notes that former Secretary General of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Disputes (ICSID), Ibrahim Shihata, described the key objective of the organization as
being to to depoliticize the resolution of investment disputes by providing access to a neutral forum
and precluding the involvement of home states. For other examples see: Legum 2006, at 526; Pryles
2005, at 419; Alvarez and Park 2003, at 369.
44Reproduced in UNCTAD 2000a, at 301.
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private investors, and it introduced the idea of investors directly pursuing claims
against states in international arbitration.45 The Convention was evaluated by the
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), now known as the
OECD, which led to the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property of 1962.46 While the OECD Draft Convention was never adopted due
to opposition from some countries, it was revised in 1967 and approved by the
Council of the OECD (with Turkey and Spain abstaining) as a model for bilateral
agreements adopted by Member States.47 An UNCTAD report remarks that the
importance of the OECD Draft Convention “rests mainly in the fact that, at a time
when most developing countries - and some developed countries too - were very
supportive of national controls over foreign direct investment, it placed emphasis
on the protection of foreign investments.”48
Finally, capital-exporting countries also made efforts to diminish the standing
of the UN General Assembly Resolutions. In this respect the CERDS was the
main target. The US Council of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
described the Charter as “the cutting edge of a threat to the well-being - and even
the existence - of foreign-owned private enterprise and to the security of foreign
investment in many countries.”49 The CERDS was denied legal authority and sta-
tus as customary international law by many capital-exporting countries.50 While
it was supported by a majority of states, it was not endorsed by any of the most im-
portant economies, which represent the bulk of outward international investment
flows.
2.1.3 The Modern Period: 1980-Present
The modern period marks a paradigm shift in attitudes and policies in developing
countries in terms of foreign investment. As Vandevelde remarks, “[n]o single
event accounts for the sudden reversal in investment policy and the emergence of
45Van Harten 2007a, at 20.
46OECD Doc. C(67)102, http://www.oecd.org. Reproduced in 7 ILM (1968), at 117.
47Muchlinski 2001, at 117-8.
48UNCTAD 1999a, at 8.
49Qtd. in Akinsanya 1980, at 66.
50Mosoti 2005, at 112.
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the contemporary consensus” on the benefits of FDI.51 However, many observers
suggest that the most significant factor was the debt crisis that erupted in 1982.52
As a result of the crisis, developing countries were desperate for foreign capital
and were finding financial aid and preferential loans increasingly scarce. Further-
more, their experience suggested that perhaps foreign investors were less likely to
interfere in their economies than were international and foreign lending organiza-
tions.53 In addition, financial institutions such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) also placed pressure on developing countries to open their
doors to investors, as did capital-exporting states.54
In the modern period, it can be said that the majority of developing countries
have sought to attract greater flows of FDI. At the same time, many developed
countries have also endeavored to increase their share of investment flows and
capital has become more mobile.55 These factors have resulted in competition
between states to attract investment.56 Governments compete for investment by
providing incentives, such as tax holidays, loan guarantees and cash grants, and
also by differentiating their legal jurisdictions from those of their competitors.57
In this latter sense, legal reform has become an important asset for developing
countries.58 As Van Harten points out, as states compete for investment “the bar
rises as to what qualifies as a hospitable investment climate,”59 which Guzman
describes as a “bidding up” of concessions to foreign investors.60
As a result of the shift in attitude and approach to investment in developing
countries, there have been extensive changes in the national laws of host states,
both in terms of the development of general investment codes and in terms of
the policies adopted in specific sectors. According to the 2005 World Investment
51Vandevelde 1998, at 386.
52Van Harten 2007a, at 42; Brooks et al. 2004, at 1; Sornarajah 2004b, at 210; Balasubramanyam
1999, at 36; Moran and Pearson 1990, at 29.
53Vandevelde 1998, at 389.
54Van Harten 2007a, at 42.
55Oman 2000, at 15-16.
56Ibid., and Chudnovsky and Lo´pez 2002, at 45.
57Encarnation and Wells 1985, at 48.
58Trubek et al. 1994, at 477.
59Van Harten 2007a, at 43.
60Guzman 1998, at 671-2.
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Report, 2,156 measures related to foreign investment were adopted by 102 de-
veloping countries between 1991 and 2004, the vast majority of which (93%)
were aimed at creating a more favourable environment for investors.61 Similarly,
around 120 countries reformed their mineral regimes between 1985 and 2002.62
These mineral reforms have generally aimed at liberalization as well as at estab-
lishing an investment climate based on stability and predictability.63
However, investment protection is limited when it is only enshrined in national
laws which can be modified at will. Furthermore, due to the perceived or real cor-
ruption of local courts in many countries, investors do not feel that they are a
neutral or fair forum for the resolution of disputes.64 In this view, therefore, inter-
national agreements and access to international arbitration are required to ensure
the protection of foreign investors, and thereby to facilitate flows of investment to
developing countries. This is the reasoning behind the push in the modern period
for the development of IIAs.
Regional Free Trade Agreements
While von Moltke argues that it is “a mistake to view foreign direct investment
simply as an adjunct to trade,” there are clear links between trade and investment
which some have used as justification for negotiating a multilateral agreement on
investment within the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see below).65 The inclu-
sion of investment provisions within regional free trade agreements (FTAs) is also
becoming increasingly common. The first FTA to contain significant protections
for foreign investors, including access to international arbitration, was the NAFTA
involving Canada, Mexico, and the US.66
61UNCTAD 2005d, at 26.
62Otto and Cordes 2002, at III-3.
63Bastida 2002.
64Peter 1995, at 328.
65von Moltke 2002a, at 347.
66North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Ottawa, Mexico, Washington. While it
is not directly relevant to this study, it is worth briefly mentioning the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a side agreement to the NAFTA enacted in 1993. The aim
of the agreement is to ensure that states effectively enforce their environmental laws and regulations
(essentially it is based on concerns about pollution havens - see Section 1.2.1). The Commission
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The NAFTA’s Chapter 11 on investment marks a significant milestone in in-
vestment law, despite the fact that the language of many of the provisions in the
agreement is essentially drawn, with relatively minor modifications, from BITs
that the US had concluded prior to 1993.67 It is nonetheless noteworthy, firstly,
because it marks what was and remains a rather rare occurrence - an investment
agreement involving more than one developed state. Secondly, investor-state dis-
pute settlement under Chapter 11 has been extensively employed by investors,
marking a new era of investment arbitration and arguably triggering the current
surge in disputes brought under other agreements.68 Despite the fact that the in-
vestment chapter was largely aimed at constraining Mexico,69 suits have been
brought by investors against all three signatory countries. Thirdly, the pleadings
in these suits were argued in ways not previously contemplated by governments,
and through NAFTA tribunal decisions the substantive content of investor rights
has arguably evolved and expanded. The public policy implications of invest-
ment agreements first became apparent in NAFTA disputes (see Chapter 5) and
the agreement has also become a focal point for debate on the ‘right to regulate’.
Since the conclusion of the NAFTA, several similar treaties have been ne-
gotiated which expand NAFTA-style investment protection to Central and South
America. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) was signed in
2004, by the US, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
When the Dominican Republic joined the group later in the year the acronym
was modified to CAFTA-DR.70 While the CAFTA-DR is viewed as an important
agreement, many see it as merely a stepping-stone for the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA), an agreement that would cover North, Central, and South
America, and the Caribbean (excluding only Cuba). The agreement was origi-
nally proposed at the 1994 Summit of the Americas. The 1998 Declaration of the
on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established by the NAAEC to adjudicate environmental
claims. Non-enforcement of existing environmental laws can be challenged by the CEC, but laws
on the exploitation of natural resources are excluded.
67Gantz 2001, at 671.
68Weiler 2003, at 67, remarks that the Chapter 11 “acted as the catalyst for an explosion of investment
claims.”
69Brower 2001b, at 51.
70Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, 5 August 2004, Wash-
ington.
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Second Summit of the Americas in San Jose´ called on the negotiators to:
establish a fair and transparent legal framework to promote investment thro-
ugh the creation of a stable and predictable environment that protects the
investor, his investment and related flows, without creating obstacles to in-
vestment from outside the hemisphere.71
As with the CAFTA-DR, the draft FTAA followed the NAFTA model with some
modification. In the most recent publicly available draft of the proposed text it
is clear that consensus has not been reached on many investment issues; even
the definition of the pivotal and basic concepts of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ are
disputed.72
If successfully concluded, the FTAA would be the most far-reaching trade
agreement in history, as well as the most significant IIA. However, the initial
deadline of January 2005 for the signing of the agreement was not met, and nego-
tiations have remained deadlocked since February 2004, primarily due to ongoing
disagreements between the delegates on farm subsidies and intellectual property
rights.73 Public opposition to the Agreement has also been intense.74
The Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
Despite the strong desire amongst most countries in the world to promote and to
attract FDI, a truly multilateral agreement on investment has not emerged. How-
ever, there have been several attempts to develop such an agreement, the most sig-
nificant being the negotiation of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)
in the mid-1990s. It is worthwhile to briefly review the MAI negotiations as they
brought environmental issues to the forefront of discussions on investment protec-
tion for the first time.
71Qtd. in Mann and Araya 2002, at 172.
72Third Draft FTAA Agreement, 21 November 2003, http://www.ftaa-alca.org.
73
“Summit of the Americas Fails to Resurrect FTAA,” Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 9(38), 9
November 2005.
74Large protests took place at both the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001 in and
Miami in 2003. In Brazil a plebiscite organized by NGOs resulted in over 10 million votes cast
against the agreement.
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The MAI negotiations took place within the OECD commencing in 1995. The
OECD was viewed by the US government as a ‘friendly forum’ where a ‘high
standards’-regime could be negotiated, which could subsequently be opened for
ratification by non-OECD states.75 Despite the advantages of a friendly forum,
European governments and business lobbies were not convinced that the OECD
was an appropriate locus for discussions and continued to favour the WTO in-
stead.76 However, given the opposition of developing countries to opening nego-
tiations in the WTO, the American position eventually prevailed. Five non-OECD
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, and the Slovak Republic) were
granted observer status in the negotiations. The initial deadline for an agreement
to be reached was 1997, which was subsequently pushed back to 1998. Negoti-
ations were effectively abandoned in October of 1998 when France withdrew its
delegation.
Various factors contributed to the breakdown of the MAI negotiations. Ac-
cording to an article in The Economist, the problems began with the choice of the
OECD as the forum.77 The OECD has a membership of only 30 countries. OECD
countries act both as the primary source and as the main destination for FDI, but
it was widely acknowledged that an agreement on investment between only these
countries would be largely irrelevant, given that they already have strong domes-
tic protections for foreign investors. The strategy of drafting an agreement among
countries where it was relatively unnecessary and later expanding it to the rest of
the world was problematic given the likely reluctance of non-OECD countries to
sign an agreement that they had not been involved in drafting.78 However, oppo-
nents of the MAI argued that developing countries would feel compelled to ratify
the agreement for fear of losing foreign investments from signatory nations.79
Some countries were concerned that signing the MAI could even become a re-
quirement for receiving financial assistance from organizations such as the World
75Dattu 2000, at 276; Mabey 1999, at 63; Crane 1998, at 431.
76Walter 2001, at 60. According to Muchlinski 2001, at 121, the WTO was also preferred by the
European Community because in that forum it had direct negotiating rights on behalf of its Member
States.
77
“The Sinking of the MAI,” The Economist 2004 (346), at 81-2.
78Ibid.
79Crane 1998, at 436.
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Bank and IMF (which are effectively controlled by OECD countries).80
The collapse of the MAI negotiations could also be attributed, at least in part,
to a concerted effort on the part of environmental and labour groups to stop, or at
least influence the outcome of, the negotiations.81 Environmental and social issues
barely featured at the start of MAI talks but became key points of contention in the
end.82 Following the leak of a confidential draft of the agreement on the Internet, a
broad coalition was formed between environmental NGOs, human rights and con-
sumer advocate groups, trade unions, indigenous peoples organizations, and local
governments and communities opposed to the MAI.83 The coalition campaigned
for the inclusion of environmental and labour standards in the agreement and also
argued that the MAI conflicted with many international commitments that OECD
countries had made, including those found in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21
(see Section 2.2.3).84 NGO activities also sparked the interest of the social and
environmental ministries of OECD governments that had been excluded from, and
often unaware of, the negotiations and the implications of the MAI for their policy
areas.85 However, even at the height of the discussions on environmental issues
in the MAI, only two countries sent delegates of their environmental ministries to
the negotiations.86
NGOs were particularly concerned that provisions on expropriation and inves-
tor-state dispute settlement would allow corporations to challenge domestic laws
and standards that could be shown to have the equivalent effect of expropriation.
Given their experience with Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, it was American and Cana-
dian NGOs that provided the strongest opposition to the MAI.87 In fact, the set-
tlement of a particular investor-state dispute (Ethyl v. Canada, see Section 5.1.1),
which seemed to indicate that certain provisions included in the MAI could be
interpreted in unexpected ways, lent support to the NGO position and may have
80Ibid., at 437.
81Mabey 1999, at 61; Muchlinski 2001, at 132
82
“The Sinking of the MAI,” The Economist 2004 (346), at 81-2.
83Henderson 1999, at 27.
84Crane 1998, at 439.
85Mabey 1999, at 64.
86Ibid.
87Walter 2001, at 62.
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influenced the MAI drafters.88
Walter argues that the push from NGOs for labour and environmental stan-
dards to be included in the MAI led to a weakening support for the agreement
from business lobbies, which in turn eventually led to the demise of the entire
process.89 However, there were also other complicating factors: business lob-
bies were pushing for provisions related to taxation, which governments strongly
opposed; and the French and Canadian governments wanted ‘cultural industries’
to be exempted from the agreement, which was unpopular with the American
business lobby in particular.90 Other ‘deal-breakers’ concerned the US desire to
introduce provisions on the rights of owners of illegally-expropriated property to
pursue claims against the current owners of that property, and the EU position on
the need for an exemption for ‘regional economic integration organizations’ from
certain provisions.91 In contrast to the general feeling in 1995 that negotiating
an agreement among such ‘like-minded’ countries should be relatively easy, over
the three years of negotiations it became quite evident that there were substan-
tial differences between OECD countries with regard to their views on investment
protection.
Since that time, efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment
within the WTO have also failed rather spectacularly. In fact, most recently, efforts
to launch negotiations at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancu´n were
blocked by developing countries who argued that investment protection should
only be considered if there was also agreement to expand the discussions to cor-
porate conduct and liability.92 Following Cancu´n, the EU continued to push for
optional investment negotiations on a plurilateral basis, despite diverging views
on this position amongst EU member countries.93 On 1 August 2004, the General
Council of the WTO adopted a Decision on the so-called July Package, which
88Newcombe 2007b, at 392; Sornarajah 2004a, at 293; Muchlinski 2001, at 128.
89Walter 2001. See also Sikkel 2001.
90Muchlinski 2001, at 130; Walter 2001, at 62; Malanczuk 2000, at 418; UNCTAD 1999b, at 23-2.
91Muchlinski 2001, at 129-30.
92Kerremans 2004, at 363; Sornarajah 2004a, at 28.
93The United Kingdom (UK) has argued that it would be better to remove investment from the WTO
agenda altogether. See Peterson 2004b, at 1.
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broke the Cancu´n deadlock.94 This Decision makes it clear that investment will
not be an issue for negotiation within the WTO in the Doha Round.95
The Rise of the Bilateral Investment Treaty
Although BITs were around long before the MAI (the first known BIT was signed
in 1959 between West Germany and Pakistan), it is only recently that the negoti-
ation and enforcement of these agreements have become widespread. There are
now more than 2,500 BITs worldwide.96
The first BITs were created to deal with the period of uncertainty follow-
ing decolonization, and the main purpose of BITs today is still to protect foreign
investors in the developing world. OECD countries participate in BITs almost
exclusively with developing countries; while there is an increasing number of
South-South BITs, there is a dearth of IIAs between industrialized nations.97
The main provisions on investment protection found in BITs, that are of rel-
evance in this study, are national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, the
international minimum standard of treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full
protection and security, expropriation, performance requirements, and access to
international investment arbitration, although not every treaty covers all of these
provisions (see Chapter 4). BITs typically last for ten years, with an automatic
extension of this term unless a party files notice to terminate the treaty. It is also
typical for there to be a period following the termination of an agreement in which
the provisions continue to apply to existing investments.98 As most BITs are of
a relatively recent vintage, there is little experience with their expiry or termina-
94
“The July 2004 Package,” WTO website, http://www.wto.org.
95Specifically, it includes a paragraph on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction
between Trade and Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement stating that
“the Council agrees that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs
20-22, 23-25 and 26 respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that Decla-
ration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the
WTO during the Doha Round.”
96Not all BITs have entered into force. UNCTAD 2006d estimates that of the 2,495 BITs concluded
prior to 2006, 1,891 (i.e. 75.8%) had entered into force.
97Garcia 2004, at 315; Hallward-Driemeier 2003, at 8.
98Reed et al. 2004, at 61.
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tion.99
Despite the large number of BITs, these agreements have enjoyed a relatively
low profile in comparison with regional trade and investment agreements such
as the NAFTA, and the controversial and well-publicized attempts of states to
develop a multilateral agreement on investment. This is now beginning to change,
as Spiermann notes:
The times are gone when bilateral investment treaties could be treated as
‘mainly bureaucrats’ treaties’ tucked away from the hustle and bustle of the
financial world.100
Part of the reason for the increased interest in BITs is the sudden and dramatic rise
in investor-state disputes.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Prior to the modern period, most disputes between investors and states were re-
solved locally, in the domestic courts of the host state and under domestic law.
Local remedies have a variety of advantages for the host state; in particular they
are considerably less costly, both financially and in terms of reputation.101 On the
other hand, foreign investors have consistently argued that local courts in develop-
ing countries are ill-equipped to deal with investment disputes and, furthermore,
that if asked to adjudicate claims brought against their own state these courts “may
hardly be able to resist the political pressure inherent in this situation.”102
Historically, an investor’s only alternatives to local remedies were to attempt
to bring a case in a foreign court or to endeavor to convince his home state to
either apply diplomatic pressure or bring the claim on his behalf before an inter-
national tribunal. A number of obstacles can preclude remedy in a foreign court,
such as sovereign immunity.103 Choi notes that diplomatic protection is also unde-
99Ibid., at 62.
100Spiermann 2004, at 179.
101Dodge 2000, at 361.
102Bernardini 2001, at 246.
103Bankas 2005, at vii-viii, notes that historically states have been immune from the judicial process
and enforcement jurisdiction of municipal courts, although in recent years some restrictions have
been placed on the concept. See also Dodge 2000, at 358; Cook 2007, at 1095.
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sirable for many reasons; in particular, it tends to politicize disputes and increase
international friction, and introduces power differences that inevitably affect the
resolution of the dispute.104 Others argue that investors simply cannot rely on
home states to bring claims on their behalf, because they are rarely willing to do
so and, when they are, it is often for political reasons rather than on the basis of a
sound evaluation of the merits of the investor’s claim.105
As noted above, in the 1960s and 1970s, a substantial debate emerged over
the ‘internationalization’ of state contracts. While the validity of the theory of the
internationalization of state contracts has been challenged,106 with the advent of
IIAs the local remedies rule has, in any case, largely been supplanted by recourse
to international arbitration.107 Customary international law requires the exhaus-
tion of local remedies before a foreign investor’s claim may be brought before an
international tribunal, but this rule may be waived by international agreement.108
Few IIAs require the exhaustion of local remedies prior to the commencement of
the arbitration process, and some agreements require the investor to choose its av-
enue of dispute settlement from the outset. In addition, state contracts that refer to
local remedies may nevertheless be subsumed under IIAs in certain circumstances
(see further Section 4.1.6).
Van Harten argues that the removal of the duty to exhaust local remedies has
several, perhaps unanticipated, implications: firstly, domestic courts are no longer
presumed to be capable of delivering justice; secondly, investors, unlike other
foreign nationals, are no longer assumed to have a duty to take into account the
domestic means to redress wrongs; and thirdly, the host state’s legal system is
denied the opportunity to correct any wrongs to a foreign investor before they
become an issue of international responsibility.109 Ginsburg goes so far as to
suggest that as access to international arbitration allows powerful players to exit
the local jurisdiction, it removes an important source of support for efforts to
improve domestic court systems and can even, under certain conditions, result in
104Choi 2007, at 727-8.
105Brower 2003, at 89.
106Sornarajah 2003, at 175.
107Baruti Dames 2005, at 530.
108Dodge 2000, at 363.
109Van Harten 2007a, at 110.
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a reduction of local institutional quality.110
A plethora of investor-state disputes have been resolved in international arbi-
tration in the last decade. The cumulative number of all known111 treaty-based
cases was 255 as of November 2006.112 This can be compared to the end of 1994
when there were only five known treaty-based cases. At least 70 governments (44
in the developing world) have faced investment arbitration.113
2.2 A Brief History of Environmental Protection
2.2.1 The Colonial Period: Pre-1945
As with the protection of foreign investment, the protection of the environment
has only been a major political issue since the Industrial Revolution. While envi-
ronmental issues certainly existed prior to the industrialized age, the potential for
human beings to alter the environment has increased rapidly with the development
of modern technology.
It is now recognized that colonialism and imperialism had profound environ-
mental consequences.114 The colonies were used as a source of raw materials
for the developed world, but also as a ‘testing ground’ for emerging policies of
environmental management, particularly in the area of nature and wildlife conser-
vation. Traditional methods of nature conservation in the colonies were viewed as
ignorant and wasteful and were substituted with Western concepts implemented
by colonial governments.115
Resource exploitation dominated the agenda in colonial times.116 The main
issue of environmental concern in the period, as defined by the colonial powers,
was nature conservation and in particular the management of wildlife.117 Regu-
110Ginsburg 2005. For an opposing opinion see Franck 2007.
111As further discussed in Chapter 4, not all cases are disclosed to the public.
112UNCTAD 2006c, at 2. This does not include cases brought on the basis of a state contract.
113Ibid.
114Clapp and Dauvergne 2005, at 47.
115Ibid.; Barrow 2005, at 33.
116Barrow 2005, at 33.
117Clapp and Dauvergne 2005, at 47; Adams 1990, at 19.
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lating foreign investment was not an issue within the colonies (as any investors
were likely to originate from the colonial powers) and outside of the colonies the
focus was on the economic control of industries, as described above, rather than
on environmental protection.
2.2.2 The Post-Colonial Period: 1945-1980
It was not until the post-colonial period that environmentalism rose as an issue of
substantial concern in the developed world. The origins of the movement were
largely rooted in public opposition to nuclear weapons and chemical pollution;
the products of industrialization and technological development. In developing
countries much of the focus remained on development and control of natural re-
sources, and Northern concepts of environmental protection were treated with a
degree of suspicion. The concern of many government officials was not simply
that protecting the environment might come at some economic cost, but that the
environmental agenda would be used as a guise by developed countries to main-
tain control over resources and technology and even hinder development in the
South.118
In this period, the notion of the global environment or the global commons
also emerged for the first time and, as a result, some multilateral efforts aimed
at protecting the environment were initiated. Other multilateral processes which
addressed a wide range of issues, including corporate conduct, also covered envi-
ronmental protection.
The UN Conference on the Human Environment
In response to the emergence of global environmental concern, the first global
conference on the environment was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in June 1972.119
Delegates from 113 governments attended the UN Conference on the Human En-
vironment (UNCHE). According to Adams, the focus of the conference was on
the classic concerns of developed countries, such as pollution, whilst the environ-
118Porter et al. 2000, at 179.
119Clapp and Dauvergne 2005, at 54.
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mental and developmental problems of the South were addressed only partially
and belatedly.120
One of the most significant outcomes of the Conference was the creation of
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1972 by the UN General
Assembly to be based in Nairobi, Kenya. The Declaration of the Conference also
codified several important principles of international environmental law.121 Prin-
ciples that were most relevant to developing countries were: Principle 8, which
suggested that development was needed to improve the environment; Principles 9,
10 and 12, which covered the need of developing countries for assistance (techni-
cal and financial) and for reasonable prices for exports; Principle 11, which stipu-
lated that development need not be impaired by environmental protection; Princi-
ples 13 and 14, which addressed ‘integrated development planning’ and planning
to avoid/resolve development-environment conflicts; and Principle 21, which af-
firmed states’ permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. However, of the
109 Recommendations for Action, only eight addressed the relationship between
development and the environment.122
The UN Commission on Transnational Corporations
The first major attempt to codify the duties of TNCs began in 1974, when the UN
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) was established under the
auspices of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Commission was
composed of 48 members from all geographic regions. The highest priority for
the UNCTC was the development of a code of conduct for TNCs, and negotiations
began on this issue in 1977. The UNCTC Code was intended to define both the
rights and responsibilities of states and TNCs in a balanced manner.123 In the mid-
1980s the UNCTC began to work on environmental aspects of TNC activity.124
Part B of the UNCTC Code contained three provisions relating to environ-
120Adams 1990, at 36-7.
121Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-16 June 1972, Stockholm,
UN Doc. A/CONF/48/14/REV.1, http://www.unep.org/.
122Recommendations 102-109.
123Correa and Kumar 2003, at 32.
124Hansen 2002, at 162.
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mental protection, which covered:
• Adhering to national environmental laws and regulations, policies and practices;
• Giving due regard to international environmental standards;
• Taking steps to protect the environment and rehabilitate it when it is damaged;
• Supplying relevant information to the competent authorities related to the possi-
ble environmental impacts of products and services and measures necessary to
avoid or mitigate environmental harm, as well as any prohibitions or other pub-
lic regulatory measures that are imposed in other countries with respect to these
products/services; and
• Being responsive to requests from governments and international organizations to
cooperate in efforts to develop and promote national and international environmen-
tal standards.125
The UNCTC also issued a series of 14 ‘criteria for sustainable development
management’ in 1989, and prepared a set of recommendations on TNC conduct
in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit (see further below).126 However, the
recommendations were considered too controversial and were dropped from the
Summit’s agenda.127
Due to opposition from developed countries, an economic recession, and the
debt crisis, the drive to adopt the UNCTC Code faded in the 1980s.128 Despite an
attempt to revive it in 1990, the UNCTC was officially dismantled in 1992. Some
of its work was carried on by UNCTAD, which remains an important forum for
discussion on TNC regulation (as well as investment protection), but the UNCTC
Code was abandoned altogether.
2.2.3 The Modern Period: 1980-Present
With the demise of the UNCTC, and the dramatic shift of developing countries to-
ward actively seeking FDI, the notion of corporate accountability has been put on
125Draft UNCTC Code, at paras. 43-5.
126Hansen 2002, at 162.
127Ibid., at 163.
128Ibid.
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the back-burner of international politics in the modern period. In its place, the no-
tion of ‘corporate social responsibility’, the process whereby companies “integrate
social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their inter-
action with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis,” has gained prominence.129
As Utting explains:
The confrontational politics of earlier decades, which had pitted a pro-
regulation and redistributive lobby against TNCs, lost momentum as gov-
ernments, business and multilateral organizations alike, as well as an in-
creasing number of NGOs, embraced ideas of ‘partnership’ and ‘co-regulation’
in which different actors or ‘stakeholders’ would work together to find ways
of minimizing the environmental cost of economic growth and moderniza-
tion. The hands-on regulatory role of the state ceded ground to ‘corporate
self-regulation’ and ‘voluntary initiatives’ as the best approach for promot-
ing the adoption of instruments and processes associated with corporate en-
vironmental responsibility.130
At the same time, environmental problems have become more and more recog-
nized as serious political issues, in need of global action. The modern period has
had two major ‘Earth Summits’, and by 2007 over 900 multilateral environmen-
tal agreements (MEAs) and at least 1500 bilateral ones had been developed.131
However, these agreements typically lack strong enforcement mechanisms.
The ties between environmental issues and other issues relating to develop-
ment were increasingly strengthened in the modern period through the notion of
sustainable development. However, despite the growing integration of issues of
environment and development, global environmental governance retains a strong
North-South dimension. For example, numerous politically contentious issues
have arisen between developed and developing countries in the areas of climate
change,132 food governance,133 and the transboundary movement of hazardous
wastes.134
129European Commission 2001, at 8.
130Utting 2002, at 1.
131See the International Environmental Agreements Database Project website developed by Ronald
Mitchell, http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static, accessed 4 January 2008.
132See generally Gupta 1997.
133See generally Gupta 2004.
134See generally Porter et al. 2000, at 103-8.
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The Brundtland Report
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), informally
referred to as the ‘Brundtland Commission’ (after its chairman Gro Harlem Brundt-
land, former Prime Minister of Norway), was established in 1983 by the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. The Commission was created to address growing concern about
environmental degradation and its relationship to development.
The report emanating from the WCED, entitled Our Common Future, is per-
haps most famous for its articulation of the concept of sustainable development as
“development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”135 With regard to the
present topic, Section 3.3 on ‘Ensuring Responsibility in Transnational Invest-
ment’ is particularly relevant.
The report noted that while developing countries have become more open to
inflows of FDI, mutual suspicions still existed between these countries and TNCs,
usually a result “of an asymmetry in bargaining power between large corporations
and small, poor, developing countries.”136 The report suggested that developing
countries lacked information and technical preparedness to deal with TNCs, and
suffered from political and institutional weaknesses.137 It was therefore argued by
the Commission that regional and international organizations should assist devel-
oping countries in negotiations with foreign investors, for example by producing
model contracts.138 It was also suggested that TNCs should adopt ‘home country
standards’.139
Finally, the Brundtland report noted that international measures aimed at reg-
ulating TNCs “have been generally lacking and have proved extremely difficult
to negotiate” and recommended that the codes of conduct for transnational cor-
porations formulated by the OECD (see below) and under discussion in the UN
(UNCTC Code) should deal explicitly with environmental matters and the objec-
135World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 1987, at 43.
136Ibid., at 86.
137Ibid.
138Ibid.
139Ibid. See further below.
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tive of sustainable development.140
The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) took place in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. The event, also commonly referred to as the
‘Earth Summit’, was attended by 172 governments. The business lobby was also
heavily involved in the activities surrounding the UNCED. Particularly notable
was the presence of the newly formed Business Council for Sustainable Devel-
opment (BCSD), which later merged with the World Industrial Council for the
Environment (WICE), to become the World Business Council for Sustainable De-
velopment (WBCSD).
Major outcomes of the UNCED included the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development141 and Agenda 21,142 as well as the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change,143 the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),144 and the
non-binding ‘Forest Principles’.145
As the Stockholm Declaration had done 20 years prior, the Rio Declaration in-
cluded the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and empha-
sized the need to integrate environmental considerations into development plan-
ning.146 Furthermore, the Declaration stressed the need for capacity-building for
sustainable development.147 The Declaration also espoused the ‘precautionary
principle’ (or approach), stipulating that:
140Ibid.
141Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro,
http://www.unep.org. Reproduced in 31 ILM (1992), at 874.
142Agenda 21, Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 3-14 June 1992, Rio
de Janeiro, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/ Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex II, http://www.unep.org.
143UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, New York, http://unfccc.int. Repro-
duced in 31 ILM (1992), at 851.
144Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, http://www.cbd.int. Reproduced
in 31 ILM (1992), at 818.
145Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Man-
agement, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests, 14 June 1992, Rio de
Janeiro, http://www.un.org/esa/forests. Reproduced in 31 ILM (1992), at 1333.
146Principles 2 and 4 respectively.
147Principle 9.
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Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full sci-
entific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.148
The ‘polluter pays’ principle was also included in the Declaration:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of en-
vironmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution,
with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international
trade and investment.149
The emphasized text represents a significant caveat to the polluter pays principle,
given that, as Wa¨lde notes, “[i]t is hard to consider an example of pollution where
full liability would not in some way ... distort investment or affect international
trade.”150
Agenda 21, the plan of action emanating from the UNCED, covered a wide
range of environmental issues and laid out steps that needed to be taken globally,
nationally, and locally, to address them. Chapter 2 of the plan noted that:
Investment is critical to the ability of developing countries to achieve needed
economic growth to improve the welfare of their populations and to meet
their basic needs in a sustainable manner, all without deteriorating or deplet-
ing the resource base that underpins development. Sustainable development
requires increased investment, for which domestic and external financial re-
sources are needed. Foreign private investment and the return of flight cap-
ital, which depend on a healthy investment climate, are an important source
of financial resources.151
Chapter 30 was entitled Strengthening the Role of Business and Industry and
was divided into two program areas: promoting cleaner production, and promot-
ing responsible entrepreneurship. The second program area, which is particularly
relevant, had two objectives: to encourage the concept of stewardship in the man-
agement and utilization of natural resources by entrepreneurs, and to increase the
148Principle 15.
149Principle 16.
150Wa¨lde 1998b, at 243.
151Agenda 21, at para. 2.23, emphasis added.
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number of entrepreneurs engaged in enterprises that subscribe to and implement
sustainable development policies.152 Business and industry were encouraged to
participate in a number of activities including the development of world-wide cor-
porate policies on sustainable development. According to Hansen, the elimina-
tion of all but these few ambiguous and non-binding recommendations referring
to TNCs in Agenda 21 was, for many observers, “a prime example of the business
community capturing the international environmental agenda.”153
The Global Compact
The shift away from the corporate accountability approach toward the softer cor-
porate responsibility approach in the modern period is perhaps best exemplified by
the Global Compact. This initiative was launched at the World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland, in 1999, by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The
Compact is aimed at bringing together large TNCs and the UN to make globaliza-
tion more equitable and sustainable.154 The original Compact was based on nine
principles, three drawn from each of the following: the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Fundamental Prin-
ciples and Rights at Work; and the Rio Declaration. In 2004 a tenth principle,
dealing with anti-corruption, was added to the list. The three environmental prin-
ciples cover general environmental responsibility, the precautionary principle, and
the development and dissemination of environmentally friendly technologies.
While many welcomed the initiative as a creative step, NGOs generally viewed
the Compact as not only ineffective, but also potentially dangerous as it could act
as a ‘bluewash’ for companies with poor social and environmental records. Ac-
cording to Bruno and Karliner, “notorious violators” of the Compact’s principles
are active participants in the Compact.155
On the other hand, John Ruggie, who acted as Assistant Secretary-General
152Ibid., at para. 30.18.
153Hansen 2002, at 163.
154
“Blue Washed and Boilerplated,” The Economist 2004 (371), at 61-2.
155Bruno and Karliner 2002, at 35. For example, the mining company Rio Tinto is a participant in
the Compact, and is also accused of numerous human rights and environmental abuses related to its
operations in Indonesia.
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and Chief Adviser for Strategic Planning to Kofi Annan from 1997 to 2001, ar-
gues that the critics are seriously underestimating the Compact’s potential, while
also acknowledging that its supporters may be holding excessive expectations for
what the initiative can achieve.156 Ruggie claims that the principal role of the
Compact is to act as a learning forum for corporations. According to Ruggie, the
UN launched the Global Compact rather than attempting to initiate negotiations
on a binding set of rules of corporate conduct for several reasons: (i) countries
were not interested in adopting a meaningful code of conduct at the time; (ii) the
logistical and financial requirements to monitor global companies and their supply
chains far exceeded the capacity of the UN; (iii) the business community would
have opposed the imposition of a code of conduct and even progressive business
leaders would have been drawn into an anti-code coalition; (iv) many principles
of human rights, labour rights, and environmental stewardship could not be pre-
cisely defined at the time; and (iv) the pace of change in corporate strategies,
structures, and production processes made it exceedingly difficult to specify what
desired/prohibited practices a code should have included.157
The Revised OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are part of the 1976 Dec-
laration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises and associated
Decisions of the OECD Council (which also covers national treatment, investment
incentives, and conflicting requirements).158 The Guidelines consist of voluntary
principles and standards relating to employment and industrial relations, human
rights, environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer inter-
ests, science and technology, competition, and taxation. The Guidelines are ad-
dressed to TNCs operating in, or from, countries that have adopted them.159 The
Guidelines were reviewed in 2000, and updated to reflect the shift in the interna-
tional community to a sustainable development agenda.
156Ruggie 2001, at 371.
157Ibid., at 373.
158The OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises:
Basic Texts, DAFFE/IME(2000)20, http://www.oecd.org.
159All of the OECD countries and 10 non-OECD countries are signatories.
A Brief History of Environmental Protection 67
Section V on the environment states that enterprises should “take due account
of the need to protect the environment” and “generally conduct their activities in
a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable development.” To achieve
this they should, in general, take heed of domestic laws and regulations as well as
international agreements, principles, objectives, and standards. More specifically
they should:
• Establish and maintain a system of environmental management;
• Provide timely information on environmental impacts of their activities and com-
municate and consult with communities that are directly affected by these activi-
ties;
• Address environmental impacts in decision-making and prepare EIAs;
• Not use the lack of scientific certainty as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent or minimize environmental damage (precautionary principle);
• Plan for environmental accidents and emergencies;
• Improve environmental performance through improved technologies, research, de-
velopment of environmentally friendly products, and the promotion of consumer
awareness;
• Educate and train employees in environmental health and safety matters; and
• Contribute to the development of environmentally meaningful and economically
efficient public policy (e.g., partnerships, awareness-raising initiatives, etc.).160
The Guidelines contain a mechanism of implementation: National Contact
Points are set up in each country that endorses the Guidelines to receive com-
plaints about companies. However, this mechanism is considered largely ineffec-
tive.161 According to Jenkins, “the OECD Guidelines did not represent a genuine
160OECD Guidelines, at paras. V.1-8.
161In 2002, the UN Expert Panel on Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo named 85 companies in breach of the OECD Guidelines, but no significant
action was taken by governments to respond. See “Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in
the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Public Statement by the OECD Committee on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 12 February 2004, http://www.oecd.org.
68 Historical Context
attempt to control transnationals, but was rather designed to deflect criticism of
their activities.”162
The World Summit on Sustainable Development
The 10-year follow-up to the Rio Earth Summit was the World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2002. Tens
of thousands of participants, from heads of state and government to representa-
tives of NGOs and businesses, attended the 10-day meeting.
The Report of the WSSD made reference to ‘investment’ 56 times, and while
the use of this term can certainly also encompass investment by the public sec-
tor, the emphasis in the report is clearly on the private sector.163 In developing
countries, this most often means the involvement of foreign investors. Three para-
graphs in the document are worth noting. In the Political Declaration, it was sug-
gested that globalization had added a new dimension to the complexity of the issue
of sustainable development and remarked that, among other things,“significant
increases in investment flows around the world have opened new challenges and
opportunities for the pursuit of sustainable development.”164 While this paragraph
made reference only to the “challenges and opportunities” of foreign investment
itself, the Plan of Implementation additionally noted the need for “an enabling
environment for investment,” which was viewed, as a part of good governance, as
“the basis for sustainable development.”165 Finally, the Plan of Implementation
calls for the creation of:
the necessary domestic and international conditions to facilitate significant
increases in the flow of foreign direct investment to developing countries,
in particular the least developed countries, which is critical to sustainable
development, particularly foreign direct investment flows for infrastructure
development and other priority areas in developing countries to supplement
the domestic resources mobilized by them.166
162Jenkins 2001, at 4.
163Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-
4 September 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev.
164Political Declaration, at para. 14.
165Plan of Implementation, at para. 4.
166Ibid., at para. 84(a), emphasis added.
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The WSSD Report also made reference to corporate responsibility. The Po-
litical Declaration stated that the signatories, “agree that there is a need for pri-
vate sector corporations to enforce corporate accountability, which should take
place within a transparent and stable regulatory environment.”167 In the Plan of
Implementation states are urged to “enhance corporate environmental and social
responsibility and accountability,” including actions to encourage:
• Improvement in the social and environmental performance of industry through vol-
untary initiatives, including environmental management systems, codes of conduct,
certification and public reporting on environmental and social issues;
• Dialogue between enterprises and the communities in which they operate and other
stakeholders;
• Incorporation of sustainable development considerations into the decision-making
processes of financial institutions; and
• Workplace-based partnerships and programs, including training and education pro-
grams.168
The focus thus clearly remained on voluntary initiatives. Perhaps the most promis-
ing paragraph in the Plan of Implementation, from the perspective of advocates of
binding rules for TNCs, called on governments to:
Actively promote corporate responsibility and accountability, based on the
Rio principles, including through the full development and effective im-
plementation of intergovernmental agreements and measures, international
initiatives and public-private partnerships and appropriate national regula-
tions, and support continuous improvement in corporate practices in all
countries.169
According to Morgera, the WSSD outcomes played a significant role in ex-
panding the scope of corporate responsibility beyond environmental concerns (the
167Political Declaration, at para. 29.
168Plan of Implementation, at para. 18.
169Ibid., at para. 49.
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focus of Chapter 30 of Agenda 21) and importantly emphasized action on the in-
ternational, rather than strictly the national level.170 However, others view the
provisions as “weak and permissive,” arguing that corporate influence in the de-
velopment of the Plan undermined the efforts of NGOs and some governments to
launch negotiations on a binding agreement on corporate accountability.171
The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights
The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (UN Norms) were adopted by
the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in
August 2003.172
The UN Norms are focused on human rights, but they also relate to environ-
mental protection:
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall carry out
their activities in accordance with national laws, regulations, administrative
practices and policies relating to the preservation of the environment of the
countries in which they operate, as well as in accordance with relevant in-
ternational agreements, principles, objectives, responsibilities and standards
with regard to the environment as well as human rights, public health and
safety, bioethics and the precautionary principle, and shall generally con-
duct their activities in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable
development.173
The Commentary on the UN Norms, provided in a separate report, lays out
in further detail what this paragraph is meant to entail.174 According to the Com-
mentary, TNCs and other businesses are expected to:
170Morgera 2004, at 219.
171Steiner 2003, at 36. See also “Summary of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,” Earth
Negotiations Bulletin 22(51), 6 September 2002.
172Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html.
173Ibid., at para. 14, emphasis added.
174Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Busi-
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• Respect the right to a clean and healthy environment, concerns for intergenerational
equity, internationally recognized environmental standards, and the wider goal of
sustainable development;
• Be responsible for the environmental and human health impact of all of their activ-
ities;
• Assess the impact of their activities on the environment and human health and
in these assessments address the impact of proposed activities on certain groups,
such as children, older persons, indigenous peoples and communities (particularly
in regard to their land and natural resources), and/or women;
• Distribute assessment reports in a timely manner and in a manner that is accessible
to the UNEP and other international bodies, governments, and the public;
• Respect the prevention principle and the precautionary principle, and not use the
lack of full scientific certainty as a reason to delay the introduction of cost-effective
measures intended to prevent environmental damage;
• Ensure effective means of collecting or arranging for the collection of products that
have reached the end of their life-cycle for recycling, reuse and/or environmentally
responsible disposal; and
• Take appropriate measures in their activities to reduce the risk of accidents and
damage to the environment by adopting best management practices and technolo-
gies.175
Weissbrodt and Kruger suggest that the UN Norms represent:
a landmark step in holding businesses accountable for their human rights
abuses and constitute a succinct, but comprehensive, restatement of the in-
ternational legal principles applicable to businesses with regard to human
rights, humanitarian law, international labour law, environmental law, con-
sumer law, anti-corruption law, and so forth.176
ness Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/commentary-Aug2003.html.
175Ibid., at para. G.14.
176Weissbrodt and Kruger 2003, at 901.
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However, while the text details how the UN Norms are to be implemented and
provides for independent and transparent monitoring, the Norms do not represent
legally binding obligations.
Private and Public-Private Initiatives
While mainly intergovernmental activities aimed at the protection of the environ-
ment have been described thus far, private or public-private initiatives have also
emerged in the modern period. These initiatives are voluntary and often market-
based.177 One of the most significant initiatives with respect to foreign investment
is the development of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) envi-
ronmental management standards.178
The ISO 14000 family of standards on environmental management is primar-
ily concerned with what an organization does to “minimize harmful effects on
the environment caused by its activities,” and to “achieve continual improvement
of its environmental performance.”179 While the majority of ISO standards are
highly specific to a particular product, material, or process, ISO 14000 standards
are ‘generic management system standards’, meaning that they can apply to any
product or process in any sector. The 14001 standard is the best known in the
14000 series. It basically requires that firms comply with domestic environmental
regulation, that they commit to continual improvement and prevention of pollu-
tion, and that they set up an environmental management system and have that
system audited.180 By the end of 1999, over 13,000 firms in 75 countries had
obtained ISO 14001 certification.181
While it is certainly not the only set of international environmental guidelines
177Examples of such regulation include certification and labeling schemes such as those developed by
the Forest Stewardship Council. See Pattberg 2007.
178The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), established in 1946, is a network of the
national standards institutes of 157 countries and the world’s largest developer of standards. In the
run up to the UNCED, the ISO set up a Strategic Advisory Group on Environment to look into
the possibility of creating environmental management standards. In 1993 the ISO created a new
committee on environmental management (TC 207).
179
“ISO 9000 and ISO 14000,” ISO Website, http://www.iso.org, accessed 4 January 2008.
180Clapp 2005, at 230.
181Morrison et al. 2000, cited in Clapp 2005, at 223.
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aimed at corporations,182 ISO 14001 has gained wide recognition, and according
to Clapp it has eclipsed other voluntary initiatives becoming a “condition for firms
that wish to compete in the global marketplace.”183 However, there are debates
about the legitimacy of the ISO (and other such schemes), as it is an industry-
dominated body and is lacking transparent and participatory procedures.184 There
are also questions as to the actual value that ISO standards play in improving
environmental conditions. For example, Cle´menc¸on points out that:
ISO 14001 certification of a company does not require the company to set
verifiable environmental quality targets and does not require standardized
reporting or provide for outside environmental performance reviews. En-
vironmental groups have therefore criticized the voluntary ISO 14001 stan-
dardization as little more than a labeling ploy of many companies to gain
access to Northern markets.185
ISO 14001 has also been said to provide little incentive for firms to go beyond the
minimum requirement of meeting domestic laws and regulations.186
It is difficult to assess the importance of ISO 14001 and other private and
public-private initiatives intended to ‘green’ business in the South, because re-
search on this issue in developing countries has been limited.187 However, in gen-
eral, voluntary private and public-private initiatives do not “amount to an adequate
or appropriate replacement for regulation at the state or international level.”188
Conditions Tied to Investment Risk Insurance and Project Financing
When companies invest abroad they are likely to insure themselves against cer-
tain risks, such as nationalization, expropriation, or other similar measures, and
182Other examples include the CERES Principles, http://www.ceres.org, and the ICC Business Charter
for Sustainable Development, http://www.iccwbo.org/home/environment/charter.asp.
183Clapp 2005, at 229-30.
184Ibid., at 224.
185Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 217.
186Gulbrandsen 2004, at 84 and 86.
187Utting 2002, at 10.
188Newell 2001, at 913. See also Hansen 2002, at 177, who states that “it would be naive to believe
that business self-regulation is an alternative to government action.”
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war or other armed conflict. The main public sources of investment insurance are:
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) (part of the World Bank
Group), the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (IAIGC), and various
national insurance schemes.189 Insurance can also be provided by private compa-
nies such as Lloyds of London and the American International Group.190
According to Sornarajah, “[o]fficial insurance companies and banks ... are in-
creasingly wary of assisting multinational corporations that cause massive pollu-
tion” and there is “recognition of the duty not to assist corporations which pollute
in other states and the possibility of legal responsibility for complicity of those
who assist such companies which pollute.”191 As such, many organizations have
developed environmental conditions that are tied to the receipt of insurance. For
example, according to the MIGA Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainabil-
ity, the Agency:
strives for positive development outcomes in the private sector projects for
which it provides guarantee support. An important component of posi-
tive development outcomes is the social and environmental sustainability
of projects, which MIGA expects to achieve by applying a comprehensive
set of social and environmental performance standards.192
In terms of project financing, the Equator Principles were first launched by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and a small number of banks in 2003 and
later revised in 2006.193 The Equator Principles apply to all new projects with total
project capital costs of US$10 million or more that are financed by signatory orga-
nizations. The Equator Principles relate to: social and environmental assessment;
social and environmental standards; action plans and management systems; con-
sultation and disclosure; grievance mechanisms; independent review; covenants
(on compliance with host country laws and certain other conditions); and report-
189E.g., the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the UK Export Credits Guarantee
Department (ECGD), and Export Development Canada (EDC).
190Kolo 1996.
191Sornarajah 2000, at 364.
192
“Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability,” 1 October 2007, http://www.miga.org.
193
“The Equator Principles: A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and
Managing Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing,” July 2006, http://www.equator-
principles.com.
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ing (by financial institutions on implementation of the principles). The Principles
appear to have attracted broad participation, but it is perhaps too soon to be able
to assess their impact on the ground.
Home State Measures and Foreign Direct Liability
The term ‘home state measures’ has traditionally referred to measures taken by
capital-exporting states to promote flows of investment into developing countries
(e.g., the provision of risk insurance, the grant of tax exemptions, etc.).194 How-
ever, there is now a suggestion from many NGOs and some developing countries
that home state measures should also extend to the exertion of control over the
way that TNCs conduct themselves in host states.195
One of the ways that home states can influence the behaviour of TNCs is by
requiring EIAs of projects before providing insurance, as noted above. Another
way is to develop environmental and social policies for their export credit guar-
antee agencies which support outward FDI. For example, the United Kingdom
Export Credit Guarantees Department takes into account the contribution of an
investment to sustainable development and to the promotion of human rights and
good governance.196
Home states may also facilitate ‘foreign direct liability’; that is liability for
companies in home states for their (or their subsidiaries’) actions in other coun-
tries. There are several reasons why it may be advantageous to bring a claim
against a parent company in the home state rather than against a local subsidiary
in the host state: corporations can organize themselves so that the subsidiary is
insolvent, not worth suing, or uninsured; there may be limited access to justice
in host country courts; and workers’ compensation schemes may preclude claims
by victims against an employer.197 Bringing a claim in a foreign court is the only
option other than a domestic claim as TNCs do not have formal international legal
personality and, therefore, do not have standing before any international court.198
194Sornarajah 2004a, at 169.
195Zarsky 2000.
196UNCTAD 2007b, at 178.
197Cordonier Segger 2003, at 300.
198Sornarajah 2000, at 361.
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Sornarajah argues that there may be a basis in international law for duty on
the part of states to entertain litigation of TNCs based on their activities in foreign
states.199 Because the home state permits hazardous technology or investment
to be taken out of its territory it is partially responsible for any harm that may
ensue as a result and, therefore, should permit litigation before its courts to reduce
or redress the harm. It can also be argued that certain norms of international
environmental law have such overwhelming support that domestic courts should
provide sanctions for violations of these norms.
Newell suggests that foreign direct liability “provides a potentially vital chan-
nel for ensuring that TNCs do not exploit lower environmental standards and poor
enforcement regimes at the expense of workers and their environment,” but he
also recognizes the limitations of this mechanism.200 The main barrier to foreign
direct liability suits is the principle of forum non conveniens. Investors can rely on
this principle to argue that a court in the host state is a more appropriate venue for
the resolution of a dispute than a court in the home state. This barrier proved sig-
nificant in the Bhopal disaster case, the first case in which foreign direct liability
was utilized in order to redress an environmental harm. The Indian government
tried to bring a claim against Union Carbide in the US but it was unsuccessful;
the court declined jurisdiction on the basis that the courts in India were a more
convenient forum. However, according to Sornarajah, since the delivery of this
much criticized judgment there has been a greater willingness of courts to extend
jurisdiction in similar cases.201
Other problems with using litigation to hold investors accountable relate to:
the difficulty of establishing cause-effect relationships in cases of environmental
damage; the need to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ to establish connections between
subsidiaries and parent TNCs; the length of time that the process requires; and
the limited capacity of many potential claimants to bring cases.202 Furthermore,
as Newell remarks, litigation “reduces complex social problems to questions of
monetary compensation.”203 Thus, despite the potential for foreign direct liability
199Ibid., at 363-4.
200Newell 2001, at 914.
201Sornarajah 2000, at 361.
202Newell 2001, at 915-6; Ayine and Werksman 1999.
203Newell 2001, at 915.
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to act as an important tool, particularly in the case of disasters like Bhopal or
situations of especially grave abuses of human rights, Cordonier Segger argues
that “it would be unrealistic and undesirable” to attempt to resolve all cases of
TNC misconduct in this manner.204
2.3 Summary
This brief historical overview illustrates that while the global reach and influence
of TNCs continue to rise, the international community has repeatedly failed to
address the crucial issue of their regulation. Despite the lack of a multilateral
agreement on investment, the legal protection of foreign investment is far more
developed at the international level than is the protection of the environment. One
can contrast the weak and underdeveloped initiatives for the regulation of foreign
investors (where implementation is only possible through national governments
and where enforcement mechanisms lack teeth), with the extensive web of bind-
ing and enforceable agreements on investment protection. As a result, it can be
assumed that conflicts that arise between foreign investors and host states, includ-
ing those that relate to the protection of the environment, will be resolved in the
forums offered by IIAs and state contracts. As such, anyone concerned with en-
vironmental governance should take a keen interest in international investment
arbitration.
The overview also illustrates that historically there has been a perceptible
North-South divide on the issues of the protection and regulation of foreign in-
vestment, and the protection of the environment. This divide is neither imper-
meable nor immutable, but it has not completely disappeared despite dramatic
changes in the economic situations of some developing countries. South-South
agreements agreements on investment protection have begun to emerge and many
countries that formerly only imported capital are now significant exporters of cap-
ital. Nevertheless, the backlash to the MAI and the failure of the WTO Ministerial
in Cancu´n tend to suggest that developing countries still occasionally act as a
relatively unified bloc on the issue of investment protection. Similarly, while dis-
agreements exist in the North, as evidenced in the failed MAI negotiations, their
204Cordonier Segger 2003, at 302.
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desire for increased protection of their investors without accompanying binding
rules on corporate conduct is fairly consistent.
Theoretical Framework 3
The focus of this study is on the relationship between the protection of foreign
investment and the protection of the environment. This relationship is compli-
cated by the fact that both areas are bound up in issues of economics, politics, and
law. Thus, a study of this nature will invariably have to cross disciplinary bound-
aries. However, the guiding theoretical approach in this study is derived mainly
from international relations/international political economy scholarship, and par-
ticularly from critical works that take a neo-Gramscian perspective. This chapter
introduces the neo-Gramscian approach to international (or more aptly transna-
tional) politics and explains why it provides an especially apposite framework for
this study. The chapter also defines and delineates the concept of the institution
of investment protection. It then provides a critical assessment of this institution
through the application of neo-Gramscian theory and forms a plan of inquiry for
the remainder of the study.
3.1 International Relations Theory
This section reviews several conventional and unconventional approaches to the
subjects of international law and non-state actors in international relations. The
conventional approaches (neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) are found
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to be dismissive of international law and neglectful of the importance of non-
state actors. It is argued that the more unconventional approaches (constructivism,
liberalism, and neo-Gramscianism) are more suited to, and capable of, addressing
the rapid expansion of international law and the increasing participation of non-
state actors in international politics. Neo-Gramscian theory is singled out as the
most relevant approach for this study.
3.1.1 International Law and Non-State Actors
In recent years, many international relations scholars have recognized that, “[i]n
many issue-areas, the world is witnessing a move to law.”1 Particularly in areas
that affect commerce, law is becoming ubiquitous at the domestic and interna-
tional levels.2 This move to law has been termed the ‘legalization’ of international
politics.3 Given the rapid development of IIAs and the shift from diplomatic to
legal mechanisms of investor-state dispute settlement, it is evident that the area
of foreign investment protection is a key example of legalization. In fact, Kahler
suggests that legalization has achieved some of its “most dramatic advances” in
the areas of trade and investment.4
At the same time, it has been recognized that there has been a significant
rise in the number of non-state actors that are, in one way or another, involved
in international politics. Over one third of the world’s 100 largest economies
are corporations, not states,5 and the 200 largest corporations have almost twice
the economic clout of the poorest four fifths of humanity.6 More than 50,000
international NGOs are currently active,7 over 3000 of which have consultative
status with the UN.8
1Goldstein et al. 2000, at 385.
2Cutler 2003, at 18.
3See the special issue of International Organization (vol. 54, issue 3) devoted to the topic.
4Kahler 2000, at 667.
5Anheier et al. 2003, at 9.
6Whitman 2002, at 53.
7Union of International Associations 2005, at Appendix 3, Table 1.
8
“Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Non-Governmental Organizations Section,” UN
Department of Economic and Social Affairs website, http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo, ac-
cessed 4 January 2008.
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While, as empirical developments, the growth of international law and in-
creased numbers of international non-state actors is undeniable, debates continue
as to the significance of these developments and the implications for the sovereign
state. These debates are discussed below from the perspective of conventional
(neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) and unconventional (constructivism,
liberalism, and neo-Gramscianism) approaches in international relations. The per-
spectives described are ideal-types; the work of individual authors that identify
with a given school of thought will often vary considerably in their treatment of
these issues.
Conventional Approaches
In a neorealist perspective, where states (the primary unit of interest) are con-
ceived of as rational actors struggling to survive in an anarchical system, inter-
national law has no independent basis outside of power politics. For neorealists,
international law serves the interests of powerful states, and when it is challenged
by such states it proves to be weak and ineffectual.9 Neorealists emphasize the
importance of consent in international law (states will only agree to be bound by
rules that conform to their interests) and the lack of strong enforcement mecha-
nisms. Critics of the neorealist conception of international law argue that it fails
to explain the growing body of international law and instances where strong states
have clearly been constrained by international legal norms.10 In addition to view-
ing international law as an epiphenomena in world politics, neorealists also have
a tendency to ignore or downplay the significance of non-state actors.11
Like neorealists, neoliberal institutionalists view states as rational and unitary
actors and take state preferences as fixed and exogenously determined. Unlike ne-
orealists, neoliberal institutionalists focus on relative, rather than absolute, gains
and suggest that states can cooperate to avoid suboptimal outcomes that emerge
under anarchy. In this view, states cooperate through ‘regimes’, or more broadly
‘institutions’, defined as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and infor-
9Reus-Smit 2004, at 16.
10Ibid., at 17-8; Stone Sweet 1997, at 138.
11Cutler 2003, at 77.
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mal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations.”12
Clearly, this broad definition encompasses legal institutions. However, because
neoliberal institutionalists focus primarily on how institutions can help states over-
come collective action problems, they have been criticized for ignoring the way
in which international institutions can shape the interests of states, and even their
identities.13 Furthermore, while this standard definition of institutions does not
rule out the participation of non-state actors, these actors have by and large been
sidelined in the majority of neoliberal institutionalist accounts.14
Unconventional Approaches
Constructivists, who reject the rationalist conception of state identities and pref-
erences as stable and exogenous, accord international law greater significance in
international relations. Constructivists argue that the demand for institutions (in-
cluding legal institutions) depends on an actor’s perception of international prob-
lems, which is, in part produced by their causal and normative beliefs.15 Thus, it
is a state’s perception of its interests which forms the basis for action on the inter-
national stage, and in turn, this perception may be influenced by international law.
To a constructivist, law is both produced by, and constitutive of, politics.16 While
constructivist insights could also be applied to the interrogation of the identities
and preferences of non-state actors, constructivist scholarship primarily focuses
on states.17
Like constructivists, liberal theorists also focus on variation in state prefer-
ences.18 However, their emphasis is on the relationship between domestic politics
and state behaviour, the analysis of which they view as necessarily prior to any
theory of social construction.19 Many scholars have recognized that traditional
12Keohane 1989, at 3.
13Reus-Smit 2004, at 20.
14Cutler 2003, at 77.
15Hasenclever et al. 1997, at 137.
16Reus-Smit 2004, at 23.
17Overbeek 2004, at 114; Tabb 2004, at 31.
18Moravcsik 1997, at 539.
19Ibid., at 540.
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examinations of international institutions have neglected domestic politics.20 Un-
derhill argues that:
States have legal decision-making power in international and (depending on
constitutional arrangements) domestic affairs, and are units in this sense.
They are not, however, unified and single-purpose decision-makers because
of the ways in which an array of competing coalitions of social forces
are integrated into the policy process of the state itself ... The rational
choice/unitary state device may well be useful for clarifying a complex sit-
uation in a set of international negotiations, for example, but it does not
necessarily enhance a general theory of international politics.21
While liberals pay particular attention to the “underlying identities, interests,
and power of individuals and groups” within the state, “who constantly pressure
the central decision makers to pursue policies consistent with their preferences,”
they also acknowledge that individuals and groups outside the state play a role.22
As such, in a liberal perspective, international law is not confined to intergovern-
mental treaties, but also spans private and transnational lawmaking (see further
discussion in Section 3.2.3).23
In this latter respect, liberal theory is compatible with more critical approaches
in international relations theory, which take a keen interest in transnational pro-
cesses (see further below). However, liberalism is often associated, rightly or
wrongly, with the belief that international law, as promoted by ‘liberal’ demo-
cratic states, is inherently good and will influence all states in such a manner as to
improve domestic governance.24 Critical theorists, particularly those that draw on
the writings of Antonio Gramsci, would disagree. Neo-Gramscian scholars argue
that it is only the most powerful corporate and economic actors and their allies
in government that have a real influence on state behaviour. These actors form a
transnational historic bloc, which propagates a certain ideology and works to cre-
ate and bolster institutions that favour the dominant forces in modern capitalism.25
20Martin and Simmons 1998, at 750.
21Underhill 2006, at 8.
22Moravcsik 1997, at 518.
23Slaughter 2000, at 244-5.
24Ibid., at 246. See Alvarez 2001, for a critique of Slaughter’s liberal theory.
25Cox 1999, at 12; Gill 1998, at 11.
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Legal experts play an important role in the transnational historic bloc.26
Like neorealists, neo-Gramscians view international law as undergirded by
power structures. However, rather than arguing that international law as ineffec-
tual, neo-Gramscians, like constructivists, consider law as both produced by and
constitutive of politics. In a neo-Gramscian perspective, international law, and
in particular international economic law, serves both to ‘lock-in’ state reforms
which favour market forces,27 and to cloak a fundamentally coercive, oppressive,
and inequitable global economic system in the rationality and neutrality of law
and legal expertise.28 It is argued that legalization is supported by an ideology
that is increasingly anti-political and serves to place economic institutions be-
yond politics.29 Furthermore, the types of international legal structures that are
emerging are seen as “overwhelmingly on ad hoc, discretionary, closed, and non-
transparent.”30 As such, in contrast to many liberal scholars, neo-Gramscians view
the trend of legalization as being at odds with the notions of democracy and the
rule of law.31
3.1.2 A Brief Introduction to Neo-Gramscian Theory
A neo-Gramscian approach is more suited to a study such as this, which is heavily
focused on international law and the role of non-state actors in international re-
lations, than conventional approaches. The rational approach of both neorealism
and neoliberal institutionalism minimizes the relevance of international law in in-
ternational relations. Furthermore, as a result of an overriding focus on states, con-
ceptualized as units, the conventional approaches fail to capture the importance of
transnational processes and non-state actors. Constructivist and liberal theories
overcome many of the shortcomings of conventional approaches. However, each
theory alone fails to capture the whole picture. The advantage of neo-Gramscian
theory is that it can incorporate both constructivist and liberal insights. In other
26Cutler 2001, at 485.
27Gill 2003, at 167.
28Cutler 2005, at 532.
29Jayasuria 2001, at 452.
30Schuerman 1999, at 3.
31Ibid.; Schneiderman 2001, at 526.
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words, it is a theory that addresses both structure and agency.
A neo-Gramscian approach is also apposite because of the critical nature of
this work. According to Cox, while a ‘problem-solving’ theorist “takes the world
as given (and on the whole as good)” and is primarily “concerned with the specific
reforms aimed at the maintenance of existing structures”, in contrast a ‘critical’
theorist is “concerned with how the existing order came into being” and “with
exploring the potential for structural change and the construction of strategies for
change.”32
It should be noted at the outset that it is the scholarship of neo-Gramscians,
rather than Gramsci himself, that this study calls upon. Some authors have sug-
gested that neo-Gramscians have employed Gramsci’s ideas in inappropriate ways,
in particular by transferring concepts developed at the national level to explain
global phenomena.33 However, as Levy and Newell point out, “Gramsci’s value
lies ... in the inspiration he has given to contemporary theorists in their sophisti-
cated treatment of these issues.”34
Hegemony and Historic Blocs
Hegemony is a central concept in a neo-Gramscian understanding of global pol-
itics. In this perspective, hegemony is not confined to the traditional notion of
the dominance of a state in the international system, but is broadened to involve
other “societal groups, economic structures, and concomitant ideological super-
structures.”35 An important aspect of hegemony is that it rests on a broad base of
consent, rather than depending on the employment of coercion.36 States consent-
ing to be bound by international legal rules which, in turn, constrain their actions is
a prime example of the voluntary nature of hegemony. As Egan argues, “instead
of capital ‘escaping’ the national state ... capital is more correctly being ‘liber-
ated’ by national states through their participation in the creation of multilateral
32Cox 1995, at 32.
33Germain and Kenny 1998.
34Levy and Newell 2005, at 53.
35Levy and Egan 2003, at 806.
36Ibid., at 805; Gill and Law 1989, at 476.
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institutions.”37
Hegemony is exercised through ‘historic blocs’ which represent “a historical
congruence between material forces, institutions, and ideologies, or broadly to an
alliance of different class forces.”38 It should be recalled that the neo-Gramscian
conception of a historic bloc is transnational. As Overbeek explains:
Transnational processes...are constituted in a social space transcending na-
tional borders (i.e. their dynamics are not fundamentally defined by the
existence of national boundaries...) and take place simultaneously in subna-
tional, national and international arenas.39
Van Apeldoorn makes an important clarification that while transnational social
forces have transcended national boundaries this is not to say that agency no
longer occurs in the national context: “by definition transnational social forces
do not operate outside states but inside different states at the same time.”40
A transnational historic bloc consists not only of TNCs and international or-
ganizations but also of government elites.41 As Cox argues:
Power within the state becomes concentrated in those agencies in closest
touch with the global economy – the offices of presidents and prime min-
isters, treasuries, central banks. The agencies that are more closely iden-
tified with domestic clients – ministries of industries, labor ministries, etc.
–become subordinated.42
This is part of what Cox termed the ‘internationalization’ of the state, a processes
by which national policies and practices are adjusted to the exigencies of the
global economy.43 This is a transformation of the state, rather than a ‘retreat’
per se.44 Bieling argues that:
37Egan 2003, at 85.
38Ibid.
39Overbeek 2005, at 42.
40van Apeldoorn 2004, at 145.
41Cox 1999, at 12.
42Cox 1997, at 162.
43Cox 1987, at 253.
44Strange 1996.
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The changing relevancy of particular state agencies – i.e. the up- or down-
grading of different kinds of ministries – gives an impression that states are
by far not unitary actors. There is at least some evidence to suggest that
globalisation and global governance have not generally weakened the state,
but rather advanced a business-oriented transformation of statehood.45
The process is also not uniform, but will result in “different forms of state corre-
sponding to the different positions of countries in the world economy.”46
The New Constitutionalism
Neo-Gramscians argue that the structural power of transnational capital has both
a material and an ideological dimension, and consider the two as highly inter-
related.47 The material dimension is the ability of capital to move - the exit option
discussed in Section 1.2.1. The ideological dimension is the structuring of hege-
mony through a set of ‘hegemonic ideas’.48 These hegemonic ideas are supported
and propagated by historic blocs, but the eventual goal is “the subtle establishment
of the prevailing ideology as natural and inevitable, indeed commonsensical.”49
Gill refers to the current dominant ideology as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’.50
One key aspect of disciplinary neoliberalism is the notion of competitiveness.
States must be stable and credible in the eyes of capital and currency investors, or
they will be ‘disciplined’ by the market (e.g. industrial flight).51 Egan argues that:
The ideological construction of globalization makes it appear reasonable
for states to emphasize policies that support ‘competitiveness,’ and this is
used to justify weaker or lax enforcement of labor laws and regulations on
environmental protection as well as the elimination of restrictions on trade
and capital movements.52
45Bieling 2007, at 2-3.
46Cox 1987, at 253.
47van Apeldoorn 2004, at 159; Egan 2003, at 79.
48Gill and Law 1989, at 476.
49Litowitz 2000, at 528.
50Gill 1998.
51Ibid, at 5.
52Egan 2003, at 79.
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Cerny describes the transformation of the traditional nation-state into a ‘competi-
tion’ state: a ‘quasi-enterprise association’ that may actual require increased state
intervention in certain areas in order to ensure competitiveness and marketiza-
tion.53 According to Cerny, “[t]he challenge of the competition state is said to be
one of getting the state to do both more and less at the same time.”54 That is to say,
the state may be retreating from service and social protection of the public, while
it simultaneously increases its role in the securing private property rights and in-
vestor freedoms. This thinking is consistent with Gramsci’s argument that the
public and the private are complementary spheres of domination, and that in some
cases hegemony in the private sphere will only be possible with the provision of
public protection by the state.55
Gill argues that while ideology and market power are both significant forces,
alone they are insufficient to secure the transformation of the state in line with
the tenets of neoliberalism.56 What is further required is an international gov-
ernance framework: the politico-legal dimension of disciplinary neoliberalism.57
Gill refers to this governance framework as the ‘new constitutionalism’, and ar-
gues that “[i]t seeks to separate economic policies from broad political account-
ability in order to make governments more responsive to the discipline of market
forces and correspondingly less responsive to popular-democratic forces and pro-
cesses.”58
Counterhegemony
For neo-Gramscians, civil society is the ground on which hegemony is built, but
also the terrain of contestation where a counterhegemony could be constructed.59
However, there are several significant obstacles to such a development. The first,
as Cutler argues, is that counterhegemonic voices may be silenced through a
53Cerny 1997, at 251.
54Ibid., at 263, emphasis added.
55Litowitz 2000, at 526.
56Gill 2003, at 132.
57Gill 1998, at 5.
58Ibid.
59Cox 1999, at 3.
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knowledge structure that privileges expertise.60 Law, in particular, has a ten-
dency to empower particular expertise.61 A second obstacle is what Gramsci
called transformismo, which as Cox explains:
can serve as a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dan-
gerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and
can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organized opposition to
established social and political power.62
In other words, counterhegemonic voices can be co-opted by the historic bloc.
With an understanding of transformismo, many neo-Gramscian scholars are skep-
tical of accounts that champion global civil society in general, and NGOs in par-
ticular, as “autonomous social groups balancing the power of states and capital.”63
Despite these obstacles, neo-Gramscians argue that a counterhegemony can
be constructed through a ‘war of position’: a long term coordinated strategy that
involves the mobilization of multiple bases of power and the development of or-
ganizational capacity.64
3.2 The Institution of Investment Protection
While this study adopts a neo-Gramscian framework, the focus is not macro-level
analysis, but rather an assessment of one particular institution: the institution of
investment protection. This section provides a more precise definition of an insti-
tution. It describes the sources of the norms and rules that form the basis of the
institution of investment protection and clarifies the nature of this institution as a
hybrid of public and private authority.
3.2.1 One Institution or Many?
As Duffield notes, the term institution “is frequently used to refer to distinctly
different empirical phenomena, such as intergovernmental organizations ... inter-
60Cutler 1999, at 77.
61Adler and Bernstein 2005, at 310.
62Cox 1993, at 39.
63Levy and Newell 2005, at 54.
64Ibid at 51; Egan 2003, at 77; Cox 1993, at 45.
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national regimes, and sets of norms.”65 In this study, the concept of an institution
is used to group together a variety of norms and rules that interact to provide pro-
tection to foreign investors. While each IIA, contract, or set of arbitral rules could
individually be classified as an institution, it is the collection of norms and rules
that compose these agreements that is of interest here. While it is true that treating
these norms and rules collectively risks ignoring potentially significant discrepan-
cies between various agreements (see further the discussion of BITs in Section
3.2.2), it allows for cross-case comparison and a more comprehensive treatment
of issues that transcend one individual agreement.
The definition adopted in this study builds on Duffield’s conceptualization
of international institutions as “relatively stable sets of related constitutive, reg-
ulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system,
the actors in the system (including states as well as non-state entities), and their
activities.”66 For further explanation, norms can be defined as “socially shared ex-
pectations, understandings, or standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with
a given identity.”67 Norms are implicitly consensual, and cannot be imposed, but
carry a sense of obligation. Norms can vary in strength and exert differing de-
grees of influence. While norms are intersubjective, rules are formal. However,
rules may exhibit differing degrees of formality or formalization. Young suggests
that rules are “well-defined guides to action or standards setting forth actions that
members [of an institution] are expected to perform (or to refrain from perform-
ing) under appropriate circumstances.”68 Constitutive norms and rules endow ac-
tors with significant roles and rights and “determine their underlying identities,
interests, and preferences.”69 Regulative norms and rules order and constrain be-
haviour: they can be prescriptive (requiring or obligating actors to behave in cer-
tain ways), or they may proscribe, prohibit or forbid various actions, or they may
be permissive (allowing actors to engage in certain actions).70 Finally, procedural
65Duffield 2007, at 1.
66Ibid., at 2.
67Ibid., at 6.
68Young 1989, at 16.
69Duffield 2007, at 7 and 13.
70Ibid., at 14.
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norms and rules govern the interactions of actors within an institution.71
This definition explicitly acknowledges a role for non-state actors in insti-
tutions and the possibility of private or public-private institutions (see Section
3.2.3). Furthermore, it recognizes the constitutive function of institutions that is
emphasized by constructivist and critical scholars. However, as it is a definition
of international institutions, it focuses explicitly on norms and rules that pertain
to the international system. As such, it reifies an international-domestic divide
which, it is argued here, is inappropriate in a study of investor-state interaction.
Instead, it is suggested that the institution of investment protection is transna-
tional in nature. Processes within this institution transcend territorial boundaries,
but foreign investors operate within the bounds of the state. It then follows that
the transnational institution of investment protection operates simultaneously at
the international, national, and subnational levels, and is composed of a relatively
stable set of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that
pertain to the protection of foreign investors and their investments within host
states.
3.2.2 Sources of Norms and Rules
Some norms and rules are universal, and enshrined in customary international law,
while others only exist in specific IIAs or state contracts. Furthermore, several
different sets of procedural norms and rules of arbitration may be applied to a
given dispute, depending on stipulations in an IIA or state contract, and in some
cases, the choice of the investor.
Customary International Law
Customary international law consists of norms and rules that are deduced from
the behaviour of states. In order for law to be customary, a substantial number
of states must have acted consistently as if they believed that they were required
by law to behave in a given way (opinio juris).72 Customary international law
71Ibid., at 7 and 14.
72Sornarajah 2004a, at 89.
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is important because it may influence the interpretation and application of treaty
provisions, and in some cases modify their content.73
Defining norms of customary international law in any area is generally a dif-
ficult task. Byers notes that custom arises out of “frequently ambiguous combi-
nations of behavioural regularity and expressed or inferred acknowledgments of
legality.”74 However, it is especially difficult to define in the area of investment
protection where opinions on what constitutes custom are particularly divisive.
Some authors would argue that the General Assembly resolutions on permanent
sovereignty over natural resources and CERDS (see Section 2.1.2) should be con-
sidered a part of customary international law.75 However, Paasivirta argues that,
“the Charter, whilst in many respects reflecting the present customary law, has not
gained full recognition as regards its treatment of foreign investment.”76 Others
have suggested that the vast number of BITs have established certain norms of
investment protection as custom, despite the fact that developing countries have
traditionally rejected them in other fora.77 In opposition to this view, Sornarajah
argues that BITs are not consistent enough to constitute custom; they vary consid-
erably depending on which countries are involved in the negotiations, as well as
the time at which a treaty was drafted.78
It can be concluded that the content of customary international law in the area
of investment protection is highly contested and varies not only by observer, but
also according to changes in the ebb and flow of prevailing international political
and economic forces.79
International Investment Agreements
As of the end of 2005, there were an estimated 2,500 BITs, more than 232 regional
trade agreements and economic cooperation agreements containing investment
73Byers 1999, at 4.
74Ibid., at 3.
75Sornarajah 2004a, at 90-1.
76Paasivirta 1989, at 339.
77Otto and Cordes 2002, at V-32.
78Sornarajah 2003, at 181.
79Dattu 2000, at 280.
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provisions,80 and five WTO Agreements covering foreign investment-related is-
sues.81 IIAs generally include the same basic set of provisions, but there are often
textual variations which could result in different interpretations of the same gen-
eral obligations under different agreements.82 IIAs vary based on the countries
involved, their relative bargaining strengths, and the time at which a treaty was
negotiated; as Sornarajah notes “the treaties made when the sway of economic
liberalism was high would tend to include rules favoring more absolute forms
of investment protection than treaties made at the time when different ideologies
were competing with each other.”83
The implicit purpose of an IIA for capital-importing states is to attract for-
eign investment that will contribute to development. However, this purpose is
hardly ever made explicit in the text of an IIA.84 The majority of IIAs limit the
purpose of the agreement to the ‘promotion and protection’ of investment, and as
Newcombe notes, “promotion is largely the assumed byproduct of protection.”85
It is investment protection that is the key interest of developed capital-exporting
economies.86
Many developed countries have taken up the practice of producing what is
called a ‘model’ or ‘prototype’ BIT, a template used in negotiations.87 Actual
BITs tend to follow these models quite closely, with only minor changes. While
countries each develop their own model, there are two broad categories that these
models generally fit into: European, and North American.88 The main differences
80UNCTAD 2006a.
81The Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); the Agreement on Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs); the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM); and the Agreement on Government
Procurement (GPA). This study does not explore the provisions of the WTO agreements in any
detail.
82Houde and Yannaca-Small 2004, at 3.
83Sornarajah 2003, at 181.
84Garcı´a-Bolı´var 2005, at 760.
85Newcombe 2007a, 373.
86Van Harten 2007a, at 179, points out that these countries are under competitive pressure to protect
their own investors in order to avert their flight to other capital-exporting states offering better
protection.
87The template may also be used in the drafting of investment chapters in FTAs.
88Houde and Yannaca-Small 2004, at 3; Brewer and Young 1998, at 76.
94 Theoretical Framework
between the two types are that North American IIAs cover the pre-establishment
phase and include provisions on performance requirements (see Section 4.1.4),
whereas European IIAs generally do not.89
State Contracts
The term ‘state contracts’ refers to contracts between governments and foreign na-
tionals, including loan agreements, contracts for supplies and services, contracts
for employment, agreements for the construction or operation of transport or tele-
phone systems, and agreements conferring rights to exploit natural resources.90 It
is the latter form of state contract that is particularly relevant for the purposes of
the present study.
In most developed countries, rights to access natural resources, such as min-
erals and oil, are based only on law and regulation; however, developing countries
have relied far more on state contracts. State contracts that were drawn up in
colonial times are generally referred to as ‘concession agreements’. These agree-
ments gave investors nearly limitless rights over vast areas of land for long periods
of time, while imposing few obligations on them.91 During this period, compa-
nies possessed significant bargaining power as they had the support of their home
states. Following decolonization, the bargaining power shifted to newly indepen-
dent governments, and many contracts were renegotiated or investments were na-
tionalized.92 The types of state contracts that were negotiated in this period were
very different from traditional concessions. Referred to as ‘economic develop-
ment agreements’, they were far more focused on the goals of the state in promot-
ing development.93 This generation of contracts took on new forms such as joint
venture agreements, production-sharing agreements, service contracts, contracts
of work, and management contracts.94 In the modern period, with the increased
89Ibid.
90UNCTAD 2004b, at 135.
91Peter 1995, at 328.
92See Kolo and Wa¨lde 2000 for examples of contract renegotiations in the mineral sector during this
period.
93Otto and Cordes 2002, at I-42.
94Maniruzzaman 1992, at 162.
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competition between states for foreign investment, the bargaining power has ar-
guably begun to shift back to favour TNCs. As a result, the newest generation of
state contracts are chiefly concerned with investment promotion and protection.
While they still contain some development provisions, they are mainly ones that
impose minimal economic cost to investors.95
Countries may negotiate ad hoc agreements with investors, which will be uni-
que, or provide model agreements to establish the same conditions for several dif-
ferent projects or some hybrid of the two (where model agreements are provided
but more specific terms can be negotiated).96 As state contracts are generally
confidential documents, at least for a given period of time (usually until after the
project has terminated), model agreements obviously provide more transparency
and opportunity for public scrutiny and thus reduce the possibilities for corruption
in the negotiation process.97
State contracts rarely endure for fifty years or more as was possible in colonial
times, but they are still long-term in nature. For example, a thirty-year contract
with renewal clauses would not be uncommon. One could argue that the long
duration of state contracts is justified by the high costs and high risks that investors
face in the extractive industries. Nevertheless, it should also be recognized that
this aspect of contracts may cause problems for the host state, as international and
domestic political circumstances, government priorities, and indeed governments
themselves, change over such periods of time.98
Arbitral Rules
A state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism has always been present in the large
majority of IIAs. Arbitration provides an option beyond diplomatic negotiations,
but formal state-to-state investment disputes tend to be quite rare. In the 1960s,
a second type of dispute settlement mechanism emerged which allowed for ar-
95Otto and Cordes 2002, at IV-18.
96Otto 1999, at 30.
97That having been said, one of the most widely recognized examples of a successful model agreement
program is that of the contract of work (CoW) system in Indonesia, which operated under the New
Order regime and has been associated with graft. See further discussion of CoWs in Section 6.1.1.
98Peter 1995, at 14.
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bitration directly between an investor and the host state. Investor-state dispute
settlement mechanisms are now standard features of IIAs and state contracts.
An international ‘investment court’ has not been established and, as there is
no broad multilateral agreement on investment, nothing comparable to the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding has been set up. Instead, BITs and other IIAs
rely on ‘one-off’ tribunals that follow the procedures of various sets of arbitral
rules established externally to IIAs.
Investor-state arbitration can be supervised by an administrative body (institu-
tional arbitration)99 or can be unsupervised (ad hoc arbitration). The supervising
body may assist in appointing arbitrators, determining the place of arbitration, de-
termining costs and arbitrator fees, and so forth, and will itself charge a fee for the
performance of these functions.
The most important supervisory body referred to in IIAs and state contracts
is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
which was established in 1966, when the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention)
came into force. More than 1,500 BITs provide for ICSID arbitration, as do im-
portant regional agreements such as the NAFTA.100 Ratifications of the ICSID
Convention rose gradually in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s following the
accession of the major developing countries and former communist countries.101
As of November 2007, 155 states had signed the Convention, and 143 had ratified
it.102 In order for a dispute to qualify for ICSID arbitration, it must be between a
Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State. However, if one of
the parties does not meet these criteria, then the Additional Facility, developed in
1978, may be utilized. The ICSID Rules and Additional Facility Rules are peri-
odically revised; the most recent versions came into force in April 2006.103 Some
99While this is the common terminology employed in the literature, it is not used in this study in
order to avoid confusion with institutional theory and the notion of the institution of investment
protection.
100
“Canada: ICSID At A Crossroads,” Mondaq, 27 September 2006, http://www.mondaq.com.
101Van Harten 2007a, at 27.
102This number is actually lower than that reported in May 2007: in the intervening period, Bolivia
withdrew from the Convention. See further Section 7.4.3.
103
“Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules),” ICSID Convention, Regula-
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of the changes that were made in the latest update to the rules are discussed in
Section 7.1.3.
Unlike other supervisory bodies, ICSID was designed expressly for the pur-
pose of handling investor-state arbitrations and does not handle disputes between
firms. The Centre is a part of the World Bank Group and is located in Washington,
D.C. It is made up of a Secretariat and an Administrative Council composed of one
representative of each Contracting State (usually a finance minister or his or her
deputy) and chaired by the President of the World Bank.104 Although ICSID was
established in 1966, the first ICSID arbitral tribunal did not convene until 1972,
and the pace of cases brought before the Centre remained slow for decades.105
It is only in the last five years that the caseload of ICSID has increased sharply.
Between 2001 and 2006, the number of disputes filed under ICSID was 150%
of the total number of cases filed over the first 35 years that the Centre was in
existence.106
The ICC’s International Court of Arbitration is another major supervisory
body.107 In contrast to ICSID, the ICC is a private organization, which refers
to itself as “voice of world business.”108 The current Rules of Arbitration of the
ICC came into force in 1998.109
In 1976, the most significant set of ad hoc arbitral rules were developed by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).110
UNCITRAL was established by the UN General Assembly in 1966 and was given
the general mandate to further the progressive harmonization and unification of
the law of international trade.111 An integral part of the Commission’s work is the
tions and Rules, April 2006, http://icsid.worldbank.org.
104Reed et al. 2004, at 5.
105Egli 2007, at 1063.
106Rowly 2006.
107Other supervisory institutions include the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).
108
“What is ICC?” ICC website, http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html, accessed 4 January 2008.
109ICC Rules of Arbitration, 1 January 1998, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4199/index.html.
110UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 28 April 1976, Report of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law on the Work of its Ninth Session, UN Doc. A/31/17 (1976), reproduced in 15
ILM (1976), at 701.
111
“Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL,” UNCITRAL website, http://www.uncitral.org,
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promotion of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards (1958 ‘New York Convention’), which is crucial to the enforcement
of awards rendered under UNCITRAL and other rules (see Section 4.2.2).112 At
the time of writing, discussions were taking place on a revision of the UNCITRAL
Rules for the first time in their history (see Section 7.1.4).
3.2.3 Public and Private Authority
Weintraub points out that the concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ mean very differ-
ent things to different people, and therefore “any discussion of public and private
should begin by recognizing, and trying to clarify, the multiple and ambiguous
character of its subject matter.”113 In this study, the distinction between private
and public is meant in the sense of the individual versus the collective.114 This
distinction is used to differentiate between state and non-state actors, but also be-
tween the public and private acts of a state (i.e. acts that affect or do not affect the
public interest).
Scholars have observed that non-state actors are increasingly taking on new
and significant roles in the development, implementation, and enforcement of in-
ternational rules. New forms of private and hybrid (public-private) governance are
emerging in a multitude of issue areas.115 Examples include reporting schemes
(e.g. the Global Reporting Initiative), certification and labeling schemes (e.g. the
Forest Stewardship Council), sets of voluntary principles (e.g. the ICC Business
Charter for Sustainable Development), and standards regimes (e.g. the ISO).116
Cutler et al. define a ‘private regime’ as “an integrated complex of formal and
informal institutions that is a source of governance for an economic issue area as
a whole.”117 Falkner presents a broader notion of ‘private governance’:
accessed 4 January 2008.
112The New York Convention had 142 Parties as of 1 January 2008. The full text
of the Convention and its membership status is found on the UNCITRAL website,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.
113Weintraub 1997, at 3.
114Ibid., at 5.
115Hall and Biersteker 2002; Cutler et al. 1999.
116Pattberg 2007; Clapp 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Cutler et al. 1999.
117Cutler et al. 1999, at 13.
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‘Private governance’ emerges at the global level where the interactions among
private actors, or between private actors on the one hand and civil society
and state actors on the other, give rise to institutional arrangements that
structure and direct actors’ behavior in an issue-specific area. These struc-
turing effects resemble the ‘public’ governing functions of states and inter-
governmental institutions, and for this reason the notion of governance, and
indeed authority, has been applied to private actors.118
It may not be immediately apparent how the area of investment law fits in to
this debate, given that IIAs are intergovernmental (i.e. public) agreements. How-
ever, when one looks at the broader architecture of investment protection, which
includes state contracts and arbitral rules that have been developed by non-state
organizations (e.g. the ICC) with the original intention of governing purely private
disputes, it is clear that the line between public and private has been blurred. The
arbitration process is a particularly grey area. It brings together public and private
rules, state and non-state actors, and vests authority in private actors (arbitrators)
in a selection process that is not controlled by states.119
The legal literature emphasizes that arbitrators only ‘interpret’ the rules that
have been laid out by states. However, Stone Sweet suggests that arbitration
is more accurately described as a form of governance.120 First, by resolving a
dispute, the arbitrator “makes rules that are concrete, particular, and retrospec-
tive.”121 Second, in providing a justification for the decision, the arbitrator “makes
rules of an abstract, general, and prospective nature.”122 In the first instance the
decisions reflect the particular circumstances of the dispute at hand and determine
the resolution of that dispute. In the second instance, the decisions affect the very
relationship between the parties to the dispute, causing them to reflect on their own
interpretations of what that relationship entailed, and likely affecting the future of
the relationship and the occurrence and/or outcome of any future disputes.
In addition to conferring the authority to govern in arbitrators, investor-state
118Falkner 2003, at 72-3.
119The state chooses one arbitrator, the investor a second, and they collectively agree on a third. See
further Section 4.2.1.
120Stone Sweet 1999, at 147.
121Ibid., at 156.
122Ibid., at 157.
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dispute settlement, by its very nature, elevates foreign investors to a level of recog-
nition in international law and politics not usually afforded to non-state actors.
Foreign investors, like all non-state actors, are considered ‘objects’ rather than
‘subjects’ of public international law.123 According to the International Law As-
sociation (ILA), investors are not acquiring international legal personality through
investment law per se, but they “enjoy a measure of international locus standi.”124
However, as Cutler argues, no matter what terminology is used, “today transna-
tional corporations are significant de facto subjects of law.”125 The analytical
distinction only serves to make corporations ‘invisible’ under international law
when it comes to issues of corporate conduct.126 Sornarajah points out that, ironi-
cally, while IIAs and contracts give investors standing in international law, efforts
to create responsibilities on the part of TNCs have been resisted on the grounds of
the absence of international legal personality:
The classic ploy has been to recognise that there is a problem as far as ac-
countability is concerned but that the only method by which the matter can
be dealt with is through the formulation of non-binding codes containing
exhortations to multinational corporations to conform to its prescriptions.
The emergence of strong norms has been stunted through countermanding
of such efforts by the home states of multinational corporations. The phe-
nomenon that results is that while treaties protecting multinational corpora-
tions are increasing, the rules that seek to impose duties on these corpora-
tions are aborted.127
Elevating private actors to a level playing field with states is generally consid-
ered acceptable when states are acting in a private capacity. Van Harten explains
how states can act under contracts as private parties:
When a legislature expropriates property, leading to a dispute with its pri-
vate owner, the passage of the legislation is quintessentially a sovereign act
and the resulting dispute quite clearly a matter of public law. Alternatively,
when the Government contracts with a company to tend the lawn in front
123Horn 2004, at 9.
124International Law Association (ILA) 2006, at 5.
125Cutler 2003, at 21.
126Ibid.
127Sornarajah 2006b, at 32.
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of Parliament, the Government’s conclusion of the contract is a commercial
act of the State, one that a private party could carry out, and its resolution
by arbitration can credibly be positioned within the private domain.128
Van Harten admits that in practice it may be difficult to separate the private and
public acts of states, but he argues that in two particular situations the distinc-
tion is clear. In IIAs the relationship between the state and an investor is one of
regulator and regulated, and therefore any government acts that are challenged in
arbitration will be of a public nature. In contrast, state contracts generally reduce
states to private actors participating in commercial relationships and do not cover
regulatory acts, and as such “arbitration does not usually determine core questions
of public law.”129 However, if a contract contains a ‘stabilization clause’ it will
cover regulation, and the relationship ceases to be private (see Section 4.1.5).
In summary, the institution of investment protection is a hybrid of public and
private authority. States make some of the rules, often influenced by the work of
international organizations and private actors, while other rules are developed by
private organizations. Private actors are delegated the authority to ‘interpret’ and
apply these rules to specific disputes. This constitutive aspect of the institution
is particularly significant in light of the broad and vague nature of the regulative
rules and norms of investment protection (see Chapter 4). The elevation of foreign
investors to de facto subjects of international law is also an important constitutive
aspect of the institution. Finally, this hybrid institution has implications for public
policy when it determines the outcome of regulatory disputes that arise under an
IIA or a stabilization clause in a contract.
Scholarly inquiry on the issue of private authority in international affairs has
focused on two main questions: (i) what does increasing transnational private
authority mean for the continuing existence/relevance of public authority (i.e. the
state)?; and what does increasing transnational private authority mean in terms of
democratic accountability and legitimacy at all levels of governance?130 Both of
these issues are addressed in this study with specific reference to environmental
governance.
128Van Harten 2007b, at 373.
129Ibid., at 25.
130Cutler 2003, at 28; Hall and Biersteker 2002, at 7.
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3.3 A Critical Assessment of the Institution of Investment
Protection
In this section, it is argued that the discussions of the institution of investment
protection in both political and legal scholarship fail to address several crucial
issues. There is a need for a critical assessment of the institution that is grounded
in political theory. Such a critical assessment is developed in this section through
the application of neo-Gramscian insights. This assessment frames the remainder
of the study.
3.3.1 A Gap in the Literature
There are numerous assessments, many of them critical, of the MAI negotiations
in the OECD.131 However, with the collapse of the MAI, scholarly attention turned
to other issues, and in international relations literature the subsequent proliferation
of IIAs has been largely neglected. The one exception is the research devoted
to analyzing the effectiveness of BITs in attracting flows of FDI, discussed in
Section 1.1.1. Legal scholars have addressed a far broader range of topics related
to investment protection. However, the majority of legal scholarship is rationally
based and uncritical.132 States are viewed as utility-maximizers which rationally
evaluate the costs and benefits of complying with IIAs. Guzman’s analysis of a
state compliance with BITs illustrates the rational perspective:
Consider a country that has signed a BIT in which it promises not to expro-
priate foreign investment. Assume for the purposes of this example that the
country makes this promise because doing so increases the flow of foreign
direct investment into the country. Even after making the promise, of course,
the country could choose to expropriate the local assets of foreign firms. As-
sume that the available assets have a total value of $100 million to the coun-
try. This potential gain of $100 million must be weighed against the cost
of an expropriation, which includes several components. First, the violating
country loses the benefits currently being provided by foreign firms, includ-
ing tax revenues, technological transfers, employment, and so on. Suppose
131See, e.g., Egan 2003.
132Notable exceptions are the work of Prof. Sornarajah and Gus Van Harten.
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that this loss amounts to $40 million. Second, the country is likely to suffer
a reputational loss in the eyes of foreign investors. The act of expropriation
signals a willingness to seize the assets of foreigners and reduces the attrac-
tiveness of the country to potential investors. Assume this translates into a
loss of future investment, which the country values at $40 million. Finally,
the country will suffer a loss of reputational capital with respect to other
countries. Potential treaty partners will view the country as a less reliable
partner and will be less willing to enter into future agreements. Assume that
this loss is equivalent to $30 million.133
In this example, Guzman has not even taken into account the costs of an arbitration
and an award against the state. His aim is rather to show that the reputational effect
of a BIT is significant in a cost-benefit analysis. He calculates that the total cost of
the expropriation for the state is $110 million, compared with only a $100 million
benefit. Given the net loss of $10 million, in Guzman’s view the state will clearly
choose to honour its commitment, and forgo the expropriation.
There are four main problems with this type of cost-benefit approach to in-
vestment protection: (i) it assumes that the effects of an institution are intended
and anticipated by states; (ii) it assumes that states have perfect knowledge with
regard outcomes; (iii) it assumes that the costs and benefits of a given course of
action can be objectively measured; and (iv) it ignores the domestic politics that
lead to government decisions.
First, this approach assumes that a state acts with the intention to comply
with or to breach its international obligations. In Guzman’s example, the gov-
ernment contemplated an intentional expropriation of an investment for material
gain. By contrast, investor-state disputes concerning the environment presumably
arise unintentionally. Young refers to the unintended effects of institutions as ‘side
effects’, and notes that:
In individual cases, the impact of the relevant side effects may equal or even
exceed the magnitude of the intended effect attributable to the operation of
international regimes, a fact that should give pause to regime enthusiasts
who advocate the creation of new institutions as a solution to every prob-
lem.134
133Guzman 2002, at 1851-2.
134Young 1994, at 151-2.
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Side effects are possibly not even anticipated by a government when it ne-
gotiates a contract or an IIA. Martin and Simmons argue that it is important to
differentiate between unintended and unanticipated effects:
Effects may be anticipated but unintended. For example, it is generally ex-
pected that arrangements to lower the rate of inflation will lead to somewhat
higher levels of unemployment. Thus, higher unemployment is an antici-
pated, although unintended, consequence of stringent monetary policies. It
is best understood as a price actors are sometimes willing to bear to gain the
benefits of low inflation. Such unintended but anticipated consequences of
institutions present little challenge to a rationalist approach, since they fit
neatly into a typical cost-benefit analysis. Genuinely unanticipated effects,
however, present a larger challenge.135
According to Martin and Simmons, unanticipated effects are more likely “in sit-
uations that have relatively complex and permutable secondary rules, such as le-
galized institutions.”136 Abbott and Snidal argue that delegation (for example to
an arbitral tribunal), “provides the greatest source of unanticipated sovereignty
costs.”137 In the specific case of the NAFTA, Abbott suggests that Chapter 11
“has been invoked by private investors in circumstances that were not contem-
plated by NAFTA negotiators” and that disputes have “yielded certain unantic-
ipated results.”138 Dhooge argues that the NAFTA’s Chapter 11 has “opened a
proverbial Pandora’s Box of unintended and unanticipated consequences for fu-
ture environmental regulation.”139 Comments made by US Senator Kerry in 2002
further support the claim that the legislators who passed the NAFTA did not an-
ticipate the investor-state arbitrations that resulted:
When we passed NAFTA, there wasn’t one word of debate on the subject of
the Chapter 11 resolution - not one word. Nobody knew what was going to
happen. Nobody knew what the impacts might be.140
135Martin and Simmons 1998, at 750, emphasis added.
136Ibid.
137Abbott and Snidal 2000, at 438.
138Abbott 2000, at 522 and 547.
139Dhooge 2001, at 274.
140Qtd. in Kinnear and Hansen 2005, at 104.
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Finally, a statement from the Attorney General of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan,
suggests that this is the experience outside of the NAFTA as well; he claims that
BITs “are signed without any knowledge of their implications,” and that it is not
until “you are hit by the first investor-state arbitration [that] you realize what these
words mean.”141
The second problem with the rational cost-benefit approach, is that it also as-
sumes that governments have perfect knowledge with regard to outcomes, that is
that they can predict the costs and benefits of all courses of action. This logic is
questionable in many circumstances, but particularly so where norms and rules
intended to govern behaviour are very imprecise. While a direct expropriation,
given as an example by Guzman, is likely the most straightforward issue in inter-
national investment law, it is nevertheless notoriously difficult for states, investors,
and arbitral tribunals to determine when an expropriation is lawful and to agree
on the level of compensation that is appropriate. Furthermore, direct expropria-
tion, although a major problem in the past, is now a rarity. Contemporary issues
in investment protection predominantly concern regulatory interference with in-
vestment. In the case of an indirect expropriation (see Section 4.1.3), or other in-
stances where regulation or the actions of courts have affected an investment, the
complexities of applying investment law are manifold. Predicting the outcome of
a arbitration in such a case is further complicated by a lack of transparency and
consistency in arbitral practice, and by the limited number of cases that have been
decided to date (see Section 4.3.2 and Chapter 5 in its entirety.).
Thirdly, the rational cost-benefit approach assumes that a concrete value can
be placed on the benefit of interfering with an investment. In Guzman’s example,
the benefit to the state of the direct expropriation was assessed at $100 million.
Again, when one is discussing regulatory interference with an investment rather
than an outright taking, such a simple calculation is impossible. For example,
how does one quantify the benefit of protecting biodiversity? Economists may
have derived many ways of answering this type of question, but it is undeniably a
value-laden issue; politics and ideology will very much factor into a government’s
assessment.
141
“Pakistan Attorney General Advises States to Scrutinize Investment Treaties Carefully,” Investment
Treaty News, 1 December 2006, http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn.
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Finally, the approach taken by Guzman and the vast majority of international
law scholars ignores the dynamics of domestic politics that lead to a decisions
such as whether to expropriate a property. For example, if a government felt that
its response to an investor-state conflict would determine the outcome of an up-
coming election, it might very well choose a course of action that would otherwise
appear ‘irrational’.
As rational approaches dominate legal scholarship, and political scientists
have largely ignored the topic, the most substantial critiques of the institution of
investment protection have emerged outside of academia. Several NGOs, most of
them based in the US or Canada, have done a remarkable job of generating infor-
mation about, and sound criticisms of, IIAs and specific investor-state disputes.142
While the work of these NGOs is commendable for its depth and sophistication, it
is argued here that there remains a need for an academic account of the institution
of investment protection that is grounded in political theory.
3.3.2 Neo-Gramscian Insights
The institution of investment protection is viewed in this study as a key component
in the ‘new constitutionalism’.143 The institution is aimed at binding states to a
version of economic liberalism and ‘locking-in’ regulatory frameworks to ensure
predictability for investors.144 The institution is a product of the dominance of
the ideology of disciplinary neoliberalsm, but it also serves to further propagate
this ideology. In this ideology investment protection is framed in the institution
as necessary for the attraction of FDI, which is in turn put forth as an essential
requirement for development. As Egan argues, “negotiations to liberalize trade
and investment serve the dual role of seeking to free capital from regulation as well
as to construct a common sense understanding of the inevitability and desirability
of doing so.”145
In addition, disciplinary neoliberalism frames arbitration as neutral and de-
142The leader in this field is the International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD), but also
prominent is the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL).
143See also Schneiderman 2000.
144Schneiderman 2001, at 521.
145Egan 2003, at 79, emphasis added.
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politicized. Arbitrators are viewed not as governors, but as mere interpreters of
the law, which itself is viewed as rational and unbiased. However, as Cutler ar-
gues, “[w]hile the authority of law clearly rests on the belief that more than the
rule of social mores, pure power, or economic efficiency is involved, it is impor-
tant to recognize the role of human agency in its creation and application.”146 Pic-
ciotto further suggests that, “the interpretation and application of legal rules is not
a mechanistic but a flexible process, which allows scope for the overt or covert
consideration of social, political, and cultural factors and adaptation to circum-
stances” and furthermore reminds us that, “legal rules are normative, and hence
their interpretation inevitably involves judgments about values.”147 In domestic
courts, these judgments about values are made by individuals that are accountable
to the government and thereby the public, but in arbitration, traditional mecha-
nisms of accountability are lacking (see Section 4.3.2). Nevertheless, arbitration
is held up to be impartial while national legal systems are made out to be arbi-
trary. Scheuerman argues that this view is “blatantly ideological.”148 While it
is true that courts and domestic laws may be, on occasion, biased against foreign
capital, Scheuerman suggests that foreign investors’ preference for arbitration also
reflects their fear that domestic courts are more concerned with the public interest
than with corporate profit.149
The superiority of arbitration over dispute resolution in national courts is pro-
mulgated by international organizations, academics and “corporate legal elites im-
bued with neoliberal ideology.”150 Because investment law is highly technical
and complex, the implications of its application are only understood by a small
set of specialists.151 These specialists are trained to defend the independence and
neutrality of arbitration and the separation of law and politics.152 In the area of
investment protection, academic commentators may also have a vested interest in
upholding this ideology, if they themselves act as arbitrators or the legal repre-
146Cutler 2001, at 490.
147Picciotto 2005, at 479-81.
148Scheuerman 1999, at 8.
149Ibid.
150Cutler 1999, at 77.
151Cutler 2003, at 5.
152Ibid.; Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002, at 6.
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sentatives of parties and thereby profit from the system (see Sections 4.2.1 and
4.3.2). Thus, in the institution of investment protection, legal expertise is privi-
leged while opportunities for public participation and democratic accountability
are minimized.
Democratic accountability may be further reduced by the exploitation of the
institution of investment protection by elites in government that form a part of
the transnational historic bloc. For example, Allee and Huth have argued that
political leaders “will seek legal dispute settlement in situations where they an-
ticipate sizeable domestic political costs should they attempt to settle a dispute
through the making of bilateral, negotiated concessions.”153 The authors refer to
this as ‘political cover’. Through political cover, a leader can use the existence
of an international constraint as a defense for a politically unpalatable position.
In a similar vein, Brewster has assessed how international constraints can bene-
fit certain divisions of government, resulting in a shift of power (e.g. from the
legislature to the executive) and a change in the results of the domestic political
process.154 Her insights could equally apply to different sectors of government.
Each ministry, agency, or even department within a ministry, may have an agenda
that is particular to its mandate. Even if all elected officials generally support
economic growth and the attraction of foreign investment, they are likely to have
different preferences in how investment is admitted and regulated. It is rare that
the separate interests of various branches of government are coordinated with one
another to ensure the perfect compatibility.155 State contracts and IIAs are not
likely to be negotiated by the ministries/agencies that make the social and envi-
ronmental policies that are affected by them. These agreements will most likely be
the purview of ministries that deal with economics and foreign affairs or specific
industries (e.g. mining): these are the “agencies in closest touch with the global
economy” and are likely to hold a stronger position in the government hierarchy
than environmental ones.156
Finally, it should be noted that despite the prevalence of IIAs and state con-
tracts throughout the world, not all hegemonic projects in this field have been
153Allee and Huth 2006, at 219.
154Brewster 2006, at 283.
155Leon and Terry 2006, at 71.
156Cox 1997, at 162.
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successful.157 The failure of the MAI and the similar efforts to negotiation mul-
tilateral investment rules in the WTO are evidence that such processes can be
successfully contested. However, recalling the notion of transformismo, one must
also question the extent to which potentially counterhegemonic voices have been
co-opted. Gill argues that ‘corporate environmentalism’ is a prime example of
transformismo:
‘sustainable development’ is primarily defined in pubic policy as compat-
ible with market forces and freedom of enterprise. When the global envi-
ronmental movement was perceived as a real threat to corporate interests,
companies changed track from suggesting the environmentalists were either
crackpots or misguided to accepting a real problem existed and compromise
was necessary. Of course a compromise acceptable to capital was not one
that would fundamentally challenge the dominant patterns of accumulation
partly through strategies of transformative resistance.158
One need look no further than the WSSD Declaration and Plan of Implementa-
tion (see Section 2.2.3) to see how corporate environmentalism has embraced the
notion of promoting investment through the institution of investment protection.
3.3.3 A Plan of Inquiry
It can be recalled from Chapter 1 that the overarching question guiding this study
concerns the implications of the protection of foreign investment through interna-
tional investment agreements and state contracts for environmental governance,
particularly in developing countries. This question can now be reformulated as
What are the implications of the institution of investment protection for en-
vironmental governance, particularly in developing countries?
It has been argued above that in addition to material power (the exit option),
foreign investors are given voice as de facto subjects of international law through
the institution of investment protection. This institution is a part of the new con-
stitutionalism: the politico-legal framework that supports the ideology of disci-
plinary neoliberalism.
157Egan 2003, at 87.
158Ibid.
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As the new constitutionalism is aimed at ‘locking-in’ regulatory frameworks,
it is possible that where environmental regulation conflicts with the principles of
market efficiency, consistency and efficiency, states will be disciplined. In the con-
text of investment protection, discipline comes in the form of the requirement to
compensate investors. Thus, the first step in understanding the implications of the
institution of investment protection for environmental governance is to determine
the circumstances under which states will be required to compensate investors.
This requires a more detailed examination of the rules and norms of investment
protection, which is provided in Chapter 4.
However, understanding the structure of international investment law is only
the first step: the agency involved in the application and interpretation of these
rules is also critical. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, one would anticipate that
arbitrators imbued with neoliberal ideology would interpret the rules and norms of
investment protection with a pro-investor bias. In order to assess how arbitrators
have balanced public and private interests in practice, several environmentally
relevant investor-state disputes are analyzed in Chapter 5.
As mentioned in Section 1.3.2, it is argued in this study that the institution
of investment protection may also play a role in the outcome of investor-state
conflicts that are not resolved through arbitration. This is consistent with neo-
Gramscian theory. The ideology of disciplinary neoliberalism heightens state
concerns about their competitiveness and may therefore, in turn, condition how
states will respond to conflicts with investors. Otto and Cordes note that investor-
state disputes may be viewed as administrative or managerial failures that affect
the government’s political risk ranking and thereby also the future flows of in-
vestment.159 Thus, it is likely that many states will seek to avoid disputes, even
if this means rolling-back, reconfiguring, or failing to develop and enforce their
environmental policies (regulatory chill).
However, in a neo-Gramscian perspective, the state is not viewed as unitary.
Thus, while some ministries, departments, or levels of government (e.g. regional
and local governments) may be legitimately constrained by the institution of in-
vestment protection, others may benefit from it. In the event of a threat of ar-
bitration, political leaders may use the threat of arbitration as political cover to
159Otto and Cordes 2002, at V-16.
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dissipate popular dissent over a decision to settle with an investor. Agencies in-
volved in the negotiation of IIAs and state contracts may use their knowledge of
the institution of investment protection to support investors and to bolster their
own position in the government hierarchy. Savvy foreign investors can strategi-
cally exploit these domestic divides by targeting their lobbying efforts at specific
ministries, departments and agencies, which are most likely to support them.160
Through an analysis of second-order outcomes, Chapter 6 assesses how domestic
politics are affected by the institution of investment protection, and examines the
implications for environmental governance.
Finally, in line with neo-Gramscian scholarship, a static notion of international
relations must be rejected and the opportunities for change in the institution of
investment protection assessed. Those changes that have occurred in recent years
and several potential future avenues of institutional development are analyzed in
Chapter 7.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has outlined the guiding theoretical approach adopted in this study.
It has explained that conventional international relations theories fail to account
for the growing importance of both international law and non-state actors, and
has argued that neo-Gramscian ideas and concepts can provide insight on these
developments.
This chapter has also elucidated the concept of the transnational institution of
investment protection, which is composed of a relatively stable set of related con-
stitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the protection
of foreign investors and their investments within host states. The key constitutive
functions of the institution of investment protection are that it accords investors
with the legal standing to bring a dispute with a state to arbitration, and it endows
arbitrators with the authority to govern the resolution of such disputes. The key
regulative and procedural rules of investment protection are examined in the next
chapter.
160Leon and Terry 2006, at 71.
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The transnational institution of investment protection is a part of the new con-
stitutionalism. The institution serves to lock states in to the ideology of disci-
plinary neoliberalsm, which frames the arbitration process as neutral and depoliti-
cized. Legal expertise is privileged in the institution, while opportunities for pub-
lic participation and democratic accountability are minimized. Democratic ac-
countability may be further reduced by the exploitation of the institution by elites
in government that participate in the transnational historic bloc.
The critical assessment of the institution of investment protection led to the
development of a plan of inquiry for the remainder of the study. This plan calls
for a more detailed assessment of the structure of investment protection (regulative
and procedural norms and rules) and how it relates to environmental governance.
It also requires an analysis of the operation of agency in the institution, in par-
ticular how arbitrators balance public and private interests. Furthermore, the plan
entails an assessment of the role that the institution plays in facilitating the voice
of foreign investors, and the implications of threats to arbitrate. Finally, a criti-
cal assessment necessitates an evaluation of the opportunities for change within
the institution of investment protection, as well as within the broader context of
international relations. It is to these issues that the study now turns.
Key Norms and Rules of
Investment Protection
4
In Chapter 3, the institution of investment protection was defined as a relatively
stable set of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that
pertain to the protection of foreign investors and their investments within host
states. It was further noted that the key constitutive functions of the institution
of investment protection are that it endows actors with the role and rights of an
arbitrator to a dispute and that it accords investors with the legal standing to bring
a dispute with a state to arbitration.
This chapter analyzes the key regulative and procedural norms and rules of in-
vestment protection that are relevant to the protection of the environment. It first
explores in detail the regulative rules of investment protection. It then examines
the procedural norms and rules of investment protection (i.e. investment arbitra-
tion). In the concluding section, the implications for environmental governance
and developing countries are assessed.
4.1 Regulative Norms and Rules
As noted in Chapter 2, regulative norms and rules order and constrain behaviour
and they can prescribe, proscribe, prohibit or permit certain actions or activities.
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This section discusses the regulative norms and rules of investment protection
that are most relevant in investor-state disputes pertaining to environmental pro-
tection, namely: national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment (relative
standards of treatment); the international minimum standard of treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, and full protection and security (absolute standards of treat-
ment); prohibition of expropriation without compensation; prohibition of perfor-
mance requirements; stability of host country law; and observance of obligations
(umbrella clauses).
4.1.1 Relative Standards of Treatment
Relative standards “define the required treatment to be granted to investment by
reference to the treatment accorded to other investment.”1 The most important
relative standards, often found in the same article or paragraph, are national treat-
ment and most-favoured-nation treatment.
National Treatment
National treatment is one of the core provisions of investment protection.2 Essen-
tially, it requires that countries not discriminate against foreign investors in favour
of domestic ones. The standard of treatment can be defined in two ways: ‘same’
or ‘as favourable as’ treatment; or ‘no less favourable’ treatment. The difference
is subtle, but the ‘no less favourable’ formulation, which is the most common in
IIAs, leaves open the possibility that investors may be entitled to treatment that is
more favourable than that accorded domestic investors, in accordance with inter-
national standards.
National treatment provisions may refer to the treatment of only investors,
only investments, or as is the case in an increasing number of IIAs, to both invest-
ments and investors in order to avoid ambiguity on this issue. For example, the
Japan-Sri Lanka BIT states first that:
1UNCTAD 2007a, at 28.
2Although it is unusual, some IIAs, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Agreement for the Protection and Promotion of Investments and the early BITs signed by China,
Norway and Sweden, do not grant national treatment. See UNCTAD 1999c, at 16.
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Neither Contracting Party shall within its territory subject investments and
returns of nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party to treat-
ment less favourable than that accorded to investments and returns of na-
tionals and companies of the former Contracting Party or of nationals and
companies of any third country.3
It then goes on to state that:
Nationals and companies of either Contracting Party shall within the terri-
tory of the other Contracting Party be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to nationals and companies of such other Contracting
Party or to nationals and companies of any third country in all matters relat-
ing to their business activities in connection with their investment.4
National treatment can be read narrowly to cover only de jure discrimination
or broadly to cover also de facto discrimination. De facto discrimination occurs
when a measure not specifically aimed at a foreign investor has the practical effect
of less favourable treatment.5 De facto discrimination focuses on the result of the
treatment, and therefore evidence of intent to discriminate on the part of the host
state is not necessary.6 Similarly, a narrow reading of the standard would require
that the treatment reflected a pattern of conduct in the host state’s behaviour to-
ward foreign investors as a group, while a broad reading would find a violation
even in the case of an isolated event affecting only one investor.7
Some IIAs, particularly those signed by Canada and the US, qualify the defi-
nition of national treatment by including the provision that it only applies in ‘like
circumstances’ or ‘similar circumstances’. While, in theory, this approach offers a
narrower scope for comparison than IIAs with no qualifying language, in practice
a large scope for interpretation remains.8 The issue of ‘likeness’ has been contro-
versial in the context of the trade regime, where the ‘likeness’ of products is often
compared. In the jurisprudence that has developed under the WTO, likeness has
3Japan and Sri Lanka Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1 March
1982, Colombo, at Art. 3.1, emphasis added.
4Ibid., at Art. 3.2, emphasis added.
5Van Harten 2007a, at 85; UNCTAD 1999c, at 12.
6Weiler 2004, at 171.
7Van Harten 2007a, at 85
8Gantz 2001, at 677; UNCTAD 1999c, at 34.
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been assessed largely on the basis of whether the products can be considered to
be substitutes in the marketplace, leaving aside the environmentally relevant ques-
tion of the processes and production methods utilized in their creation.9 It can be
argued that ‘like products’ in the trade regime and ‘like circumstances’ in the in-
vestment regime are very different and cannot be evaluated in the same manner.10
In the case of foreign investment, production facilities will operate within the ju-
risdiction of the state in which measures are taken, and will therefore have a direct
impact on that state.11 Nevertheless, investors and investment arbitral tribunals
often draw on WTO jurisprudence to support their arguments and decisions.12
A further question that has been raised with respect to national treatment is
the extent to which the standard applies to subnational authorities.13 For example,
in a federalist country composed of provinces, would national treatment require
that foreign investors be given no less favourable treatment than that accorded to
nationals or enterprises from within the province? Or would it only require that
they be treated as all other out-of-province nationals are treated? Some IIAs now
explicitly refer to such situations, for example, the CAFTA-DR states:
The treatment to be accorded by a Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 means,
with respect to a regional level of government, treatment no less favorable
than the most favorable treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that
regional level of government to investors, and to investments of investors,
of the Party of which it forms a part.14
This formulation suggests that national treatment in the CAFTA-DR requires only
out-of-province treatment.
Finally, IIAs differ on whether national treatment applies only to existing in-
vestments and investors or also to the prospective ones. The latter type of treat-
ment is found mainly in agreements negotiated by Canada, the US, and more
recently Japan. For example, the Canada-Costa Rica BIT states that:
9UNCTAD 2007a, at 37.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Kurtz 2007, at 311.
13UNCTAD 1999c, at 25.
14CAFTA-DR, at Art. 1003.3.
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Each Contracting Party shall permit establishment of a new business enter-
prise or acquisition of an existing business enterprise or a share of such en-
terprise by investors or prospective investors of the other Contracting Party
on a basis no less favourable than that which, in like circumstances, it per-
mits such acquisition or establishment by ... its own investors or prospective
investors.15
National treatment provisions may be subject to general, subject-specific, and
industry specific exceptions.16
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
Most-favoured-nation treatment requires that a government not discriminate be-
tween foreign investors from different countries. As with national treatment, the
standard can be defined as ‘same’, ‘as favourable as’, or ‘no less favourable’, with
the latter choice being the most common. For example, the Sweden-Argentina
BIT states that: “Each Contracting Party shall apply to investments in its territory
by investors of the other Contracting Party a treatment which is no less favourable
than that accorded to investments by investors of third States.”17
As with national treatment, some IIAs qualify most-favoured-nation treatment
so that it does not require the host country to treat enterprises in different sectors
or in different ‘situations’ or ‘circumstances’ the same, and refer to the treatment
of both investments and investors. For example, Article 1103 of the NAFTA states
in the first paragraph that
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less fa-
vorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other
Party or of a non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, ex-
pansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.
15Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 18 March 1998, San Jose´, at Art. 3.
16UNCTAD 1999c, at 43-6. For examples of exceptions see UNCTAD 2007a.
17Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the Repub-
lic of Argentina on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 22 November 1991,
Stockholm, at Art. 3.1, emphasis added.
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It repeats this formulation for “investments of investors of another Party” in the
second paragraph. Also, as with national treatment, most-favoured-nation treat-
ment may apply only to the post-establishment, or also to pre-establishment, phases
of investment.
There has been some controversy over whether most-favoured-nation treat-
ment allows investors to ‘import’ more favourable provisions from other invest-
ment agreements signed by the host country. In Maffezini v. Spain, the Tribunal
decided that the most-favoured-nation clause in the Spain-Argentina BIT could
be applied in such a manner as to allow the claimant to have access to dispute
resolution provisions in a BIT between Spain and Chile (so-called treaty piggy-
backing).18 The Maffezini case prompted the parties to the CAFTA-DR to include
a footnote in the 2004 draft text of the agreement, referred to as the ‘Maffezini
exclusion’, stating that the Parties did not agree with the arbitral decision in that
case. Another possible issue is the importation of pre-establishment rights into
BITs that only cover post-establishment rights.19
There are some exceptions to most-favoured-nation treatment that can be found
in IIAs: to exclude treatment provided under a customs union, common market,
or free trade area; and also, in some cases, to exclude matters of taxation, govern-
ment procurement and subsidies.20 For example, the Australia-Philippines BIT
states that:
The provisions of this Agreement relative to the grant of treatment not less
favourable than that accorded to the investors of any third State shall not be
construed as to oblige one Party to extend to investors of the other Party the
benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege resulting from:
a. any existing or future customs union, common market, free trade area,
18Emilio Agustı´n Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections
to Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, 16 ICSID Review (2001), at 212, http://icsid.worldbank.org. Under
the Argentina-Spain BIT the investor was required to exhaust domestic remedies before submitting
the dispute to international arbitration. This requirement was not present in the Chile-Spain BIT.
For further discussion see Singh 2004. See also Vesel 2007, and Egli 2007, who discuss Maffezini
as well as several other disputes where tribunals have either accepted or rejected the use of most-
favoured-nation clauses to import dispute settlement provisions from other treaties.
19UNCTAD 2007a, at 25.
20OECD 2004, at 5.
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regional economic organisation, interim agreement or arrangement
leading to the formation of a customs union, common market, free
trade area or regional economic organisation to which either Party is
or may become a member or other arrangement for the facilitation of
frontier trade; or
b. the provisions of a double taxation agreement with a third country.21
Agreements may also include specific exceptions to most-favoured-nation treat-
ment.22
4.1.2 Absolute Standards of Treatment
Absolute standards of treatment are non-contingent: “They establish the treatment
to be accorded to the investment without referring to the manner in which other
investments are treated.”23 The main absolute standards are the international min-
imum standard of treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and full protection and
security.
International Minimum Standard of Treatment
The international minimum standard of treatment can essentially be thought of
as a ‘floor’, below which the treatment of foreign investors should not fall. In
other words, the standard protects investors from unjust treatment that is not dis-
criminatory (i.e. nationals and/or foreigners from other countries are also treated
poorly).
As noted in Section 2.1.1, it has long been debated whether or not such a min-
imum standard exists in customary international law. Defining the precise nature
and content of the standard remains quite problematic, as it is rarely laid out ex-
plicitly in the texts of agreements. Referring to cases on state responsibility, one
could conclude, as Sornarajah does, that the standard potentially relates to three
areas: compensation for expropriation; responsibility for destruction or violence
21Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of the Philip-
pines on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 25 January 1995, Manila, at Art. 4.3.
22For examples of exceptions see UNCTAD 2007a.
23UNCTAD 2007a, at 28.
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by non-state actors; and denial of justice.24 However, as expropriation is dealt
with separately in IIAs, and responsibility for destruction or violence is usually
covered by reference to ‘full protection and security’ (see below), the only con-
tent unique to the minimum standard would be ‘denial of justice’. The principle
of denial of justice derives from customary international law and has been inter-
preted both broadly (to encompass all types of wrongful conduct on the part of
state) and narrowly (to only cover instances where an alien is denied access to
courts).25 However, Sornarajah argues that tribunals are generally reluctant to
find misconduct on the part of state judicial organs except in extreme cases, which
leaves little substance of relevance in the standard (although see further discussion
below and in Section 6.3.3).
Historically, the test for breach of the minimum standard was based on the
findings of the the tribunal in the Neer Claim:
the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to
an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international stan-
dards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency.26
More recent tribunals have moved away from a Neer-based analysis, and have
sought to interpret the minimum standard as covering a broad area of require-
ments, discussed further below.
Fair and Equitable Treatment and Full Protection and Security
A further question concerning the minimum standard is its relationship to two
other absolute standards - fair and equitable treatment and full protection and se-
curity. These two standards generally appear in two different incarnations. In
one set of agreements, including those negotiated by the US, UK, France, Japan,
and Canada, they are included in the same article or paragraph as the minimum
24Sornarajah 2004a, at 330.
25Yannaca-Small 2004, at 28-9.
26Qtd. in Schrijver 1995, at 164.
Regulative Norms and Rules 121
standard.27 In a second set of agreements, such as those negotiated by Germany,
Switzerland and Sweden, they are independent of the minimum standard.28
For example, NAFTA Article 1105.1 reads: “Each Party shall accord to in-
vestments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.” On
the other hand, the Netherlands-Chile BIT states:
Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the in-
vestments of nationals of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair,
by unreasonable or discriminatory measures, the operation, management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by those nationals. Each
Contracting Party shall accord to such investments full security and protec-
tion.
The Germany-India BIT simply states that, “[e]ach Contracting Party shall accord
to investments as well as investors in respect of such investments at all times fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security in its territory.”29
Many BITs that fall into the second category combine fair and equitable treat-
ment with national and most-favoured-nation treatment. For example, the Denmark-
Ethiopia BIT states that:
Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments made by
investors of the other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment which
in no case shall be less favourable than that accorded to its own investors
or to investors of any third state, whichever is the more favourable from the
point of view of the investor.30
Full protection and security appears to be fairly uncontroversial, and is gen-
erally accepted to mean that failure to provide protection to an alien threatened
with violence creates state responsibility.31 Tribunals that have considered claims
27Dolzer 2005, at 261; Yannaca-Small 2004, at 10.
28Ibid.
29Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of India for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, 10 July 1995, Bonn, at Art. 3.2.
30Agreement between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Kingdom of Denmark
Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 24 April 2001, Addis Ababa,
at Art. 3.1.
31Sornarajah 2004a, at 342.
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of violation of full protection and security have generally interpreted the standard
as requiring the host state to employ ‘due diligence’ in actively protecting foreign
investors from harm.32
It is far more difficult to pin down a universal definition of fair and equitable
treatment. If one interprets fair and equitable treatment as composing a part of the
international minimum standard, then the test to determine whether it has been
violated is an objective one, which is based on the existing customary international
law on state responsibility for injury to aliens as described above.33 If, on the other
hand, one seeks to use a case-by-case test based on the ‘plain meaning’ of the
standard, the evaluation is far less objective. An UNCTAD report suggests that,
“the concepts ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ are by themselves inherently subjective, and
therefore lacking in precision.”34 It is further noted in another report of the same
organization that the fair and equitable treatment standard is “less amenable to a
technical specification than rules requiring national treatment and [most-favoured-
nation] treatment of foreign investors,” and that an established body of law or
existing legal precedents to assist in the evaluation is lacking.35
Following a review of recent arbitral awards, Westcott concluded that “ensur-
ing stability of the business and legal framework is now an established element
of fair and equitable treatment.”36 What is particularly required from the state to
create a stable environment for business is further expanded on by the ILA, which
suggests that “certain elements of an emergent standard of review of administra-
tive action appear to be taking shape” which reflect “contemporary approaches to
good governance.”37 In the view of the ILA, fair and equitable treatment requires
32Robbins 2006, at 427.
33UNCTAD 2007a, at 29.
34UNCTAD 1999, at 10-11.
35UNCTAD 2007a, at 29; UNCTAD 2004a, at 80.
36Westcott 2007, at 425.
37ILA 2006, at 16. For examples of common definitions of good governance see those
developed by: the OECD, http://www.oecd.org; the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, http://www.undp.org; the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch; the Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org; the Aus-
tralian Parliament, http://www.aph.gov.au; and the Canadian International Development Agency,
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca. See also the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participa-
tion in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, Aarhus,
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quite significant obligations on the part of the host state:
it is now reasonably well settled that the standard requires a particular ap-
proach to governance, on the part of the host country, that is encapsulated
in the obligations to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and
in total transparency, without arbitrariness and in accordance with the prin-
ciple of good faith. In addition, investors can expect due process in the
handling of their claims and to have the authorities act in a manner that is
non-discriminatory and proportionate to the policy aims involved. These
will include the need to observe the goal of creating favourable investment
conditions and the observance of the legitimate commercial expectations of
the investor.38
With regard to the last point, about the observance of an investor’s legitimate
commercial expectations39, this is an issue that has also emerged in discussions of
expropriation (see below). As Coe and Rubins explain:
Under a common view of international investment law, the foreign investor
and host State are entitled to have the governmental interference with the
investor’s enterprise considered in light of the investor’s chosen business
model, the nature of its enterprise, the regulatory regime in place at the
time of investment, and associated expectations. In recent practice, this has
sometimes been expressed in terms of the investor’s reasonable ‘investment-
backed expectations’ a formula invoked by disputants and now found within
certain investment treaties.40
An investor’s expectations may be based on treaties signed by the host state, na-
tional law, administrative licenses or permits, and even brochures and other mate-
rials designed to entice foreigners to invest in the state.41
http://www.unece.org, reproduced in 38 ILM (1999), at 517.
38Ibid. Yannaca-Small 2004, at 26, identifies similar categories of obligation falling under the fair
and equitable treatment standard including: the obligation of vigilance and protection; due process
including non-denial of justice and lack of arbitrariness; transparency; and good faith (which could
cover transparency and lack of arbitrariness). See also Behrens 2007, at 175, who lists good faith,
non-discrimination, lack of arbitrariness, due process, transparency, consistency, and proportional-
ity as the key requirements of fair and equitable treatment.
39Also commonly referred to as simply ‘legitimate’ or “reasonable’ expectations, or ‘reasonable
investment-backed’ expectations.
40Coe and Rubins 2005, at 624.
41Madalena 2003, at 77.
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Finally, a further issue concerns whether the fair and equitable treatment is an
overriding obligation, meaning that the failure to provide other standards of treat-
ment, such as national or most-favoured-nation treatment, constitutes a breach
of fair and equitable treatment as well.42 An UNCTAD report suggests that “al-
though some instances of practice support the notion that the fair and equitable
treatment encompasses the other treatment standards in most investment instru-
ments, this is the minority position.”43
4.1.3 Prohibition of Expropriation without Compensation
As noted in Chapter 1, the direct taking of foreign property has historically been
one of the most significant risks to foreign investment. Outright takings are now
considered rare in most parts of the world, although recent events in Latin America
are a reminder that direct expropriations are not completely a thing of the past.44
However, with time, the meaning of expropriation has changed. As Lipson points
out: “It is important to remember that the social meaning of expropriation is nei-
ther intrinsic nor immutable. Its meaning, and that of investment protection, must
be continually reestablished.”45
At the moment, the debate over expropriation primarily concerns the way it
has been reestablished to cover so-called indirect expropriation. Indirect expro-
priation falls short of actual physical taking of property but results in the effective
loss of management, use or control, or a significant depreciation of the value of
the assets of a foreign investor.46 Soloway suggests that “an indirect expropriation
can take an infinite number of forms; it can be essentially any action, omission, or
measure attributable to a government that interferes with the rights flowing from
the foreign-owned property to an extent that the property has been functionally
expropriated.”47
Indirect expropriations have variously been referred to in IIAs by language
42UNCTAD 1999a, at 35.
43Ibid., at 37.
44In 2006, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela made moves to nationalize oil and gas reserves.
45Lipson 1985, at 31-2.
46UNCTAD 2000b, at 4.
47Soloway 2002, at 133, emphasis added.
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such as measures having a ‘similar’ or ‘equivalent’ effect to expropriation. For
example, the Finland-Brazil BIT states that:
Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall not be nationalized,
expropriated or subjected to measures having a similar effect (hereinafter
referred to as ‘expropriation’) in the territory of the other Contracting Party
... ”
48
In the case of some IIAs, such as the NAFTA, reference is made to measures
‘tantamount’ to expropriation; this language has been particularly contentious in
investment arbitration (see Sections 5.2.2, 5.2.4, and 5.3.1).
For further clarity, a distinction can be made between ‘creeping expropria-
tions’ and ‘regulatory takings’. Creeping expropriations involve the slow and in-
cremental encroachment on the ownership rights of a foreign investor, leading to
the devaluation of the investment.49 Regulatory takings, are defined by UNCTAD
as “those takings of property that fall within the police powers of a State, or oth-
erwise arise from State measures like those pertaining to the regulation of the
environment, health, morals, culture or economy of a host country.”50 The latter
form of indirect expropriation is of particular importance in this study.
It is not a simple matter to determine when regulation crosses the invisible line
of what is acceptable (i.e. non-compensable) and what is not. Soloway explains
the difficulty in demarcating the boundaries of regulatory takings:
If the definition is too expansive, the argument goes, it could impose po-
tentially huge financial obligations on governments, create disincentives to
enact health and safety regulations, and introduce multiple distortions and
social inefficiencies. On the other hand, a definition that is too restric-
tive would obliterate a key investment guarantee that protects foreign in-
vestors.51
48Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Feder-
ative Republic of Brazil on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 28 March 1995, Brasilia,
at Art. 5.1, emphasis added.
49UNCTAD 2000b, at 11.
50Ibid., at 12.
51Soloway 2002, at 31.
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The issue of regulatory takings is also not confined purely to international
investment law. Some countries, particularly the US, have strong domestic pro-
tections against regulatory takings,52 and furthermore both the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have issued
significant decisions on indirect expropriation under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (European Convention).53 However, given the significance of this issue, and
the potential implications for states, Byrne argues that the definition of regulatory
expropriation should be a matter of international consensus and “[c]onsequently,
it should not be assumed that the principles developed by any particular municipal
or regional legal systems, for example, the US and the EU, can be automatically
applied on a global basis.”54 Furthermore, while the jurisprudence in these arenas
may have some relevance to an understanding of the international law on expro-
priation, the standard set in the US Constitution and the European Convention
differ significantly from that found in most IIAs.55
Another source of potential ‘precedent’ on indirect expropriations is the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal set up to deal with disputes between US investors
and the Iranian government following the 1979 revolution. However, as Been and
Beauvais point out, these cases dealt “primarily with postrevolutionary actions
such as governmental appointment of managers or supervisors of foreign com-
panies, de facto nationalization, and failure to permit the exportation of foreign-
owned equipment.” In other words, these cases addressed government actions
that are radically different from the type of regulatory takings that may arise in
the environmental context.56
52The US Constitution contains specific protections against uncompensated takings in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See: Been and Beauvais 2003; Appleton 2002; Stanley 2001.
53Been and Beauvais 2003, at 56.
54Byrne 2000, at 118.
55Been and Beauvais 2003, at 56.
56Ibid., at 58.
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The Effects Test and Police Powers
In establishing whether or not a regulatory taking has occurred, tribunals have
tended to adopt one of two basic approaches. Under the first approach, the tribunal
focuses solely on the effect of the regulation on the investor.57 Those ascribing to
the second approach will also examine the effect of a measure on an investor, but
will further address the purpose of the regulation and assess whether it falls under
the state’s police powers.58
As Gudofsky explains, the ‘sole effect’ or ‘effects’ test requires a tribunal to
“establish a line between when a government’s measure goes ‘too far’ and imposes
too great an interference with the use and enjoyment of property.”59 In evaluating
the effect of a measure, tribunals will likely examine both the economic impact
and the duration of the measure. While outside of IIA arbitration (e.g., in the
ECHR) there is indication that the investment must be rendered valueless or that
the economic impact be at least ‘severe’ or ‘substantial’ for a measure to qual-
ify as an expropriation, IIA tribunals place a stronger emphasis on the legitimate
expectations of the investor.60 It can be recalled from the discussion above that
investor expectations may also be factored into an evaluation of whether treatment
has been fair and equitable. Muse-Fisher suggests that, in the context of regulatory
takings, there is a two-part test to determine the reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations of an investor: (i) the tribunal must determine whether the investor had
an actual expectation that his property would not be affected by a given regula-
tion when he purchased it; and (ii) if he did have such an expectation, the tribunal
must evaluate whether this expectation was reasonable.61 The US courts have
been hesitant to find an investor’s expectations reasonable when he is entering a
heavily regulated jurisdiction, particularly if newly enacted legislation only builds
on the existing framework.62 International tribunals have been less consistent in
this respect (see Section 5.4). In addition to the severity of the economic impact of
57Kunoy 2005, at 471; Fortier and Drymer 2004, at 300.
58Newcombe 2007b, at 417; Mann and Soloway 2002.
59Gudofsky 2000, at 259-60.
60Gutbrod and Hindelang 2006, at 65; Fortier and Drymer 2004, at 307.
61Muse-Fisher 2007, at 518-9.
62Ibid.
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a measure, tribunals are also likely to consider its temporal aspect. A measure that
is permanent, or of long duration, is more likely to be considered an expropriation
than one that is temporary in nature.63 However, the temporal aspect is not rigidly
defined, and a tribunal may assess the particular circumstances of a case to deter-
mine whether an action continued long enough to constitute an expropriation.64
The task is even more complicated for a tribunal that chooses to examine the
purpose of a measure in addition to its effects on an investor. The definition and
scope of a state’s ‘police powers’ are not agreed upon and it is debated whether
they are quite strictly circumscribed to cover only measures necessary for the
maintenance of public order or safety, or are broad enough to cover environmen-
tal regulation more generally.65 Given the difficulty of drawing a ‘bright line’
between bona fide non-compensable regulation and a taking, many commentators
and arbitral tribunals suggest that such a determination can only be achieved on a
case-by-case basis.66
The Legality of Expropriation
If it is determined that a regulatory measure constitutes a taking, then for the
purposes of determining its legality it can be treated the same as a direct expro-
priation.67 According to customary international law, and most IIAs, there are
three conditions that must be satisfied in order for a taking to be lawful: it must
be for public purpose, non-discriminatory, and compensation must be paid to the
affected investor. Some BITs and regional agreements also include a fourth con-
dition, referred to as ‘due process’. For example, the Japan-Sri Lanka BIT states
that
Investments and returns of nationals and companies of either Contracting
Party shall not be subjected to expropriation, nationalization, restriction or
any other measure the effects of which would be tantamount to expropri-
ation or nationalization, within the territory of the other Contracting Party
63Coe and Rubins 2005, at 620.
64Turk 2005, at 64.
65See Muse-Fisher 2007; Newcombe 2007; Baughen 2006; Turk 2005.
66Fortier and Drymer 2004, at 314.
67Reisman and Sloane 2003, at 121.
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unless such measures are taken for a public purpose and under due process
of law ; are not discriminatory; and, are taken against prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.68
Public purpose is fairly straightforward and certainly includes the protection
of the environment.69 However, it is important to stress that if a regulatory mea-
sure is found to be a taking, fulfillment of the public purpose requirement does
not lead to a determination that no compensation is required. All three (or four)
conditions must be fulfilled for an expropriation to be legal.70
Traditionally, non-discrimination required that any taking should not unrea-
sonably single out a particular person or group of people, such as measures of re-
taliation or reprisal against another state or a particular racial group.71 However,
increasingly the scope of this requirement has expanded to cover any discrimina-
tory or arbitrary action, or any action that is without legitimate justification, even
if specific nationals are not targeted.72
Due process, a concept borrowed from the American legal system, generally
requires that the regulation has been made in accordance with host state law, and
that affected parties had access to municipal courts to challenge the government
action.73
Akinsaya’s statement in 1980 that the requirement for, and measurement of,
compensation was “the most important, and most controversial, issue of all rules
governing expropriation of foreign property,” remains accurate today.74 There is
a long-standing international debate over compensation that generally falls on a
North-South divide. As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, capital-exporting states have
long advocated the Hull formula as a means to calculate compensation. It states (in
68Japan and Sri Lanka Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1 March
1982, Colombo, at Art. 5.2.
69It is important to emphasize that ‘police powers’ and ‘public purpose’ are different in both scope
and form. The former is narrow and acts as an exception to the requirement for compensation,
while the latter is broad and acts as a condition for an expropriation to be defined as legal under
international law.
70Turk 2005, at 69.
71UNCTAD 2000b, at 13.
72Ibid.
73Madalena 2003, at 77.
74Akinsanya 1980, at 25.
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its various incarnations) that compensation should be prompt, adequate, and effec-
tive. In contrast to this, the ‘appropriate compensation’ doctrine often favoured by
developing countries suggests a more complex calculation which factors in other
considerations, such as the past practices of the investor, the depletion of natural
resources or environmental damage that has occurred as a result of the investment,
and the economic situation of the country.75 Despite the fact that developing coun-
tries have historically objected to the Hull formula and have vehemently denied
that it represents customary international law, they have signed numerous IIAs
that contain obligations that are equally or even more demanding than it.76
IIAs may stipulate more specifically the form, timing, and amount of compen-
sation required in the event of an expropriation. In terms of form, IIAs may dictate
what currency compensation payments should be made in, as well as stipulating
the investor’s right to transfer payments out of the country.77 As for timing, it is
usually framed in some manner as to indicate that it will be promptly paid fol-
lowing the expropriatory action. Guidance on the determination of the amount of
compensation is generally vague, with terms such as ‘fair market value’ or ‘gen-
uine value’ used. For example, the BIT between the US and Bolivia states that
Compensation shall be paid without delay; be equivalent to the fair market
value of the investment immediately before the expropriatory action was
taken (‘the date of expropriation’); and be fully realizable and freely trans-
ferable. The fair market value shall not reflect any change in value occurring
because the expropriatory action had become known before the date of ex-
propriation.78
There is no single valuation method that binds tribunals, and while investment
agreements may provide some general indicators as to what should be considered
75UNCTAD 2000b, at 14.
76See Guzman 1998, who uses the prisoner’s dilemma to explain why developing countries have
accepted the Hull formula for compensation in BITs when they have traditionally rejected it in
favour of an appropriate compensation doctrine. See also Bubb and Rose-Ackerman 2007, who
offer an alternative explanation.
77UNCTAD 2004a, at 71.
78Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Re-
public of Bolivia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 17 April
1998, Santiago, at Art. III.2.
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in a calculation of the value of an expropriated property, relatively few provide
for specific methods.79 The two most common methods used by tribunals are net
book value (NBV) and discounted cash flow (DCF).80
4.1.4 Prohibition of Performance Requirements
Performance requirements are stipulations, imposed by governments on investors,
which require them to meet certain criteria such as the exportation of a certain
percentage of production, the purchase of local products and services, or the em-
ployment of local labour. The aim of a performance requirement is to protect
local entrepreneurs to some extent and to enhance the overall contribution of for-
eign investment to local development.81 However, there are divergent views as to
the efficacy of performance requirements in these respects.82
Developed capital-exporting countries tend to view performance requirements
as trade-distorting (and they have been addressed to some extent in the WTO) and
certain countries, particularly Canada and the US, include provisions on the elim-
ination of performance requirements in their BITs and regional agreements. How-
ever, when performance requirements are included in an IIA, the article is often
accompanied by an exception clause, generally one modelled on GATT Article
XX. For example, the NAFTA provision on performance requirements is accom-
panied by the following text:
Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or
investment, nothing in paragraph 1(b) or (c) or 3(a) or (b) shall be construed
to prevent any Party from adopting or maintaining measures, including en-
vironmental measures:
79Coe and Rubins 2005, at 629; UNCTAD 2004a, at 73.
80NBV is calculated based on the difference between a company’s recorded assets and liabilities. DCF
is calculated by discounting (based on inflation etc.) the net cash flow (based on the anticipated
future income and expenditures) of an investment over its potential lifespan. On the one hand, NBV
has been criticized for not reflecting the cash-generating ability of a company, while on the other
hand, it has been suggested that DCF is purely speculative and often generates an inflated value.
For further discussion see Sabahi 2007, at 564-7.
81Sornarajah 2004a, at 237.
82UNCTAD 2003, at 2.
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a. necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;
b. necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or
c. necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible nat-
ural resources.83
4.1.5 Stability of Host Country Law
Stabilization clauses are not found in bilateral and regional investment agree-
ments, but rather in state contracts. One of the main difficulties associated with
research on stabilization clauses, and state contracts more generally, is a lack of
access to information. In many cases, state contracts are negotiated and signed
without the involvement of Parliament or the disclosure of the agreement to the
public. Thus, while this section draws on some examples of stabilization clauses
and agreements in the mineral sector, it is by no means an exhaustive survey.84
The Purpose of Stability
As Balasubramanyam clarifies, “it is the stability of policies over time rather than
the stability of governments and political regimes which weigh heavily in the FDI
decision process of foreign firms.”85 As mentioned above, many observers now
argue that fair and equitable treatment requires that host states provide a stable
environment for investors. However, stabilization clauses are far more explicit
in this respect. The purpose of a stabilization clause is “to preserve the law of
the host country as it applies to the investment at the time the state contract is
concluded” and to ensure “that the future changes to the law of the host country are
inapplicable to the foreign investment contract.”86 As Faruque illustrates, stability
can be said to have both a temporal and an economic dimension:
Stability has a temporal dimension to the extent that it requires the conti-
nuity of the contractual relationship towards its successful completion and
83NAFTA, at Art. 1106.6, emphasis added.
84A modified version of this section was published in Tienhaara 2008.
85Balasubramanyam 1999, at 35.
86UNCTAD 2004b, at 3.
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the achievement of desired objectives as contemplated by the parties. The
economic dimension, which is also regarded as the most important indicator
of a stable contract order, implies maintaining the contractual equilibrium
perceived by the parties throughout the duration of the contract.87
Notably, stabilization clauses and agreements are found almost exclusively in
developing and transition economies. Omalu and Zamora suggest that this is be-
cause the more a government is viewed by foreign investors as being “volatile and
unreliable,” the more the use of stabilization methods will be “desired and there-
fore in most cases required” by foreign investors.88 In general, investors view
developing and transition countries as more politically unstable than developed
ones. Furthermore, the relative weakness of developing countries in terms of bar-
gaining power, combined with a strong desire to attract investment, makes them
accept conditions that developed countries would not consider.89
Promises of stability may be either restricted in their application or all in-
clusive. A comprehensive stabilization clause that freezes the general legislative
framework “attempts to insulate completely contractual undertakings from any
change in the applicable law of a host state.”90 Stabilization clauses of limited
scope may refer to one or more specific areas of legislation. Stabilization is often
sought in the fiscal area (tax laws/royalties), in labour legislation, in export-import
provisions, or in the free transferability of currencies.91 Environmental regula-
tions could fall under these categories. Therefore, even if a stabilization clause
does not explicitly refer to environmental regulation, it could effectively cover
it.92
Methods of Achieving Stability
Investment codes and national legislation in developing countries commonly con-
tain provisions for the stability of investment contracts, and some countries even
87Faruque 2006a, at 86.
88Omalu and Zamora 1998, at 17.
89Faruque 2006b, at 323; Wa¨lde and N’Di 1996, at 223.
90Faruque 2006b, at 318.
91Ibid.; Peter 1995, at 221.
92Verhoosel 1998, at 456.
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have a stability guarantee included in their constitution.93 Although a consti-
tutional guarantee may have some weight, legislative promises of stability are
generally considered less enforceable than a contractual clause or a separate sta-
bilization agreement as laws can be modified at the will of the government. Nev-
ertheless, legislative promises may still be taken into consideration by an arbitral
tribunal.94
One example of a national law that makes specific reference to the stability of
environmental regulations is Algeria’s Mining Act of 2001.95 Article 84 sets out
that a mining lease is to be accompanied by a mining agreement, which should be
concluded by the state and the investor, and:
The mining agreement, after its effectiveness, can not be modified but by
the written consent of parties. This amendment will be formalised by a
rider approved by decree on proposal of the Minister in charge of mines.
The mining agreement specifies the obligations and rights of the parties in
relation with the legal, financial, fiscal, social and environmental conditions
applying to exploitation during its term. It guarantees to the mining claim
holder the stability of these conditions during the whole term of the claim
according to this law provisions.
The Mining Act thus commits the government to stabilize all mining agreements,
which may also themselves contain stabilization clauses.
Contractual stabilization clauses96 were reported to have diminished in scope
and frequency in the 1970s, but they now appear to be re-emerging in even more
extensive forms than were previously observed.97 According to a recent study,
the use of stabilization clauses is widespread across industries and regions of the
world.98
93Faruque 2006a, at 105.
94Wa¨lde and N’Di 1996, at 240.
95Mining Act of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Law no. 01-10 2001. For other
examples of stability provisions in recently enacted laws see Maniruzzaman 2007.
96It should be noted that there is an important distinction to be made between stabilization clauses and
‘intangibility clauses’. Intangibility clauses remove administrative interference in the contract (i.e.
the government cannot modify or terminate the contract unilaterally), whereas stabilization clauses
control legislative interference in the contract. See Montembault 2003.
97Wa¨lde and N’Di 1996, at 218.
98Shemberg 2008, at vi.
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Traditionally, there were three main ways in which stabilization clauses were
formulated in investment contracts.99 The first option was to prohibit the enact-
ment of any legislation that would adversely affect the investor’s rights. This type
of clause could even include the prohibition of nationalization. The second type
of clause provided that, in the event of an inconsistency between any legislation
enacted in the future and the contract, the latter would prevail. This type of clause
could also be extended to ensure that any adverse effects of legislation would be
avoided, even in the absence of an inconsistency. Finally, the third type of clause
incorporated the host country’s law and froze it at a specific date, thus ensuring
that legislative changes would not apply to the investment. These three formu-
lations have been collectively referred to as stabilization clauses stricto sensu.100
An example of a freezing clause can be found in the 2005 Mineral Development
Agreement between Mittal Steel and the Government of Liberia:
... In particular, any modifications that could be made in the future to the
Law as in effect on the Effective Date shall not apply to the CONCESSION-
AIRE and its Associates without their prior written consent, but the CON-
CESSIONAIRE and its Associates may at any time elect to be governed by
the legal and regulatory provisions resulting from changes made at any time
in the Law as in effect on the Effective Date.101
Stabilization clauses stricto sensu are still employed in modern agreements.
However, new stabilization clauses, which are essentially a hybrid of ‘freezing’
with re-negotiation, have also emerged. Such clauses aim to restore the eco-
nomic equilibrium of the contract in the event of legislative change and have thus
been termed ‘economic equilibrium clauses’. Since this type of clause does not
seek to completely prevent the development or application of new legislation to
the investment and favours re-negotiation over arbitration (although arbitration is
not precluded if the parties cannot come to an agreement), it is more compatible
with the notion of state sovereignty and is likely to be preferable to host govern-
ments.102 However, restoring the economic equilibrium of the contract following
99Peter 1995, at 215-17.
100Faruque 2006b, at 319; Montembault 2003, at 600.
101Article XIX, section 9, quoted in Global Witness 2006, at 31.
102Sornarajah 2004a, at 408-9; and Faruque 2006b, at 321.
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a legislative change may still have significant implications for the state in terms of
compensation to be paid or concessions to be made in other areas. Furthermore,
determining what the economic impact of the regulation is and, therefore, how the
investor should be compensated may be complex, making re-negotiation difficult.
An example of an economic equilibrium clause is found in a contract between
the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and a consortium of
investors:
The rights and interests accruing to Contractor (or its assignees) under this
Contract and its Sub-contractors under this Contract shall not be amended,
modified or reduced without the prior consent of Contractor. In the event
that the Government or other Azerbaijan authority invokes any present or
future law, treaty, intergovernmental agreement, decree or administrative
order which contravenes the provisions of this Contract or adversely or pos-
itively affects the rights or interests of Contractor hereunder, including, but
not limited to, any changes in tax legislation, regulations, administrative
practice, or jurisdictional changes pertaining to the Contract Area the terms
of this Contract shall be adjusted to re-establish the economic equilibrium
of the Parties, and if the rights or interests of Contractor have been adversely
affected, then SOCAR shall indemnify the Contractor (and its assignees) for
any disbenefit, deterioration in economic circumstances, loss or damages
that ensue therefrom. SOCAR shall within the full limits of its authority use
its reasonable lawful endeavours to ensure that the Government will take
appropriate measures to resolve promptly in accordance with the foregoing
principles any conflict or anomaly between such treaty, intergovernmental
agreement, law, decree or administrative order and this Contract.103
It is also possible for a state contract to be stabilized even in the absence of
an explicit stabilization clause. The strength of a state contract depends both on
the type of legal system in the country and the nature of the act authorizing the
103Article 23.2 of the Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri
and Chirag Fields and the Deep Water Portion of the Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of
the Caspian Sea Among the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic and Amoco Caspian
Sea Petroleum Ltd., BP Exploration (Caspian Sea) Ltd., Delta Nimir Khazar Ltd., Den Norske
Stats Oljeselskap a.s., Lukoil Joint Stock Company, McDermott Azerbaijan, Inc., Pennzoil Caspian
Corp., Ramco Hazar Energy Ltd., Turkiye Petrolleri A.O., and Unocal Khazar Ltd. http:// sub-
sites.bp.com/caspian/ACG/Eng/agmt1/agmt1.pdf
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agreement.104 There are three main ways by which resource exploitation con-
tracts are generally approved: by an act of Parliament; by a decree of the execu-
tive or the responsible minister; or by the signature of the responsible minister. A
state contract enacted by Parliament provides the most protection to investors as
it can effectively stabilize it, perhaps even against subsequent parliamentary ac-
tions. Indonesia is an example of a country that passes mineral contracts through
Parliament (see Section 6.1.1).
Finally, in what appears to be a growing trend, many governments now offer
investors the option to negotiate agreements separate from the main contract, to
ensure stability. These agreements are variously termed ‘stability agreements’,
‘development agreements’, or ‘(legal) stability contracts’. Many of these agree-
ments only stabilize the fiscal aspects of the investment (that is, taxes and royal-
ties), while others stabilize the entire legal framework or other specific aspects of
it. In Chile, stability contracts include stabilization of the legal, regulatory, and
policy regime in addition to fiscal and other incentives.105 In Peru, the legal sta-
bility agreements are valid for 10 years and are offered in a wide variety of sectors
with variations in the terms of the agreement by sector. According to an UNCTAD
report, the mining, power, hydrocarbon, and infrastructure sectors have the most
favourable arrangements.106
Colombia also provides for legal stability contracts but takes a different ap-
proach than Chile or Peru. Direct investments in certain sectors (including min-
ing), which exceed about US $1.2 million, can obtain contractual protection from
adverse changes in national legislation.107 The contract can have a term of 3 to 20
years, subject to negotiation. While in Chile and Peru, stability agreements can
only cover a predetermined list of areas and there is no option for negotiation of
the scope of the terms, in Colombia the government has adopted a positive list
approach, which means that they may agree to stabilize any regulation, unless ex-
pressly excluded by law. An UNCTAD report rightly points out that this approach
will encourage investors to maximize the regulations that will be covered by the
104Barberis 1998, at 41-3.
105UNCTAD 2006b, at 26.
106UNCTAD and Japan Bank for International Cooperation 2006, at 18.
107UNCTAD 2006b, at 25.
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contracts.108 The report also suggests that this approach may foster disputes and
that the “scope for future litigation could be immense.”109
The Validity and Effect of Stabilization Clauses and Agreements
A long and divisive debate in academia about the validity of stabilization clauses
has been largely drawn along ideological lines. While it is certainly important to
acknowledge this division, one must also examine, from a practical perspective,
the effect that a stabilization clause or agreement will have if it is deemed to be
valid by an arbitral tribunal.
Three main positions have been taken by legal experts examining the validity
of stabilization techniques: the acceptance of stabilization clauses and contracts as
being valid; the dismissal of stabilization clauses as being invalid; and the ‘middle
ground’ view, which accepts the validity of stabilization clauses but denies them
full effect.
Those who uphold the validity of stabilization clauses emphasize the princi-
ple of sanctity of contract and argue that if a state can bind itself by a treaty with
another state, then it may also bind itself by a contract with a private party.110
Furthermore, they claim that the inclusion of certain clauses in a contract (par-
ticularly stabilization and arbitration clauses) has the effect of ‘internationalizing’
the contract (see Section 2.1.2).
Those who deny the validity of stabilization clauses generally focus on the
principle of state sovereignty and the succession of laws principle.111 They dis-
agree with both the notion that a foreign investment contract can be equated with
an inter-state treaty (as foreign investors do not have international legal personal-
ity) and the idea that state obligations rest in some ‘external’ system rather than
in national law. It has even been suggested by one author that the theory of inter-
108Ibid., at 27.
109Ibid.
110See Paasivirta 1989.
111Otto and Cordes 2002, at IV-22, explain that the succession of laws principle provides that the
“legislative capacity of lawmakers cannot be bound, nor can the executive/public powers of the
government be fettered by a contract with a private individual or corporation, i.e. no parliament can
bind its successor through a contractual mechanism.”
Regulative Norms and Rules 139
nationalization of contracts was only developed in order to give validity to stabi-
lization clauses.112 Furthermore, in the case of contracts in the natural resource
sector, there is perhaps even more reason to doubt the validity of stabilization
clauses, given the importance of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources.113
Despite the seemingly intractable academic debate on this issue, tribunals have
frequently affirmed the validity of stabilization clauses.114 Also, notwithstand-
ing the support for the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
states continue to include commitments to stability in their national legislation
and their state contracts. Given these realities, the critical issue would appear to
be the extent of the effect of a commitment to stability, which is determined by
several factors.115 First, the form of the commitment (that is, contractual clause
versus national legislation) and its scope (all-inclusive versus restricted) affects
the strength of the commitment and determines its application. Second, the ap-
plicable law of the contract has an effect. If the contract is governed by national
law, then the effect of a stabilization clause may be limited or negated by constitu-
tional constraints, whereas this is not an issue if international law is chosen as the
applicable law of the contract116 However, even in the latter situation a complete
guarantee of contractual stability will not exist, as it is recognized in international
law that the state has the right to interfere in a contract when its vital interests are
at stake.117
If a tribunal finds that a government has breached a promise of stability, what
are the likely consequences? The most accepted argument appears to be that while
stabilization clauses cannot stop a government from “doing what it pleases,” the
investor will be entitled to “comprehensive compensation” in the instance of a
112Sornarajah 2004a, at 408.
113Ibid.
114Verhoosel 1998, at 456. See also Cotula 2008.
115Much of the discussion on the effect of stabilization clauses has focused on the issue of whether
they make nationalization unlawful. This issue will not be discussed in depth in this study. The
primary interest here is in legislative change or government interference in a contract rather than
all-out nationalization. For an overview of arbitration cases dealing with the issue of nationalization
and stabilization, see Begic 2005.
116Faruque 2006b, at 333-4.
117Ibid.
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breach.118 Comeaux and Kinsella, for example, suggest that:
Generally, arbitrators will not order specific performance of a concession
agreement, even if it contains a stabilization clause, out of respect for state
sovereignty and an inability to enforce such an award ... Instead a state’s vio-
lation of a stabilization clause is more likely to affect the amount of damages
awarded or the certainty that damages will be awarded.119
The effect of stability commitment on the amount of damages awarded in the case
of a breach has been referred to by Wa¨lde and N’Di as a ‘stabilization premium’,
the amount of which should be determined based on the legal weight of the stabi-
lization promise.120
In addition to increasing the likelihood of receiving compensation, and po-
tentially affecting the amount of compensation, several authors also suggest that
there is a functional value to stabilization clauses since they can act as a ‘bar-
gaining chip’ for investors in any re-negotiation of the terms of the contract.121
There is also a potential ‘deterrent effect’ of the stabilization clause, which means
that governments will be discouraged from committing a breach because it would
damage the country’s reputation with investors and could lead to arbitration before
an international tribunal.122
4.1.6 Observance of Obligations
Another area of considerable debate and diverging opinion, not only in academia
but also seemingly amongst arbitrators, is the relationship between breach of con-
tract and breach of treaty. As an UNCTAD report reflects “it is generally accepted
that not every breach of State contract on the part of the State automatically en-
tails a violation of international law, or a breach of an applicable IIA.”123 There
are thus independent standards for determining breach of contract and breach of
treaty. However, it is possible for government action in relation to an investment
118Peter 1995, at 227.
119Comeaux and Kinsella 1994, at 25.
120Wa¨lde and N’Di 1996, at 267.
121Peter 1995, at 228; Verhoosel 1998, at 456.
122Faruque 2006b, at 335.
123UNCTAD 2004b, at 9.
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protected under contract to amount to a breach of treaty, for example, in the case
of an expropriation or when a state’s actions or omissions amount to a denial of
justice.124
Where the debate chiefly lies is on the effect of so-called umbrella clauses.
Some IIAs, in fact approximately 40% of existing BITs,125 contain such provi-
sions, which refer to the ‘observance of obligations’ undertaken by host states
with respect to foreign investors.126 For example, the UK-Jamaica BIT states
that “each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it may have entered
into with regard to investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting
Party.”127
Dolzer and Stevens have asserted that umbrella clauses protect an investor’s
contractual rights against “any interference which might be caused by either a
simple breach of contract or by administrative or legislative acts.”128 Schreuer
similarly argues that the purpose of the umbrella clause is to “add extra protec-
tion” and to dispense “with the often difficult proof that there has been an indirect
expropriation or a violation of the fair and equitable standard under the treaty.”129
In this view, a violation of a state contract becomes thereby a violation of an ap-
plicable IIA.130 If this were to be the case, arguably an investor could get around
a contractual provision expressly placing disputes within the purview of the do-
mestic courts of the host state. As Cheng notes, the decisions of the 10 tribunals
that have considered umbrella clauses are inconsistent, with 5 tribunals taking the
view that the umbrella clauses in the respective BITs did not transform the pur-
ported contractual breaches of the host state into treaty breaches, and 5 tribunals
finding that the umbrella clause could or did transform at least some contractual
obligations into treaty obligations (though they differed on the precise scope of
124Ibid., at 10; Schreuer 2005, at 298; Foy 2003, at 75-6.
125Figure cited in UNCTAD 2007a, at 73.
126UNCTAD 2004b, at 19.
127Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of Jamaica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 20 January 1987,
Kingston, at Art. 8.
128Dolzer and Stevens 1995, at 82.
129Schreuer 2005, at 301. See also Wong 2006.
130UNCTAD 2004b, at 10.
142 Key Norms and Rules of Investment Protection
this transformation).131
While an investor faced with a choice of treaty rights and contract rights will
normally choose to enforce the former,132 it may be possible for an investor to
pursue both types of claim. If the contract provides for international arbitration,
this can lead to duplicative and potentially inconsistent tribunal awards.
4.2 Procedural Norms and Rules
Delegation of dispute resolution to arbitral tribunals is perhaps the most significant
aspect of the institution of investment protection. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2,
there is no standing investment court, but rather several sets of procedural rules,
borrowed from the world of commercial inter-firm disputes, which can be used
for the creation and function of one-off arbitral panels. IIAs and contracts may
provide the option of choosing amongst several sets of arbitral rules to apply to the
dispute. While there are variations among the different sets of rules, some general
statements about the set-up and operation of arbitration tribunals can be made. In
this study a focus is given to ICSID and UNCITRAL-based arbitration.133
4.2.1 Arbitral Proceedings
According to the ICSID Convention, the host state (a contracting state) or the in-
vestor (of a contracting state) may initiate arbitration proceedings, but most IIAs
only allow an investor to bring a claim.134 IIAs and contracts may require that
disputing parties enter into good faith consultations prior to the commencement
of arbitration. This ‘cooling off’ period generally lasts 6 months.135 Furthermore,
there may be a period after which the dispute may no longer be brought to arbi-
131Cheng 2007, at 1139.
132Cremades and Cairns 2004, at 332.
133According to UNCTAD 2007a, at 110, ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules are the most commonly
employed rules in investor-state disputes.
134Choi 2007, at 736.
135UNCTAD 2007a, at 105.
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tration (i.e. a statute of limitations).136
Consent to Arbitration and Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Arbitration is a voluntary process. There are a variety of ways in which a state may
provide its consent to arbitration and this consent may refer to either a specific
investor or a specific dispute or instead to a defined class of unknown investors
and future disputes.137 In the first instance, consent is generally given in a clause
within a state contract. In the second instance, the more general consent can be
provided through a clause in an IIA or within national legislation. Consent in this
form is referred to as ‘arbitration without privity’,138 and is somewhat debated
amongst legal experts.139 It was only in the 1990s that the inclusion of general
consent to arbitration in IIAs became widespread.140 Van Harten argues that,
unlike contractual consent where the state is only providing access to arbitration
to specific investors with respect to specific investments, general consent in IIAs:
incorporates within the system a broad class of potential claimants whose
identity is unknown to the state at the time of the state’s consent and a wide
range of potential disputes arising from any exercise of sovereign authority
that affects the assets of a foreign investor.141
The investor, not being party to IIAs, cannot provide such general consent. In-
vestors consent to arbitration by initiating proceedings. The ICSID Convention
stipulates that where both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of ICSID, nei-
ther party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.142 Furthermore, consent to IC-
SID arbitration is at “the exclusion of any other remedy” unless otherwise stated
136For example, in the NAFTA, Art. 1116.2 stipulates that a claim under Chapter 11 cannot be made
“if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should
have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred
loss or damage.”
137Reed et al. 2004, at 7.
138Paulsson 1995.
139Sornarajah 1997.
140Van Harten 2007a, at 26.
141Ibid., at 63.
142ICSID Convention, at Art. 25.1.
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in a contract or IIA.143
Customary international law requires the exhaustion of local remedies before
a foreign investor’s claim may be brought before an international tribunal, but
holds that a domestic court’s decision is not res judicata144 for a subsequent in-
ternational tribunal. Dodge summarizes the system well: “It gives the foreign
investor two ‘bites at the apple’ but requires it to take the domestic bite first.”145
However, as noted in Section 2.1.3, the local remedies rule can be waived by inter-
national agreement. The ICSID Convention states that: “A Contracting State may
require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition
of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.”146 Nevertheless, in contrast
with other forms of international legal remedies, IIAs rarely require that foreign
investors first exhaust domestic legal remedies before proceeding to international
arbitration.147 As Horn points out, exhaustion of local remedies clauses “are not
very appreciated by investors who look for ways to immediately commence arbi-
tration procedures.”148
The issue of domestic versus international remedies can become particularly
complex when an investor is pursuing both contract claims and treaty claims in
relation to the same dispute. Some IIAs have so-called fork in the road provisions,
which stipulate that if the investor submits a dispute before the local courts of the
host state or to any other agreed dispute resolution procedure, he forever loses the
right to submit the same claims to the international arbitration procedure in the
IIA.149 However, contract and treaty claims have been considered to be distinct
by some tribunals.150 Schreuer explains that the fork in the road clause may not
be applicable in some circumstances:
143Ibid., at Art. 26.
144A final judgement that is not subject to further appeal.
145Dodge 2000, at 360.
146ICSID Convention, at Art. 26.
147Peterson 2004b, at 3, points out that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms requires claimants to begin in local courts.
148Horn 2004, at 25.
149Reed et al. 2004, at 58.
150See the discussion of Occidental v. Ecuador in Blades 2006, at 111.
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The loss of access to international arbitration applies only if the same dis-
pute based on the same cause of action has previously been submitted to
the domestic judiciaries of the host state. If the dispute before the domestic
court concerns a contract claim or an appeal against the decision of a regu-
latory authority and the dispute before the international tribunal concerns a
BIT claim, the fork in the road clause will not apply.151
Another provision, slightly different from the fork in the road, is the ‘no U-
turn’ rule found in the NAFTA and some BITs.152 This type of provision allows
investors to abandon domestic court proceedings, before or after a decision is
rendered, in favor of submission to arbitration, but prohibits an investor from re-
turning to the domestic courts if it is unsuccessful in arbitration.
Arbitrators
While it is possible for a tribunal to consist of a sole arbitrator, or any uneven
number of arbitrators, investment arbitration generally runs on a three-arbitrator
model. Under this system, the respondent state appoints one arbitrator, the in-
vestor appoints one arbitrator and then the two parties jointly agree on a third,
who will act as the ‘president’ of the tribunal.153 If the parties cannot agree on the
selection of the president, they may opt to have a supervisory body, such as ICSID,
make the appointment on their behalf. This is possible even in instances where
the tribunal is formed under non-ICSID rules. According to Van Harten, the im-
portance of the power of appointment should not be underestimated: “In tripartite
arbitration the decision-making process generally turns on the presiding arbitrator
given that the party-appointed arbitrators are more likely to take opposing views
and that the president usually drafts the award.”154
ICSID has a Panel of Arbitrators, from which appointments by the body must
be made. However, parties may appoint arbitrators from outside the Panel, as long
as they are: “persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the
151Schreuer 2005, at 307.
152NAFTA, at Art. 1121.2.
153Generally the president can not be a national of either the contracting parties. See UNCTAD 2007a,
at 113.
154Van Harten 2007a, at 169.
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fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise
independent judgment.”155 It is not only barristers and retired judges that are
frequently appointed as arbitrators, but also professors.156 In fact, there is not even
a requirement for arbitrators to be experts in international law. Furthermore, it is
entirely possible for an individual to act as a legal representative for a respondent
or claimant in one case, and an arbitrator in another.157
Either party may object to the appointment of an arbitrator or seek to have
an arbitrator disqualified if it does not meet the criteria outlined in the ICSID
Convention.158 Decisions on disqualification are made by the other members of
the tribunal, or if necessary, by the ICSID Secretariat. There are no criteria for the
selection of arbitrators laid out in the UNCITRAL Rules, although an appointment
can be challenged on the basis of lack of independence or impartiality.159
The selection of arbitrators is considered a key decision in winning or losing
a case. As Dezalay and Garth note, the attorneys for each side “well understand
that the ‘authority’ and ‘expertise’ of arbitrators determine their clout within the
tribunal.”160
Confidentiality
As mentioned above, investor-state arbitration has its origin in private firm-to-firm
(commercial) dispute resolution. Commercial arbitration is cloaked in confiden-
tiality to protect business interests, and this artifact has carried over to investment
arbitration. Consequently, there are no requirements in IIAs or in any of the ad
hoc or supervised dispute settlement mechanisms for investors to publicly signal
their intention to launch a dispute. The ICSID secretariat does keep a registry of
all cases filed under its rules, and this registry is published on the Internet and
includes the names of the disputants, the date the case was registered and a short
description of the dispute. The registry does not indicate whether the case was
155ICSID Convention, at Art. 40 and 14.1.
156Goldhaber 2003.
157Coe 2006, at 1351-2.
158ICSID Convention, at Art. 57.
159UNCITRAL Rules, at Rule 10.1.
160Dezalay and Garth 1996, at 8-9.
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brought in relation to a contract, consent to arbitration under a national law, or to
the provisions of a BIT or regional treaty. The other supervisory bodies, such as
the ICC, do not have a public register and bodies such as UNCITRAL do not even
keep track of arbitrations that make use of their ad hoc arbitration rules.
Proceedings of investment disputes are held in camera and non-disputant par-
ties will not have access unless the disputant parties consent to open the proceed-
ings.161 There have been some changes in the procedures of arbitration related to
confidentiality in recent years which will be discussed further in Section 7.1.
Governing Law and Interpretation
IIAs and contracts may or may not stipulate the law that is to govern the dispute
(i.e. domestic law, international law, the IIA/contract or some combination). In
the absence of an explicit choice of law in the IIA or contract or an agreement
between the disputing parties, arbitral rules provide some guidance. The ICSID
Rules stipulate that “the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State
party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of
international law as may be applicable.”162 The UNCITRAL Rules are slightly
broader: “the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of
laws rules which it considers applicable.”163
The interpretation of the regulative norms and rules of investment protection
is generally guided by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.164 Article 31 states that: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”165 The ‘ordinary mean-
ing’ is only to be disregarded if it can be established that the parties intended
that a term have ‘special meaning’.166 In determining the object and purpose of
the treaty, an arbitrator is to look to: the text, including any preambular text and
161ICSID Rules, at Rule 32.2; UNCITRAL Rules, at Rule 25.4.
162ICSID Rules, at Rule 42.1.
163UNCITRAL Rules, at Rule 33.1.
164Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Vienna.
165Ibid., at Art. 31.1.
166Ibid., at Art. 31.4.
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annexes; any other agreements made by all the parties and related to the treaty;
and any instruments made by one or more parties in connection with the conclu-
sion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.167 An arbitrator should also consider: any subsequent agreement between
the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its pro-
visions; any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; and any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.168
According to Swan, Article 31 sets out “a narrow interpretive paradigm,”
while Article 32 is far more flexible and expansive.169 Article 32 covers supple-
mentary means of interpretation which can be utilized to confirm the interpretation
that resulted from application of Article 31 or to supplement the interpretation in
cases where the meaning of the treaty remains “ambiguous or obscure” or where
application of Article 31 “leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreason-
able.” In such cases, arbitrators may look to other sources, such as the preparatory
work of the treaty.
4.2.2 Arbitral Awards
In the course of arbitral proceedings a tribunal may issue several awards, for ex-
ample, on jurisdiction, damages, and costs.
Jurisdiction
There are several aspects that a tribunal must consider in order to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over a dispute. The most critical concern whether the
investment, the investor, and the government measures fall within the scope of the
IIA.
The definition of ‘investment’ has evolved over time; while it was originally
more narrowly confined to the ‘tangible’ or physical assets of an investor, it has
broadened in both academic discourse and international agreements not only to
167Ibid., at Art. 31.2.
168Ibid., at Art. 31.3.
169Swan 2000, at 163.
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include ‘intangible’ assets but also to expand the scope of what these intangible
assets could entail. Shares in corporations established by the foreign investor,
intellectual property rights, contractual rights, and administrative rights are now
among the intangible assets that are included in many IIAs. This expansion of
the definition of investment has in effect internationalized aspects of investment
that were previously within the control of domestic regulation. Some IIAs limit
the scope of protection only to investments that have been approved by the gov-
ernment. However, other agreements focus on measures (laws and regulations)
‘relating to’ investments. In this latter form, “a broad range of regulations in the
host country could potentially fall under the scope of application of the [agree-
ment].”170
In terms of the definition of ‘investor’, most IIAs cover both natural persons
and legal entities such as corporations. There are several criteria commonly used
(separately or in combination) to determine whether a legal entity qualifies under
the ratione personae requirement of an agreement such as: place of incorporation;
location of seat (i.e. where effective management takes place); and nationality of
control or ownership.171 Some agreements extend the meaning of the term ‘in-
vestor’ to include entities established in third countries if nationals of a party have
a controlling interest in the entity, while other agreements specifically preclude
this through a ‘denial of benefits’ clause. Broad and open-ended definitions of ‘in-
vestor’ leave open the opportunity for companies to structure investments through
a chain of holding companies located in different jurisdictions, which provides
them with the option of ‘forum shopping’ or pursuing multiple claims through
different IIAs.172
It should also be noted that there may be temporal restrictions on the appli-
cation of an IIA to a dispute. The majority of IIAs do not retroactively apply to
170UNCTAD 2007a, at 7.
171UNCTAD 2004a, at 111.
172Houde and Yannaca Small 2004, at 4. For an example of forum shopping see Aguas del Tunari,
S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, where the claimant, an American company,
set up a shell company in the Netherlands to benefit from the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT. For an
example of multiple claims/awards, see CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award
and Separate Opinion, 14 March 2003, and Lauder v. Czech Republic Partial Award and Separate
Opinion, 13 September 2001, and Final Award, 3 September 2001.
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disputes that arose prior to the entry into force of the agreement.
Damages
In general, arbitral tribunals appear to be wary of awarding restitution to claimants,
and prefer instead to only award monetary damages.173 However, restitution is not
definitively ruled out.174 Some agreements, such as the 2004 US Model BIT, may
stipulate that the respondent state may pay monetary damages in lieu of restitu-
tion.175 The ICSID Convention also strongly favours monetary relief over restitu-
tion.176
As mentioned above, articles on expropriation often contain references to the
requirement for compensation, and may indicate whether it is to be prompt, ad-
equate, and effective or only appropriate. Some IIAs also provide guidance on
valuation. However, often the tribunal is left a significant degree of discretion to
determine damages, which may include lost future profits. In general, IIAs and
contracts do not stipulate how compensation should be calculated for breaches
that fall short of expropriation. According to the ILA, the method of assessing
compensation in such cases is different and should be “based on the actual market
value of the damaged and lost property, taking into account the realities of the
political and economic risks faced by the investor in the host country.”177
Costs
The ICSID Secretariat charges a fee for the lodging of a request for arbitration
(US$25,000), for any interpretation, revision or annulment of an arbitral award
rendered pursuant to the Convention (US$10,000), for the administration of a dis-
pute (US$20,000 per year plus out of pocket expenses), and for the appointment of
an arbitrator or decisions on the challenge of an arbitrator in arbitrations not con-
173Coe and Rubins 2005, at 628.
174See generally Endicott 2007.
175Kantor 2004, at 390.
176ICSID Convention, at Art. 54.1.
177ILA 2006, at 17.
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ducted under the Convention or Additional Facility Rules.178 ICSID Arbitrators
receive reimbursement for any direct expenses reasonably incurred in the course
of the arbitration, and unless otherwise agreed between them and the parties, a
fee of US$3,000 per day of meetings or other work performed in connection with
the proceedings. The tribunal in an ICSID case is free to determine how the costs
of the arbitration, and the legal fees of the parties, should be distributed in the
award.179
The UNCITRAL Rules provide that the arbitral tribunal shall fix the costs
of arbitration in its award.180 There is no ceiling for arbitrator fees under the
UNCITRAL Rules, though it is stipulated that they “shall be reasonable in amount,
taking into account the amount in dispute, the complexity of the subject-matter,
the time spent by the arbitrators and any other relevant circumstances of the
case.”181 It is also suggested that the “costs of arbitration shall in principle be
borne by the unsuccessful party.”182 However, the arbitral tribunal may choose to
divide the costs, including legal fees, between the parties, taking into account the
circumstances of the case.183
According to an UNCTAD report, companies have been known to spend up to
US$4 million on lawyers’ and arbitrators’ fees for an investor-state dispute, and
countries can expect an average tribunal to cost US$400,000 or more in addition
to the US$1-2 million in legal fees.184
Publication of Awards
Once a ruling is made by a tribunal there is no requirement to publish the award.
ICSID Rules require the consent of both parties to a dispute before a ruling will
be published by the Secretariat (although either party may unilaterally publish it
178This schedule of fees is effective as of 1 January 2008. The administration fee was previously only
US$10,000 per year.
179ICSID Convention. at Art. 61.
180UNCITRAL Rules, at Rule 38.
181Ibid., at Rule 39.
182Ibid., at Rule 40.
183For further discussion on the allocation of costs and fees see Rubins 2003.
184UNCTAD 2005b, at 7.
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elsewhere), while under UNCITRAL Rules the award may only be published with
the consent of both the investor and the state.185
Challenges and Annulment Procedures
The ICSID Convention excludes appeal and forecloses challenges to awards. The
only remedies available to the losing party are interpretation of the scope and
meaning of the award, revisions of the award based on discovery of a previously
unknown factor of decisive importance, and annulment of the award in a limited
number of circumstances.186 An ad hoc committee chosen by the ICSID Secre-
tariat rules on the annulment of an award.
The ICSID annulment procedure is unique and available only for disputes that
were brought under ICSID Rules. Awards decided under the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules or UNCITRAL Rules can be revised or set aside in the place of ar-
bitration or in courts of the state “under the law of which” the award was made.187
Some states restrict the scope of court review of arbitral decisions within their
territories, in part because tribunals generally seek to avoid siting proceedings in
states where the scope for review of awards is broad.188
Enforcement of Awards
In the view of Van Harten, “the awards of arbitrators are more widely enforce-
able than any other adjudicative decision in public law.”189 There are several
mechanisms which aid in the enforcement of arbitral awards. Firstly, IIAs of-
ten explicitly obligate states to recognize awards, thus allowing investors to seek
enforcement in the local courts of the host state.190 Secondly, where an IIA or
185ICSID Rules, at Rule 48.4; UNCITRAL Rules, at Rule 32.5.
186The reasons, outlined in Art. 50, 51, and 52 of the ICSID Convention, are: the tribunal was not
properly constituted; the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers; there was corruption on the part
of a tribunal member; there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or the
award failed to state the reasons on which it was based.
187New York Convention, at Art. V.
188Gantz 2006, at 52.
189Van Harten 2007a, at 5.
190Ibid., at 118.
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state contract provides for enforcement under the ICSID Convention, an investor
can seek enforcement in the domestic courts of any state party to the Convention.
Article 54 of the ICSID Convention stipulates that each Contracting State shall
recognize an ICSID award as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations im-
posed by that award within its territory as if it were a final judgement of a domestic
court. As Horn remarks “it is expected that a state that is obliged to recognize an
award under Art. 54 will fulfill this commitment as an international obligation,
the general consideration being that its international reputation is at stake.”191
ICSID awards have a high execution rate, which some observers hypothesize
is a result of the body’s connection to the World Bank.192 It has been suggested
that there is a perception amongst states that failure to enforce an ICSID award
could lead to strained relations and a loss of credibility with the Bank.
For awards that cannot be enforced under the ICSID Convention, enforcement
can be sought through other agreements, such as the New York Convention. The
New York Convention is similar to the ICSID Convention in that it requires courts
in Contracting States to enforce arbitral awards. Given its widespread membership
and significant role in the enforcement of awards, it is understandable why Wetter
has described the New York Convention as “the single most important pillar on
which the edifice of international arbitration rests.”193
IIAs and state contracts will often stipulate that an arbitration must take place
in a country that is party to the New York Convention, as otherwise awards cannot
be enforced. Under the New York Convention, the recognition and enforcement
of the award may be refused by a court under certain conditions, including when
it would be “contrary to the public policy” of the country.194 However, the public
policy exception is typically read quite narrowly by courts.195
191Horn 2004, at 29.
192Franck 2007, at 372; Van Harten 2007a, at 118; Reed et al. 2004, at 9.
193Wetter qtd. in Van Harten 2007a, at 52.
194New York Convention, at Art. V.2.
195Harris 2007, at 10.
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Precedent
Awards rendered in investment arbitration are only binding on the parties involved
the dispute: the rulings of tribunals are said to have no stare decisis. Hence, tri-
bunals do not have to base their decisions on the decisions of previous tribunals.
However, Stone Sweet points out that this is also the case in the trade regime, and
yet nevertheless citations to past decisions are common and expected: “Once con-
structed as a precedent-based discourse about the meaning of GATT rules, panel
decisions became a fundamental source of those rules.”196 Citations to past rulings
certainly also occur in investment arbitration, and Cheng argues that “there is an
informal, but powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account
for prior published awards and to stabilize international investment law.”197
4.3 Implications for Environmental Governance
Having reviewed a number of regulative and procedural norms and rules of invest-
ment protection, this section now explores the relevance of these norms and rules
to the protection of the environment, particularly in developing countries.
4.3.1 Potential Conflicts with Environmental Policy
The next chapter will deal with actual cases of conflict between the regulative
norms and rules of investment protection and environmental policy. However,
before delving into the substance of these cases, it is worth reviewing some of the
hypothetical conflicts that have been put forth in the literature.
Standards of Treatment
In terms of relative standards of treatment, observers have noted that discrimi-
nation (or ‘preferential treatment’, to use a less derogatory term) can, in some
196Stone Sweet 1999, at 170.
197Cheng 2007, at 1016. For a quantitative and qualitative assessment of citations in investment tri-
bunal awards, see Commission 2007.
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circumstances, be desirable from an environmental perspective.198 Von Moltke
also argues that given the limited resources of environmental authorities and the
challenges of implementing environmental law, some degree of “selective enforce-
ment” is inevitable.199 Criteria such as the nature of the environmental threat, the
past history of a company, or public pressure may be of more relevance to an en-
vironmental regulator than nationality.200 Examples of preferential measures that
could conflict with the national treatment standard include:
• Requiring higher environmental standards and cleaner technologies in foreign-
owned operations than in domestic ones;201
• Granting special land-use and resource exploitation rights to local communities and
indigenous groups, in line with the CBD’s measures to protect customary use;202
and
• Requiring foreign investors to put up bonds or provide insurance guarantees to
cover clean up costs or reclamation efforts following the completion of the invest-
ment project (not required from domestic investors who cannot exit the jurisdiction
before environmental requirements are fulfilled).203
With regards to most-favoured-nation treatment, Cle´menc¸on rightly points out
that:
Effective implementation of environmental agreements may depend on pro-
visions that oblige Member countries to treat companies from non-Member
countries (or from Member countries that are in violation of the agreement)
differently from companies from complying Member countries.204
It is unclear whether tribunals will be willing to take such issues into account in
the assessment of the ‘circumstances’ of different investors. Relative standards,
therefore, have the potential to conflict with environmental policies.
198Mann and Araya 2002, at 169; Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 208; Downes 1999, at 16.
199Von Moltke 2002, at 258.
200Ibid.
201Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 208.
202Downes 1999, at 16.
203Mann and Araya 2002, at 169.
204Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 205.
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However, absolute standards are much more expansive and appear to be more
frequently employed in investor claims. Fair and equitable treatment is a partic-
ularly problematic standard, especially if a plain meaning approach is applied.
According to some, the vagueness surrounding this standard is intentional, in or-
der to give arbitrators a certain amount of discretion.205 Brower suggests that the
inclusion of the reference to fair and equitable treatment in Article 1105.1 of the
NAFTA “represents the exemplification of an intentionally vague term, designed
to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules
necessary to achieve the treaty’s object and purpose in particular disputes.”206
Despite, or perhaps because of the imprecise nature of the standard, the ILA has
recently argued that fair and equitable treatment is “currently the most important
standard, from the perspective of investor protection.”207 Similarly, an UNCTAD
report suggests it is the most likely standard to be relied upon by an investor in
and arbitral claim.208
According to Freedman, because of the ambiguity of the standard, “some en-
vironmentalists have expressed concern that it could be (and perhaps has been)
interpreted expansively by an arbitral tribunal to second guess health and environ-
mental regulations.”209 Sornarajah argues that increasingly absolute standards,
particularly fair and equitable treatment, are being used by claimants in cases
concerning government regulation.210 Similarly, Dolzer notes that:
Certainly, the principle of fair and equitable treatment may, in practice, have
wide-ranging repercussions for the sovereignty of the host state to determine
and apply its administrative law, as it covers all phases of the investments
and extends to all areas of domestic law affecting foreign investment. De-
pending upon how it is interpreted and applied by the tribunals, the principle
has the potential to reach further into the traditional domaine re´serve´ of the
host state than any one of the other rules of the treaties.211
205Yannaca-Small 2004, at 2.
206Brower 2001a, at 78.
207ILA 2006, at 16.
208UNCTAD 2007a, at 32.
209Freedman 2003, at 96.
210Sornarajah 2006a.
211Dolzer 2005, at 964.
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Some governments, particularly in the NAFTA context, appear to have real-
ized that the ambiguity of fair and equitable treatment may in fact give arbitra-
tors too much discretion. As Weiler points out, “[t]he early consensus among
NAFTA investors appears to be that ‘fair and equitable treatment’ means anything
and everything.”212 In the early litigation under the NAFTA, tribunals also had
a propensity toward an expansive view, which greatly increased arbitral power
to determine whether state acts were in compliance with the agreement.213 In
2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued Notes of Interpretation
of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, rejecting the expansive view that the tribunals
had taken by clarifying that fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment.214 The US
Government has also taken pains to clarify that fair and equitable treatment does
not entail anything further than adherence to customary international law in the
latest version (2004) of its Model BIT (see Section 7.2.4).
Regulatory Takings
The issue of regulatory takings is a particular point of concern from the perspec-
tive of environmental protection and sustainable development. Gutbrod and Hin-
delang argue that if arbitral tribunals utilize the effects test it could have serious
implications for regulation:
determining indirect expropriation only by diminution in property value mi-
ght reduce national policy space to zero as, governments would then be
confronted with claims for compensation any time they change policy, this
would limit international law on foreign investment to an insurance policy
against bad business decisions.”215
It is not possible for a government to predict whether a tribunal will adopt
the effects test or a more balanced approach. However, even in the latter case,
212Weiler 2004, at 177.
213CIEL 2003b, at 5.
214Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC),
31 July 2001, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf.
215Gutbrod and Hindelang 2006, at 64.
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there is a broad scope for tribunals to interpret the actions of the government as
arbitrary or unnecessary. According to Horn, if an investor claims that an en-
vironmental regulation amounts to expropriation, the following questions should
be posed: is the environmental regulation proportionate and necessary for a legiti-
mate purpose?; is the law and the application of the law discriminatory?; is there is
a breach of an agreement or investment treaty or of legitimate, investment-backed
expectations?; and does a reasonable adjustment of a regulation to evolving and
accepted environmental standards justify certain restrictions on such expectations
in the exercise of regulatory powers?216 With regards to the final point, it has been
suggested that if there has been no substantial change in scientific knowledge or
international environmental standards since the time when the state committed to
the investment project, a policy change is more likely to be considered an expro-
priation.217
The priority for governments is the ability to establish at the policy develop-
ment stage whether a measure constitutes a taking or not. However, a stable def-
inition of regulatory takings is unlikely to emerge from investment arbitration in
the near future, making such prediction extraordinarily difficult.218 Furthermore,
it may not only be a government policy which is challenged: Wa¨lde suggests that,
“[e]nvironmentally motivated private actions - e.g., a lasting blockade of a min-
ing or energy operation by private environmental groups resulting in the forced
closure of the operation - will amount expropriation if the government, even if
ex-post, sponsors, supports or formalises them.”219
Performance Requirements
Provisions on performance requirements are not as widespread as those on ex-
propriation and standards of treatment, but when they are present in an IIA they
may have implications for environmental governance. Freedman notes that prohi-
bitions on performance requirements could affect environmental measures requir-
216Horn 2004, at 19.
217Fortier and Drymer 2004, at 307; Wa¨lde and Kolo 2001.
218Van Harten 2007a, at 93.
219Wa¨lde 1998b, at 257.
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ing the provision of certain emissions and other environmental information.220
According to a recent publication of the ILA:
the scope of restrictions on entry and establishment rights may need to be
considered further. A particular new issue here may arise in relation to
environmental restrictions related to entry, such as, for example, a require-
ment for an environmental impact assessment of the proposed investment
resulting in environmental performance requirements being imposed as a
condition of entry.221
Stabilization Clauses
Stabilization clauses in state contracts, which were largely unrecognized by the
environmental community until very recently, could have significant implications
for the regulation of the environment.222 More than any other regulative rule
of investment protection, stabilization clauses epitomize neo-Gramscian concerns
about states being ‘locked-in’ to the new constitutionalism.
The stability of the fiscal regime is generally understood to be the key issue
for investors and is the most common area to be stabilized. Stabilization of fiscal
matters could also cover market-based environmental measures. While the use
of measures, such as environmental levies and taxes, is not yet commonplace in
developing countries, there is a global trend toward a greater use of such mecha-
nisms and it can be expected that developing countries will adopt more of these
types of instrument in the future.223 Stabilization clauses may therefore affect the
options available to governments in the development of policy; in other words, the
number of tools in the ‘policy toolbox’. If stabilization clauses limit the range of
instruments available to regulators, then this may in turn result in a reduction of
the effectiveness or efficiency of the policies produced.
Clearly, any stabilization of the general legislative framework applicable to
the investment will also cover environmental regulation. However, it is still worth
220Freedman 2003, at 96.
221ILA 2006, at 14.
222However, it is notable that recently several NGOs have begun to investigate the issue. See: Ayine et
al. 2005; Amnesty International UK 2005.
223Verhoosel 1998, at 457.
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further questioning whether there is evidence that investors are particularly in-
terested in stabilizing environmental requirements. This depends, in part, on the
industry. For example, a poll of investors conducted in 1992 suggests that ‘ad-
verse change in law’ in the area of environmental regulation is a major concern
for mineral investors.224 The “ability to predetermine environmental obligations”
ranked tenth out of sixty possible investment decision criteria in the exploration
stage and eighth out of sixty criteria in the mining stage. It seems fair to as-
sume that a survey today would find this criterion ranking as high, if not higher.
Leading investment law experts have also suggested that after the fiscal regime,
environmental regulations were perhaps the most relevant area in which to seek
stability.225
It is not necessarily the ‘strictness’ of the environmental regulation in the host
country that concerns investors (as the controversial pollution haven hypothesis
would suggest, see Section 1.2.1), but rather uncertainty regarding future changes
to the framework.226 The existing environmental regulatory framework can be fac-
tored into a risk-profit assessment before the investment is made, whereas future
changes cannot.227 Investors want predictability, and particularly in developing
countries, environmental regulation “is currently one of the most unpredictable
factors facing potential investors.”228 Thus, it is not surprising that environmental
regulations are now also explicitly referred to in some stabilization clauses and
agreements. For example, in Tanzania, the Mining Act of 1998, which was de-
veloped in the context of a World Bank-financed sectoral reform project, permits
the Minister of Mines to enter into a ‘development agreement’ with the holder or
applicant for a mineral right. According to the Act, the ‘development agreement’
may contain provisions binding on the government:
a. which guarantee the fiscal stability of a long term mining project, and
for that purpose, but not otherwise, make special provision for the
payment of royalties, taxes, fees and other fiscal imposts;
224Otto 1992.
225Wa¨lde and N’Di 1996, at 230.
226Otto and Cordes 2002, at IV-49.
227Bekhechi 2001, at 86; Wa¨lde 2001, at 50.
228Verhoosel 1998, at 545.
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b. relating to the circumstances or the manner in which the Minister or
the Commissioner will exercise any discretion conferred on them by
this Act or the Regulations;
c. relating to environmental matters, including in respect of matters which
are project specific and not covered by regulations of general applica-
tion, provisions intended to define the scope, and, as may be appropri-
ate in any particular case, limit the extent of obligations or liabilities
of the holder of a special mining licence;
d. dealing with the settlement of disputes arising out of or relating to the
development agreement, the administration of this Act, or the terms
and conditions of a special mining licence, including provisions re-
lating to the settlement of any such dispute by international arbitra-
tion.229
This provision goes even further than traditional stabilization clauses, actually
permitting the lowering of environmental requirements. According to a Tanza-
nian NGO, the provision allows the minister to “choose to overlook the require-
ments for the commission and submission to him of an EIA or an [environmental
management plan] for a specific project.”230 Butler describes this clause as a “leg-
islative loophole,” which “allows some rules to be suspended or modified in favour
of private corporate mining interests.”231
The limited nature of contracts and agreements also creates problems in terms
of policy coherence. If each investment contract freezes the environmental leg-
islation for one project at a given time, then it is possible for different projects
in the same sector to be governed by completely different sets of rules. Further-
more, domestic investors are unlikely to be offered the stability that covers foreign
investments, and will therefore also be covered by a separate set of rules:
Stabilization clauses that attempt to immunize the contract from normal op-
eration of the succession of laws principle raise serious practical and legal
problems for host countries. If this limit on legislative discretion is effec-
tively secured, ten or even thirty years later the project may operate under a
legal regime very different from that governing all other economic activities.
229Mining Act of Tanzania, No. 5, 1998, at Art. 10, emphasis added.
230Lissu 1999.
231Butler 2004, at 74-5.
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Moreover, different mining projects may operate under different investment
terms. From political, economic, administrative and legal perspectives the
acceptability of this result is problematic. The concern is likely to be even
greater when contracts freeze preferential terms not available to local in-
vestors. This would reintroduce a new form of legal and economic enclave
and the dangers envisaged by bargaining theorists.232
In terms of environmental management, this kind of regulatory incoherence would
result in an increased strain on the already limited resources that developing coun-
tries have to devote to monitoring and enforcement activities.
Finally, the relationship between stabilization and the implementation of in-
ternational committments should be considered. In recent years, NGOs have
critiqued the contracts covering several large transnational pipeline projects.233
The stabilization clauses in these agreements explicitly cover legislative measures
taken by a government to implement an international agreement. Leader summa-
rizes the dilemma that governments face as a result of such contractual commit-
ments:
Poorer states which make such an agreement are thereby put before a dif-
ficult choice: either they fully implement into their domestic legal orders
the international norms to which they are committed - with no exceptions
carved out for the investor - and thereby pay the latter compensation for its
lost profit; or else they permit the project to create a hazard to local popula-
tions, and find themselves in breach of international standards as a result.234
He goes on to suggest that it is not difficult to predict what choice the government
will make, given the more severe consequences that result when a government
“incur[s] the wrath of the international investment community.”235
4.3.2 The Unaccountable Governance of Disputes
The role of arbitration in the institution of investment protection is particularly
significant because the regulative norms and rules are often vague and impre-
232Otto and Cordes 2002, at V-23.
233In particular, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. See: Amnesty
International UK 2005; 2003; CIEL 2003a.
234Leader 2006, at 690.
235Ibid.
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cise. Thus, despite the fact that states are the primary developers of the norms and
rules of investment protection, the interpretation of these norms and rules itself in-
volves decision-making and the further development of rules that are not precisely
defined at the outset. An acceptance that arbitration is a form of transnational gov-
ernance, rather than mere interpretation of state-sponsored rules, logically leads
one to consider issues of accountability.
Neutrality
As noted in Section 3.3.2, in the dominant ideology of disciplinary neoliberalism,
investment arbitration is promoted as a neutral forum, free of the messy politics
that influence domestic courts. However, in a critical study, this supposed neutral-
ity must be interrogated.
The international arbitration community is a relatively small and tightly knit
group, often referred to as a ‘mafia’ or ‘club.’236 As Dezalay and Garth argue:
Only a very select and elite group of individuals is able to serve as inter-
national arbitrators. They are purportedly selected for their ‘virtue’ - judg-
ment, neutrality, expertise - yet rewarded as if they are participants in in-
ternational deal-making. In more sociological terms, the symbolic capital
acquired through a career of public service or scholarship is translated into
a substantial cash value in international arbitration.237
Commission’s data substantiates this claim: he found that in 115 concluded ICSID
cases, 43 arbitrators accounted for 49% of appointments, and that in 103 pending
ICSID cases, 32 arbitrators accounted for 54% of appointments.238
This elite group shares “common commercial values”239 and often uses a
“property friendly approach” when making decisions.240 The culture of com-
mercial arbitration may be of concern for environmental advocates. As Wa¨lde, an
academic and sometimes arbitrator notes:
236Dezalay and Garth 1996, at 10.
237Ibid., at 8.
238Commission 2007, at 138-9.
239Wa¨lde 1998a.
240Horn 2004, at 19.
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the human rights ‘topoi’ get recognized in the like-minded human rights dis-
course community or environmental ‘topoi’ in the environmental lawyer’s
club but it is much harder to get a hard-nosed GATT or [Energy Charter
Treaty] arbitral panel to accept what may be fully recognised in another
club, not in the international trade lawyers’ community.241
The means by which arbitrators are chosen and rewarded for their services
also creates the appearance of a biased system. Court judges have no financial
stake in the outcome of disputes. Arbitrators, on the other hand, are not only
chosen by the parties to the dispute, they are also paid by the hour with no time-
limits on proceedings. As Garcia argues, such incentives inevitably favor the party
advancing the claim (i.e. the investor), even if unintentionally.242 Van Harten
further notes that:
the lack of security of tenure of arbitrators in a one-sided system of state lia-
bility, in which only investors bring the claims and only states pay damages
for breach of the treaties, makes the adjudicator dependent on prospective
claimants and thus biased, in an objective sense, against respondent govern-
ments.243
The fact that individuals can act as both arbitrators and counsel is also problem-
atic, as they may “consciously or unconsciously” make decisions as arbitrators
that will further their client’s interests in another case.244 Furthermore, even when
such a direct conflict of interest does not exist, it remains the case that a large
number of arbitrators work for law firms with corporate clients that have a direct
stake in the interpretation of investment provisions.245
The arbitration world is also perceived as a “first world club.”246 Appoint-
ing institutions, which have considerable influence over the overall direction of
investment arbitration, are in some cases seen as being controlled by powerful
developed countries. This is particularly the case with ICSID, given its intimate
241Wa¨lde 1998b, at 244.
242Garcia 2004, at 352.
243Van Harten 2007a, at 5.
244Buergenthal 2006, at 498.
245Mann 2006, at 76.
246Cutler 2001, at 489.
Implications for Environmental Governance 165
ties with the World Bank. In any case, a disproportionate number of investor-state
arbitrators hail from the US, UK, France, Switzerland and Canada.247 According
to Garcia:
the president of the arbitral panel will likely hail from an OECD-member
state in continental Europe, and may not be sensitive to or cognizant of
the legal, economic, cultural, political, and commercial mores at work in
the host state that are the necessary context to any evaluation of investor
treatment.248
Furthermore, Wa¨lde suggests that while arbitrators may fear not being re-appointed
if they decide against an influential party, decisions against weaker parties (includ-
ing weaker states) “possibly count less.”249
Otto and Cordes conclude that while in theory arbitration is a neutral forum
for the amicable settlement of disputes, this is only possible when the “process and
decisional rules are mutually perceived as fair.”250 This is often the case in private
contractual disputes, but much less so in disputes involving states, particularly
those from the developing world.
Transparency
The lack of transparency in investor-state arbitrations is also a subject of consid-
erable concern. As Blackaby succinctly summarises: “the current opacity occurs
at various levels: first, the knowledge of the dispute’s existence; secondly, the
access to the process itself and finally the access to the resulting decision.”251
Confidentiality makes it impossible for there to be an accurate assessment of how
many cases even exist, let alone to know their substantive content. Peterson sug-
gests that there is a “legal iceberg” where an unknown proportion of cases remain
hidden from view.252 The lack of transparency may also create an information
247For statistics on frequently appointed arbitrators and their nationalities see Commission 2007, at
138-40.
248Garcia 2004, at 363.
249Wa¨lde 2007, at 51.
250Otto and Cordes 2002, at V-26.
251Blackaby 2004.
252Peterson 2004a, at 129.
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imbalance, which puts developing countries at a disadvantage, as Cosbey et al.
note:
States or investors with the financial resources to hire major international
law firms specializing in this area will enjoy greater entre to this disparate
body of arbitral decisions through the formal and informal links those firms
maintain, than will many developing country counsel relying on scattered
and incomplete sources.253
Blackaby refers to this network of international law firms as the “magic circle” and
suggests that it is “not right that [they] should have a wider array of jurisprudence
with which to fight their case.”254
Closed proceedings may also upset the balance between the national and lower
levels of government within a country. Often it is local authorities that make de-
cisions concerning permits and licenses for commercial operations, and in many
countries provincial or state governments have a strong role in regulating public
health and the environment. However, as a consequence of the limited access to
dispute proceedings, subnational authorities are not able to fight their own battles,
and they may have concerns that the federal government is not accurately rep-
resenting their interests.255 Given that decentralization is occurring in one form
or another in the majority of developing countries,256 this issue could become
increasingly important in future disputes.
While significant progress has been made in the area of transparency, prob-
lems remain, particularly with regard to non-ICSID cases (see Section 7.1).
The Capacity of Developing Countries
The cost of arbitration and the technical capacity of developing countries to ef-
fectively represent themselves is also an important issue. As Salgado notes, “a
253Cosbey et al. 2004, at 7. Similarly, Gottwald 2007, at 256, suggests that, “[d]eveloping country
counsel seeking to find relevant precedent are forced to engage in a kind of legal scavenger hunt
through scattered and incomplete sources for past arbitral awards.”
254Blackaby 2004.
255Gaines 2002, at 108.
256See Larson and Ribot 2005.
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tribunal’s ability to reach fair and just results largely depends on its ability to con-
sider all interests affected by the proceeding,” which in turn depends on the par-
ties being well represented.257 In any form of litigation, the level of expertise of a
party’s lawyers will likely be a decisive factor in the outcome of the dispute, but
in the specialized area of investment arbitration the importance of having access
to legal expertise is magnified.258
Hiring representation from an international law firm that has specialists in the
field of investment arbitration has a number of significant advantages, such as
access to past awards as mentioned above. However it is also very expensive.
Gottwald notes that the hourly rates for lawyers in elite firms can range from
US$400 to US$600.259 When a team of lawyers is retained for an arbitration
proceeding that is drawn out over a period of several years, the result can be a
“staggering” legal bill.260 The Czech Republic is reported to have spent US$10
million to defend itself against two particular treaty claims and announced that it
would spend US$3.3 million in 2004 and US$13.8 million in 2005 on its defense
against more than a half-dozen new claims.261
While developed countries will likely have sufficient in-house expertise, de-
veloping countries will generally not. For financial or tactical reasons, developing
countries may nevertheless rely on government attorneys regardless of their expe-
rience or access to necessary resources. As Gottwald has found in a recent study,
“this can lead to shocking disparities in the quality of legal representation between
investor claimants and developing nation defendants.”262 Gottwald discusses one
example where the Attorney General for the Seychelles, who had no prior expe-
rience with investor-state arbitration, defended an ICSID claim without access to
a reliable Internet connection, Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis, or basic treatises on IC-
SID or investment arbitration. Similarly, at the commencement of the onslaught
of claims against Argentina there was no access to fundamental substantive law or
arbitration doctrine in the government legal office. While Argentina now has sub-
257Salgado 2006, at 1036.
258Gottwald 2007, at 252.
259Ibid., at 254.
260Ibid.
261Ibid.
262Ibid.
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stantial expertise in the area, this is only as a result of having to defend numerous
claims. According to Coe, an anecdotal survey of recent investor-state disputes
“confirms that not infrequently one disputant faces significant resource limitations
reflected in modest libraries, small teams of lawyers, and difficult choices about
the use of counsels’ time.”263
Even assuming that developing countries have the resources to effectively de-
fend their actions in arbitration, if they lose they may face considerable difficulty
in paying the damages. While it is rather an extreme case, by 2006 Argentina
was facing more than 30 claims for an estimated US$17 billion in compensation,
amounting to nearly the entire annual budget of the national government.264 The
Czech Republic was obliged to pay more than US$350 million in compensation
to a Dutch investor, which according to one report meant a near doubling of the
country’s public sector deficit.265 The cost of losing a case only reinforces the
need for effective representation.
4.3.3 Uncertainty for Regulators
The main theme that runs through the discussion of regulative and procedural
rules and norms of investment protection in relation to environmental issues and
developing countries is uncertainty. The regulative rules and norms are vague and
broad and therefore open to potentially expansive interpretation.266 There is a lack
of transparency, thus making it difficult to evaluate how similar cases have been
handled.
The lack of precision in the definition of regulative norms and rules of invest-
ment protection, which leads to uncertainty in how they will be interpreted and
applied, is a common problem for many treaties and canonical statements of legal
rules. As Chayes and Chayes point out, treaties:
frequently do not provide determinate answers to specific disputed ques-
tions. Language often is unable to capture meaning with precision. Treaty
263Coe 2006, at 1359-60.
264Van Harten 2007a, at 2. On the Argentine cases, see Kentin 2007; Schill 2007.
265IISD 2007, at 1.
266Bean and Beauvais 2003, at 58.
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drafters do not foresee many of the possible applications-let alone their con-
textual settings. Issues that are foreseen often cannot be resolved at the time
of treaty negotiation and are swept under the rug with a formula that can
mean what each party wants it to mean. Economic, technological, scientific,
and even political circumstances change. All these inescapable incidents of
the effort to formulate rules to govern future conduct frequently produce a
zone of ambiguity within which it is difficult to say with precision what is
permitted and what is forbidden.267
However, in addition to individual provisions being imprecise, it is also the case in
the area of investment protection that a multitude of IIAs with textual variations
exist, which further increases the level of uncertainty about the obligations of
states in a given dispute.268
Furthermore, it is only investors, who have no long-term interest in the in-
terpretation of regulative rules and norms of investment protection, who are the
potential claimants.269 As they are not parties to IIAs and the only obligations at
issue are those imposed upon the state parties to the agreement, investors do not
fear counterclaims and they may not even have an interest in pursuing arbitration
to completion but instead anticipate that the threat of arbitration will induce settle-
ment or the withdrawal of a government measure.270 As such, it is not surprising
that investors will argue for the broadest possible interpretation of the regulative
rules and norms of investment protection, and thus, arbitrators will hear, and may
adopt, more expansive readings of provisions even when such an interpretation
conflicts with the views of some or all of the states party to an agreement.271
Also contributing to uncertainty is the fact that states may not even be aware
of their obligations to certain investors. The nationality of a company is often
neither easily identifiable or stable.272 Changes in ownership, mergers, and even
the adoption of ‘flags of convenience’ to access protection under IIAs mean that
267Chayes and Chayes 1993, at 188-9.
268Van Harten 2007a, at 27.
269Foy 2003, at 50.
270Ibid., at 50-1; Kinnear 2005, at 8. On counterclaims see Veenstra-Kjos 2007, who suggests that it
may be possible for a state to make a counterclaim against an investor, even in treaty arbitration, but
that doing so is not simple or straightforward.
271Van Harten 2007a, at 86.
272Ibid., at 116.
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governments may have to assume that all investors operating in their territory po-
tentially have access to international arbitration.273 Furthermore, as claims may
arise from the actions of courts or local authorities, who are not likely to be well
informed on the intricacies of international investment law, the ability of govern-
ments to predict disputes is further limited.274
A more complicated issue is that of precedent. As Stone Sweet points out,
precedent may help to legitimize decisions made in dispute resolution by “simul-
taneously acknowledging rule-making behaviour” and “constraining that same be-
haviour with a rule: that like cases shall be settled likewise.”275 As investment
arbitrators do not have to base their decisions on those of previous tribunals, they
may come to different conclusions about cases that are substantively similar.276
Franck argues that inconsistency in tribunal decisions creates uncertainty for both
investors and states, contributing to a “looming legitimacy crisis” in investment
arbitration.277 As mentioned above, there does appear to be an informal system
of precedent emerging; however, Cheng argues that this informal system “imper-
fectly supports” public policy goals.278 Similarly, MacArthur questions the value
of precedent, which might make the system “even more inflexibly resistant to pub-
lic input,” in light of the concern that the system of arbitration has a pro-investor
bias.279
Van Harten concludes that the uncertainty surrounding claims of breach of the
regulative rules and norms of investment protection “makes a great deal of regula-
tion inherently risky, wherever it is perceived to implicate multinational firms.”280
While it is also risky for an investor to make a claim that might turn out to be
unfounded, the hazard is far greater for states, who alone are required to pay dam-
ages. As Gottwald notes, a significant implication of the uncertainty over treaty
273Mann 2003, at 250, provides the example of the Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia case, where the investor
was originally located in a tax shelter in the Caribbean but moved its head office to the Netherlands
when the dispute arose in order to access the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.
274Gagne´ and Morin 2006, at 366.
275Stone Sweet 1999, at 157.
276Houde and Yannaca-Small 2004, at 3.
277Franck 2005, at 1583.
278Cheng 2007, at 1016.
279MacArthur 2003, at 930.
280Van Harten 2007a, at 94.
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standards is that it “may make developing nations more prone to settling even
spurious investor claims rather than bear the expense of litigation and the risk of
a financially devastating award.”281
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, the key norms and rules of investment protection that are rele-
vant to the protection of the environment have been analyzed. The key regulative
norms and rules are: relative standards of treatment (national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment); absolute standards of treatment (international mini-
mum standard of treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and full protection and
security); prohibition of expropriation without compensation (including indirect
expropriation); prohibition of performance requirements; stability of host country
law; and observance of obligations (umbrella clauses). The procedural norms and
rules relate to the functioning of investment arbitration, including the selection of
arbitrators, enforcement of awards, and challenges and annulment procedures.
It has been argued in this chapter that the regulative norms and rules of in-
vestment protection are decidedly vague and open to a significant degree of inter-
pretation. There is the clear potential for environmental policy or court proceed-
ings on environmental matters to be interpreted as conflicting with the regulative
norms and rules of investment protection. However, the emergence and outcome
of disputes remains difficult to predict given the broad scope for interpretation
by arbitral tribunals and the absence of any system of precedent. Serious proce-
dural issues, including the lack of transparency and accountability in investment
arbitration, compound this uncertainty. Particular challenges exist for developing
countries, which lack the financial and technical resources to deal with complex
and costly arbitral proceedings.
281Gottwald 2007, at 260, emphasis added.
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First-Order Outcomes 5
The basis by which foreign investors may challenge environmental policies was
established in Chapter 4. This chapter delves into the complexities of actual cases
that have been resolved in investment arbitration.
The cases assessed in this chapter are restricted to those that involve environ-
mental regulation explicitly.1 Limitations of time and space prevent consideration
of a number of cases of relevance to the elucidation of the norms and rules dis-
cussed in the previous chapter even though some may be considered to border
on environmental concerns.2 Furthermore, there are several cases that do directly
relate to environmental regulation that will not be considered here because at the
time of writing they had not yet proceeded past the stage of the investor submitting
a notice of arbitration.3
1Environmental regulation is defined broadly to cover instances, e.g., where a contract is canceled for
environmental purposes, or a permit is denied to an investor for reasons related to the environmental
impact of the investment project.
2E.g., Azinian et al. v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Waste Management
Inc. v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3.
3E.g., Chemtura Corp. v. Government of Canada, V.G. Gallo v. Government of Canada, Sun Belt
Water, Inc. v. Government of Canada. See “NAFTA - Chapter 11 - Investment: Cases Filed
Against the Government of Canada,” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada website,
http://www.international.gc.ca.
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The disputes that are reviewed cover a wide range of regulatory actions and
several different environmental issues (e.g., hazardous waste, biodiversity loss,
air and water pollution). Cases from developed countries (Canada and the US) are
discussed, as are cases from the developing world (Peru, Costa Rica, and Mexico).
Detailed description of the cases are provided in order to avoid over-simplification
of the complex issues that are involved.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the types of environmental measures
that may be subject to arbitration and to glean from the decisions the possible
range of interpretations of the norms and rules of investment protection in relation
to environmental matters. While there is no attempt made in this chapter to judge
whether a decision in a given case was good or bad, an appraisal is made of the
tribunal’s attempt to balance public and private interests.
The cases are divided into three types: those that have completed the jurisdic-
tional phase of arbitration (a tribunal decided whether the investor/investment met
the criteria required to qualify for an arbitral ruling, as set out in the IIA); those
that have completed the merits phase of arbitration (a tribunal decided on the facts
of the case); and those that are pending completion.
5.1 Cases Completing the Jurisdictional Phase
Awards on jurisdiction are important because they can prevent lengthy and costly
proceedings in cases where investor claims are spurious or fall outside of the scope
of an IIA or contract. However, it would seem that often tribunals find that the de-
termination of jurisdiction requires the examination of evidence, and thus they join
jurisdictional issues to the merits phase of the proceedings. There are therefore
only a few awards related to environmental issues that deal solely with jurisdic-
tion.
5.1.1 Ethyl v. Canada
This dispute, the first filed under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA to be resolved, con-
cerned a Canadian law banning internal and international trade in a gasoline ad-
ditive. An American investor claimed that the ban amounted to expropriation and
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discriminatory treatment, and that it further constituted a prohibited performance
requirement. The Tribunal, following UNCITRAL Rules, determined that it had
jurisdiction to hear the case despite the objections of Canada. The Canadian gov-
ernment opted to settle rather than to proceed to the merits phase of arbitration.
Background
Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT) is a fuel additive used to
increase the level of octane in unleaded gasoline. The combustion of MMT pro-
duces manganese residues inside engines and emission control and monitoring
systems, and releases airborne respirable manganese and unburned MMT into the
atmosphere.4
In May 1995, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-94, an act to reg-
ulate the importation of, and interprovincial trade in, certain manganese-based
substances. Bill C-94 failed to pass through Parliament before the session ended
in January 1996, but was reintroduced in April of that year as Bill C-29. Bill C-
29 was enacted into law on 24 June 1997, banning the import and interprovincial
trade of MMT except in cases where it would not be used as a gasoline additive.
As MMT is not produced in Canada, the ban ensured the removal of MMT from
all Canadian gasoline. Although in theory a company could establish manufactur-
ing plants to produce MMT for sale within a single province, this would be highly
unlikely to occur in practice. The particular approach of a trade ban was adopted
by the government because it had been determined that MMT did not meet the
requirements for prohibition under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act.5
The Dispute
Ethyl Corporation (Ethyl), incorporated under the laws of the State of Virginia
and sole shareholder of Ethyl Canada Inc., was the developer and sole importer
of MMT into Canada at the time of the ban. Ethyl filed a Notice of Intent to
Submit to Arbitration under Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Rules
4Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Statement of Defence (Ethyl Statement of Defence),
27 November 1997, http://www.international.gc.ca.
5Gantz 2001, at 665.
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on 10 September 1996 (prior to Bill C-29 being passed into law), and a Notice of
Arbitration on 14 April 1997 (more than two months before the MMT Act came
into force). Ethyl’s Statement of Claim nevertheless relied on the MMT Act as the
source of breach of several provisions of the NAFTA. Specifically, Ethyl argued
that the ban amounted to expropriation of its investment, as well as breach of the
national treatment standard and the prohibition on performance requirements.
Interestingly, in addition to claiming expropriation of its ‘enterprise’ (i.e. Ethyl
Canada), Ethyl also claimed an expropriation of its ‘goodwill’.6 Ethyl proposed
that MMT was not harmful to public health or to the environment, but was being
targeted by the automotive industry, which believed that the additive was damag-
ing emission control monitoring systems in new vehicles.7 The company argued
that by making public (and according to the company “unfounded”) statements
about the harmful effects of MMT, the government had created public fear and
uncertainty about the product that in turn “substantially interfered with the corpo-
rate reputations, images and goodwill associated with Ethyl Corporation and Ethyl
Canada” both within Canada and globally.8 In the opinion of Ethyl, such inter-
ference constituted measures tantamount to expropriation under NAFTA Article
1110. According to the reasoning of Ethyl, “[a]n expropriation ... exists whenever
there is a substantial interference in the enjoyment of a property right.”9
In terms of performance requirements, Ethyl pointed out that the ban was in-
tended to act as an incentive to encourage local production of MMT.10 The com-
pany argued that it would have had to set up a plant in each Canadian province in
order to sustain its share of the Canadian market.11 It also claimed that the gov-
ernment sought to promote domestic ethanol production as an alternative to MMT
and that the NAFTA prohibits measures that require a preference for domestic
6Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit Claim to Arbitration (Ethyl
Notice of Intent), 10 September 1996, at 6, http://www.international.gc.ca.
7Ibid., at 4.
8Ibid., at 6-7.
9Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Notice of Arbitration (Ethyl Notice of Arbitration),
14 April 1997, at 11, http://www.international.gc.ca.
10Ethyl Notice of Intent, at 7.
11Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Statement of Claim (Ethyl Statement of Claim), 2
October 1997, at 12, http://www.international.gc.ca.
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goods.12 Ethyl further claimed that the ban did not meet the stipulations of the ex-
ception to the prohibition on performance requirements (to be non-arbitrary, jus-
tified, not a disguised restriction on trade, and necessary to protect human health
or the environment or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources).13 Ethyl
suggested, based on GATT/WTO jurisprudence, that even if scientific evidence
proving that MMT was a threat to health or the environment existed, in order for
the ban to qualify as a necessary measure, it would have to be proved that it was
the least trade restrictive measure available to the Canadian government.
Ethyl also argued that the measure was designed to discriminate between for-
eign and domestic investors, contrary to the national treatment standard.14 Ethyl
argued that it was in ‘like circumstances’ with producers of other gasoline ad-
ditives such as ethanol because the end products were indistinguishable to con-
sumers.15 According to Ethyl, “[t]o violate the national treatment obligation, it
is not necessary to prove that discrimination has actually occurred, only that it
may occur since the requirement to provide equality of competitive opportunities
extends to potential discrimination.”16
The company claimed US$201 million in damages plus “costs associated with
efforts to prevent the Government of Canada’s breach of its NAFTA obligations,”
costs associated with the arbitration proceedings, and interest.17 In the Notice of
Arbitration the company raised its damages claim to US$250 million plus costs.18
In its Statement of Claim the damages were again raised to US$251 million plus
costs.19
Canada challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear Ethyl’s claims,
which it argued were outside the scope of Chapter 11. Firstly, Canada claimed
that Ethyl’s action was premature, because at the time of Ethyl’s notice of arbitra-
tion, the MMT Act had not yet come into effect.20 Secondly, Canada argued that
12Ibid., at 9.
13Ethyl Notice of Arbitration, at 14.
14Ethyl Notice of Intent, at 10.
15Ethyl Statement of Claim, at 9.
16Ethyl Notice of Arbitration, at 9, emphasis added.
17Ethyl Notice of Intent, at 11.
18Ethyl Notice of Arbitration, at 19.
19Ethyl Statement of Claim, at 13
20Ethyl commenced Chapter 11 proceedings before the legislative process was complete and before
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Ethyl had failed to correctly follow the procedures for launching an arbitration
laid out in the NAFTA.21 Canada also put forth that the MMT Act could not be
considered a measure relating to an investment.22 Furthermore, the Government
argued that if it was to be considered a measure under the NAFTA, it would have
to be considered as relating to trade in goods, rather than relating to an investment,
and thus subject to Chapter 3 of the NAFTA.23
In its Statement of Defence, the government acknowledged that while high
doses of airborne respirable manganese are known to be toxic, the environmental
and health impacts of low-dose, long-term, exposure are unknown.24 Neverthe-
less, Canada argued that clean air is an ‘exhaustible natural resource’ and that
by damaging emission control technologies, MMT could increase the amount of
airborne pollutants such as nitrous oxides, volatile organic compounds and car-
bon monoxide.25 It also noted its international commitments to reducing emis-
sions of such pollutants.26 According to Canada, the ‘indirect potential effects’ of
MMT on the environment and health made it inappropriate to regulate it through
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, but argued that “the absence of a
pre-existing federal statutory authority to address the indirect hazards and risks
associated with MMT use does not signify, as Ethyl infers, the absence of any
environmental or health hazard.”27
In response to the substantive claims of Ethyl, Canada pointed out that there
was no distinction made in the MMT Act between nationals and non-nationals (all
the MMT Act had come into force. Even the Parliamentary debate on the Bill did not begin until
15 days after Ethyl submitted its Notice of Intent. The Notice of Arbitration was delivered after the
third reading of the MMT Act in the Senate, but still before the legislative process was complete.
The NAFTA procedures require that the Claimant wait six months following the events that give
rise to a claim before submitting the claim to arbitration.
21Specifically Articles 1119-1121 and 1137.
22Article 1101.1 of the NAFTA states that Chapter 11 “applies to measures adopted or maintained by
a Party relating to: (a) investors of another Party [or] (b) investments of investors of another Party
in the territory of a Party.” (emphasis added).
23Ethyl Statement of Defence, at 10-12.
24Ibid., at 13.
25Ibid., at 17-18.
26Ibid.
27Ibid., at 26.
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were prevented from importing or interprovincially trading in MMT) and argued
that the “substance of the measure, not solely the relevant industry structure at
a given point in time, must be assessed to determine its effect on national treat-
ment obligations,” otherwise every measure affecting a foreigner that was a sole
supplier in a given market would be considered a breach of the national treatment
standard.28 Canada also rejected the claim that Ethyl was in ‘like circumstances’
with producers of other gasoline additives.29 With regard to the claim that the
MMT Act constituted a prohibited performance requirement, Canada argued that
the purpose of the trade ban was to remove all MMT from gasoline in Canada,
not to give preference to domestic production of the additive.30 In the event that
the Tribunal nevertheless found the ban to constitute a performance requirement,
Canada argued that the exception was applicable, as the measure was necessary
to prevent a negative impact on clean air (an exhaustible natural resource) and
life and health.31 In response to the claim of expropriation, Canada argued that
there had been no taking, and that in promulgating the MMT Act, the country was
exercising its ‘police powers’ as recognized in international law.32
On 11 March 1998, Mexico made a submission to the Tribunal.33 The sub-
mission supported the position of Canada. Mexico argued that the dispute was not
a Chapter 11 dispute (but rather related to issues of trade), and further noted that
Chapter 11 does not apply to proposed legislation.34
Prior to the release of the Tribunal’s Award, another dispute on the MMT Act
outside of the NAFTA, initiated by several Canadian provinces, was concluded.
The dispute settlement panel in that case found the MMT Act to be inconsistent
with the Federal Government’s obligations under Canada’s Agreement on Internal
Trade.35
28Ibid., at 29.
29Ibid., at 30.
30Ibid., at 31.
31Ibid., at 32.
32Ibid.
33Under Article 1128 of the NAFTA, non-disputant parties to the agreement may make submissions
on the interpretation of the treaty
34Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Article 1128 Submission of the United Mexican
States, 11 March 1998, http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx.
35Swan 2000, at 160.
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Outcome
The NAFTA Tribunal produced its Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction on 24 June
1998.36 The Tribunal found that the claims Canada had made with regards to
procedural failings on the part of Ethyl did not amount to a jurisdictional chal-
lenge. In the view of the Tribunal, under the UNCITRAL Rules the fundamental
jurisdictional issue was consent to arbitration, which Canada provided when it rat-
ified the NAFTA.37 The only relevant question, therefore, was whether the claims
made by Ethyl fell within the bounds of what Canada had consented to submit to
arbitration. The tribunal agreed with Canada and Mexico that a proposed piece
of legislation did not constitute a ‘measure’. Nevertheless, as the MMT Act had
subsequently come into force, the only problem was that Ethyl had not waited
the required six months to initiate proceedings, which the Tribunal viewed as a
procedural rather than a jurisdictional issue.38 This conclusion was drawn despite
the Tribunal’s acknowledgment that Ethyl “may have ‘jumped the gun’ for tacti-
cal reasons relating to the legislative process,” and “may have decided to file its
Notice of Intent on 10 September 1996 for the purpose of affecting that debate.”39
The Tribunal joined the issues of whether the MMT Act related to trade in
goods or to an investment and whether Ethyl could claim damages to its good-
will and reputation outside of Canada to the merits phase of the proceedings, dis-
missing all other jurisdictional challenges.40 However, the tribunal did place the
burden of the costs of the jurisdictional phase that were related to the debate over
procedural issues on Ethyl.41
Canada settled with Ethyl in July 1998, less than one month after the Tribunal
made its award on jurisdiction. Canada agreed to reverse the ban on MMT, to pay
Ethyl US$13 million in legal fees and damages, and to issue a statement declar-
ing that current scientific information did not demonstrate any harmful effects of
MMT to health or automotive systems.
36Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction, 24 June 1998,
http://www.international.gc.ca. Reproduced in 38 ILM (1999), at 700.
37Ibid., at para. 60.
38Ibid., at para. 69
39Ibid., at para. 87, emphasis added.
40Ibid., at para. 96
41Ibid.
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One of the explanations given for why Canada chose to settle is that it had
already lost a domestic challenge to the ban.42 However, the panel in the internal
trade case expressly stated that the withdrawal of the MMT Act was not recom-
mended, and furthermore that case did not relate to the international ban, but only
to the interprovincial one.43 Others therefore hypothesize that the Canadian gov-
ernment settled because it was concerned about the large amounts of money that
it had spent on the arbitration and the huge damages it could be expected to pay
Ethyl if it lost the case.44
5.1.2 Lucchetti v. Peru
This case concerns the construction and operation of a pasta factory adjacent to
an ecological reserve in Peru. Local governments revoked the operating licence
for the Chilean-owned factory, forcing it to close, following allegations of envi-
ronmental misconduct. The investor brought a claim under the Chile-Peru BIT;
a rare instance of a South-South agreement being invoked in a dispute. The IC-
SID Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case
because the dispute had ‘crystallized’ prior to the entry into force of the BIT. An
Annulment Committee declined to overturn the Tribunal Award.
Background
Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. a Chilean company, is the majority shareholder of Luc-
chetti Peru´, S.A., (collectively ‘Lucchetti’) which was the owner of an industrial
plant for the manufacture of pasta situated in the district of Chorrillos in the City
of Lima, Peru. The plant was situated close to, but not within, a protected wetland
called Pantanos de Villa.
In August 1997, the Municipality of Chorrillos issued a stop work notice to
Lucchetti, followed on 25 September by Decree 111, issued by the Council of
the Municipality of Lima, which ordered work on the construction of the plant to
cease immediately. The Decree also established a Commission, which reported in
42Gaines 2002, at 110; Gudofsky 2000, at 303.
43Mann 2001, at 73.
44Jones 2002, at 542.
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October that Lucchetti had “violated specific provisions of the National Construc-
tion Regulations, the Environmental Code, rules and agreements on environmen-
tal protection and the Regulations on Construction Licenses.”45 The Commission
also suggested that the plant posed “an imminent environmental threat to the Nat-
ural Protected Area of Pantanos de Villa.”46 The Council of the Municipality of
Lima followed up on the Commission’s report with a further Decree (126) on 21
October, which established a ‘Special Regulatory Zone of Pantanos de Villa’ and
suspended all construction permits and licences within that zone. A further Decree
(01) on 2 January 1998 annulled Lucchetti’s permits.47
The company challenged the annulment of the permits and the grounds on
which they were based in the domestic courts of Peru.48 Four separate judgments
resulted, all in favour of Lucchetti.49 The company was granted suspension of
Article 4 of Decree 01, Decree 126, and the stop work notice. Thereafter, on
4 September 1998, the Council of the Municipality of Lima promulgated Ordi-
nance 184, which established a comprehensive environmental regulatory scheme
for the area and required company activities to be brought into compliance within
five years. Lucchetti successfully challenged the Ordinance in the courts. Work
was permitted to proceed and in December 1999, the Municipality de Chorrillos
granted Lucchetti its construction and operating licenses.
In August 2001 the Council of the Municipality of Lima promulgated Decrees
258 and 259. Decree 258 was designed to establish a regulatory framework for
the permanent protection of the Pantanos de Villa as an ecological reserve. It
authorized the municipal authorities of Lima to adopt measures to achieve that
objective and contained a provision charging the Mayor of Lima to present the
Peruvian legislature with proposals for the expropriation of all areas necessary
for the permanent preservation, maintenance, and protection of the Ecological
45Qtd. in Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru´, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/4, Award (Lucchetti Award), 7 February 2005, at para. 29(ii), http://icsid.worldbank.org.
Reproduced in 19 ICSID Review (2004), at 359.
46Ibid.
47Lucchetti Award, at para. 19.
48Ibid., at para. 31.
49Ibid., at para. 32.
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Reserve.50 Decree 259 specifically revoked the operating license of Lucchetti, and
required that the plant be closed and demolished within 12 months. The Decree
lists the following reasons for this action: Lucchetti’s failure to comply, since
1997, with the legal rules applicable the construction of the plant near the Pantanos
de Villa, thus endangering that ecological reserve; Luccheti’s attempts to thwart
the municipality’s efforts to protect the region’s environment in the courts; and the
evidence (contained in testimony before a congressional committee) indicating
that there was corruption in the procurement of the court judgments in Lucchetti’s
favour.51
The Dispute
Lucchetti submitted a Request for Arbitration, on the basis of a BIT between
Peru and Chile,52 to ICSID on 24 December 2002. Luccetti alleged that Peru had
breached Article 3.2 of the Peru-Chile BIT on the promotion and protection of
investments, Article 4.1 on fair and equitable, national and most-favoured-nation
treatment, and Article 6.1 on expropriation. The company sought damages, costs
and interests, and indicated that their investments in Peru had been worth more
than US$150 million.53
Peru objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the following grounds:
the dispute arose in 1997, while the Chile-Peru BIT did not enter into force until
3 August 2001, and the provisions of the BIT do not apply to disputes that arose
before the BIT entered into force (Article 2); the dispute was previously submitted
to the domestic courts of Peru and the BIT has a ‘fork in the road’ provision
(Article 8); and the plant is not covered as a protected ‘investment’ under the BIT
because the Claimants violated the laws and regulations of Peru governing the
construction and operation of their plant (Articles 1 and 2).54 With regards to the
latter point, Peru contended that the company had commenced construction:
50Qtd. in Lucchetti Award, at para. 20.
51Ibid., at para. 21.
52Convenio Entre el Gobierno de la Republica del Peru yel Gobierno de la Republica de Chile para la
Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de las Inversiones, 2 February 2000.
53Lucchetti Award, at para. 17.
54Ibid., at para. 25.
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without obtaining the necessary urban habilitation and environmental ap-
provals and that their approach throughout the construction process was to
build their plant quickly, without regard for Peruvian laws and regulations,
in the expectation that they could then present a fait accompli to the munic-
ipal authorities who would feel pressured to approve the project and grant
the necessary permits after the fact.55
Peru also made claims that the circumstances under which the company had at-
tained favourable judgment in the domestic courts were “corrupt and egregious”
and suggested that for the Tribunal to attribute “any preclusive significance to
those illicitly obtained judgments for purposes of permitting Claimants to gain
access to the ICSID forum would constitute a gross miscarriage of justice and
subvert the rule of law.”56
Lucchetti countered that the dispute did not relate to the annulment of their
permits in 1997/98, an issue which had been dealt with in the domestic courts, but
related only to Decree 258 and 259 which were promulgated by the Municipality
of Lima in 2001, following the entry into force of the BIT. This dispute had not
been taken before the domestic courts and therefore, in the Lucchetti’s view, the
fork in the road provision did not apply. The company also denied that their
investment in Peru had violated any national laws or regulations.57 They further
suggested that the opposition to the plant of the Mayor of Lima was motivated by
political considerations, rather than concern for the environment.58
Outcome
The Tribunal issued its Award on 7 February 2005. The Tribunal decided that
the dispute had ‘crystallized’ in 1998, and was not a ‘new dispute’ as claimed by
Lucchetti.59 The Tribunal based this decision on the fact that the reasons for the
adoption of Decrees 258 and 259 in 2001 were:
55Ibid., at para. 28.
56Ibid., at para. 37.
57Ibid., at para. 25.
58Ibid., at para. 28.
59Ibid., at para. 53.
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... directly related to the considerations that gave rise to the 1997/98 dispute:
the municipality’s stated commitment to protect the environmental integrity
of the Pantanos de Villa and its repeated efforts to compel Claimants to
comply with the rules and regulations applicable to the construction of their
factory in the vicinity of that environmental reserve.60
The Tribunal rejected the Claimant’s argument that Decree 01 and Decrees 258/259
were substantially different, the former dealing with the issue of construction, and
the latter addressing environmental concerns, finding that all dealt with environ-
mental issues in both the construction and operation of the plant.61 They also
rejected the notion that the time lag between the court judgments and the 2001 De-
crees made the disputes distinct.62 Finally, they dismissed the argument that the
dispute should be seen as discrete from the one resolved in Peru’s courts because it
concerned a violation of treaty rights. The Tribunal noted that the company could
hardly claim that it had made its investment with the expectation that it could rely
on access to arbitration, given that such a remedy was unavailable “until years
after Lucchetti had acquired the site, built its factory, and was well into the second
year of full production.”63 While the Tribunal did not delve into the question of
whether the domestic court judgments in favour of Lucchetti had been tainted by
corruption, they did note that if such corruption could be proved it would provide
an independent ground for the conclusion that the court proceedings had not ter-
minated the original dispute.64 The Tribunal concluded that because the dispute
had ‘crystallized’ prior to the entry into force of the BIT, it had no jurisdiction to
hear the merits of Lucchetti’s claim. The Tribunal awarded costs of the arbitration
to be born equally between the parties.
On 6 June 2005, Lucchetti submitted to ICSID a Request for Annulment of
the Tribunal’s Award. Lucchetti argued for the annulment of the Tribunal Award
on three grounds, which found their basis in the ICSID Convention : (i) manifest
excess of powers; (ii) failure to state reasons; and (iii) serious departure from a
60Ibid.
61Ibid., at para. 55.
62Ibid., at para. 56.
63Ibid., at para. 61.
64Ibid., at para. 57.
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fundamental rule of procedure.65 A Committee was formed to rule on the annul-
ment.
With regard to the charge of manifest excess of powers, Lucchetti claimed that
the Tribunal:
... arrogated to itself an authority it did not properly possess, to determine
that a government measure taken after an investment treaty’s entry into force
fell outside that treaty’s coverage, simply because its ‘subject matter’ was
the same as earlier government measures which were formally, legally and
irrevocably invalidated by the local courts, and because the government
never ceased to resent this chapter of history and continued to stir the flames
of public opinion. By deferring to public opinion and the government’s sub-
jective beliefs rather than recognised legal principles ... the Tribunal also
failed to apply the proper law ... [and] failed to exercise the jurisdiction that
it properly possessed.66
In Lucchetti’s view, the fact that the dispute had historical antecedents was ir-
relevant: the date on which the government promulgated Decrees 258 and 259
(following the entry into force of the BIT) was the date that Lucchetti’s rights
were violated and its investment destroyed.67 Lucchetti also argued that the Tri-
bunal had “disregarded the legal principles that govern finality of disputes and the
related principles of repose and vested rights in the country in question” when
it concluded that Decrees 258 and 259 were related to a dispute that had been
conclusively resolved in the courts of Peru.68
With regard to the second charge, Lucchetti argued that the Tribunal’s ap-
proach departed from the “fundamental rule of procedure in international cases
under which jurisdiction is to be based on the claimant’s formulation of its claims,
65ICSID Convention, at Art. 52.1(b),(d), and (e).
66Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa Peru´, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/4, Decision on Annulment, 5 September 2007, at para. 31, http://icsid.worldbank.org. The
companies involved in the dispute changed their names to Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A.
(previously Empresas Lucchetti, S.A.) and Indalsa Peru´, S.A. (previously Lucchetti Peru´, S.A.), but
in the Decision the two Claimants are treated as one unit, and the name ‘Lucchetti’ is used to refer
to both of them.
67Ibid., at para. 36.
68Ibid., at para. 39.
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not on the respondent’s defence.”69 Lucchetti claimed that it had not been given
the opportunity to prove that the stated reason for Decree 259 (i.e. environmen-
tal concern) was mere pretext, disguising ulterior motives. As such, the Tribunal
based its assumption that the dispute was a continuation of the previous one only
on the statements of Peru. Furthermore, Lucchetti argued that in implicitly ac-
cepting the allegations of corruption, the tribunal violated the company’s right to
be presumed innocent of a criminal offence.
Lucchetti also claimed that the Tribunal presented contradictory reasons for
the decision on jurisdiction by basing the Award on “different and inconsistent
standards.70 Furthermore, Lucchetti argued that the Tribunal failed to deal with
several of the arguments that it had put forward in its original claim, including
the argument that the preamble to Decree 259 (relating to concern for the en-
vironment) was merely a pretext and that the real reasons for the Decree were
political.71
For its part, Peru argued that the Tribunal had not manifestly exceeded its
powers, departed from fundamental rules of procedure or failed to state its reasons
in the Award. Furthermore, Peru argued that what Lucchetti was seeking was not
an annulment, but an appeal:
... even if the reasons in the Award were wrong, this would not justify an-
nulment of the Award, because it is not within the province of an ad hoc
committee to review a tribunal’s finding that it lacked jurisdiction. Luc-
chetti’s request for annulment is in reality an appeal against the Tribunal’s
decision that it did not have jurisdiction ratione temporis under Article 2 of
the BIT. Appeals are not permitted, and the Committee may not review the
Tribunal’s findings of fact and law.72
The Decision on Annulment was dispatched to the parties on 5 September
2007. The Committee for the most part agreed with the position of Peru, and
made it clear that it was not its task to determine whether or not the Tribunal had
interpreted the BIT correctly. The Committee suggested that “treaty interpreta-
tion is not an exact science, and it is frequently the case that there is more than
69Ibid., at para. 46.
70Ibid., at para. 51.
71Ibid., at para. 52.
72Ibid., at para. 57.
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one possible interpretation of a disputed provision, sometimes even several.”73
The Committee highlighted that rather than assessing a tribunal’s reasoning, the
purpose of an annulment proceeding is to examine the process by which a tribunal
arrives at its decision.
In regard to Lucchetti’s first charge, on manifest excess of powers, the Com-
mittee noted that “the Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 2 of the BIT, as it appears
in the Award, does not reflect all relevant aspects of treaty interpretation accord-
ing to the Vienna Convention.”74 However, despite this conclusion, the Committee
found no basis to conclude that the Tribunal disregarded the widely accepted rules
of treaty interpretation or that the Tribunal’s reasoning in the Award constituted
an excess, let alone a manifest excess, of their powers.
As for Lucchetti’s second claim, relating to departure from a fundamental rule
of procedure, the Committee found that the company had been given ample oppor-
tunity to present arguments at the jurisdictional stage with regard to the motives
behind Decrees 258 and 259. While the Tribunal could have called for documents
or evidence to be presented, or joined jurisdictional issues to the merits phase in
order to allow the factual basis of claims to be further explored, the fact that it
did not do so did not amount, in the opinion of the Committee, to a violation of
a fundamental rule of procedure.75 Furthermore, as the Tribunal did not exam-
ine the issue of corruption in the domestic legal proceedings, and only suggested
that if corruption could be proved that it would provide an independent basis for
their conclusion that the original dispute had not been resolved, the Committee
reasoned that there could be no violation of Lucchetti’s right to be presumed in-
nocent.76
Finally, with regard to Lucchetti’s claim that the Tribunal failed to state its
reasons, the Committee found that while the Award did not provide a “full picture
of the various elements which should be taken into account for treaty interpre-
tation under the Vienna Convention” it did refer to various standards adopted in
international case-law and doctrine and set out the elements which the Tribunal
found conclusive. The Committee was also satisfied that the Tribunal examined
73Ibid., at para. 112.
74Ibid., at para. 116.
75Ibid., at para. 123.
76Ibid., at para. 124.
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all of Lucchetti’s arguments.77
The Committee, therefore, while finding flaws in the Tribunal Award, did not
find that the standards for annulment had been met. One arbitrator dissented,
finding that there were sufficient grounds for an annulment.78 The costs of the
annulment proceeding were divided between the parties.
5.2 Cases Completing the Merits Phase
Several investor-state disputes related to environmental protection have been de-
cided on the merits. These cases have certain similarities, but in other respects are
not easily comparable. The arguments of investors and states and the decisions of
tribunals made in these cases indicate certain trends in investment arbitration, but
they also raise numerous questions about the interpretation of norms and rules of
investment protection.
5.2.1 Santa Elena v. Costa Rica
This case is distinguishable from the rest of the cases discussed in this section by
the fact that it involves a direct expropriation of property for the purpose of the
protection of the environment. The issues in this case revolve only around the
appropriate level of compensation to be provided to the aggrieved investor. Costa
Rica argued that a number of factors, including the public purpose of the measure
and the development status of the country, should be taken into account in the
calculation of damages. However, the ICSID Tribunal disagreed, and found that
the duty to pay compensation is unaffected by such considerations.
Background
In 1978, the Costa Rican government expropriated a property in the northwest
corner of the country owned by a Costa Rican company, Compan˜ı´a del Desar-
rollo de Santa Elena, S.A. (Santa Elena), the majority of whose shareholders were
77Ibid., at para. 129.
78The dissenting opinion is attached to the Annulment Decision.
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American citizens. The company had intended to develop the property, which
it had acquired for a sum of approximately US$395,000, as a tourist resort and
residential community.79
The area expropriated was composed of tropical dry forest, known to contain
“flora and fauna of great scientific, recreational, educational, and tourism value”
as well as beaches of particular importance for nesting sea turtles.80 The area
was also adjacent to the Santa Rosa National Park. The stated purpose of the
expropriation was the expansion of the park for the preservation of biodiversity.
The area of the park prior to the expansion was insufficient to maintain stable
populations of large feline species such as pumas and jaguars.81
Costa Rican law requires that a property expropriated for a public purpose
must be dedicated to that purpose within ten years, and thus the government issued
a decree on 25 July 1987, expanding the boundaries of the park so as to incorporate
the Santa Elena property.82
The Dispute
After making an appraisal of the value of the property, Costa Rica initially of-
fered Santa Elena the sum of approximately US$1.9 million.83 This proposal
was rejected, and the company countered with a proposed sum of approximately
US$6.4 million, in accordance with an appraisal of the property that they had
commissioned.84 A long period of domestic court battles ensued. The company
sought annulment of the 1978 Decree and separately petitioned against the 1987
Decree. The company pursued these claims as far as the Supreme Court of Costa
Rica, but lost in every instance.85 In 1992, negotiations on a settlement for com-
pensation were recommenced and a new appraisal was conducted on behalf of the
79Compan˜ı´a del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Fi-
nal Award (Santa Elena Final Award), 17 February 2000, at para. 16, http://icsid.worldbank.org.
Reproduced in 39 ILM (2000), at 1317.
80Expropriation Decree, qtd. in ibid., at para. 18.
81Ibid.
82Santa Elena Final Award, at para. 22.
83Ibid., at para. 17.
84Ibid., at para. 19.
85Brower and Wong 2005, at 751.
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government in 1993, which valued the property at US$4.4 million.86
In May 1995, the company filed a Request for Arbitration with ICSID, which
was officially lodged with the Centre in March 1996 (the delay was at the request
of Santa Elena). Costa Rica was not obliged to participate in international arbi-
tration under an IIA, but agreed to do so in response to diplomatic pressure and
economic sanctions (specifically the delay of a US$175 million Inter-American
Development Bank loan at the behest of the US government).87
There was no disagreement between Costa Rica and Santa Elena that the ex-
propriation had been lawful. What was in dispute was the amount of compensation
due to Santa Elena. The parties agreed that the appropriate standard of compen-
sation was the fair market value of the property.88 However, the parties were
not in agreement on the appropriate method to calculate the fair market value or
the date on which this value was to be assessed, as this depended in part on the
law applicable to the dispute. Under Costa Rican law, the value of an expropri-
ated property is determined at the time that compensation is provided. Under
international law, the value of expropriated property is assessed at the time of the
expropriation, which in this case would be 1978. The former method would likely
yield a higher value for the property, and thus a greater amount of compensation,
and was therefore favoured by Santa Elena.89 For the same reasons, Costa Rica
favoured the application of international law. Costa Rica also argued that if the
Tribunal found that Costa Rican law was applicable to the case, environmental
legislation developed since 1978, that would significantly restrict, if not prohibit
outright, the commercial development of the property should be taken into account
in the valuation. In particular, Costa Rica noted that the Guanacaste Conservation
Area (which surrounded the expropriated area) was listed as a World Heritage
Site in 1999.90 Costa Rica also provided detailed evidence on its international
86Ibid.
87Santa Elena Final Award, at para. 24. Brower and Wong 2005, at 751, suggest that it is likely
that the company would have actually preferred to rely on the pressure imposed by US to reach a
favourable settlement, rather than having to pay for an expensive and lengthy arbitration, and that it
was rather Costa Rica that pushed for the latter option in order to avoid an unfair settlement.
88Santa Elena Final Award, at para. 70.
89Brower and Wong 2005, at 757-8.
90Brower and Hellbeck 2001, at 25.
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obligations to protect the environment, including MEAs and the 1940 Western
Hemisphere Convention.91 The country argued that setting the compensation too
high would discourage states (particularly those in the developing world) from
adopting environmental objectives.
The Claimant requested an award in the amount of US$41.2 million plus in-
terest and other amounts (later revised to US$40,337,750).92 Costa Rica proposed
and alternative sum of US$1,919,492 or, in the event that Costa Rican law was
applied, US$2,965,113.68.93
Outcome
The Tribunal rendered its Final Award on 17 February 2000. The Tribunal ac-
cepted that the expropriation occurred on 5 May 1978 (the date the Decree was
in effect), arguing that there was no evidence that the property was devalued by
any prior public knowledge that it was about to be expropriated. The Tribunal
further decided that in the absence of an explicit agreement on what law would
govern the dispute, international law would be applied. The Tribunal found that
the reasonable and fair approximation of the value of the property lay between
the value attributed by Costa Rica in 1978 (US$1.9 million) and the Santa Elena’s
1978 valuation (US$6.4 million), and thus came to the amount of US$4,150,000.94
Taking into account interest, the final sum that the Tribunal arrived at was US$16
million.95 The costs of the arbitration were borne equally by the parties.
The Award is particularly significant for several statements made on the rela-
tionship between the public purpose of an expropriation and the requirement of
compensation:
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classi-
fied as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact
that the Property was taken for this reason does not affect either the na-
ture or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. That is,
91Ibid., at 764.
92Santa Elena Final Award, at para. 29.
93Ibid., at para. 35.
94Ibid., at para. 95.
95Ibid., at para. 107.
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the purpose of protecting the environment for which the Property was taken
does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compen-
sation must be paid. The international source of the obligation to protect
the environment makes no difference.96
And further:
Expropriatory environmental measures-no matter how laudable and benefi-
cial to society as a whole-are, in this respect, similar to any other expropria-
tory measures that a state may take in order to implement its policies: where
property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, whether domes-
tic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.97
5.2.2 Metalclad v. Mexico
This was the first NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute to be decided on its merits, and
quite possibly the most controversial of any investor-state dispute concluded to
date. The case revolves around the construction and operation of a hazardous
waste facility in Mexico. The American investor involved in the dispute sought
compensation for breach of the minimum standard of treatment (including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security), national treatment, most-
favoured-nation treatment, as well as expropriation and use of prohibited perfor-
mance requirements, following the denial of a municipal construction permit and
ongoing public demonstrations against the company’s operations. An ICSID Ad-
ditional Facility Tribunal ruled in favour of the investor. Mexico challenged the
award in a Canadian court, which partially annulled the award but still required
Mexico to compensate the investor.
Background
In 1993, Ecosistemas Nacionales, S.A. de C.V., a Mexican corporation wholly-
owned by Eco-Metalclad, which in turn is a subsidiary of Metalclad Corporation,
96Ibid., at para. 71, emphasis added.
97Ibid., at para. 72.
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incorporated in the US (collectively ‘Metalclad’), purchased the Mexican com-
pany Confinamiento Tecnico de Residuos Industriales, S.A. de C.V. (Coterin),
which had obtained permits from Mexico’s National Ecological Institute (INE)
to construct and operate a hazardous waste transfer station in the Municipality
of Guadalcazar in the State of San Luis Potosi.98 Metalclad endeavored to ex-
pand the transfer station into a toxic waste processing plant and landfill and, in its
opinion, secured the necessary Mexican state and federal permits to do so.
According to Metalclad, shortly after the purchase of Coterin, the Governor
of San Luis Potosi embarked on a public campaign to denounce the company and
prevent the operation of the landfill.99 The site had a contentious history of en-
vironmental misconduct prior to Metalclad’s involvement, and was viewed with
concern and suspicion by the local community.100 The company entered into ne-
gotiations with the State government, and claimed that it eventually secured their
support of the project (a fact that Mexico denied in the course of the arbitra-
tion).101 Metalclad began work on the development of the landfill in May 1994.
In October of the same year, the Municipality of Guadalcazar ordered the ces-
sation of all building activities due to the absence of a municipal construction
permit.102 Metalclad subsequently applied for the municipal construction permit,
and according to the company, it had the assurance of the federal government
that it was a simple formality and that the application would be approved in due
course.103 Without yet receiving the municipal permit the company resumed con-
struction on the site, completing the landfill in March 1995.104
However, an inauguration ceremony was blocked by public demonstrations.
Metalclad claimed that it was thenceforth effectively prevented from opening the
98Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Metalclad
Award), 30 August 2000, at paras. 2, 28 and 29, http://icsid.worldbank.org. Reproduced in 40 ILM
(2001), at 36.
99Ibid., at para. 37.
100Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Counter-Memorial
(Metalclad Counter-Memorial), 17 February 1998, at paras. 40-4, http://www.naftaclaims.com.
101Metalclad Award, at para. 38.
102Ibid., at para. 40.
103Ibid., at paras. 41-2.
104Ibid., at para. 45.
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landfill.105 The company entered into negotiations with the INE and the Mexi-
can Federal Attorney’s Office for the Protection of the Environment (PROFEPA)
to resolve the problem, resulting in an agreement (the Convenio) in November
1995.106 The Convenio stated that an environmental audit of the site had been
carried out from December 1994 through March 1995. The audit detected cer-
tain deficiencies, and Metalclad was required to submit an action plan to correct
them including a corresponding site remediation plan. The Convenio also required
PROFEPA to create a Technical-Scientific Committee to monitor the remediation.
The Convenio provided for a five-year term of operation for the landfill, renew-
able by the INE and PROFEPA. The Governor of San Luis Potosi denounced the
Convenio shortly after it was publicly announced, and it was also the subject of a
court action and a complaint by the NGO Greenpeace.107
On 5 December 1995, Metalclad’s application for a municipal construction
permit was denied.108 On 8 February 1996, the INE granted Metalclad an addi-
tional permit authorizing the expansion of the landfill capacity from 36,000 tons
per year to 360,000 tons per year. From May 1996 through December 1996,
Metalclad and the State of San Luis Potosi attempted to resolve their issues with
respect to the operation of the landfill, but these efforts failed. On 23 September
1997, three days before the expiry of his term, the Governor issued an Ecological
Decree declaring a Natural Area (encompassing the landfill site) for the protection
of rare cactus.109
The Dispute
In 1996, Metalclad notified Mexico of its intention to file a dispute under Chap-
ter 11 of the NAFTA, which it did in January of the following year. Metalclad’s
request for US$90 million in compensation was based on a claim of expropria-
tion (Article 1110), a breach of the minimum standard/fair and equitable treat-
ment (Article 1105), a breach of the national treatment (Article 1102) and most-
105Ibid., at para. 46.
106Ibid., at para. 47.
107Metalclad Counter-Memorial, at para. 65.
108Metalclad Award, at para. 49.
109Ibid., at para. 59.
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favoured-nation treatment (Article 1103) standards, and use of prohibited perfor-
mance requirements (Article 1106). The tribunal operated under the rules of the
ICSID Additional Facility, as Mexico is not party to the ICSID Convention, and
the proceedings took place in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
In its Memorial, Metalclad argued that the NAFTA provided guidance on the
interpretation of the international minimum standard in its preamble which states
that the purpose of the agreement is to “ensure a predictable commercial frame-
work for business planning and investment.”110 Metalclad further argued that the
standard should be read in light of the objectives of the NAFTA laid out in Article
102. In Metalclad’s view, the minimum standard thereby also enveloped the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination (national and most-favoured-nation treatment) and
transparency. Having established an interpretation of Article 1105, Metalclad
proceeded to argue that Mexico’s conduct had not met the requirements of the
standard, leaving the company “in a tenebrous investment climate, full of bewil-
derment, bereft of predictability.”111 The company also claimed that it had been
denied full protection and security.112
The claims regarding breach of Articles 1102 and 1103 were based on the
fact that the Municipality of Guadalcazar did not require construction permits
from any national investors or other foreign investors.113 In terms of performance
requirements, Metalclad argued that it had effectively been forced to provide pro-
prietary information to the state government on how to construct a landfill, as well
as to offer certain services to the local community, such as free medical care, and
free consultations for the government regarding hazardous waste matters.114
Finally, Metalclad addressed the issue of expropriation, arguing that the de-
privation of its vested right to operate the landfill was irreversible. Metalclad
further suggested that the taking had not been for a public purpose, noting that at
best it had been for a ‘political purpose’ and at worst for personal gain. In Metal-
clad’s view, the taking had also been discriminatory and implemented without due
110Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Memorial (Metalclad
Memorial), 13 October 1997, at para. 162, emphasis added by Metalclad.
111Ibid., at para. 165.
112Ibid., at para. 212.
113Ibid., at paras. 214 and 228.
114Ibid., at para. 235.
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process.115 While arbitration proceedings were initiated prior to the Governor is-
suing the Ecological Decree, Metalclad nevertheless subsequently sought to have
this measure considered by the tribunal as an expropriation. In terms of compen-
sation, Metalclad argued that the fair market value of the investment included lost
future profits.116
Mexico disputed many of the facts raised in the Metalclad’s Memorial, point-
ing out that Coterin had been denied a municipal construction permit in 1991,
prior to Metalclad’s purchase of the site, and arguing that it was always clear to
the company that it would have to acquire the necessary permits and solicit local
approval for the project.117 Mexico further argued that the company had misrep-
resented itself to various levels of government, engaged in unethical and at times
unlawful behaviour, and was neither competent nor financially capable of running
a hazardous waste landfill in a safe and effective manner.118
In terms of the relevant provisions of the NAFTA, Mexico first argued that
it could not be held liable for any actions taken prior to the entry into force of
the agreement in 1994, nor for anticipated actions (the Ecological Decree which
was enacted following the Notice of Intent), nor for the actions of non-state ac-
tors (e.g., the NGOs and the local community who staged protests). In response
to the claim of discriminatory treatment, Mexico argued that Metalclad was not
in ‘like circumstances’ with other investors in the state or municipality; no other
hazardous waste landfills existed in the area, in fact the closest thing in the mu-
nicipality to an ‘industrial site’ at the time was a gas station.119 Other hazardous
waste sites did exist within the country at the time, but because of the environmen-
tal liability issues unique to the Guadalca´zar landfill and the local opposition to
the project, Mexico argued that they were not an appropriate comparator.120 Mex-
ico suggested that Metalclad’s treatment should only be compared with that of
Coterin when it was wholly Mexican-owned. With such a comparison, there was
115Ibid., at para. 253.
116Ibid., at para. 255.
117Metalclad Counter-Memorial, at paras. 45-52.
118Ibid., at paras. 77-129.
119Ibid., at para. 814.
120Ibid., at para. 813.
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clearly no discrimination.121 Mexico further argued that Metalclad had provided
no evidence that it had been forced to provide the state government with infor-
mation or services, and that even if it had, these did not qualify as performance
requirements under Article 1106.
In its discussion of the minimum standard and fair and equitable treatment,
Mexico pointed out that the standard should be interpreted in light of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a side-agreement
of the NAFTA. Among other things the NAAEC acknowledges the rights of states
to set high standards for environmental protection, and requires them to enforce
their own environmental laws. Mexico further argued that there was no authority
on which to base an interpretation of fair and equitable treatment that required
transparent and predictable behaviour on the part of the host state.122 Furthermore,
they argued that no damage had been caused by the demonstration put on by local
opponents to the landfill (who were not connected with any level of government
in Mexico) and therefore Metalclad’s claim that full protection and security had
not been provided could not be upheld.123
Finally, with regard to the claim of expropriation, it is worth quoting directly
from Mexico’s Counter Memorial:
A finding of expropriation on the facts of this case would lead to an un-
precedented result. In the Respondent’s submission, it would be surprising
to all three NAFTA Parties that where a foreign investor sought to make a
high risk investment in a highly regulated field, where public opposition to
its project was widely known, and the investor knew of both prior to making
its investment, a NAFTA Party could be held responsible for that calculated
business decision to proceed in the face of known risks.124
Both the US and Canada made written submissions to the Tribunal as permit-
ted under Article 1128. Canada cautioned against any equation of the expropri-
ation standard in the NAFTA with the jurisprudence of either the US domestic
121Ibid., at paras. 815-6.
122Ibid., at para. 860.
123Ibid., at paras. 876-9.
124Ibid., at para. 905.
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courts or the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.125 The US submitted that NAFTA Ar-
ticle 1110’s reference to measures ‘tantamount’ to expropriation addressed both
measures that directly and indirectly expropriate, but rejected the suggestion that
the term was intended to create a new category of expropriation not previously
recognized in customary international law.126
Outcome
The Tribunal issued its Award on 30 August 2000. In a very controversial deci-
sion, the Tribunal incorporated a provision on transparency from another chapter
of the NAFTA into its interpretation of Article 1105 on the minimum standard/fair
and equitable treatment.127 The Tribunal argued that ‘transparency’ meant that
“all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, completing and suc-
cessfully operating investments made, or intended to be made ... should be ca-
pable of being readily known to all affected investors [of a NAFTA Party],” and
that there “should be no room for doubt or uncertainty on such matters.”128 The
tribunal went on to conclude that:
The absence of a clear rule as to the requirement or not of a municipal
construction permit, as well as the absence of any established practice or
procedure as to the manner of handling applications for a municipal con-
struction permit, amounts to a failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the
transparency required by the NAFTA.129
This led the Tribunal to the decision that Metalclad had not been treated fairly or
equitably.130
The Tribunal’s determination on expropriation was directly connected to its
finding of a breach of Article 1105. The Tribunal argued that in permitting or
125Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AB)/97/1, Submission of
the Government of Canada, 28 July 1999, http://naftaclaims.com.
126Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AB)/97/1, Submission
of the Government of the United States of America (Metalclad US Article 1128 Submission), 9
November 1999, http://www.state.gov.
127NAFTA, at Art. 102.1.
128Metalclad Award, at para. 76.
129Ibid., at para. 88.
130Ibid., at para. 101.
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tolerating the conduct of the Municipality of Guadalcazar, Mexico had taken a
measure tantamount to expropriation. The Tribunal also relied on the absence of
a timely, orderly and substantive basis for the denial of the construction permit
by the Municipality in making its assessment that an indirect expropriation had
occurred.
The Tribunal determined that consideration of the Ecological Decree was
within its jurisdiction but chose not to attach to this particular measure any “con-
trolling importance,” meaning that their finding that the Decree qualified as ex-
propriation did not affect the Award (as the Tribunal had already found that other
measures met the standard of expropriation).131 Despite its irrelevance to the
Award itself, the Tribunal made a significant statement that it “need not decide
or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the Ecological Decree” in
finding that it constituted a taking. Metalclad was awarded US$16,685,000.132
Mexico petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia (the seat of the
arbitration) to annul the Metalclad award on the basis that the Tribunal had acted in
excess of jurisdiction by applying transparency provisions as the basis for finding
a breach of Article 1105. The Attorney General of Canada intervened to support
Mexico’s petition.133
The Court agreed with Mexico and Canada that the Tribunal should not have
considered provisions on transparency found in the NAFTA, but outside of Chap-
ter 11, which are subject only to State-State disputes. While Chapter 11 is meant
to be interpreted in light of ‘international law’, the Court argued that the proper
meaning was customary international law rather than ‘conventional international
131Ibid., at para. 69.
132Award, at para. 131.
133There was a debate over which arbitration act - the International Commercial Arbitration Act
(ICAA) or the Commercial Arbitration Act (CAA) - should be applied in the case. This would
determine the extent of the legal review possible as under the ICAA only annulment for serious
defects in jurisdiction or procedure that damage the integrity of arbitration as an institution is per-
mitted, whereas the CAA also permits judicial review of awards for legal error. The ICAA was
adopted by the court, nevertheless, Canada requested that the court review the award with greater
scrutiny than was typical for arbitral awards because of the public nature of the dispute and because
NAFTA awards did not merit judicial deference. See further Brower 2001b, at 62-3.
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law’ (i.e. treaties such as the NAFTA).134 The Court struck down some aspects
of the decision, but concurred with the Tribunal that the actions of Mexico con-
stituted an expropriation and calculated an award of US$15.6 million. Mexico
eventually reached a settlement with Metalclad for an undisclosed amount of com-
pensation.135
5.2.3 Tecmed v. Mexico
This case is similar to the Metalclad case (it concerns the operation of a haz-
ardous waste facility in Mexico), although it was brought under a BIT rather than
the NAFTA. Following the denial for renewal of its operating permit, the Span-
ish investor in this case argued that Mexico had discriminated against it, had not
provided fair and equitable treatment, and had expropriated its investment. The
Tribunal found in favour of the investor.
Background
In 1996, an agency in the Municipality of Hermosillo auctioned a hazardous waste
landfill located in the State of Sonora, Mexico.136 The landfill had been built in
1988. Prior to privatization, the landfill had been run by a municipal government
entity, which operated under a licence issued by the Hazardous Materials, Waste
and Activities Division of the INE on an indefinite basis.137
Tecmed, Te´cnicas Medioambientales, S.A. de C.V. (Tecmed), a company in-
corporated under Mexican law and owned by a Spanish parent company, made
a successful bid on the site. The company set up a subsidiary, Cytrar, S.A. de
C.V., to run the landfill operations. In 1996, Tecmed made a request to the INE
for a change in the name on the operating licence to reflect the new ownership
134United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, Supreme Court of British Columbia, Reasons for
Judgment, 2 May 2001, at para. 62, http://www.investmentclaims.com. Reproduced in 5 ICSID
Reports (2002), at 238.
135Gonza´lez de Cosso 2002, at 236.
136Te´cnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award (unofficial English translation from Spanish original) (Tecmed Award), 29 May
2003, at para. 35, http://icsid.worldbank.org. Reproduced in 19 ICSID Review (2004), at 158.
137Ibid., at para. 36.
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of the property.138 The Municipality of Hermosillo supported this request. How-
ever, rather than changing the name on the licence, the INE issued a new licence
which, unlike the the previous one, was not indefinite and had to be renewed each
year. The alteration of permit duration was a part of a general regulatory change
implemented by the Mexican government to enable action to be taken against
non-compliant landfill sites.139
In July 1997, a new Mayor of the Municipality of Hermosillo was elected.140
Tecmed and the newly elected Mayor faced mounting opposition to the landfill
from the local population. On several occasions there were demonstrations and
blockades involving several hundred people. In late 1997, the municipal govern-
ment and the company began negotiations on the relocation of the landfill.141
In December 1997, the association Academia Sonorense de Derechos Hu-
manos (Sonora Human Rights Academy) filed a criminal complaint against Cy-
trar for the commission of acts that they defined as “environmental crimes.”142
The main concern with the landfill was its close proximity to the urban centre
of Hermosillo (8 km), which was in violation of Mexican regulations requiring
hazardous waste to be sited at least 25 km from any settlement of more than
ten thousand residents.143 However, these regulations were put in place after the
landfill had been established, and were not retroactive. Another concern was the
transportation of contaminated soil from a plant in Baja California to the land-
fill.144 On several occasions inspections conducted by PROFEPA had revealed
that there were open hazardous material packaging bags in the trucks transporting
the waste.145 In April 1998, PROFEPA cited further irregularities and levied a fine
against the company stating that “there are circumstances that pose or may pose
a risk to the environment or to health.”146 A similar situation occurred in May
138Ibid., at para. 38.
139Newcombe 2007b, at 408.
140Tecmed Award, at para. 42.
141Ibid., at para. 110.
142Ibid., at para. 108.
143Ibid., at para. 106.
144Ibid., at para. 49.
145Ibid., at para. 107.
146Ibid.
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1998.147
In November 1998, the INE released a Resolution denying Cytrar a renewal
of its permit and further requesting the company to submit a program for the
closure of the landfill. The Resolution based the non-renewal of the permit on
the following three grounds: (i) while the company had only been authorized
to store agrochemicals and pesticides at the site, it had also been disposing of
biological and infectious wastes; (ii) the volume of waste confined at the site far
exceeded the limits established for one of the landfill’s active cells; and (iii) the
landfill had operated as a ‘transfer centre’ (temporarily storing hazardous waste
destined for disposal outside the landfill), an activity for which the company did
not have the required authorization.148 Tecmed argued that these infringements
had already been investigated by PROFEPA, which had found that they were not
egregious enough to justify the immediate cancellation, suspension or revocation
of the permit, and had fined the company instead.149 After the Resolution was
issued, discussions on the possible relocation of the landfill site continued, but
they ceased prior to the commencement of arbitration.
The Dispute
On 28 July 2000, Tecmed filed with ICSID an application for approval of access
to the Additional Facility and a request for arbitration based on the Agreement on
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments signed by the Kingdom
of Spain and the United Mexican States (Spain-Mexico BIT), which entered into
force on 18 December 1996.150
Tecmed alleged that Mexico had violated the following provisions of the Spain-
Mexico BIT: Article 2.1 on the promotion and admission of investments; Article
3 on protection of investments (including full protection and security); Article 4.1
on fair and equitable treatment; Article 4.2 on most-favoured-nation treatment;
147Ibid.
148Ibid., at para. 99.
149Ibid., at para. 100.
150Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments signed by the Kingdom of
Spain and the United Mexican States, 22 June 1995.
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Article 4.5 on national treatment; and Article 5 on expropriation.151 The company
sought damages, including compensation for harm to its reputation, and addition-
ally requested restitution in kind through the granting of permits to the company to
enable it to operate the landfill until the end of its useful life.152 Tecmed assessed
the market value of the landfill at US$52 million.
Tecmed argued that when it bid on the landfill, it bid not only on the land
and tangible materials, but also on intangible assets, most importantly the existing
operation permits.153 However, the permits that were eventually granted to the
company were different (in terms of their duration as well as the conditions to
which they were subject) from the permit that was present at the time that the bid
was made. Tecmed suggested that, while it was not central to their case, it wished
to highlight the permit issue as evidence of a string of actions that amounted to
discriminatory treatment.154 Mexico, for its part, denied that the tender and sub-
sequent award to Tecmed included intangible assets such as licenses or permits,
and argued that it was rather solely concerned with certain facilities, land, infras-
tructure and equipment.155 Mexico suggested that it was always clear to Tecmed
that it would require its own licenses, authorizations or permits in order to oper-
ate the landfill. As the bidding had occurred prior to the entry into force of the
Spain-Mexico BIT, it was unclear as to whether this issue could be taken into
consideration by the Tribunal.156
However, the central issue for Tecmed was not the limited nature of the permit
that Cytrar had been granted, but rather the refusal of the INE to renew it, with
no apparent justification. Tecmed argued that the federal government had yielded
to the combined pressure of the municipal authorities of Hermosillo and the State
of Sonora along with the community movement opposed to the landfill.157 The
company denied any misconduct or violation of the operating permit that could
151Tecmed Award, at para. 93.
152Ibid., at para. 184.
153Ibid., at para. 40.
154Ibid., at para. 40.
155Ibid., at para. 47.
156Tecmed sought retroactive application of a treaty on the grounds that absent such application the
investor would be receiving less favorable treatment than a similarly situated Austrian investor. The
Tribunal noted the claimant’s reference to Maffezini but refused to consider the Austrian treaty.
157Tecmed Award, at para. 43.
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justify a refusal to renew it.158 Tecmed argued that it had not received: national
treatment, noting that all the previous owners of the landfill - government enti-
ties - were provided with operation permits; or most-favoured-nation treatment,
pointing out that another foreign investor had been granted an operation permit of
unlimited duration for a similar landfill.
Tecmed also claimed that it had not been treated fairly or equitably. Tecmed
argued that fair and equitable treatment, “encompasses the duty to act transpar-
ently and respecting the legitimate trust generated in the investor.”159 The com-
pany claimed that the Mexican government had not acted transparently (it was not
clear that the indefinite permit would be replaced with one of limited duration)
and that the ‘legitimate trust’ that had been generated, inducing the company to
make the investment in the first place, had been “violated and seriously trampled
upon.”160 Tecmed also alleged that Mexican municipal and state authorities had
encouraged the community protests against the Landfill and that the authorities
did not act “as quickly, efficiently and thoroughly as they should have to avoid,
prevent or put an end to the adverse social demonstrations.”161 The company
viewed this as a violation of Article 3.1 of the Spain-Mexico BIT, which provides
for full protection and security.
Mexico responded that the INE Resolution was neither arbitrary nor discrim-
inatory and furthermore that it was a “regulatory measure issued in compliance
with the State’s police power within the highly regulated and extremely sensi-
tive framework of environmental protection and public health.”162 Mexico argued
that the landfill was denied its permit and shut down for the following reasons:
(i) the site of the landfill did not comply with applicable Mexican regulations in
terms of its location and characteristics; (ii) in 1998, a number of irregularities
occurred in the operation of the landfill, and these irregularities triggered strong
community pressure against the landfill; (iii) Mexican authorities, mainly from the
Municipality of Hermosillo, expressed their doubts as to the safety of the landfill’s
operations; and (iv) there was the risk that community pressure might increase if
158Ibid.
159Ibid., at para. 58.
160Memorial, at 122, qtd. in Tecmed Award, at para. 58.
161Tecmed Award, at para. 175.
162Ibid., at para. 97.
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operation of the landfill continued.163
Outcome
In 2003, the Tribunal issued its award, finding that Mexico had expropriated
Tecmed’s investment and had breached the provision on fair and equitable treat-
ment in the Spain-Mexico BIT.
In determining whether or not the INE Resolution constituted an expropriation
of Tecmed’s investment, the Tribunal adopted a two-part test. In the first part, they
assessed whether the company had been “radically deprived of the economical
use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights related thereto - such as the
income or benefits related to the Landfill or to its exploitation - had ceased to
exist.”164 The Tribunal suggested that this was:
... one of the main elements to distinguish ... between a regulatory measure,
which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the state’s police power
that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that
deprives those assets and rights of any real substance.165
They went on to suggest that:
... the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or not, are an indirect
de facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and if ... the
economic value of the use, enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights
affected by the administrative action or decision have been neutralized or
destroyed.166
Most significantly, they argued that the “government’s intention is less important
than the effects of the measures on the owner of the assets or on the benefits arising
from such assets affected by the measures.”167 The Tribunal found that the INE
Resolution undoubtedly met the conditions of the effects test.168
163Ibid., at para. 105.
164Ibid., at para. 115.
165Ibid.
166Ibid., at para. 116.
167Ibid.
168Ibid., at para. 117.
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However, the Tribunal did not end its discussion of expropriation there, and
went on to the second part of its test, on the purpose of the measure. In the Tri-
bunal’s view there must be a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between
the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be re-
alized by any expropriatory measure.”169 In terms of the aim of the expropriatory
measure, they determined that the INE Resolution was not designed to protect
the environment, but rather issued as a response to the ‘political circumstances’
surrounding the dispute.170 The Tribunal noted that:
The absence of any evidence that the operation of the Landfill was a real or
potential threat to the environment or to the public health, coupled with the
absence of massive opposition, limits ‘community pressure’ to a series of
events, which, although they amount to significant pressure on the Mexican
authorities, do not constitute a real crisis or disaster of great proportions,
triggered by acts or omissions committed by the foreign investor or its affil-
iates.171
Thus, they concluded that there was not sufficient justification for Mexico to ex-
propriate Tecmed’s property without compensating the company, particularly as
it had not been proved that Tecmed’s behavior was the cause of the political pres-
sure or the demonstrations.172 Thus, the Tribunal found that the INE Resolution
amounted to a breach of Article 5 of the Spain-Mexico BIT on expropriation.173
The Tribunal commenced its evaluation of fair and equitable treatment by not-
ing that ‘bad faith’ on the part of a state was not required for a breach of this princi-
ple.174 In the Tribunal’s view, the provision requires that states provide “treatment
that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the for-
eign investor to make the investment.”175 They went on to note that the foreign
investor expects the state to act in a ‘consistent manner’ and:
169Ibid., at para. 122, emphasis added.
170Ibid., at para. 127.
171Ibid., at para. 144.
172Ibid., at para. 147.
173Ibid., at para. 151.
174Ibid., at para. 153.
175Ibid., at para. 154, emphasis added.
208 First-Order Outcomes
... free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and reg-
ulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its in-
vestment and comply with such regulations.176
The Tribunal found that the behavior of the INE conflicted “with what a reasonable
and unbiased observer would consider fair and equitable” and thus found Mexico
to be in violation of Article 4.1 of the Spain-Mexico BIT.
With regard to Article 3, the Tribunal held that Tecmed had not provided
enough evidence to prove that the Mexican authorities encouraged, fostered, sup-
ported or participated in the protests against the Landfill.177 They also found that
there was insufficient evidence supporting the allegation that the Mexican author-
ities did not deal with the protests in an acceptable manner. The Tribunal further
noted that the “guarantee of full protection and security is not absolute and does
not impose strict liability upon the State that grants it.”178
The Tribunal also determined that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
Tecmed had been discriminated against or had received less favorable treatment
than that afforded to nationals or investors of any third State.179 The Tribunal
further decided that Mexico had not breached Article 2.1 (on the promotion and
protection of investments), and that if such a violation had occurred, it would be
the subject of a state-state dispute rather than an investor-state dispute.180 Finally,
the Tribunal ruled that the INE’s refusal to renew Tecmed’s permit did not amount
to a violation of Article 3.2 of the Spain-Mexico BIT, pursuant to which each
Contracting Party “within the local legal framework” shall grant the necessary
permits with regard to the investments from the other Party.181
176Ibid., emphasis added.
177Ibid., at para. 176.
178Ibid., at para. 177.
179Ibid., at para. 181. In particular the Tribunal accepted Mexico’s argument that the circumstances
of another foreign investor operating a landfill were materially differed from that of Tecmed and,
therefore, could not be compared.
180Ibid., at para. 182.
181Ibid. The Tribunal found no evidence showing that INE’s refusal to renew the permit was contrary
to Mexican laws.
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The Tribunal chose not to consider the option of restitution in kind and rather
focused on monetary damages. The Tribunal awarded US$5,533,017.12 with 6%,
compound interest from the date of the expropriatory act (25 November 1998)
until the effective and full payment to Tecmed.182
5.2.4 S.D. Myers v. Canada
This case revolves around the movement of hazardous wastes across the Canada-
US border. Following an opening of the border from the American side, Canada
temporarily prohibited the transboundary movement of certain hazardous wastes
in order to ensure compliance with its international obligations on the matter. The
country was subsequently sued by an American investor for breach of NAFTA
Chapter 11 provisions on national treatment, the minimum standard of treatment,
performance requirements and expropriation. The UNCITRAL Tribunal found a
breach of the former two provisions and awarded the investor compensation.
Background
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are highly toxic substances that have been the
subject of increasingly strict regulation in Canada and the US since the 1970s.
Their production was banned in both countries following a 1973 OECD Coun-
cil Decision on the issue.183 The use of PCBs in products manufactured in or
imported into Canada was banned in 1977.184 In 1986, Canada and the US
entered into the Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Haz-
ardous Waste (Transboundary Agreement), although there was some confusion as
to whether this agreement actually covered PCBs, which have never been classi-
fied as a hazardous waste in the US (see further below).185 In 1988, PCBs were
included in Schedule 1 on Toxic Substances in the newly developed Canadian
182Ibid at para. 197.
183S.D. Myers v. Government of Canada, Partial Award (S.D. Myers Partial Award), 13 November
2000, at para. 99, http://www.international.gc.ca. Reproduced in 40 ILM, at 1408.
184Ibid., at para. 100.
185Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, 28 October 1986, Ot-
tawa, http://www.epa.gov.
210 First-Order Outcomes
Environmental Protection Act.186 This legislation was supplemented by the PCB
Waste Export Regulations in 1990, which effectively banned the export of PCB
waste from Canada to all countries other than the US.187 Under these regulations,
exports to the US were only permitted with the prior approval of the US Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (US EPA). In the US, there are restrictions on the
manufacture, sale, use, import, export, and disposal of PCBs and PCB contami-
nated wastes under the Toxic Substances Control Act; however, the US EPA may
grant an exemption from this Act if it is satisfied that the applicant’s activities will
not result in unreasonable risk to human health or the environment.188
In 1992, Canada ratified the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes.189 The US also signed the Basel Convention in 1989,
but as of early 2008, the country had not yet ratified the agreement. PCBs are listed
in Annex 1 of the Basel Convention as “waste to be controlled.” Under the Basel
Convention, Parties are required, among other things, to:
• reduce the production of hazardous waste;
• ensure the availability of adequate disposal facilities, to the extent possible, within
its own boundaries; and
• ensure that the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other waste is
reduced to the minimum consistent with the environmentally sound and efficient
management of such wastes and is conducted in a manner which will protect human
health and the environment against the adverse effects which may result from such
movement.190
The export and import of hazardous wastes to and from non-Parties is also pro-
hibited,191 unless an agreement exists between the Party and non-Party that is as
stringent as the Basel Convention.192
186S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para. 100.
187Ibid.
188S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (S.D.
Myers Notice of Intent), 21 July 1998, at 4, http://www.international.gc.ca.
189Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 22
March 1989, Basel, http://www.basel.int/. Reproduced in 32 ILM (1993), at 276.
190Basel Convention, at Art. 4.2(a), (b), and (d).
191Ibid., at Art. 4.5.
192Ibid., at Art. 11.
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In the early 1990s, S.D. Myers, Inc., an American waste treatment company,
began a concerted lobbying effort aimed at acquiring permission from the US EPA
to import PCBs and PCB waste from Canada.193 Between 1991 and 1993 the
company submitted four petitions to the US EPA, who rejected each after finding
that S.D. Myers had failed to prove that there was no unreasonable risk to human
health or the environment.194 By the company’s own estimates, the proposed im-
portation would expose the US and Canada to the risk of approximately 2.5 PCB
spills, including spills of high-concentration PCBs.195 The US EPA determined
that the better alternative was for the PCBs to be destroyed in Canada.
However, S.D. Myers eventually succeeded in its lobbying efforts and received
an enforcement discretion valid from 15 November 1995 to 31 December 1997.196
Under the terms of the enforcement discretion, the US EPA would not enforce the
US regulations banning importation of PCBs against S.D. Myers provided that
the company met certain conditions. Following this decision, further enforcement
discretions were granted to nine other US companies.197 This turn of events was
apparently the result of intense political pressure on the US EPA, brought about
as a result of the S.D. Myer’s extensive lobbying.198
In the period that followed the US EPA’s decision, the Canadian government
struggled with several issues including: (i) whether the enforcement discretion
fully complied with US law; (ii) whether exports of PCB wastes to the US, a
non-Party to the Basel Convention, would be in compliance with Canada’s in-
ternational commitments; (iii) whether PCBs would be disposed of in the US in
an environmentally sound manner; (iv) whether exports would be in compliance
with Canada’s policy of destroying Canadian PCBs in Canada; (v) whether ex-
ports would threaten to the long-term viability of domestic PCB disposal facili-
ties; and (vi) whether there would be sufficient options for disposal if US facilities
subsequently became unavailable, or if the US border was again closed to im-
193S.D. Myers Partial Award, at paras. 113-4.
194Hodges 2002, at 375.
195Ibid., at 376.
196S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para. 118.
197Ibid., at para. 119.
198Hodges 2002, at 378.
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ports.199 In terms of the issue of compliance with the Basel Convention, Canada
was unclear as to whether the Transboundary Agreement actually covered PCBs
and met the requirements of Article 11. It was not until three months after the US
EPA granted the first enforcement discretion that Canada received notification by
diplomatic note that the US took the position that the Transboundary Agreement
did in fact cover PCBs.200
In November 1995, the Canadian Minister of the Environment signed an In-
terim Order, which amended the PCB Waste Export Regulations and had the effect
of banning the export of PCBs and PCB wastes from Canada. The stated purpose
of the Interim Order was “to ensure that Canadian PCB Wastes are managed in an
environmentally sound manner in Canada and to prevent any possible significant
danger to the environment or to human life or health.”201 On 26 February 1996,
the Interim Order was converted into a Final Order. It would appear from a mem-
orandum written by the Director of the Hazardous Waste Branch in the Canadian
Department of the Environment, that there was concern within the government
that this action could be difficult to justify (in particular that the opening of the
US border posed a significant danger to the environment or health) and also that
it could spark a NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute.202
In February 1997, having studied the issues and having determined that the
country could permit exports of PCBs and still satisfy the requirements of the
Basel Convention, Canada re-opened the border by a further amendment to the
PCB Waste Export Regulations, allowing exports of PCBs for disposal at US EPA-
approved sites. The border was thus closed to cross-border movement of PCBs
and PCB waste by regulations introduced by Canada for a period of approximately
16 months, from November 1995 to February 1997.203 Thereafter, the border was
open and there were seven contracts pursuant to which PCBs and PCB waste
material were exported from Canada to the US for processing by S.D. Myers.
While these events were transpiring in Canada, across the border the Sierra
199S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Statement of Defence (S.D. Myers Statement of De-
fence), 18 June 1999, at para. 20, http://www.international.gc.ca.
200de Pencier 2000, at 415-6.
201Explanatory note attached to the Interim Order, qtd. in S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para. 123.
202Qtd. in Weiler 2001, at 178.
203S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para 127.
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Club (an environmental NGO) was challenging the legality of the US EPA en-
forcement discretion. In July 1997, the Ninth Circuit of the US Court of Appeals
overturned the US EPA enforcement discretion, finding that the US EPA had vi-
olated its own rule-making procedures and the Toxic Substances Control Act.204
Thus, the border was closed once again from the American side. In total, the
border was open to the movement of PCBs and PCB wastes for a period of five
months, between February and July 1997.
The Dispute
S.D. Myers filed for NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration in 1998, claiming US$20 mil-
lion in damages.205 S.D. Myers claimed that Canada had breached the following
articles of the NAFTA: 1102 on national treatment; 1105 on the minimum stan-
dard; 1106 on performance requirements; and 1110 on expropriation.206
In terms of national treatment, S.D. Myers argued that the Interim Order dis-
criminated against US waste disposal operators and favoured domestic compa-
nies.207 S.D. Myers put forth that the true purpose of the Interim Order was to
favour a Canadian competitor called Chem-Security, which had disposal facilities
for PCBs located in the Province of Alberta.208 Canada suggested instead that the
export ban merely established a uniform regulatory regime under which all com-
panies were treated equally: neither national nor foreign operators were permitted
to export PCBs.209
With regard to the minimum standard, the company claimed that the Interim
Order was promulgated in a discriminatory and unfair manner that constituted a
204Hodges 2002, at 379-80.
205S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Notice of Arbitration, 30 October 1998, at 4,
http://www.international.gc.ca.
206Ibid.
207S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Statement of Claim (S.D. Myers Statement of Claim),
30 October 1998, at 11, http://www.international.gc.ca.
208S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Memorial (S.D. Myers Memorial), 20 July 1999, at
9-13, http://www.international.gc.ca.
209S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Counter-Memorial (S.D. Myers Counter Memorial), 5
October 1999, at 81, http://www.international.gc.ca.
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denial of justice and a violation of good faith under international law.210 In partic-
ular, S.D. Myers pointed out that prior to the Interim Order being finalized there
had been no consultation with the company or with the US government.211 Canada
rebutted that given the circumstances and the urgent need to respond to the sudden
and surprising decision of the US EPA, it had no duty to consult the US govern-
ment (which had not consulted Canada prior to the US EPA decision) let alone a
company that it argued it was unaware of.212 In any case, non-consultation would
not amount to the kind of egregious behaviour required to breach the minimum
standard, in the view of Canada.213
In terms of performance requirements, S.D. Myers claimed that the Interim
Order effectively required it to dispose of PCB contaminated waste in Canada.214
The company argued that this resulted in a performance requirement for PCB
disposal operators to accord preference to Canadian goods and services and to
achieve a given level of domestic content.215 Canada refuted this and pointed out
that the NAFTA lists all prohibited performance requirements and export bans are
not so-listed. Furthermore, Canada argued that even if the Interim Order were
classified as a prohibited performance requirement, the exception would apply
because it is a measure necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
or was necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natu-
ral resource. The argument that the Interim Order was intended to protect the
environment was challenged by S.D. Myers, who pointed to the fact that the ma-
jority of the PCB waste in Canada was located in Ontario and Quebec, making
S.D. Myers facilities in Ohio significantly closer than those of Chem-Security in
Alberta.216 Assuming that the facilities in Alberta and Ohio were comparable
(as S.D. Myers claimed), one would conclude that cross-border shipment was the
more environmentally-sound option. However, as S.D. Myers reportedly planned
to recycle the wastes in Ohio, but then ship them to Texas for final incineration,
210S.D. Myers Memorial, at 51-7.
211Ibid.
212S.D. Myers Counter-Memorial, at 89-90; de Pencier 2000, at 411-2.
213Ibid., at 88.
214S.D. Myers Memorial, at 62-6.
215Ibid.
216Ibid., at 6.
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the distances for the movement of the wastes were actually much greater.217
With respect to its final claim, S.D. Myers put forth that Canada had indirectly
expropriated its investment without providing compensation.218 Canada repudi-
ated this claim, pointing to the fact that S.D. Myers subsidiary in Canada had
continued operations while the Interim Order remained in effect and that there
was no evidence that S.D. Myers had sustained any loss as a result of the Interim
Order.219
In addition to rebutting S.D. Myers’ claims, Canada also argued that the In-
terim Order was not a measure that ‘related to’ an investor or an investment in
Canada (as required for Chapter 11 to apply), and suggested that S.D. Myers did
not in fact have an investment in Canada, as the shares of Myers Canada were
owned by several members of the Myers family, rather than by S.D. Myers as a
company.220 Furthermore, Canada contended (as did Mexico in a Non-Party sub-
mission) that because S.D. Myers and Myers Canada were engaged in the trade in
goods or cross-border services, Chapters 3 and 12 of the NAFTA applied, which
take precedence over Chapter 11.221 Canada further argued that its other interna-
tional obligations, including the Basel Convention and Transboundary Agreement,
should prevail over Chapter 11 obligations in the event of any inconsistency.222 Fi-
nally, Canada sought to establish that the US EPA Enforcement Discretion, which
had provided the basis for the open border and thus the Interim Order and the
NAFTA dispute, had not been lawful.223
Outcome
On 13 November 2000, the Tribunal delivered its First Partial Award. Although
the Tribunal was unanimous in its findings, one arbitrator also wrote a Separate
217Hodges 2002, at 383.
218S.D. Myers Memorial, at 74-5.
219S.D. Myers Counter-Memorial, at 105.
220Ibid., at 66-76.
221Ibid., at 122; S.D. Myers v. Canada, Article 1128 Submission of Mexico on the Merits, 14 January
2000, http://www.naftaclaims.com.
222Ibid., at 61-3.
223S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para. 191.
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Concurring Opinion.224
The Tribunal found that S.D. Myers was an ‘investor’ and had an ‘investment’
under the definitions provided in Chapter 11, despite the previously mentioned
issue of share ownership.225 They also found that the requirement that the import
ban relate to S.D. Myers and its investment in Canada was easily satisfied, arguing
that the company’s plans to expand its Canadian operations was the specific inspi-
ration for the Interim and Final Orders.226 The Tribunal determined that Canada
had breached Articles 1102 and 1105 (on national treatment and the minimum
standard respectively).227 They did not find that Canada had used a prohibited
performance requirement or that it had expropriated S.D. Myers’ investment.228
In arriving at its decision, the Tribunal found that the evidence presented by S.D.
Myers established that the Interim and Final Orders were designed to a great extent
with the “desire and intent to protect and promote the market share of enterprises
that would carry out the destruction of PCBs in Canada and that were owned by
Canadian nationals.”229 They argued that while other factors were considered, the
“protectionist intent of lead minister ... was reflected in decision-making at every
stage that led to the ban.”230
In terms of the environmental justification for the measures, the Tribunal
found “no legitimate environmental reason for introducing the ban.”231 The Tri-
bunal suggested that the “indirect environmental objective” of ensuring continued
domestic capacity to dispose of PCBs and PCB wastes was legitimate but “could
have been achieved by other measures” (e.g., sourcing all government require-
ments, granting subsidies to the Canadian industry, etc.).232 As for the Basel Con-
224Under the UNCITRAL Rules (31 and 32) there can only be one award of the Tribunal on any
particular issue, and therefore a separate opinion is technically not part of an award and has no legal
status.
225S.D. Myers Partial Award, at paras. 320-1.
226Ibid., at para. 234.
227Ibid., at para. 322.
228Ibid., at para. 323.
229Ibid., at para. 162.
230Ibid.
231Ibid., at para. 195.
232Ibid. Orellana 2007, at 769, argues that it is highly debatable whether these alternatives would have
been as (cost) effective as the Interim/Final Order, and furthermore suggests that they likely would
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vention, the Tribunal first of all determined that Article 11 clearly permitted the
continuation of the Transboundary Agreement, which allowed for cross-border
movements of hazardous waste between Canada and the US. However, they also
noted that, “[e]ven if the Basel Convention were to have been ratified by NAFTA
Parties, it should not be presumed that Canada would have been able to use it
to justify the breach of a specific NAFTA provision.”233 Thus the Tribunal con-
cluded that “where a state can achieve its chosen level of environmental protection
through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, it is obliged to adopt
the alternative that is most consistent with open trade.”234 The Tribunal chose not
to look into the issue of the legality of the US EPA enforcement discretion, ar-
guing that Canada had never challenged the measure directly, and did eventually
re-open the border (thus implicitly accepting the legality of the situation).235
In considering whether Canada had breached its commitment to provide na-
tional treatment, the Tribunal looked at the broader legal context in which Article
1102 is situated, including: the rest of the NAFTA; the NAAEC; and principles
that are affirmed by the NAAEC (including the Rio Declaration principles). The
principles that the Tribunal focused on were the following:
• States have the right to establish high levels of environmental protection and they
are not obliged to compromise their standards merely to satisfy the political or
economic interests of other states;
• States should avoid creating distortions to trade; and
• Environmental protection and economic development can and should be mutually
supportive.236
The Tribunal appeared to focus quite extensively on the interpretation of the phrase
‘like circumstances’ in respect of these principles. The Tribunal suggested that
Article 1102 must take into account the general principles that emerge from
the legal context of NAFTA, including both its concern with the environ-
have violated the WTO Government Procurement Agreement or the WTO Subsidies Agreement.
233S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para. 215, emphasis added.
234Ibid., at para. 221, emphasis added.
235Ibid., at para. 191.
236Ibid., at para. 220.
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ment and the need to avoid trade distortions that are not justified by envi-
ronmental concerns. The assessment of ‘like circumstances’ must also take
into account circumstances that would justify governmental regulations that
treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.237
After establishing that S.D. Myers was in ‘like circumstances’ with Canadian
competitors, the Tribunal further assessed two factors: whether the practical ef-
fect of the measure is to create a disproportionate benefit for nationals over non-
nationals; and whether the measure, on its face, appears to favour its nationals
over non-nationals who are protected by the relevant treaty.238 The Tribunal con-
cluded on the basis of its assessment that the issuance of the Interim Order and
the Final Order was in breach of Article 1102 of the NAFTA.239
The Tribunal commenced its argument on the minimum standard with a pre-
cautionary statement that a tribunal “does not have an open-ended mandate to
second-guess government decision-making.”240 They then went on to acknowl-
edge that:
Governments have to make many potentially controversial choices. In doing
so, they may appear to have made mistakes, to have misjudged the facts, pro-
ceeded on the basis of a misguided economic or sociological theory, placed
too much emphasis on some social values over others and adopted solutions
that are ultimately ineffective or counterproductive. The ordinary remedy,
if there were one, for errors in modern governments is through internal po-
litical and legal processes, including elections.241
The Tribunal thus appeared to be somewhat sympathetic to the position of states
and further held that breach of fair and equitable treatment, as an integral part of
the minimum standard, requires conduct that is so unjust or arbitrary that it can be
deemed unacceptable from the international perspective, noting that “determina-
tion must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that international
law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within
237Ibid., at para. 250.
238Ibid., at para. 252.
239Ibid., at para. 256.
240Ibid., at para. 261.
241Ibid.
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their own borders.”242 It is somewhat surprising that the Tribunal followed these
statements with its determination (by majority) that “the breach of Article 1102
essentially establishes a breach of Article 1105 as well.”243 This decision would
later be rebuked by all the NAFTA Parties in an Interpretation of Article 1105
released by the NAFTA FTC.244
The Tribunal agreed, by majority, with Canada that the Interim and Final Or-
ders did not qualify as prohibited performance requirements under Article 1106.245
The Tribunal also rejected the interpretation provided by S.D. Myers that the
phrase “tantamount to expropriation” expanded the meaning of Article 1110 be-
yond the accepted definition in international law.246 The Tribunal argued that
‘tantamount’ meant ‘equivalent to’.247 The Tribunal categorized the Interim Order
and the Final Order as “regulatory acts,” noting the distinction between expropria-
tions, which “tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights,” and regulations,
which are a “lesser interference.”248 They went on to note that “[r]egulatory con-
duct by public authorities is unlikely to be the subject of legitimate complaint
under Article 1110 of NAFTA, although the Tribunal does not rule out that pos-
sibility.”249 However, the Tribunal then proceeded to draw a different distinction,
between permanent and temporary interferences in an investment. The fact that
the closure of the Canadian border was temporary appears to have strongly influ-
enced the Tribunal’s decision that it did not amount to an expropriation:
In this case, the Interim Order and the Final Order were designed to, and
did, curb [S.D. Myers’s] initiative, but only for a time. CANADA realized
no benefit from the measure. The evidence does not support a transfer of
242Ibid., at para. 263.
243Ibid., at para. 266.
244Paragraph B.3 of the interpretation states: “A determination that there has been a breach of another
provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has
been a breach of Article 1105(1).”
245S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para. 278. One arbitrator dissented, finding that the effect of the
Orders was to require S.D. Myers to undertake all of its operations in Canada which amounted to a
prohibited performance requirement.
246Ibid., at para. 285.
247Ibid., at para. 286.
248Ibid., at para. 282.
249Ibid., at para. 281.
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property or benefit directly to others. An opportunity was delayed.250
With regard to the issue of compensation, the Tribunal noted that, except in the
case of Article 1110 on expropriation, the NAFTA does not stipulate any particular
methodology for the calculation of damages. They thus concluded that the drafters
of the NAFTA had intended for arbitrators to decide on an appropriate method, in
light of the specific circumstances of a given case.251 In this case, the Tribunal
decided that the application of the ‘fair market value’ standard was “not a logical,
appropriate or practicable measure of the compensation to be awarded.”252 The
Tribunal also agreed with Canada that: the burden is on the Claimant to prove the
quantum of the losses in respect of which it puts forward its claims; compensation
is payable only in respect of harm that is proved to have a sufficient causal link
with the specific NAFTA provision that has been breached (the economic losses
claimed must be proved to be those that have arisen from a breach of the NAFTA,
and not from other causes); and damages for breach of any one NAFTA provision
should take into account any damages already awarded under a breach of another
NAFTA provision.253 The Tribunal delayed the final decision on compensation to
the Second Partial Award, where it concluded that the total compensation payable
to S.D. Myers was CDN$6,050,000 plus compound interest.254 The Final Award
concerned the apportionment of legal fees and arbitration costs. Canada was re-
quired to pay CDN$850,000 plus compound interest in costs and fees.255
Canada sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s First Partial Award in the Fed-
eral Courts of Canada (the arbitration had its seat in Toronto). Canada argued that
the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding on a case in which no in-
vestment was involved and had incorrectly determined that S.D. Myers was in
‘like circumstances’ with Canadian waste disposal companies. Canada also ar-
250Ibid., at para. 287, emphasis added.
251Ibid., at para. 309.
252Ibid.
253Ibid., at para. 316.
254S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Second Partial Award, 21 October 2002, at paras.
311-2, http://www.international.gc.ca.
255S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Final Award, 30 December 2002, at paras. 53-5,
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gued that the First Partial Award violated the country’s public policy.256 The
Court issued its judgment in January 2004, noting the limited scope of judicial
review of tribunal awards and dismissing the case.257 Of particular interest is the
court’s decision that review on the basis of conflicts with public policy is lim-
ited to cases of flagrant injustice, rather than mere conflicts with a government’s
‘political position’.258
5.2.5 Methanex v. United States
This case revolves around the production and sale of a gasoline additive in Califor-
nia. Following a university study that concluded that the additive was a significant
source of potential water pollution and a threat to public health, the State of Cal-
ifornia phased out its use. A Canadian investor subsequently sued the US under
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA for expropriation and breach of the national and min-
imum standards of treatment. The Tribunal in the case dismissed all claims and
detemrined that the claimant should pay all of the costs and legal fees incurred in
the course of the arbitration.
Background
Beginning in the late 1980s, studies were undertaken in the US to identify ways in
which gasoline could be reformulated to help achieve certain air quality goals.259
These studies found that the addition of oxygenated organic compounds, such as
alcohols and ethers, to conventional gasoline resulted in a reduction in the emis-
sions of carbon monoxide and other products of incomplete combustion.260 The
use of oxygenates in fuel subsequently became mandatory under US Federal law.
In California, the ‘oxygenate of choice’ was methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE).
Thus, MTBE was initially brought into use in California (and other locations) to
256Brower 2004, at 342.
257Attorney General of Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc., 3 Federal Court Reports (2004), at 368,
http://reports.fja.gc.ca.
258Ibid., at para. 55.
259Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award, 9 August 2005, at para. III.A.4.,
http://www.state.gov. Reproduced in 44 ILM (2005), at 1345.
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bring about health and environmental benefits. However, improvements in the
emission control technology used in newer cars have significantly reduced emis-
sions of air pollutants and as a result, MTBE and other oxygenates no longer have
significant effects on air quality.261On the other hand, they do pose environmen-
tal risks associated with groundwater contamination. MTBE is highly soluble in
water and will transfer readily to groundwater from gasoline leaking from under-
ground storage tanks, pipelines and other components of the gasoline distribution
system.262
On 9 October 1997, the California Senate adopted Bill 521, which commis-
sioned an assessment of the human health and environmental risks and benefits
associated with the use of MTBE and other gasoline oxygenates, to be carried
out by researchers at the University of California.263 In 1998, the University of
California released its five-volume, 600 page, report (the UC Report).264 The UC
Report concluded that California’s water resources were being placed at risk by
the use of MTBE in gasoline. While the UC Report suggested that the risk of expo-
sure to MTBE through ingestion or inhalation was low, they noted that there were
significant gaps in the scientific understanding of the acute and chronic toxicity
of MTBE.265 The UC Report also suggested that the potential treatment costs of
MTBE-contaminated drinking water could be enormous. Furthermore, the costs
associated with fixing all the leaking underground storage tanks and pipelines
would be in the order of tens of hundreds of millions of dollars per year.266
The UC Report recommended that California phase-out the use of gasoline
oxygenates. In order to do so, it would have to seek a waiver from the Federal
Government requirements on the use of oxygenates in fuel. A second-best option,
suggested in the UC Report, was the use of ethanol as an oxygenate to replace
261
“University of California Report MTBE Fact Sheet”, UC Davis website, 12 November 1998, at 1,
http://tsrtp.ucdavis.edu/public/mtbe/mtberpt/index.php.
262Ibid.
263Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, First Partial Award (Methanex First Partial
Award), 7 August 2002, at para. 26, http://www.state.gov/.
264Health & Environmental Assessment of MTBE, Report to the Governor and Legislature
of the State of California, Volume I, Summary & Recommendations, November 1998,
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MTBE. The inadequate supply of ethanol in the state meant that an immediate ban
on MTBE would have negative implications for consumers and disrupt gasoline
production significantly, and the UC Report therefore recommended a scheduled
phase-out, coupled with a careful study of the environmental and health impacts
of alternative oxygenates, such as ethanol.267
In response to the UC Report, then Governor of California, Gray Davis, issued
Executive Order D-5-99 on 25 March 1999.268 The Order directed the relevant
government bodies to: develop a timetable for the phase out of MTBE; request
from the US EPA a waiver of the Federal Government reformulated gasoline oxy-
genate requirement; and conduct a study on the environmental and health impacts
associated with the use of ethanol as an oxygenate in gasoline. Furthermore, the
Governor commissioned a study on the potential for the development of a Cali-
fornia waste-based or other biomass ethanol industry and required that gasoline
containing MTBE be labeled prominently at the point of sale (gas stations) to
enable consumers to choose the type of gasoline that they wished to purchase.269
On 12 April 1999, Governor Davis wrote to the Administrator of the US EPA
requesting a waiver from the reformulated gasoline oxygenate requirement. On 8
October 1999, Governor Davis signed into law California Senate Bill 989 placing
into statute the previously issued Executive Order (D-5-99) and enacting several
other provisions designed to protect groundwater and drinking water from MTBE
contamination.270 In December 1999, the California EPA issued its report, enti-
tled Health and Environmental Assessment of the Use of Ethanol as a Fuel Oxy-
genate.271 Based on the report, the California Environment Policy Commission
concluded that, although further research was warranted, the impacts associated
with the use of ethanol would be significantly less, and that these impacts would
also be more manageable, than those associated with continued use of MTBE.272
267Ibid., at 13-4.
268Methanex First Partial Award, at para. 29.
269Ibid., at paras. 30-1.
270Ibid., at para. III.A.29.
271Health and Environmental Assessment of the Use of Ethanol as a Fuel Oxygenate, Report to the
California Environmental Policy Council in Response to Executive Order D-5-99 State Water Re-
sources Control Board of California, Air Resources Board, Office of Environmental Health and Haz-
ard Assessment, UCRL-AR-135949 Vol. 1, http://www-erd.llnl.gov/ethanol/etohdoc/index.html.
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On 16 June 2000, the California Reformulated Gasoline Phase III Standards
(CaRFG3), which prohibited the use of MTBE in gasoline beginning 31 December
2002, were adopted.273 These regulations became effective on 2 September 2000,
and were amended in 2001. The phase-out date was later postponed in response to
the US EPA’s denial of California’s request for a waiver of the federal oxygenate
requirement. Governor Davis felt that in light of the circumstances, in particular
the fact that the current production, transportation and distribution of ethanol was
insufficient to meet the California’s needs, keeping to the original timetable would
cause economic hardship.274
The Dispute
In December 1999, Methanex Corporation, a Canadian company that produces
and markets methanol, served a Notice of Arbitration against the US under Chap-
ter 11 of the NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration.275 Methanex sup-
plies the vast majority of methanol in California, which has no methanol industry
of its own.276 While Methanex does not produce or sell MTBE, approximately
one third of Methanex’s methanol production at the time was directed at the fuel
sector, principally for use in the production of MTBE.277
Subsequent to submitting its Statement of Claim,278 the company changed its
legal counsel and applied to the Tribunal to amend the claim. Methanex’s ap-
plication substantially modified the legal and factual basis of its claim, and was
apparently based on new information related to Governor Gray Davis (see be-
low).279 The Tribunal allowed the amendment, with the caveat that Methanex
273Ibid., at para. III.A.32.
274Ibid., at para. III.A.34.
275Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Notice of Arbitration, 3 December 1999,
http://www.state.gov.
276Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Rejoinder to US’ Reply Memorial on Jurisdic-
tion, Admissibility and the Proposed Amendment, 25 May 2001, at 27, http://www.state.gov.
277Methanex First Partial Award, at para. 24.
278Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Statement of Claim (Methanex Original State-
ment of Claim), 3 December 1999, http://www.state.gov.
279Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Notice of Change of Legal Council and Intent
to File an Amended Claim, 30 November 2000, http://www.state.gov.
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should ultimately bear, regardless of the outcome of the arbitration, the costs re-
lated to the additional burden on the Tribunal and the US in having to respond to
the amendments to the claim.280 Methanex submitted its Amended Statement of
Claim in February 2001.281
In the Original Statement of Claim, Methanex argued that: the State of Cal-
ifornia did not accord a minimum standard of treatment as required by Article
1105; and various actions taken by the State of California and its Governor di-
rectly or indirectly constituted a measure tantamount to expropriation under Arti-
cle 1110. Methanex claimed compensation from the US in the amount of approx-
imately US$970 million (together with interest and costs).282 In the Amended
Statement of Claim, the company focused only on the California Executive Order
and the CaRFG3 Regulations, and not the California Senate Bill.283 Methanex
added a new claim of discrimination on the basis of nationality as prohibited by
Article 1102, as well as further claims for breaches of Articles 1105 and 1110.284
In its Statement of Defence, the US raised a series of objections to jurisdiction
and admissibility in respect of Methanex’s Claims.285 The Tribunal identified 7
distinct challenges articulated by the US Government: no proximate cause (no
connection between US measures and claimed damages); no legal right impugned
by US measures (customer base or goodwill or expectation of future profits from
methanol sales cannot qualify as an investment under the NAFTA); no legally
significant connection between US measures and Methanex or its investments;
no loss; no claim for subsidiaries’ losses (a procedural issue); no waiver (a pro-
cedural issue); and no possible claim of discrimination (all methanol producers
were treated the same, regardless of corporate nationality).286 The third chal-
lenge is particularly worth discussion. This challenge related to Article 1101.1
of the NAFTA, which requires that challenged measures relate to an investor or
280Methanex First Partial Award, at para. 78.
281Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Amended Statement of Claim (Methanex
Amended Statement of Claim), 12 February 2001, http://www.state.gov.
282Methanex Original Statement of Claim, at 13.
283Methanex Amended Statement of Claim, at 35.
284Ibid., at 42-70.
285Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Statement of Defense (Methanex Statement of
Defense), 10 August 2000, http://www.state.gov.
286Methanex First Partial Award, at para. 84.
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investment. The US asserted that the Californian ban of MTBE did not relate to
Methanex because it was not directed at methanol or methanol producers. The
US contended that the phrase ‘relating to’ requires a legally significant connec-
tion between the disputed measure and the investor.287 This excludes measures of
general application, especially measures aimed at the protection of human health
and the environment, which are likely to affect a vast range of actors and eco-
nomic interests. The US argued that if such general measures were not excluded
from consideration by tribunals, the Parties to the NAFTA could be subject to
claims based on untold numbers of local, state and federal measures that merely
have an incidental impact on an investor or investment.288 Methanex, on the other
hand, contended that it is sufficient that the measures affect the investor or its in-
vestment.289 Furthermore, it argued that the ‘relating to’ requirement is easily
satisfied if there is discriminatory intent behind a measure.290
In its First Partial Award, the Tribunal found that several of the US challenges
were not jurisdictional challenges and that, even if they were, the issues were
so tied up in the facts of the case that they would have to be dealt with in the
merits phase of arbitration. However, the Tribunal did extensively discuss the
third challenge, concerning the connection required between a measure and an
investment. The Tribunal noted that:
If the threshold provided by Article 1101(1) were merely one of ‘affecting,’
as Methanex contends, it would be satisfied wherever any economic impact
was felt by an investor or an investment ... As such, Article 1101(1) would
provide no significant threshold to a NAFTA arbitration ... Methanex’s inter-
pretation would produce a surprising, if not an absurd, result. The possible
consequences of human conduct are infinite, especially when comprising
acts of governmental agencies; but common sense does not require that line
to run unbroken towards an endless horizon.291
287Methanex Statement of Defense, at 28.
288Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, US Memorial on Jurisdiction, 13 November
2000, at 48-9, http://www.state.gov.
289Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, 12 February
2001, at 47-8, http://www.state.gov.
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As such, the Tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear Methanex’s
case as laid out in the Original Statement of Claim. Similarly, it denied juris-
diction on the Amended Statement of Claim as a whole, but found that it had
jurisdiction to hear a part of that claim. In particular, the Tribunal found that
Methanex’s allegations relating to the intent underlying the Californian regula-
tions could potentially meet the requirements of jurisdiction, but that without fur-
ther evidence, this could not be definitively determined. Methanex was therefore
invited to submit a fresh pleading setting out its specific factual allegations related
only to the issue of intent, and the decision on jurisdiction was consequently post-
poned pending the conclusion of the merits phase of the arbitration.292 Methanex
sought interpretation, clarification and reconsideration of the First Partial Award
on two occasions.293 The Tribunal clarified its position, but declined to recon-
sider any aspect of the First Partial Award, which it viewed as final and binding
on the parties.294 Methanex submitted a Second Amended Statement of Claim in
November 2002.295
In order to support its claims of breach of national treatment, which were
largely based on the notion that US measures were intended to favour the domestic
ethanol industry, Methanex first had to establish that it was in ‘like circumstances’
with ethanol producers. The company’s reasoning on this issue was based on the
fact that ethanol, as an oxygenate, competes directly with MTBE. Methanex sup-
ported this claim with the expert opinion of Sir Robert Jennings and reference to
WTO jurisprudence on the treatment of ‘like products’.296 While it was not con-
tested amongst the parties to the dispute that methanol is the essential oxygenating
element of MTBE, Methanex also relied on the fact that methanol can be used di-
rectly as a fuel oxygenate, and was therefore interchangeable with ethanol.297 The
292Ibid., at paras. 169 and 172.
293Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Request for Interpretation of Award, 28 August
2002; Request for Reconsideration of Chapters J and K of the Partial Award, 28 January 2004,
http://www.state.gov.
294Letter from the Tribunal, Re: Request for Interpretation of the First Partial Award, 25 September
2002, http://www.state.gov.
295Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Second Amended Statement of Claim
(Methanex Second Amended Statement of Claim), 5 November 2002, http://www.state.gov.
296Ibid., at para 300.
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US countered that methanol was not a legal fuel oxygenate in California.
Methanex contended that the burden of proof was on the US to justify its
discriminatory treatment. It argued that under WTO jurisprudence, this would
require the US to show that the ban on MTBE was: necessary to protect the en-
vironment of California; the least restrictive option available; based on sufficient
scientific evidence; and not arbitrary or discriminatory.298 Methanex suggested
that none of these requirements had been met. In the company’s view, MTBE
is safe and effective and any environmental problems associated with it are prin-
cipally caused by leaking underground gasoline tanks. Consequently, according
to Methanex, the appropriate solution was not to ban MTBE, but to repair and
improve storage tanks.299 Methanex further argued that, in any case, the MTBE
ban was not motivated by the Government of California’s desire to protect the
environment. The company claimed that environmental protection was merely a
convenient cover for measures that would significantly benefit the powerful US
ethanol industry. In this respect, Methanex focused on one company in particular,
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), which produces more than 70% of US ethanol.
Methanex pointed to several contributions that ADM made to Gray Davis’ guber-
nutorial campaign and to a supposedly secret meeting with Davis in 1998, when
he was Lieutenant Governor of California and the California MTBE policy was
being developed.
Whereas Methanex’s discussion of the discriminatory treatment that it had
allegedly endured was quite extensive, its discussion of the minimum standard
and expropriation were remarkably short, occupying only a few paragraphs each
in the Second Amended Statement of Claim. This is likely due to the fact that
Methanex viewed discrimination as intimately connected to the other standards.
Methanex argued that a breach of Article 1102 also constituted a breach of Article
1105, citing the decision in S.D. Myers (see above).300 In terms of expropriation,
Methanex argued that a substantial portion of its investments, including its share
of the California and wider US oxygenate markets, was taken by a discriminatory
measure and handed to the US domestic ethanol industry. The company argued
298Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Reply to US Amended Statement of Defense,
19 February 2004, at paras. 191-5, http://www.state.gov.
299Methanex Second Amended Statement of Claim, at para 199.
300Methanex Second Amended Statement of Claim, at para. 315.
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that none of the conditions for a legal expropriation had been met: the taking
was discriminatory; the taking was not for public purpose; the taking did not
comply with due process (because it was discriminatory); and compensation had
not been provided.301 In addition to having lost its share of the California market,
Methanex claimed that the measures contributed to the continued idling of one of
their plants in the US and resulted in an immediate drop in their share price.302
On the merits of Methanex’s claim, the US argued that not only was there no
evidence of a breach of any NAFTA article, but Methanex had also failed to estab-
lish that the damages it claimed were actually caused by the Californian ban.303
In fact they disputed that Methanex had suffered any quantifiable loss at all.
In terms of Article 1102, the US argued that the appropriate comparator in the
‘like circumstances’ test was the substantial domestic methanol industry. As the
California ban had precisely the same effect on American methanol companies
as it had on Methanex, there could be no breach of national treatment. The US
rejected Methanex’s method of comparing methanol and ethanol, pointing out
that they were different in several respects, and specifically that while ethanol can
be used directly as an oxygenate additive to gasoline, methanol is prohibited from
being used as such.304 Methanex countered that the fact that they were in identical
circumstances with domestic methanol producers was irrelevant.305
The US also challenged the allegations that the measures were not motivated
by environmental concern, pointing out that the decision to ban MTBE was firmly
based on the recommendations and findings of an extensive scientific study and
consultation with stakeholders.306 The US argued that:
Methanex’s claim does not remotely resemble the type of grievance for
which the States Parties to NAFTA created the investor-State dispute reso-
lution mechanism of Chapter 11. Methanex’s case is founded on the propo-
301Ibid., at paras. 317-20.
302Methanex Final Award, at para. II.D.31.
303Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Amended Statement of Defence (Methanex
Amended Statement of Defense), 5 December 2003, at paras. 216-280, http://www.state.gov.
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sition that, whenever a State takes action to protect the public health or en-
vironment, the State is responsible for damages to every business enterprise
claiming a resultant setback in its fortunes if the enterprise can persuade an
arbitral tribunal that the action could have been handled differently. Plainly
put, this proposition is absurd. If accepted by this Tribunal, no NAFTA Party
could carry out its most fundamental governmental functions unless it were
prepared to pay for each and every economic impact occasioned by doing
so. The NAFTA Parties never intended the NAFTA to bring about such a
radical change in the way that they function, and Methanex cannot show
otherwise.307
In 2001, the US submitted a copy of the Notes of Interpretation issued by the
NAFTA FTC to the Tribunal. The Interpretation clarified that Article 1105 did
not require treatment beyond that prescribed in customary international law and
stipulated that the determination that there has been a breach of another provision
of the NAFTA did not establish a breach of Article 1105. Methanex challenged
the Interpretation, arguing that it had been made with a clear purpose of affecting
the outcome of the case.308
Canada and Mexico also made submissions to the Tribunal, which supported
the arguments of the US on both jurisdictional issues and the merits of the case.309
For the first time in an investor-state dispute, third parties (several NGOs) were
also permitted to submit briefs to the Tribunal. The procedural decision of the
Tribunal to allow such briefs is discussed in Section 7.1.
Outcome
The Final Award of the Tribunal was issued on 3 August 2005. As the majority
of Methanex’s arguments had focused on discriminatory treatment, and the First
307Methanex Statement of Defense, at para 2, emphasis added.
308Methanex Final Award, at para. II.B.14. Other investors made the same claim in other disputes that
were proceeding at the time.
309Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Article 1128 Submission of Canada on Jurisdic-
tion, 30 April 2001; Article 1128 Submission of Mexico on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2001; Article 1128
Submission of Canada on the Re-Submitted Amended Claim, 30 January 2004; Article 1128 Sub-
mission of Mexico on the Re-Submitted Amended Claim, 30 January 2004, http://www.state.gov.
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Partial Award had largely limited the case to an analysis of the motivation behind
the Californian measures, the bulk of the Final Award also dealt with these issues.
In the Tribunal’s view, there was significant evidence that the measures in
question were motivated by legitimate concern for the environment and the health
and welfare of the population of California: “This policy was motivated by the
honest belief, held in good faith and on reasonable scientific grounds, that MTBE
contaminated groundwater and was difficult and expensive to clean up.”310 In
particular, they found that the UC Report reflected, “a serious, objective and sci-
entific approach to a complex problem in California.”311 The Tribunal also re-
jected Methanex’s conspiracy theory about ADM and Governor Davis, pointing
out that California Senate Bill 521, which mandated gubernatorial action regard-
ing MTBE, was passed by the California legislature prior to the election and that
once he was Governor, Davis had no discretion to deviate from the results and
recommendations of the UC Report.312 Furthermore, the Tribunal noted that the
evidence suggested that the Government of California, far from favouring ethanol,
aimed to receive a waiver from the US EPA standards so that it could prohibit the
use of all gasoline oxygenates.313 The Tribunal, therefore, found no breach of
Article 1102.
With regards to Article 1105, the Tribunal addressed the issue of whether a
breach of Article 1102 (had a breach been found) would have constituted a fur-
ther breach of Article 1105. The Tribunal decided that Methanex’s argument was
untenable, even in the absence of the NAFTA FTC Notes of Interpretation, be-
cause the plain meaning of the minimum standard does not support the contention
that the it precludes discrimination.314 As this was the entire basis of Methanex’s
claim on Article 1105, the Tribunal found that it had failed to make its case for a
breach of this provision.
Although the discussion of expropriation was not extensive in Methanex’s
pleadings, and its claim was largely based on the supposed discriminatory nature
of the measures, the Tribunal made an important decision on the issue, suggesting
310Methanex Final Award, at para. III.A.102.2.
311Ibid., at para. III.A.101.
312Ibid., at para. III.B.54.
313Ibid., at para. III.B.55.
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that:
... as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regula-
tion for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due pro-
cess and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not
deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments had
been given by the regulating government to the then putative foreign in-
vestor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from
such regulation.315
Contrary to Methanex’s claims, the Tribunal concluded that the California ban did
not amount to expropriation.
Having dealt with the merits of the claim, the Tribunal returned to the issue
of jurisdiction, which it had delayed in order to assess the issue of intent. The
Tribunal found, as it had in its discussion of national treatment, that Methanex
had failed to prove its case in respect of malign intent on the part of the Govern-
ment of California.316 As such, they concluded that there was no legally signifi-
cant connection between the Californian regulations and Methanex and its invest-
ments, and the US jurisdictional challenge was therefore upheld. Thus despite
having determined that Methanex’s claims had failed on the merits, the Tribunal
subsequently found that it lacked the jurisdiction to consider these claims, and
dismissed the case accordingly.317
Finally, the Tribunal dealt with the issue of costs. It found no compelling rea-
son not to follow standard UNCITRAL practice, based on Rule 40.1, that the los-
ing party should pay all of the costs of the arbitration. The amount that Methanex
was required to reimburse the US for in this respect amounted to nearly US$1.1
million.318 The Tribunal also held that Methanex should cover the nearly US$3
million that the US had incurred in legal fees.319
315Ibid., at para. IV.D.7. The effect of the ‘caveat’ with regard to “specific commitments” is unclear.
Specific commitments could refer to a contract or stability agreement, but as noted in Chapter
4 of this study, there is continued debate as to whether breach of contract amounts to breach of
international obligations.
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5.3 Pending Cases
5.3.1 Glamis Gold v. United States
This case concerns California regulations requiring the reclamation of land fol-
lowing open-pit mining operations. A Canadian investor filed for arbitration under
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, arguing that the regulations amounted to expropriation
and denial of fair and equitable treatment. As of early 2008, the case had pro-
gressed through the hearing on the merits, but a final award had yet to be issued.
Background
In 1987, Glamis Gold Ltd. (Glamis)320 began acquiring mining claims on federal
public lands in the Imperial Valley of California. Under the General Mining Law
of 1872, US citizens are allowed to acquire claims for mining on federal land
simply by putting up posts and registering the claim with the Department of the
Interior. To hold a claim, an annual maintenance fee of US$100 per claim is
required, but the federal government receives no rents or royalties from mining
operations conducted on these lands.321 Glamis established subsidiaries in the
US to act as ‘citizens’ to acquire the claims. The Imperial Project consisted of
approximately 187 mining claims.322
Prior to the development of any mineral operations, Glamis was required to
submit several EIAs to the Bureau of Land Management (within the US Depart-
ment of the Interior), which is responsible for the administration of mining claims
on federal lands. There were several contentious issues surrounding the project,
including the fact that the area of the proposed mine was “adjacent to two for-
mally designated wilderness areas, critical habitat for the federally-listed desert
320Glamis Gold Ltd. identifies itself as a publicly held Canadian corporation, incorporated under the
laws of British Columbia. Glamis Gold Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Glamis Gold Ltd.,
and is incorporated under the laws of the State of Nevada. Glamis Imperial is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Glamis Gold Inc., and also a Nevada corporation.
321Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Statement of Defense (Glamis Statement of De-
fense), 8 April 2005, at 3, http://www.state.gov.
322Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Notice of Arbitration, 9 December 9 2003, at 5,
http://www.state.gov.
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tortoise and an area designated as a place of critical environmental concern for
Native American cultural values.”323
Following a six year review of the project, the Bureau of Land Management
decided that the no-action alternative was preferred (i.e. it recommended that
there be no development of the mine) and in 2001 the Secretary of the Interior
Bruce Babbitt officially denied the proposed plan of operations for the Imperial
Project.324 However in late 2002, following a change of administration, the new
Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton rescinded the decision and the Bureau of
Land Management and initiated a process for the project plan to be reconsidered.
In anticipation of the possible approval of the Imperial Project, the State of Cali-
fornia began to take steps to mitigate the potential impacts of it and other open-pit
mine developments. In particular, California Senate Bill 22 was passed in 2003,
stipulating that Californian authorities may not approve the reclamation plan for
surface mining operations located within one mile of any Native American sa-
cred site or located in an area of special concern,325 unless it is stipulated that all
excavations would be backfilled and graded to achieve the approximate contours
of the land prior to mining. In addition to aiding in the restoration of the visual
landscape, backfilling also reduces the potential environmental damage caused by
cyanide leaching from waste rock piles.326
The Dispute
On 31 July 2003, Glamis submitted a Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim under
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.327 In the Notice of Intent, Glamis argued that two
Chapter 11 rules had been violated by California and thereby the US: the pro-
hibition of expropriation (Article 1110) and the requirement to provide fair and
equitable treatment to foreign investors (Article 1105). The company’s Notice of
323Non-Party Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation, 19 August 2005, at 1, http://www.state.gov.
324Glamis Statement of Defense, at 11-2.
325As defined by the California Desert Conservation Area Plan of 1980.
326Glamis Statement of Defense, at 9.
327Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration,
21 July 2003, http://www.state.gov.
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Arbitration was filed in December 2003.328 As of early 2008, the dispute was
proceeding under the UNCITRAL rules of arbitration.
Glamis argued that the measures taken by the US and California individu-
ally and collectively amounted to an expropriation. Glamis focused on Senate
Bill 22 in particular, stating that “there was little doubt about the discriminatory
and expropriatory purpose of this legislation,”329 and suggested that because the
backfilling requirements are mandatory and non-discretionary, they resulted in the
complete destruction of the economic value of the company’s investment.330 Ac-
cording to Glamis, the company “undertook the significant investment necessary
to establish and begin gold mining operation,”331 including “less than 2 million in
acquiring and developing the mineral rights” prior to 1994 and “an additional 13
million ... in the acquisition, exploration and development of the Imperial Project”
as of December 2002.332 However, Glamis’ original claim was for a sum not less
than US$50 million, based on the fair market value of the property interests owned
by Glamis Imperial.333 Glamis later amended its claim to not less that US$49.1
million in compensation for the loss of the property, plus further damages that “the
Tribunal may deem appropriate for the United State’s failure to accord Glamis the
minimum standard of treatment.”334
In its Memorial, Glamis argued that in addition to covering direct expropria-
tion and indirect expropriation, Article 1110 also creates an additional category of
measures tantamount to expropriation.335 This is an issue that arose early on in
Chapter 11 arbitrations: in Metalclad the US responded to an inquiry from the Tri-
bunal about the meaning of the phrase ‘tantamount to expropriation,’ stating that
it is the government’s position that the phrase explains what the meaning of indi-
rect expropriation is but “does not assert or imply the existence of an additional
328Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Notice of Arbitration (Glamis Notice of Arbitration),
10 December 2003, http://www.state.gov.
329Ibid., at 10.
330Ibid.
331Ibid., at 6.
332Ibid., at 7.
333Ibid., at 10-1.
334Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Memorial (Glamis Memorial), 5 May 2006, at 317,
http://www.state.gov.
335Ibid., at 229.
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type of action that may give rise to liability beyond those types encompassed in
the customary international law categories of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ nationaliza-
tion or expropriation.”336 The S.D. Myers Tribunal also rejected the argument that
‘tantamount to’ meant anything other than ‘equivalent to’.337 In its Statement of
Defense, the US asserted that, “[t]he measures of which Glamis complains have
not resulted in a taking of anything of value from Glamis,” further noting that the
financial viability of the Imperial Project had long been in question.338 The US
also argued that the company did not have ‘reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions’ that its project would not be subject to strict requirements, as it would have
been aware of the complex and stringent regulatory environment present in the
State of California.339 Finally, the US argued that regulatory measures intended to
protect the public health and the environment “are not, absent rare circumstances
not present here, of the type that can be deemed expropriatory.”340
With respect to Article 1105, Glamis argued that the minimum standard obliged
California to act in good faith and in a manner that was not arbitrary, and further-
more to provide a transparent and predictable framework for investment, with
due regard to the legitimate expectations of an investor.341 While the FTC Notes
of Interpretation preceded the commencement of this case, Glamis argued that
customary international law had evolved to incorporate these conditions, and that
therefore its claims did not fall outside the scope of the Article.342 In its Counter-
Memorial, the US argued that Glamis’ criteria for the international minimum stan-
dard had not been shown to be general and consistent state practice as required
for consideration as customary international law.343 Nevertheless, the US also
defended the actions of both the federal and state governments against Glamis’
allegations of arbitrariness, and a lack of transparency and predictability.344
336Metalclad US Article 1128 Submission, at para. 9.
337S.D. Myers First Partial Award, at para. 285.
338Glamis Statement of Defense, at 18.
339Ibid., at 19-20.
340Ibid., at 20.
341Glamis Memorial, at 288-310.
342Ibid., at 288-301.
343Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Counter Memorial, 19 September 2006, at 226,
http://www.state.gov.
344Ibid., at 235.
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The US also raised the issue of Glamis’ nationality and pointed out that in the
proposed mining plan, the subsidiary described its ultimate owner, Glamis Gold
Ltd. as a “publicly-owned US corporation.”345 This issue was also a key point in
the joint non-party submission of Friends of the Earth Canada (FOE-Canada) and
Friends of the Earth US (FOE-US).346
On 31 May 2005, the Tribunal issued a procedural order notifying the parties
that it would address both jurisdictional issues and the merits of the case in its final
award, despite the request of the US for a preliminary award on jurisdiction.347
In two sessions in August and September 2007, a total of nine days of hearings
on the merits of the case were held. The hearings were open to the public.348
During the hearings, the key points of contention between the parties were: (i) the
property rights actually possessed by Glamis; (ii) the ripeness of the company’s
claim; (iii) the interpretation of the two standards at issue; and (iv) the application
of these standards to the facts of the case.
With respect to the company’s property rights, the US argued that these rights
were circumscribed by certain ‘background principles’. In other words, because
pre-existing laws (e.g. the 1975 Sacred Sites Act, the 1975 Surface Mining and
Reclamation Act) prohibited Glamis from undertaking activities that would ir-
reparably damage sacred Native American sites, and also explicitly contemplated
that the backfilling of pits might be required, Glamis had never possessed an un-
restricted right to conduct its operations in whatever manner it preferred. Glamis
countered that California laws could not be considered to represent background
principles that could constrain a federal property interest. Furthermore, Glamis
argued that because the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act did not did not
mandate complete backfilling, it did not represent a pre-existing obligation. Fi-
nally, Glamis argued that the fact that mines with approved reclamation plans were
grandfathered was sufficient evidence that the California measures did not merely
345Qtd. in Glamis Statement of Defense, at 9, emphasis added by US.
346Amicus Curiae Submissions of Friends of the Earth Canada and Friends of the Earth United States,
30 September 2005, http://www.naftaclaims.com.
347Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Procedural Order No. 2, 31 May 2005,
http://www.state.gov.
348The transcripts of the hearings can be found on the US State Department website,
http://www.state.gov.
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implement background principles.
In terms of the issue of ripeness, the US pointed to the fact that Glamis had
never actually submitted a reclamation plan, and thus the California measures had
never been implemented with respect to the company. The US argued that until
a measure is actually applied to a claimant the issue is not ripe for arbitration
because, for example, it is impossible for a tribunal to gauge the economic impact
of the measure, and thus determine whether an expropriation has occurred. Glamis
argued that it should not be required to take steps that are clearly futile (i.e. to
submit a reclamation plan that does not comply with Senate Bill 22 and have it
rejected) in order for its claim to be ripe.
With regard to the interpretation of measures tantamount to expropriation,
both parties argued that the key issue was the economic impact of the measures.
The US argued that this issue was paramount because without evidence of a full
or nearly full deprivation of an investment an expropriation claim must fail. On
the other hand, Glamis argued that economic impact was the critical issue because
if a total deprivation was shown to have occurred then no further analysis was re-
quired by the Tribunal. While the US argued that because the denial of the project
proposal by the Department of Interior had been rescinded, Glamis could resume
the approval process and eventually (theoretically) commence mine development,
Glamis asserted that the California measures had made their project economically
infeasible. The parties presented valuation reports to back up their claims about
the economic impact of the California measures. The US presented a valuation
study based on Glamis’s own contemporaneous documents which indicated that
the mining claims retained a significant value (US$9.1 million) after the Califor-
nia measures were adopted. The US further argued that by the time of the hearings
in 2007, the value of the property had increased substantially to US$159 million
as a result of the phenomenal rise in gold prices in the interim period. Glamis
argued to the contrary that its property had a value of US$49.1 million prior to the
enactment of the reclamation requirements, but retained no value thereafter. The
company suggested that the US figures were preposterous and neglected impor-
tant factors such as rising mine operation costs. Glamis also put forth that if the
mining claims had retained any value, the company would have received purchase
offers.
While both sides argued that the expropriation analysis should end with eco-
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nomic impact – the US because it had proved that there was none, and Glamis
because it had shown that a full deprivation had occurred – they both also offered
further steps of analysis in the event that the Tribunal disagreed with their inter-
pretation of the standard or with their valuation findings. Both parties suggested
that two further analytical steps were well established in US and international tak-
ings jurisprudence: determination of the investor’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations and determination of the character of the measure(s).
Echoing the decision in Methanex, the US suggested that investors who oper-
ate in highly regulated industries, in highly regulated jurisdictions such as Califor-
nia, cannot have reasonable expectations that they will not be subject to extensions
of those regulations, unless the government has made ‘specific commitments’ to
the investor in that respect. The US pointed out that Glamis had no approved
project plan or contract, which might qualify as specific commitments. On the
other hand, Glamis argued that while specific commitments are a factor in the de-
termination of reasonable expectations, their absence is not determinative. Glamis
suggested that the Tribunal should look at the other types of assurances that the
company had received, including statements of officials charged with implement-
ing the legal regime. Glamis suggested that the California measures amounted to
an ‘undue regulatory surprise’, while the US countered that they were incremental
and evolutionary in nature.
With regard to the assessment of the character of the measures, the US argued
that numerous international arbitral tribunals have concluded that, except under
rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulations enacted for a public purpose
will not be deemed expropriatory and compensable. While the US suggested that
arbitral tribunals generally accept a government’s characterization of a measure as
‘regulatory’, Glamis argued that the motivation of the government must be interro-
gated. In this respect, Glamis put forth that the California measures were not only
discriminatory (because they did not apply to nonmetallic mines) but also were
specifically targeted at the company. Glamis further argued that even regulation
that is intended to protect the public must not disproportionately burden individu-
als. In rebuttal, the US argued that the situation of metallic and nonmetallic mines
were distinct enough to justify their separate treatment, and that furthermore, the
fact that an environmental regulation fails to address every environmental problem
does not make the regulation discriminatory. In addition, the US argued that while
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Glamis’ project might have been the impetus for the development of the California
measures, those measures were not specifically targeted at the company and had in
fact been applied to another mining project. Finally, the government argued that it
was perfectly reasonable for a company to have to shoulder the burden of dealing
with environmental damage that it had itself caused through its operations.
With respect to the second article of NAFTA that was invoked in the case,
Article 1105, the parties once again had some basis of agreement. The parties
concurred that Article 1105 refers to a customary international law standard and
does not create an independent treaty standard. Nevertheless, the parties disagreed
on the content of the standard. Glamis relied heavily on arbitral decisions that had
interpreted ‘fair and equitable treatment’ as requiring governments to act trans-
parently, to act in a manner that does not frustrate an investor’s reasonable ex-
pectations, and to refrain from arbitrary conduct. The US first disputed that the
requirements set forth by Glamis could be shown to be general and consistent state
practice as required for them to amount to customary international law, and second
objected to the notion that these requirements had, in any case, been breached. The
US pointed to the partial annulment of the Metalclad Award in a Canadian court
based on the Tribunal’s incorporation of a standard of transparency not found in
NAFTA Chapter 11. However, even if the Tribunal agreed with Glamis’ interpre-
tation, according to the US there was no basis for a claim that the government of
California had not acted transparently, pointing out that public hearings were held
prior to the adoption of the measures. The US also argued that frustration of an
investor’s expectations could not form the basis of a stand-alone claim of a breach
of customary international law. Furthermore, the US reiterated its argument from
the expropriation analysis that Glamis could not have reasonable expectations that
it would not be subject to backfilling requirements. Glamis responded by repeat-
ing its claim that it had been specifically targeted by the government of California
and that the true purpose of the measures had been to terminate the company’s
project.
As of the close of 2007, the final award in this case was pending. The State
of California has expressed serious concerns about what a victory for Glamis in
this case could mean for their ability to regulate. In a letter to the US Trade
Representative, the California Senate Select Committee on International Trade
Policy and State Legislation wrote that the case “provides a striking demonstration
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of the threats posed to the traditional regulatory power of state governments as a
result of current models of trade and investment agreements.”349
5.4 Analysis
The cases in this chapter illustrate that there is a wide range of environmental is-
sues implicated in investment arbitration, and further that several different types
of regulation (denial of permits, bans on trade, remediation requirements) have
been claimed to be in breach of the regulative rules and norms of investment pro-
tection. It would appear, from the limited number of cases reviewed, that breach
of the national treatment standard, breach of the minimum standard/fair and equi-
table treatment, and expropriation are the most common claims made by investors
in environmentally relevant cases, and also are the claims that are most likely to
be successful. While the interpretation of these standards remains a fluid process,
several trends are discernible that are worthy of particular note.
5.4.1 Different Circumstances or Different Interpretations?
In the accounts of academics and other observers, the cases detailed above are
usually briefly summarized with the author very clearly taking a position on the
outcome. For example, as Weiler notes:
The ‘story’ of Metalclad v. Mexico has become quite well known in differ-
ent circles; it just so happens that it has been told in dramatically different
ways, depending upon the circle. In circles inhabited by the opponents of
trade and investment liberalisation, as well as those who more generally
profess an amorphous ‘anti-globalisation’ ethos, Metalclad is a story about
the rights of foreign corporations trumping the popular will of the citizens
of a small, Mexican municipality. For trade and investment lawyers, and
associated policy analysts, it is just a familiar story - about international in-
vestment being held hostage to regulatory decision-making in a developing
country.350
349Letter from California Senate Select Committee on International Trade Policy and State Legislation
to Robert B. Zoellick, 17 November 2003, http://www.tradeobservatory.org.
350Weiler 2005, at 701.
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Despite acknowledging the disparate accounts of the case, Weiler himself pro-
fesses that there is no middle ground to be taken, and that the trade and investment
lawyer position is the correct one.
It is argued here that the circumstances of each case and the interpretation of
the standards in each case must be differentiated. Is it that observers view the facts
of each case differently or do they take issue with the application of investment
law to these facts by arbitral tribunals? Weiler, in the above quotation, is referring
to the circumstances of the Metalclad case. However, even if one agrees with his
argument that the investor was treated poorly by Mexico, one can still debate the
specific interpretations of the regulative rules and norms of investment protection
proffered by the Metalclad Tribunal.
One can compare the Metalclad case with the remarkably similar (in terms
of circumstances) Tecmed case. While the tribunal in each case found that the
Mexican government had expropriated an investment, the Metalclad Tribunal ap-
plied the effects test, and most controversially noted that it need not consider the
motivation for the adoption of the measure establishing the ecological reserve. As
Mann and Araya point out, “[b]y arguing that the purpose is simply not relevant,
the tribunal established a precedent that could be interpreted as broadly limiting a
state’s authority to engage in environmental protection.”351 In contrast, although
the Tecmed Tribunal also concluded that an expropriation had occurred, it applied
a more balanced approach of considering the effect, purpose, and proportionality
of a measure. Similarly, the Tribunal in S.D. Myers considered the purpose of the
government measure. However, the focus given to the temporary nature of the ban
on PCB exports leaves open the question of how the S.D. Myers Tribunal would
have assessed the measure had it not eventually been repealed. In contrast, the
Methanex Tribunal dealt with a permanent measure, but nevertheless found that it
did not amount to an expropriation.
Even in a limited examination of only four cases one can find several distinct
interpretations of one standard. These discrepancies are not solely the result of the
different circumstances in each case, but also a consequence of the broad scope left
to tribunals to interpret standards. It can be concluded, therefore, that standards
such as expropriation are not only determined on a case-by-case basis (according
351Mann and Araya 2002, at 171.
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to varying circumstances) but also on a tribunal-by-tribunal basis (according to
varying interpretations).
The same can be said for fair and equitable treatment. Both the Tecmed
and Metalclad tribunals read this standard very broadly to incorporate require-
ments for the government to act transparently and consistently. Behrens ques-
tions whether “any government in the world” would be able to live up to the trans-
parency requirement as it was defined in Tecmed.352 The Supreme Court of British
Columbia found that the Metalclad Tribunal erred in incorporating transparency
into the evaluation of fair and equitable treatment; however, this decision remains
a topic of heated debate amongst academics and other interested observers.353
The discussion of the minimum standard/fair and equitable treatment in the
S.D. Myers and Methanex cases focused more on the issue of discrimination.
The S.D. Myers Tribunal found that breach of the national treatment standard
amounted to breach of the minimum standard as well. In contrast, the Methanex
Tribunal disagreed with this interpretation. While in the NAFTA context this issue
appears to have been definitively decided for future cases (through the FTC Notes
of Interpretation), it is questionable whether tribunals outside of the NAFTA will
agree with the S.D. Myers interpretation or the Methanex/FTC interpretation.
To sum up, although the circumstances of each case differ substantially, this
alone does not account for the divergence in tribunal decisions. This is not to claim
that the circumstances of a case are immaterial, but only to argue that the view-
points and perspective of arbitrators are also relevant. This makes the outcome of
cases more difficult for states to predict.
5.4.2 Evolution of Standards or Double Standards?
Many supporters of investment protection suggest that interpretations of the reg-
ulative norms and rules are undergoing a natural process of evolution and refine-
ment as more cases are examined and as arbitrators build on the decisions of pre-
vious tribunals. In particular, they point to the Methanex Award as proof that the
broad effects test adopted to determine expropriation in the Metalclad case has
352Behrens 2007, at 175.
353Weiler 2003, at 47, argues that “the local judge was wrong in substituting his uninformed opinion
for that of the tribunal.” See also Brower 2002; 2001a; Thomas 2002.
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been supplanted by a more reasonable interpretation, which Gaines argues sets
“a high bar for investor claimants to vault over to gain compensation from host
states” reducing the chances for a successful claim “and thus the incentive for
investors to mount challenges to national regulatory actions.”354
However, other observers caution against premature jubilation, noting in par-
ticular that in the absence of a system of precedent, an arbitrator could just as
easily follow the reasoning of the Metalclad Tribunal as that of the Methanex Tri-
bunal.355 Given the broad support that the Metalclad Award has received amongst
many investment law experts, the possibility of future awards in the same line is
not inconceivable. Furthermore, it does not appear that the Methanex decision
has dissuaded investors from pursuing cases related to environmental regulation
or from relying on pre-Methanex decisions.356
It has also been questioned whether greater deference was given to the Cal-
ifornian measures in Methanex, not because the understanding of the expropria-
tion standard had naturally evolved over time, but because this case was against
a large and powerful country. Sornarajah argues that, “[o]ne has to wait until the
rich states are affected before there can be change,” and questions whether the
change will be uniform, or whether a double standard will emerge.357 Similarly,
Van Harten cautions that:
... arbitrators may choose to limit state liability only where a damages award
could provoke controversy among decision-makers and the public in the ma-
jor states. If so, this would be the right result for the wrong reason. By en-
couraging adjudicators to tread softly on powerful governments while main-
taining strict disciplinary standards for those less powerful, such reasoning
jeopardizes the neutrality of treaty arbitration.358
Finally, while one could argue that the expropriation standard has been sub-
jected to stricter, narrower, interpretations over time, it would seem that the oppo-
site is true for the the minimum standard/fair and equitable treatment. Thus, the
354Gaines 2006, at 689.
355Lawrence 2006, at 293; Mann 2005, at 9.
356See cases cited in note 3.
357Sornarajah 2006b, at 33, emphasis added.
358Van Harten 2007a, at 147
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question arises as to whether investors will continue to challenge environmental
regulation, but simply shift their focus to the latter standard.359
5.4.3 Limits to Investment Protection?
IIAs are developed in such a manner as to limit the protections that they offer to a
specific group of investors and investments under a specific set of circumstances.
However, several cases suggest that these limitations may be less effective than
states had anticipated.
For example, the Ethyl Tribunal accepted jurisdiction over Ethyl’s claims de-
spite its acknowledgment that the company had ‘jumped the gun’ in filing for arbi-
tration before the MMT Act was in force. One NGO report referred to Ethyl’s ac-
tions as a “blatant attempt to intimidate a legislative body from taking action.”360
In effect, the Tribunal’s decision sanctions Ethyl’s behaviour, and thereby encour-
ages other company’s to act in the same manner. An NGO report suggests that
“[t]hreats to use Chapter 11 are now a routine lobbying instrument.”361 The use
of the threat of arbitration to influence policy outcomes will be discussed much
more extensively in Chapter 6.
Another example is the Glamis Gold case, which raises questions about the
limitations on investor nationality. Ochs points out that it is ironic that in this case
the company is claiming mining rights available only to US citizens at the same
time as it invokes NAFTA-based rights available only to non-US companies.362
If corporations are permitted to either shift nationalities at will or create multiple
nationalities, it not only undermines the reciprocity aspect of IIAs, it also creates
further uncertainty for governments about which investors are covered by treaty
rights.363
In contrast, two other cases suggest that some limitations are being placed
on the scope of investment protection. While in the Lucchetti case the decision
on jurisdiction was largely based on technicalities, the fact that the Tribunal ac-
359Sornarajah 2006a, at 345.
360Public Citizen 2001, at vii.
361Mann 2001, at 16.
362Ochs 2005, at 511.
363Wallace 2005, at 366.
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knowledged that corruption could be considered as a basis for why the dispute
had not been definitively terminated prior to the entry into force of the BIT is
somewhat encouraging. It suggests that tribunals are potentially willing to ex-
amine evidence on egregious conduct by foreign investors. The decision of the
Methanex Tribunal that a legally significant connection between a measure and an
investment is required is also significant, as it rules out the possibility of investors
only incidentally affected by regulation being granted protection.
5.5 Implications for Environmental Governance
This section moves from the general review of environmentally relevant investor-
state disputes, to an exploration of their potential implications for environmental
governance, particularly in developing countries.
5.5.1 Legitimate Regulation and Legitimate Expectations
Legitimacy is currently a popular word in the political science literature, and it is
also frequently used by states, investors, and arbitrators in the context of investor-
state disputes. In particular, it is employed with relation to the measures adopted
by governments, and in regard to the expectations of investors (as mentioned in
Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3). The cases in this chapter illustrate that tribunals feel
justified in interrogating the legitimacy of government regulation and that they
will assess the legitimacy of investor expectations to varying degrees. It appears
in some cases that the actions of governments are scrutinized far more closely than
those of investors.
Supporters of investment protection argue that legitimate regulation will not
be found in breach of regulative rules and norms of investment protection and
further that arbitral tribunals are equipped to make decisions on the legitimacy of
government actions. Gantz notes that, “[i]n theory at least, one of the strengths
of the NAFTA legal system is to permit arbitral tribunals to distinguish between
legitimate government regulatory activity and arbitrary, discriminatory or expro-
priatory actions, and to discourage (and require compensation) the latter.364 Sim-
364Gantz 2001, at 655-6.
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ilarly, Brower argues that there is no support for the proposition that Chapter 11
undermines “legitimate regulatory programs,” and Wa¨lde suggests that investment
arbitration “is about the dissection of national regulation to identify elements that
can stand up to the sober examination of international law to distinguish what
is legitimate regulation and what is excessive interference with proprietary and
contractual rights.”365
The question of the legitimacy of government policy in the environmental
context primarily relates to the concern that regulation will be utilized as a cover
for protectionism. There is evidence in each case discussed above that the gov-
ernments involved had genuine concerns about the environment. However, there
were also indications that other issues played a role, as is likely to be the case
in practically all political decisions. For example, it has been suggested that the
Canadian ban on PCB exports related to intense lobbying that the government had
received on the part of S.D. Myers’ Canadian competitors.366 In Methanex, all
of the investor’s claims were built on the intent of California to favour domes-
tic ethanol producers over foreign methanol producers. The question is whether
the existence of multiple factors influencing a government, which is arguably in-
evitable given the complexity of the issues raised in these disputes, provides proof
that environmental concern is not legitimate. Loy makes the crucial point that,
“[v]irtually every piece of environmental or conservation legislation or regulation
affects a commercial sector, and will thus be politically supported (or opposed)
by private interest groups.”367 He calls this the ‘Baptist/Bootlegger’ problem, and
questions “[h]ow much should this possible duality matter?”368 Kurtz makes a
further relevant argument:
The ‘smoking gun’ nature of protectionist statements should not be disposi-
tive in themselves. Politicians will often engage in such populism for a vari-
ety of factors not least of which is the ever present desire for re-election. A
test based on identification of protectionist intent cannot workably be based
on the subjective intent of a single legislator.369
365Brower 2001a, at 69; Wa¨lde 2001, at 30.
366Weiler 2001, at 177.
367Loy 2002, at 24.
368Ibid.
369Kurtz 2007, at 342.
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Orellana also argues that under international law, state responsibility is tied only
to the representations of officials at the highest levels of government and that
attaching liability to statements made by lower level officials “risks introducing
havoc into the administrative workings of Governments.”370
A second issue related to the legitimacy of environmental regulation relates
to the role of science. In S.D. Myers, the Tribunal appeared unconvinced that
there was scientific evidence to support the fact that the transport of PCBs across
the Canada-US border was potentially dangerous to the environment, and this
skepticism factored into the decision that the Interim Order was motivated by
protectionism rather than legitimate environmental concern. However, one could
interpret the available scientific information differently, for example, by giving
greater weight to the numerous decisions of the US EPA that it was preferable
for PCB waste to be disposed of in Canada. The existence of an extensive scien-
tific report from a respectable academic institution was given considerable weight
by the Methanex Tribunal in their determination that the California phase-out of
MTBE was legitimate. The question which inevitably arises is how much scien-
tific evidence is required to convince a tribunal? Furthermore, will a government’s
capacity to gather sound scientific information factor into a tribunal decision on
the legitimacy of a regulation? For example, if scientific evidence is contested, but
the investor has access to more convincing scientific or technical studies, will this
sway an arbitral tribunal against a developing country that adopted a regulation
based on only the scientific information which it could gather with limited human
and economic resources?371
It is argued here that the precautionary principle has not been incorporated
into the reasoning of arbitral tribunals.372 Jones notes the dilemma that govern-
ments face in the absence of a clear adoption of the precautionary principle in the
institution of investment protection:
A government could forbid the use of the product as soon as it learns of
its potential danger, but it would then face litigation by negatively affected
foreign investors. Alternatively, the government could wait to amass more
370Orellana 2007, at 740.
371Alvarez-Jime´nez 2006, at 430. See also Orellana 2007, at 745.
372For a different perspective see Newcombe 2007a.
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scientific evidence while hoping that the product is not later found to be
dangerous. If the product were found to be harmful, the government would
likely be criticized for not acting sooner to curtail use of the product and
could then face litigation from its own injured citizens. Under either sce-
nario the government risks substantial liability.373
The precautionary principle is especially important for developing countries, for
whom a high-standard requirement of scientific evidence is more difficult to achieve.
Turning to the legitimacy of investor expectations, it would appear that tri-
bunals are much more forgiving. The most critical example of this is S.D. Myers,
where the Tribunal awarded compensation to a company that had invested in an
activity that, at the time, was completely illegal. The company was well aware
of Canada’s established policy of disposing of PCBs domestically and took on
the significant risk that the US EPA would not provide it with an enforcement
discretion. In such circumstances, how could the investor have had legitimate ex-
pectations that it could ship PCB wastes across the border? Similarly, Metalclad
knowingly invested in a controversial landfill that had previously been denied per-
mits. In Methanex, the existence of a highly-regulated environment coupled with
a lack of ‘specific commitments’ made to the investor that regulations would not
change, led the tribunal to conclude that the company did not have legitimate
expectations. However, one has to question whether the existence of a highly
regulated environment is an appropriate standard against which to measure in-
vestor expectations. Does the presence of lax standards conversely legitimize an
investor’s expectations that regulation will not change? Given the low-base level
of regulation in developing countries, and the pressures from both domestic and
international sources for governments to ‘catch up’ to international best practices,
would it not be fair to assume that investors should expect regulation to change
even more dramatically in developing countries than in developed ones?
5.5.2 Positive Obligations
An important trend visible in the Metalclad and Tecmed cases in particular, and
also evident in the literature as discussed in Chapter 4, is the growing acceptance
373Jones 2002, at 556.
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of positive obligations of investment protection. Thus, protecting investment no
longer solely requires a state to refrain from taking certain actions, it also man-
dates compliance with ‘good governance’ principles. As Reisman and Sloane
argue, governments must “establish and maintain an appropriate legal, adminis-
trative, and regulatory framework, the legal environment that modern investment
theory has come to recognize as a conditio sine qua non of the success of private
enterprise.”374 Not only is regulation subject to challenge, so too is the failure to
regulate.375 This is consistent with the neo-Gramscian argument that, under the
new constitutionalism, states are required to do both less and more.
The trend is certainly not universally accepted or welcomed. The expansion
of the scope of the minimum standard was met with considerable disquiet in all
three NAFTA states, and resulted in the issuance of the Notes of Interpretation.
Outside of the NAFTA context, it may be more difficult for governments to adopt
an interpretation of the standard, and furthermore, it is not even clear whether this
type of measure conclusively resolves the issue. The promulgation of the Notes,
when several Chapter 11 disputes were ongoing, caused consternation amongst
many observers who argued that not only was the timing inappropriate, but fur-
thermore that the Interpretation of the minimum standard in fact amounted to an
amendment of the NAFTA.376 Cook has gone so far as to claim that the interpre-
tation is a “severe curtailment of rights provided for under the ‘fair and equitable
treatment’ clause” and “is contrary to the plain meaning of the language” and thus
constitutes “a violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
has risen to the level of customary international law and requires treaties to be
interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning.”377 Despite the uproar, oth-
ers suggest that the Interpretation, far from amounting to an amendment, may not
preclude the inclusion of elements such as transparency in an analysis of the mini-
mum standard at all. As Kirkman has noted, equating fair and equitable treatment
with the minimum standard may only serve to intensify the debate on the current
374Reisman and Sloane 2003, at 117.
375Ibid., at 129.
376See the discussion in Pope & Talbot v. Government of Canada, Interim Award on Damages, 31 May
2002, http://www.international.gc.ca. See also the submissions in Methanex of the investor, the US,
Canada, and Mexico re: NAFTA FTC Statement on Article 1105, http://www.naftaclaims.com.
377Cook 2007, 1112-3.
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status of customary international law in the area; investors and many arbitrators
may argue that the standard has evolved (and expanded) considerably in recent
history.378 As noted above, this has been the strategy adopted by Glamis Gold.
What are the implications of an expanded notion of the minimum standard and
fair and equitable treatment requiring positive obligations on the part of states? It
certainly provides greater scope for investors to launch disputes, and therefore
counteracts any narrowing of the scope of regulatory takings may have occurred.
It also arguably disproportionately affects developing countries. Many poor states
are still struggling to establish the very fundamental elements of an functional
democratic system. The imposition of ‘good governance’ requirements (trans-
parency, accountability, etc.) in the form of aid conditionality has been fraught
with difficulty and controversy.379 It is fair to assume that this new form of invest-
ment conditionality will be equally contentious.
5.5.3 Multilevel Governance
Another critical aspect to recognize in the cases described in this chapter is that
in almost all instances they revolved around either measures taken by local or
regional governments (Luccetti, Metalclad, Tecmed, Methanex, Glamis Gold) or
measures taken by a national government in pursuit of international objectives
(Santa Elena, S.D. Myers). Thus, the cases reflect the now well-established phe-
nomena of ‘multilevel governance’ in the environmental field. They also raise
cause for concern in this respect.
In investment arbitration, only the national level of government can be held
liable for compensation, regardless of the level of government responsible for the
offending action. As such, national governments have an incentive to prevent sub-
national governments from adopting laws that are prone to challenge.380 Dhooge
notes that the mandate of national governments is clear: they “must establish the
limits of subnational jurisdiction existing through the exercise of the police powers
and stringently enforce those limits by taking prompt and effective action against
378Westcott 2007, at 430; Kirkman 2002, at 471.
379See Doornbos 2001.
380Kelemen 2004, at 273.
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non-complying state and local governments.”381
Multilevel governance may particularly complicate matters when it comes to
the payment of monetary damages to a successful claimant. The Mexican gov-
ernment reportedly missed a payment deadline to Metalclad because of ongoing
disputes with the various levels of government involved in the case about the ap-
propriate division of the cost of the settlement.382 In Canada, the Federation of
Canadian Municipalities has requested that the national government “guarantee
that it will never penalize municipalities for actions that are valid under domestic
law but violate NAFTA.”383 Been and Beauvais suggest that if the US govern-
ment faced payment of an award based on local or state regulations it could adopt
several different strategies: it could sue the state or local government for the cost
of compensation; it could deduct the amount of the award from grants or other
funds it would otherwise make available to the state or locality; it could condition
future funding for the state or locality upon its agreement to rescind or modify the
regulation in an effort to avoid future liability; or it could preempt, or condition-
ally preempt, the state or locality’s regulation.384 Clearly any of these strategies
could result in a reallocation of power and authority over environmental regulation
between various levels of government.385
Concern about liability under investment agreements could lead to efforts to
(re)centralize control over aspects of environmental governance, in opposition of
the trend of decentralization in recent years, especially in developing countries.386
While Kelemen rightly argues that centralization of power also results from the
harmonization of social regulation, the consequences of sub-national governments
deviating from such commitments are less immediate then in the case of violations
of trade and investment agreements.387
With regard to the other end of multilevel environmental governance - inter-
381Dhooge 2001, at 264-5.
382Been and Beauvais 2003, at 90.
383Qtd. in ibid.
384Been and Beauvais 2003, at 135-6.
385Been 2002, at 58; see also Luz and Miller 2002, at 976, who argue that Chapter 11 will lead to an
erosion of provincial power and authority in Canada.
386See Larson and Ribot 2005.
387Kelemen 2004, at 273.
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national law developed under multilateral environmental agreements - the Santa
Elena and S.D. Myers cases are particularly relevant. In S.D. Myers, the Tribunal
suggested that it should not be presumed that a breach of a regulative rule of in-
vestment protection could be justified by the existence of an international environ-
mental commitment, because the state is obliged to adopt measures that are least
inconsistent with investment protection. While the argument that a state presented
with a “variety of equally effective and reasonable means”388 to protect the envi-
ronment should choose the one that is most consistent with investment protection
does not appear unreasonable on its face, the notion that an arbitral tribunal is bet-
ter equipped than a democratically-elected government to decide what regulations
are effective and reasonable is certainly contestable. In Santa Elena, the Tribunal
reasoned that the existence of international obligations to protect the environment
did not affect the level of compensation owed to an investor. Wagner argues that
requiring governments to pay compensation to implement measures developed in
line with multilateral environmental agreements “interferes with efforts to address
global environmental problems through international consensus.”389
5.5.4 Paying the Polluters?
Several NGO reports have suggested that the S.D. Myers, Ethyl, and Metalclad
cases have turned the polluter pays principle into ‘pay the polluter’ principle.390
Similarly, Madalena suggests that “[i]nvestment treaties do not follow the well-
settled polluter pays principle, but impose a sacrifice on the community at large,
in the detriment of sustainable development under the auspices of a broadly in-
terpreted right to property.”391 On the other hand, according to Kentin, the cases
decided to date display “a rather restrained attitude in awarding high amounts of
damages with a few exceptions.”392 Investors are generally awarded much less
than they claim. Metalclad, for example, criticized the amount of damages that it
received, calling it “a token amount of money” that failed to reflect the actual value
388S.D. Myers Partial Award, at para. 221.
389Wagner 1999, at 535.
390Mann 2001, at 33; Public Citizen/FOE 2001 at 9.
391Madalena 2003, at 82. See also Hasic 2005, at 155-6.
392Kentin 2004, at 336.
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of the investment.393 Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is quite possible that
investors have significantly inflated their compensation claims in these cases, in-
cluding speculations about future profits. Table 5.3 compares the damages sought
by investors with the actual damages awarded in each case.
It is suggested here that what is more crucial is that there does not appear to
be any acknowledgment of the principle of common but differentiated responsibil-
ities in the institution of investment protection. In fact, the purpose of investment
protection arguably is to make the obligations of states uniform, despite varying
levels of development. Neither Costa Rica nor Mexico’s ability to pay was men-
tioned in the tribunal decisions in Santa Elena, Metalclad, and Tecmed. Brower
and Wong argue that the tribunal in Santa Elena did implicitly address this issue
and:
... granted compensation in an amount that, on the one hand, would not
‘break’ Costa Rica, or worse still, tempt it for lack of funds to consider
returning a World Heritage Site back to its owners for development into a
‘Disney-fied’ golf-courses-and-hotels resort, and, on the other hand, would
not so far disappoint [the investor’s] expectations as to cause it to seek an-
nulment of the Award.394
However, without explicit recognition of this principle, developing country gov-
ernments may be wary of the financial consequences of defending an environmen-
tal regulation in arbitration.
5.6 Summary
This chapter has examined the complexities of actual cases of investor-state dis-
putes related to the protection of the environment that have been resolved in in-
vestment arbitration. The cases reviewed related to several different environmen-
tal issues, and a range of regulatory actions in both developed countries (Canada
and the US) and developing countries (Peru, Costa Rica, and Mexico). The aim
of the chapter was not to pass judgment on the decisions of tribunals but rather to
393Dhooge 2001, at 259.
394Brower and Wong 2005, at 774.
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Table 5.3: Compensation Sought vs. Compensation Awarded (in millions)
examine the interpretations of the regulative rules and norms of investment pro-
tection that have been employed in arbitral practice and to identify whether any
discernible trends have emerged despite the absence of formal precedent in invest-
ment arbitration. Additionally, an effort was made to examine the extent to which
tribunals have sought to balance public and private interests. It has been argued
that the jurisprudence is inconsistent, and that it does not resolve the uncertainty
surrounding the interpretation of the norms and rules of investment protection.
Given the small number of cases, it is difficult to determine whether standards are
being refined or whether instead each arbitrator is likely to follow the particular
decisions that he agrees with.
Despite the inconsistency in tribunal decisions, several implications for envi-
ronmental governance have been identified. It has been argued that Tribunals are
not likely to accept a state’s purported reasons for adopting an environmental mea-
sure on its face, but will instead assess the measure’s legitimacy. In this respect,
science plays an important role, but the precautionary principle appears to be ab-
sent from the reasoning of tribunals. Tribunals appear less interested in examining
the behaviour of investors, which suggests that they do exhibit a degree of pro-
investor bias. The emergence of a more expansive interpretation of the minimum
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standard/fair and equitable treatment standard to cover issues such as transparency
and consistency in government behaviour toward investors is also notable. This
issue was identified in Chapter 4, but the cases in this chapter have highlighted the
implications of this approach when it is applied in practice. The implications of in-
vestment protection for multilevel governance were also discussed in this chapter.
While investment arbitration is only accessible to national governments, a great
deal of responsibility for the regulation of the environment, in both developed
and developing countries, is delegated to state, provincial, or municipal levels of
government. This dichotomy could lead to conflict between levels of government
and efforts to re-centralize power. Investment protection may also affect the im-
plementation of multilateral environmental agreements, requiring governments to
take measures that are least inconsistent with investment protection, perhaps at the
expense of the efficiency and effectiveness of environmental regulation. Finally,
it was argued that while the awards in the cases discussed in this chapter have not
been as high as the claims (or as high as the awards in several non-environmental
cases) it is evident that tribunals do not (at least explicitly) accept the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities.
Second-Order Outcomes 6
While most research on the relationship between investment law and environ-
mental policy focuses on disputes that are resolved in international arbitration,
many conflicts between investors and states will likely never reach this stage.
Arbitration is a high-risk, high-cost option for both governments and investors.
Furthermore, states are concerned with the effect that formal disputes may have
on their reputation as investor-friendly hosts. This chapter provides a detailed
examination of investor-state conflicts that were resolved without recourse to ar-
bitration, but where the existence of investment protection nevertheless played an
important role in the outcome. Conflicts concerning both environmental policy (in
Ghana, Indonesia, and Costa Rica) and domestic court proceedings (in Indonesia
and Ecuador) are examined.
6.1 Conflicts Over Policy
This chapter deals with two categories of investor-state conflicts; those that con-
cern policy and those that concern domestic court proceedings. This section exam-
ines several investor-state conflicts that have arisen over environmental policies.
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6.1.1 Open-Pit Mining in Indonesia’s Protected Forests
This case concerns a law banning open-pit mining in Indonesia’s protected forests.1
Several mining companies holding contracts in areas of protected forest threatened
to take the government to arbitration if the ban was applied to their prospective
mining operations. The conflict garnered significant attention from the public and
was drawn out over several years. Eventually, the government exempted a number
of companies from the ban.
Background
In 1999, following the fall of the New Order Regime, the Government of Indone-
sia passed a number of reform laws, including Law no. 41 Year 1999 Stipulation
to the Act on Forestry. Article 1 provides several basic definitions, including
the designation of various types of forest.2 These include: ‘production’ forests,
which are allocated mainly for the exploitation of forest products; ‘protection’
forests, which have the chief function of maintaining life-supporting hydrological
systems, preventing floods, controlling erosion etc.; and ‘conservation’ forests,
which are principally aimed at preserving plant and animal diversity. Article 38
stipulates that that open-cast mining is prohibited in protection forests. The rea-
son for this prohibition is that to expose and mine the ore in an open-cast design,
it is generally necessary to excavate a large area and to relocate a large quantity
of ‘waste rock’. Two of the main environmental concerns of the construction of
open-pit mines are the disruption of the ecosystem where the mine is excavated,
and the disposal of the waste rock. Other environmental impacts also ensue from
the building of roads to service mines, which requires the clearance of land, results
in changes to the hydrological functioning of the ecosystem, and opens access to
the area for exploitation from other sectors. In Indonesia, increasing the accessi-
bility of protection forests to illegal loggers is a major concern.
Mineral investment in Indonesia is organized under contracts-of-work (CoWs).
In the early years of the CoW system (1967-1970), the majority of the content in
1An earlier version of this case study was published in Tienhaara 2006b.
2An unofficial translation of the law was found on the Public Participation Forum (FPPM) website,
http://www.fppm.org.
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the contracts was negotiated, but later a standardized text on terms pertaining to
technical, legal and general matters was adopted.3 However, periodic changes to
laws and regulations on taxation and financial matters required adjustment to the
standardized terms, resulting in several ‘generations’ of contracts.4 A CoW spec-
ifies land rents, royalties and other payments to be made by the investor to the
government. In addition, it describes the environmental obligations of the com-
pany, although these are for the most part general statements which, as Hamilton
remarks, “lack the specificity required to allow effective inspection and enforce-
ment of their terms.”5 With regard to the settlement of disputes, there are options
for arbitration under internationally accepted rules. In later generations, the con-
tracts specifically make reference to UNCITRAL Rules.
In addition to access to investment arbitration, the CoW also has two critical
elements for attracting investors: conjunctive title and lex specialis. Conjunctive
title refers to the fact that if a commercial discovery is made, the CoW allows
for the contractor to proceed from the initial stages of surveying and exploration
all the way through to exploitation and marketing. Lex specialis in this instance
refers to the fact that the terms and conditions of CoWs, which are passed into
law, are not subject to changes in the general laws and regulations of Indonesia.
As Barberis explains, “the CoW, once approved by Parliament, has the status of
law. Therefore in the case of conflict between the law and regulations of Indonesia
and the CoW, the CoW supersedes.”6
The Conflict
Prior to the entry into force of Forestry Law 1999/41, a number of CoWs had
been signed covering areas of protection forests. In fact, over 150 companies
were supposedly affected by the ban on open-cast mining. At first, the companies
carried on with their activities as they presumed that the legislation would not be
applied retroactively and that, in any case, the contracts were lex specialis and
3Hoed 1997, at 122.
4Between 1967 and 1998, 236 CoWs were signed, the majority in the 4th generation (1985-1990)
and 6th generation (1997).
5Hamilton 2005, at 38.
6Barberis 1998, at 47.
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would therefore not be affected. The issue was eventually brought to the attention
of the public and was taken up by a number of NGOs. The Forestry department
stopped issuing permits to mining companies in protection forests and all affected
contracts were effectively suspended.
In 2002, reports began to emerge that several foreign mining companies were
threatening to bring the Government of Indonesia to international arbitration on
the matter of the Forestry Law. Several NGOs declared that the threat of arbitra-
tion was without basis.7 The following reasons were cited:
• All contracts state that companies must conform with the relevant environmental
protection laws and regulations of Indonesia;
• The law only prohibits surface mining, whereas underground mining is still per-
mitted;
• All the contracts in protected areas were signed during the period of authoritative
government, and the Forestry Law was made under democratic rule;
• The preservation of protected areas is an issue of global concern with popular sup-
port; and
• Indonesia is bound by international commitments including the provisions of the
CBD,8 and the Statement of Forest Principles and also participates in the United
Nations Forum on Forests.
The issues raised by the NGOs are worth some further examination.
The first point, that companies must comply with the relevant environmental
laws of Indonesia, is accurate. For example, the CoW of Pt. Nusa Halmahera
Minerals (Australia) states that the company shall:
In accordance with the prevailing Environmental protection and natural preser-
vation laws and regulations of Indonesia from time to time in effect, use its
7
“Mining Industry Threatens Indonesia with International Arbitration,” Friends of the Earth
Indonesia (WALHI) and Mining Advocacy Network (JATAM) News Release, 4 April 2002,
http://www.jatam.org.
8Togu Manrung, a professor at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture and director of Forest Watch In-
donesia, has suggested that allowing mining in protected forests would specifically violate Articles
7 and 8 of the CBD. See “Open Pit Mines Endanger Lives, Nature,” The Jakarta Post, 21 September
2002.
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best efforts to conduct its operations under this Agreement so as to mini-
mize and cope with harm to the Environment and utilize recognized modern
Mining industry practices to protect natural resources against unnecessary
damage, to minimize Pollution and harmful emissions into the Environment,
to dispose of Waste in a manner consistent with good Waste disposal prac-
tices, and in general to provide for the health and safety of its employees
and the local community.9
The use of the terminology “time to time in effect” suggests that investors should
not expect regulations to remain frozen over the course of the contract. Gross
argues that the clear requirement of companies to comply with environmental reg-
ulations, combined with the absence of stabilization clauses in the CoWs, rules out
the possibility that the companies could effectively argue that there was a breach
of contract by Indonesia.10 Additionally, according to a report in The Jakarta
Post, a noted lawyer told legislators that they should not worry about being sued
for breach of contract because the Forestry Law had been ratified by the House of
Representatives (DPR) and any agreements signed between the government and
investors could not violate Indonesian law.11 However, the investors argued that
this conclusion failed to take into account the fact that CoWs also have the status
of law in Indonesia, and are thus effectively stabilized.
Whether the companies could have claimed breach of treaty standards, for
example under the UK-Indonesia BIT, the Australia-Indonesia BIT, or the 1987
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments, is another question. Gross has analyzed the various
options and has concluded that: “the Government of Indonesia could have likely
beaten the mining companies’ claims at a preliminary/jurisdictional phase, and
certainly on the merits.”12 If the companies were to argue that the Forestry law
was a breach of treaty, then the second point in the NGO statement (that only one
9Contract of Work between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and Pt. Nusa Halmahera
Minerals, 17 March 1997, Jakarta, at Art. 26. It should be noted that CoWs are not, in general,
public documents, although model CoWs have been published. A copy of this specific CoW was
obtained from an NGO in Jakarta. Several other CoWs were also retrieved by the author from
company filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), http://pro-edgar-online.com.
10Gross 2003, at 896.
11
“House Urged to Challenge Mining Ruling,” The Jakarta Post, 2 July 2004.
12Gross 2003, at 901.
264 Second-Order Outcomes
method of mining - surface mining - is banned) would likely be a key point for
debate on whether the ban qualified as a taking. The mining companies rejected
the notion that alternatives to open-cast mining exist, arguing that underground
mining operations are not feasible because more than 90% of Indonesia’s mineral
potential is found in the top soil layer (around 0-50 metres).13 Thus, in the view
of investors, a ban on open-cast mining is effectively a complete prohibition on all
mining activities and thus a clear case of an expropriation. If the case had gone
to arbitration, the companies would also likely have argued that the ban did not
fall under Indonesia’s police powers. As the forests in question are classified as
protection rather than conservation forests, the mining companies argued that the
issue of biodiversity conservation is not relevant.14 However, Dr. Hariadi Kar-
todiharjo, a lecturer at the Bogor Agricultural Institute, suggests that regardless
of how the areas have been classified, mining in protection forests will result in
permanent devastation of the environment, a raised threat of extinction of rare
species, and a decrease in water supply to the Barito River and millions of people
living along the riverbank.15
The third point in the NGO statement (that the contracts were signed under a
period of authoritarian rule) is rather beyond the scope of this study, but it is an
issue that has been considered by others. Sornarajah notes that:
It is an interesting point as to whether international lawyers who promote
the norm of democracy would concede that concessions and other foreign
investment agreements signed by dictators or unrepresentative governments
should be considered invalid. It is possible to argue that the norm of self-
determination, now having acquired a near ius cogens status would invali-
date concession agreements signed by unrepresentative rulers.16
In this instance it seems unlikely that any arbitration panel would consider this
issue, as government officials have consistently stated that contracts signed under
13
“Minister of Forestry Ready to Implement DPR Decision on Mining,” MiningIndo, 1 September
2003.
14
“IMA Responds to NGOs and Mining in Forestry Critics,” MiningIndo, 30 July 2003.
15
“Government Warned of Catastrophe from Mining in Protected Forests,” MiningIndo, 8 March
2004.
16Sornarajah 2004a, at 42.
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the New Order regime would be honoured.17
Finally, it is questionable whether the last two points in the NGO statement,
relating to forest preservation as an issue of global concern and the obligations
of the government under MEAs, would have any influence on an arbitral tribunal,
given the conclusions drawn from the cases analyzed in the previous chapter.
Outcome
In any event, discussion of how a tribunal would deal with this case will remain
hypothetical. In 2002, the Government of Indonesia produced a list of 22 com-
panies with CoWs signed prior to the promulgation of Forestry Law 1999/41 that
they recommended be given approval to operate in protection forests. How this
list was devised from the original 150 or so affected companies is not clear. Fur-
thermore, the list did not remain constant over time; half of the companies were
removed (due to gloomy business prospects) and a further 11 were added, leading
State Minister for the Environment Nabiel Makarim to ask “whether twenty-two
was a sacred number.”18 In November of 2003, it was reported that 13 ‘priori-
tized’ companies from the list of 22 would be allowed to continue operations with
the issuance of a Presidential Decree, but the actual issuance of the Decree was
put off until a later date.19 These companies were apparently prioritized because
their operations were seen to be economically viable. The 9 companies on the
original list of 22 that were not included on the prioritized list of 13 were reported
to have made continued threats to sue the government. In March 2004, Paul Louis
Coutrier, an executive of the Indonesian Mining Association, was quoted as stat-
ing that the 9 companies had strong grounds to file a lawsuit, though he hoped
that the conflict would be settled out of court.20 The threat was particularly strong
from PT Inco (Canada), but this company was later confirmed to, in fact, be on
the prioritized list of 13.
On 11 March 2004, Perpu (government regulation substituting a law) no.
17Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold Inc. Form S-3 (Securities Registration Statement, simplified
form). Filed 4 November 2001. Washington D.C.: SEC, http://pro-edgar-online.com.
18
“Government Questioned Over Mining In Protected Forest,” The Jakarta Post, 19 July 2003.
19
“13 Mining Sites get Forest Status Changed,” MiningIndo, 6 November 2003.
20
“Mining Firms Threaten to Sue Indonesian Government,” Bisnis Indonesia, 12 March 2004.
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1/2004 was issued by the Government of Indonesia to add a new provision to
the 1999 Forestry Law stating that, “[a]ll permits or contracts in mining in forest
areas which were issued before the promulgation of Law 41 of 1999 on Forestry
are declared to remain valid until the expiration date of the respective permit or
contract.”21 It also stated that further implementation of the Perpu would be de-
termined by Presidential Decree.22 The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 provides
that a Perpu should be utilized only in “a pressing matter of utmost urgency.” This
type of measure had only been used once before by the Megawati administra-
tion, following the 2002 Bali terrorist bombings.23 Many environmental groups
questioned the “utmost urgency” of the mining issue, but also pointed out that the
Perpu did not actually change the position of the companies, whose contracts had
never been declared invalid.
The Presidential Decree (41/2004) issued in May was more specific and named
the 13 companies that would be allowed to continue operations in protection
forests. The Decree also stated that the operations would be further regulated un-
der a separate decree to be issued by the Ministry of Forestry. Immediately follow-
ing the issuance of the Presidential Decree, a group of NGOs issued a statement
that they would bring the Perpu, which had not yet been approved by Parliament,
before the Constitutional Court for Judicial Review. Following the development of
a special commission and much deliberation, the DPR finally voted on the Perpu
in July. Initially it appeared that the emergency law would be rejected,24 and the
NGOs were confident that they “had the numbers” needed to defeat it.25 How-
ever, the Perpu was passed into law (Law no. 19/2004) by a vote of 131 to 10226
amidst allegations of corruption. NGOs reported that they had been informed that
21
“Indonesian Forestry Issue Resolved,” Weda Bay Minerals News Release, 17 March 2004,
http://www.allbusiness.com.
22
“Mining in Protected Forests – Government Gives Way to Mining Industry Pressure,” Down to
Earth No. 61, May 2004.
23
“Nickel Miner to Sue Indonesian Government,” Asia Times, 17 March 2004.
24Irwan Prayitno, Speaker of the Commission VIII of the DPR, was reported to state that if the Perpu
was passed to the DPR it would be rejected. See “DPR to Decline Approval of Mining in Protected
Forest,” MiningIndo, 20 April 2004.
25Author’s confidential interviews with nongovernmental representatives (#1 and #7), Jakarta, July
2005.
26
“Disputed Mining Bill Endorsed,” The Jakarta Post, 16 July 2004.
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the government would provide Rp1 billion for every faction in the national parlia-
ment that voted to allow the mining operations to go ahead.27 These allegations
were corroborated by several members of Parliament who came forward claiming
to have been offered bribes.28 The money for the bribes was allegedly solicited
from the mining companies by the Department of Mines.29
In late September 2004, the Ministry of Forestry issued its Ministerial Decree
(no. 12/2004), outlining restrictions on the operations of companies permitted in
protection forests. According to a spokesperson for the Ministry: “The Decree is
designed to limit the potential destruction caused by mining operations on natural
forests and the environment.”30 Included in the Decree was a requirement for
companies to pay a bond to cover the costs of rehabilitating areas following mine
closures, and also to provide alternate areas of land for reforestation.
In 2005, in what appeared to be the last hurdle for the government, the Con-
stitutional Court conducted its review of Perpu no.1/2004 and Law 19/2004. The
Minister of Forests was reported to have stated that he would be happy if the Court
annulled the law,31 but it did not. Instead the judges concluded that:
Although this Court shares the opinion of all the experts brought by the
appellants regarding the dangerousness and negative impacts of open pit
mining in protected forests, nevertheless this Court also understands the
reasoning for the need for transitional regulation which continues the le-
gal status or rights gained by mining companies before the advent of the
Forestry Law.32
The Constitutional Court president reportedly also stated that “We can understand
the government’s argument that the regulation should be issued otherwise it would
27
“NGOs Allege Bribery in Indonesian Government Bid to Allow Mining Permits to Resume in Pro-
tected Forest,” MiningIndo, 13 November 2002; “Lawmakers Smell Fishy Deal behind Mining
Regulation,” The Jakarta Post, 24 July 2004.
28Ibid.
29The author’s confidential interview with a foreign embassy official (#4), Jakarta, July 2005.
30
“Forestry Ministry Softens Stance on Mining,” MiningIndo, 1 October 2004.
31
“Constitution Court to Conduct Judicial Review over Mining in Protected Forest,” MiningIndo, 17
February 2005.
32Conclusions of the Judgement of the Constitutional Court, qtd. in “Constitutional Court Rules no
to BHP et al. in Indon Protected Forests,” NGO Forum for Protected Forests News Release, 8 July
2005, http://www.eng.walhi.or.id.
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face difficulties in developing a favorable investment climate.”33
While the Minister of Environment has stated that no more licenses (beyond
the 13) should be issued, there is certainly potential for further threats of arbitra-
tion. In fact, by singling out 13 companies, the government has actually made the
case of other companies far stronger as they could now also claim discriminatory
treatment.34 Furthermore, the additional requirements imposed on companies op-
erating in protection forests included in the Ministerial Decree issued in late 2004
(later issued as Regulation No. 14/2006) may also be subject to challenge. The
Chair of the Indonesian Mining Association, Jeffrey Mulyono, was reported to be
particularly upset with the requirement that mining firms operating in protection
forests would have to provide a “compensatory site” twice as large as the min-
ing concession. According to Mulyono, the requirements will cause unnecessary
problems for mining firms and could deter future investment in the sector.35 An
Inco report to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also alludes to
this issue:
While PT Inco continues to believe that the terms of its Contract of Work
provide it with all authorizations needed to conduct mining activities in the
areas covered by its Contract of Work and any disputes relating to its Con-
tract of Work are subject to arbitration under international conventions, if
the Forestry Regulation restricts PT Inco’s ability to mine in certain areas,
it could reduce PT Inco’s estimated ore reserves and adversely affect PT
Inco’s long-term mining plans.36
Epilogue: Indonesia’s Draft Mining Bill
Indonesia has been in a protracted debate over the development of a new mining
bill for several years. The bill, intended to supersede Law No. 11/1967 on mining,
33
“Mining in Protected Forests Legalized,” The Jakarta Post, 8 July 2005, emphasis added.
34Author’s confidential interviews with a nongovernmental representative (#7), and a mining investor
(#9), Jakarta, July 2005.
35
“Mining Group Objects to New Forest Guidelines,” The Jakarta Post, 31 May 2006.
36Inco Limited. 2005. Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2005. Commission file number 1-1143. Wash-
ington D.C.: SEC, emphasis added.
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originally aimed to replace the CoW system with exploration and production li-
censes, to be awarded by local administrations in line with the regional autonomy
law.37 However, foreign investors have made it abundantly clear that they do not
favour this move. International accounting and consulting firm Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers called on the government to keep the CoW system, noting that the pro-
posed change to the system “hasn’t been well received by foreign investors,” and
would deter investment in the sector.38 The managing director of mining giant Rio
Tinto has also stated that, “[i]t would be of interest to Indonesia to keep its [CoW]
for long-life, large-scale projects,”39 and a group of major mining companies is-
sued a ‘white paper’ in March 2007, calling on the government to do so.40 The
Indonesian Mining Association has also urged the government to keep the CoW
system, as it provides greater legal certainty than the proposed licensing system.41
Many investors have argued that local administrations, after obtaining greater
autonomy in 2001, have been too aggressive in attempting to collect revenue by
creating new taxes and levies, which in turn has created a burden on businesses.42
They have also argued that the involvement of local governments reduces pre-
dictability in the investment process.43 It is also clear, that the ability to access
international arbitration is a key concern for investors.44 One observer has noted
that:
If one were to strip away the rhetoric and get right down to the issue that
really has industry concerned about the mining law being debated in the
House of Representatives (DPR), it would be the proposed shift from inde-
pendent international arbitration to a local government decision as a dispute
settlement mechanism.45
37
“Lawmakers Debate New Mining Bill to Install New System,” The Jakarta Post, 6 February 2006.
38
“Lingering Legal Concerns Deter Mining Investors,” The Jakarta Post, 23 January 2006; “Don’t
Scrap CoW for Mining Licenses,” Jakarta Post, 01 March 2007.
39
“Mining Law Must Provide Certainty and Equality,” The Jakarta Post, 20 February 2007.
40
“Miners Issue ‘White Paper’ Against Draft Mining Law,” The Jakarta Post, 21 March 2007.
41
“Don’t Scrap CoW for Mining Licenses,” Jakarta Post, 01 March 2007.
42
“Govt Plans New Measures to Improve Investment Climate,” The Jakarta Post, 17 February 2006.
43
“We Want Predictability, Say Mining Firms,” The Jakarta Post, 31 January 2007; “Controversial
Mining Bill Likely to be Passed,” The Jakarta Post, 23 February 2007.
44
‘Don’t Scrap CoW for Mining Licenses,” Jakarta Post, 01 March 2007.
45
“Dispute Resolution and the Environment,” Jakarta Post, 25 April 2007.
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In June 2007, the House Commission working on the draft decided that a
CoW-type system would be incorporated into the new bill for large mining projects
involving a total investment of more than US$250 million.46 Thus, while the bill
had not been passed at the time of writing, the indication is that the pressure from
the mining companies has strongly influenced the draft. The draft bill has also
been criticized by NGOs and government parties for paying little attention to the
environment.47
6.1.2 Mining in Ghana’s Forest Reserves
This case concerns a conflict over a moratorium on mining activities in forest re-
serves in Ghana.48 The moratorium was put in place in 1996, but at that point
several mining companies had already carried out exploration activities in the re-
serves and wished to proceed with mine development. The conflict pitted the
Forestry Commission against the Minerals Commission, and garnered significant
attention from NGOs. There were also indications that the government was threat-
ened with arbitration from the affected investors. The government eventually al-
lowed five companies to carry out mine operations within the forests, subject to
specific environmental guidelines.
Background
Ghana has a very long history of mining, particularly of gold, dating back to pre-
Christian times; in the colonial period it was known as the ‘Gold Coast’. Mining
law in Ghana was reformed under a World Bank structural adjustment programme
in the 1980s. The 1986 Minerals and Mining Law provided for referral of disputes
to arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules, or within the framework
of a BIT. Ghana has concluded 21 BITs; some of the agreements had been ratified
while others were still awaiting ratification.49
46
“House Wants New Agency for Mining,” The Jakarta Post 19 June 2007.
47
“A Green PKB Wants Mining Bill Revised,” The Jakarta Post, 28 February 2007.
48An earlier version of this case study was published in Tienhaara 2006a.
49
“Treaties of Ghana,” ICSID website, http://icsid.worldbank.org, accessed 4 January 2008. The US
has also signed three agreements with Ghana - the OPIC Investment Incentive Agreement, the Trade
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The 1986 Minerals and Mining Law recognizes three stages of mineral devel-
opment, and an investor requires a separate license for each stage: reconnaissance,
prospecting, and mining. In terms of mineral tenure, there is no automatic right for
the holder of a reconnaissance licence to acquire a prospecting licence, but there
is an automatic right for the holder of a prospecting licence to obtain a mining
lease.50 Mining leases are valid for up to 30 years, and generally include renewal
clauses.51 Negotiations for licences and leases are normally led by the Minerals
Commission, and the country’s Constitution requires any contract or undertaking
to be ratified in Parliament by a two-thirds voting majority. However, ratification
has little impact on the substantive content of agreements.52 According to Ayine et
al., “[w]hether and when contracts become available to the wider public depends
on whether the Parliamentary Committee invites public comments on the contract
document; for most agreements placed before Parliament this does not happen.”53
In the course of this research, three mining leases54 were obtained from com-
pany filings to the SEC in Washington D.C.55 These examples give some insight
into the substantive content of Ghanaian mining leases, although it should be cau-
tioned that other leases may differ significantly. Furthermore, it should be noted
that in addition to mining leases, a more recent trend has been for companies to
sign more general ‘investment agreements’ with the government. For example, in
2003, Newmont Mining Corp. signed an investment agreement that covered its
investments under three mining leases.56 This trend is in line with Ghana’s new
and Investment Framework Agreement, and the Open Skies Agreement - but these are not traditional
BITs.
50Addy 1999, at 237; Omalu and Wa¨lde 1998.
51Addy 1999, at 237.
52Ayine et al., at 2005.
53Ibid., at 3-4.
54Mining Lease signed between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and Canadian Bogosu
Resources Ltd., 21 August 1987. Mining Lease signed between the Government of the Republic of
Ghana and Canadian Bogosu Resources Ltd., 16 August 1988. Mining Lease signed between the
Government of the Republic of Ghana and Bogoso Gold Ltd., 29 June 2001.
55All three leases are now under the control of Golden Star Resources Ltd. The 1987 and 1988 leases
can be found in Golden Star Resources Ltd., SEC Form 10-K (Annual Report) Filed 29 March 2006,
for Period Ending 31 December 2005, and the 2001 lease can be found in Golden Star Resources
Ltd., SEC Form 8-K Filed for Period Beginning 25 October 2001, http://pro-edgar-online.com.
56
“Newmont Joins Mining List,” Ghana News Agency, 19 December 2003.
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mining law, which will be discussed further below.
Returning to the content of the leases, it can be noted that with regard to
environmental provisions, they are quite general:
The company shall adopt all necessary and practical precautionary measures
to prevent undue pollution of rivers and other potable water and to ensure
that such pollution does not cause harm or destruction to human or animal
life or fresh water or vegetation.57
In terms of dispute settlement, the 1987 and 1988 leases refer to the jurisdiction of
ICSID for settlement by reconciliation or arbitration, while the more recent 2001
lease refers to UNCITRAL Rules. All three leases also have a second section to
the arbitration clause, which provides for some stability. For example, the 2001
Mining Lease with Bogoso Gold Ltd. states that:
The Parties acknowledge and agree that this Agreement was made on the
basis of the laws and conditions prevailing at the date of the effective con-
clusion of the negotiation of this Agreement and accordingly, if thereafter,
new laws and conditions come into existence which unfairly affect the in-
terest of either party to this agreement, then the party so unfairly affected
shall be entitled to request a re-negotiation and the parties shall thereupon
re-negotiate. The parties hereby undertake and covenant with each other to
make every effort to agree, co-operate, and negotiate and to take such action
as may be necessary to remove the causes of unfairness or disputes.58
The Conflict
Mining activities in Ghana are concentrated in the south of the country, as this is
where the most substantial mineral deposits are found. Incidentally, this is also
the area within which the majority of Ghana’s remaining forestland is located.
Permanent forest estate, in the form of reserves, was developed by the colonial
government in the early part of the last century, in recognition of the increasing
pressures on Ghana’s forests. The intention was to maintain climatic quality, pro-
tect watersheds and ensure an environment conducive to cocoa production.59 The
57Art. 8b of all three leases.
58Art. 35(d)
59Kotey et al. 1998, at 23.
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demarcation of the forest estate was largely completed by 1939. While it is widely
acknowledged that much of the forest estate has been degraded despite the reserve
status, it has also been suggested that without the reserves “Ghana wouldn’t have
any forest left.”60 Ghana has an estimated 5.5 million hectares of forest, which the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations reports it is losing
at a rate of 2% per year.61 According to one report, ten to twelve thousand people
depend on forest reserves directly for their food and livelihood.62 The reserves
are also significant stores of biodiversity, containing over 700 types of tropical
trees and many endangered species including: 34 species of plant, 13 species of
mammal, 23 species of butterfly, and 8 species of bird.63
Following the promulgation of the 1986 Minerals and Mining Law, several
gold mining companies were granted permission by the National Defense Council
(NDC) government to carry out exploration activities within forest reserves. As
early as 1992, the Forestry Commission was raising concerns about the potential
impacts that mining could have on the reserves:
Mining in forest reserves will imply abandonment of scientific management
of forest reserves and consequently loss of goods and services derived from
our forest heritage set aside 60-70 years ago. Ghana could be sanctioned by
the International Conservation organizations, which have credited Ghana
with a long history of responsibility for tropical forest conservation and
management.64
In 1996, based on the apprehension about the depletion of the permanent forest
estate and the potential for mineral activities to accelerate this depletion, the Min-
istry of Lands and Forestry placed a moratorium on mineral operations in forest
reserves.65
At the time of the moratorium, some mining companies had already reached
advanced stages of exploration in forest reserves. The government selected sev-
60Author’s confidential interview with a non-governmental representative (#3), Accra, June 2005.
61FAO 2007, at Annex Table 2.
62
“Mining Takes Heavier Toll on Ghana’s Biodiversity,” Ghanaian Chronicle, 27 September 2006.
63Ibid.
64Tuffuor 1992.
65Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd. 2005. Environmental and Social Impact Assessment: Ahafo South
Project. Accra, http://www.newmont.com.
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enteen companies, apparently on the basis of the level of investment incurred and
the state of exploration that had been achieved, and determined that they should be
allowed to continue with their exploration activities.66 In 1997, the Operational
Guidelines for Mineral Exploration in Forest Reserves for Selected Companies
were produced and put in place to regulate exploration activities and the selected
companies were invited to re-apply for Forest Entry Permits.67
Up until this point, the issue had not been widely publicized. However, in
1998, Friends of the Earth (FOE)-Ghana began to investigate further. The group
visited the exploration sites and spoke with companies, who claimed that if they
found economically viable deposits they would be given mineral leases.68 FOE-
Ghana expressed alarm over the potential consequences for forest conservation
and founded a Coalition of Civil Society Groups Against Mining in Ghana’s For-
est Reserves (FOE-Ghana Coalition).
In response to the concerns that were increasingly being raised over the pos-
sibility of mining in forest reserves, and in preparation for the expected transi-
tion from exploration to mine development, the Ghana Chamber of Mines, an
association of representatives of mining companies operating in Ghana, took a
fact-finding mission to South Africa and Australia, bringing with them represen-
tatives of the Forestry Commission, Environmental Protection Agency and other
institutions. The purpose of the trip was to view successful mining operations in
forests in these countries. Upon return from the trip the Chamber commissioned
the preparation of the Environmental Guidelines for Mining in Productive Forest
Reserves.
Outcome
By the time that the Environmental Guidelines had been published in 2001, a
new government under the New Patriotic Party (NPP) had been elected, and had
66Chirano Gold Project Scoping Report & Terms of Reference, Prepared by SGS Environment,
Project No. B246. Available in the Ghana EPA Library, Accra.
67Environmental Guidelines for Mining in Productive Forest Reserves in Ghana, May 2001, at 1.
68Author’s confidential interview with a non-governmental representative (#3), Accra, June 2005.
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thus “inherited the problem” of the mining in reserves debate.69 Under increasing
public pressure, the list of proposed operations was decreased to five70 and the
government undertook visits to the proposed mine sites. The final approval for
these operations came on 12 February 2003, in a letter issued by the Ministry of
Mines to the Ghana Chamber of Mines.
The Ministry of Mines (now Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines) defended
its decision to allow mining in forest reserves with several key arguments:71
• The companies had invested substantial sums of money and, if they were not al-
lowed to proceed with mine development, the government would have to pay them
compensation;
• Not allowing the companies to proceed would discourage future investments in the
industry;
• The benefits of mining in terms of jobs and local infrastructure and royalties to the
government outweigh the environmental consequences of mine development;
• The forest reserves earmarked for mining are not pristine, rather they have already
been degraded; and
• Stricter environmental controls will be placed on companies operating in forest
reserves (the Environmental Guidelines) and they will be required to plant trees
outside of their concessions in addition to rehabilitating the mine area.
With regard to the first argument, according to several sources in Ghana, the
threat of international investment arbitration was clearly made by companies with
interests in the forest reserves, although there is disagreement from the sources
69Mr. Kwadjo Adjei Darko, former Minister of Mines, qtd. in “Golden Greed: Trouble Looms over
Ghanas Forest Reserves,” World Rainforest Movement News Release, n.d., http://www.wrm.org.uy.
70The companies were Newmont (US), Nevsun Resources (acquired by Anglogold Ashanti/South
Africa), Birim Goldfields (acquired by Goldenstar Resources/Canada), Chirano Goldmines (ac-
quired by Redback Mining/Canada), and Satellite Goldfields (acquired by Goldenstar Re-
sources/Canada).
71This summary of arguments is based on Tetteh 2004, various news articles quoted elsewhere in
this section, and the author’s confidential interviews with mining investors (#1 & #20), government
officials (#2 & #12), non-governmental representatives (#3, #4, #8 & #11), a representative of an
international organization (#6), and academics (#9, & #18), Accra, Kumasi and New Abirim, June
2005.
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over whether the government took the threat seriously,72 or merely used it as
a convenient excuse to defend its position.73 The main companies involved in
the conflict were based in Canada, the US, and South Africa. Canada does not
have a BIT with Ghana, there is no record of a South African BIT ever having
been ratified, and the American agreements (a framework Agreement Concerning
the Development of Trade and Investment Relations and an Investment Incen-
tive Agreement) do not provide for investor-state dispute settlement. Therefore, it
is unlikely that any of the companies could have brought a claim based on treaty
rights. Furthermore, the companies did not have mineral leases, which would have
provided some level of stability. However, security of mineral tenure in Ghana,
as mentioned above, ensures that holders of a prospecting licence have a right to
acquire a mineral lease for minerals that they discover in the area covered by the
licence, and the national legislation provides access to arbitration.
As for the second argument made by the Ministry of Mines, about the value
of the mining industry for the country, this is also disputed. Ghana is the second
largest producer of gold in Africa (after South Africa), and gold has replaced co-
coa as the leading foreign exchange earner.74 However, a calculation by UNCTAD
based on 2003 government figures showed that in that year Ghana earned only
about 5% of the total value of mineral exports - about US$46.7 million out of a to-
tal value of US$893.6 million.75 Furthermore, according to Awudi, the increased
activity in the sector has not led to a significant increase in employment.76
The Ministry’s third claim, that the forest reserves to be mined were degraded,
is also contested. According to one publication “Ghana mine operators roll their
eyes at the ‘reserve’ designations because locals have already plundered them.”77
Even the former Minister of Mines Cecilia Bannerman has reportedly stated that
“many of these reserves are reserves only on paper,”78 and the Minister of Lands,
72Author’s confidential interviews with a government official (#7), an academic (#9), and a non-
governmental representative (#11), Accra, June 2005.
73Author’s confidential interviews with a non-governmental representative (#8), and academics (#9 &
#18), Accra and Kumasi, June 2005.
74Awudi 2002, at 1.
75UNCTAD 2005a, at 50.
76Awudi 2002, at 1.
77
“Country Winds up for Enviro-Mining Clash,” Mineweb, 4 September 2003.
78Ibid.
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Forestry and Mines at the height of the conflict, Prof. Dominic Fobih, had also
referred to the forests in question as “so-called reserves.”79 However, others have
taken a different view, disputing the notion that the reserves in question were
degraded and suggesting to the contrary that there were still areas of virgin for-
est.80 It has also been suggested that it is illogical to conclude that because an
area is degraded it should be “offered up for further degradation.”81 Even a rep-
resentative of one of the mining companies involved in the debate admitted that
it was understandable that there was controversy over mining, even if the forests
were degraded, because there is not much forest left in Ghana.82 The FOE-Ghana
Coalition further argued that allowing mining in forest reserves contravened var-
ious national policies and the principles underlining the establishment of forest
reserves in Ghana as well as international commitments that the government had
made, for example in the Convention to Combat Desertification and the CBD.
The government’s final argument, that the companies operating in forest re-
serves would be more strictly regulated, could be seen as a compromise between
the position of the investors/Minerals Commission and that of the environmen-
talists/Forestry Commission (with the two sides ironically melded together at the
Ministry level with the amalgamation of the Forestry Ministry and the Mining
Ministry). However, members of the FOE-Ghana Coalition charged that, in the
development of the Environmental Guidelines there had been no consultation with
communities directly affected by mining or forestry or with civil society organiza-
tions.83 The Environmental Guidelines listed twelve organizations as key contrib-
utors,84 all of which are either representatives of the mining industry or govern-
79
“Minister Rekindles Mining in Forest Reserve Controversy,” Public Agenda, 8 September 2003.
80Author’s confidential interviews with a government official (#2), and non-governmental representa-
tives (#3, #4, #8, & #11), Accra, June 2005.
81Author’s confidential interview with a non-governmental representative (#11) Accra, June 2005.
82Author’s confidential interview with a mining investor (#20), New Abirim, June 2005.
83
“National Coalition of Civil Society Groups Against Mining in Ghana’s Forest Reserves:
A Presentation to the Ghanaian Media,” 31 March 2004, Old Press Centre, Accra,
http://www.bicusa.org/Legacy/Coalition press statement March04.pdf.
84Abosso Goldfields Ltd. (South Africa), Ashanti Goldfields Company Ltd. (South Africa), Birim
Goldfields Inc. (Canada), Environmental Protection Agency, Forestry Commission, Forestry Ser-
vices Division, Ghana Chamber of Mines, Knight Piesold Consulting (global consulting firm, with
representatives from Australia and South Africa), Minerals Commission, Mines Department, Min-
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ment agencies, and the funding for the project came entirely from foreign mining
companies, leading one observer to conclude that: “the production of the docu-
ment was funded by the mining industry and it cannot be trusted since it merely
parrots the wishes of the mining industry.”85 In any event, the Environmental
Guidelines are non-binding, and provisions are frequently qualified by language
such as “where practicable.” The companies operating in forest reserves would
not be permitted to build any additional facilities within the reserves and would
also be required to reforest the areas that they cleared.86 However, according to
one forestry official, the idea of restoring forests in Ghana is a myth: “You fell
tropical trees and in place you plant grass and ornamental trees - you fell ma-
hogany and plant cassia - it is not the same. After mining the soil is unable to
sustain indigenous species.”87 Officials from international organizations operat-
ing in Ghana were even more pessimistic; “Resources from mining will never be
reinvested in forestry; rehabilitation doesn’t happen in Africa.”88
While the mining-forest reserve debate has been effectively concluded by the
government’s decision, and several companies have begun to advance their oper-
ations, some controversy remains (see Box 6.1).
Epilogue: Ghana’s New Mining Law
When it was drafted, the 1986 Minerals and Mining Law was considered very
attractive for investors. However, times change and, in an attempt to regain the
country’s competitiveness vis-a´-vis other regimes, the Government of Ghana en-
acted a new Minerals and Mining Act (Act 703) in March 2006.
The key provisions which could have implications for the regulation of the
environment are found in Sections 45 and 46, where investors are given the op-
portunity to sign ‘stability agreements’ and ‘development agreements’ with the
istry of Lands and Forestry, and the Wildlife Division.
85
“Golden Greed: Trouble Looms over Ghana’s Forest Reserves,” World Rainforest Movement News
Release, n.d., http://www.wrm.org.uy.
86
“Only Proper Mining to Be Allowed in Forest Reserves,” Ghana News Agency, 13 June 2006.
87Author’s confidential interview with a government official (#13) Accra, June 2005.
88Author’s confidential interview with a representative of an international organization (#14) Accra,
June 2005.
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government. These agreements are binding and are subject to international arbi-
tration. A stability agreement ensures that:
the holder of the mining lease will not, for a period not exceeding fifteen
years from the date of the agreement
a. be adversely affected by any new enactment, orders, instruments or
other actions made under a new enactment or changes to any en-
actment, orders, instruments that existed at the time of the stability
agreement, or other actions taken under these that have the effect or
purports to have the effect of imposing obligations upon the holder or
applicant of the mining lease.89
According to the Minister of Lands, Forestry and Mines at the time the law
was enacted, Prof. Dominic Fobih, the ‘essence’ of this provision is to “protect
the holder of a mining lease for a period not exceeding fifteen years from being
adversely affected by future changes in laws that result in heavier financial burdens
being imposed on the holder.”90 In addition to a stability agreement, an investor
may also enter into a development agreement, if the proposed investment will
exceed US$500 million. Such an agreement may contain provisions;
a. relating to the circumstance or manner in which the Minister or the
Commission will exercise a discretion conferred by or under this Act;
b. relating to the mineral right or operations to be conducted under the
mining lease;
c. on stability terms as provided under section 45;
d. relating to environmental issues and obligations of the holder to safe-
guard the environment in accordance with this Act or other enactment;
and
e. dealing with the settlement of disputes.91
A former Minister of Mines, Cecilia Bannerman, has stated that stability and
development agreements “are mutually beneficial to investors and government as
89Ghana Minerals and Mining Act, at Section 45.
90Memorandum to the Draft Minerals and Mining Bill, 17 May 2005.
91Ghana Minerals and Mining Act, at Section 46, emphasis added
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they enable both parties to negotiate and agree on specified commitments and ex-
pectations.”92 The Ghana National Coalition on Mining (a group of organizations,
communities, and individuals) is not convinced of this and strongly opposed the
inclusion of stability or development agreements in the new Bill.93
The next step for Ghana is to develop a model stability agreement. UNCTAD
has recommended that this model be drafted in close consultation with industry
and Parliament and suggests that the stability agreements of Chile and Peru would
provide useful models (see Section 4.1.5).94
6.1.3 Open-Pit Mining in Costa Rica
Two cases in Costa Rica are presented in this chapter. The first case involves a
Canadian company that held a mineral exploration license in the country. In 2002,
the Costa Rican government placed a moratorium on oil and gas exploration and
open-pit mining. The Canadian mining company’s concession was not directly
affected by the moratorium, but the company faced difficulty in the approval of
its EIA. The company threatened to take the government to arbitration under the
terms of the Canada-Costa Rica BIT, but was eventually permitted to proceed with
mine development.
Background
In the late 1990s, Placer Dome Inc. of Canada explored for minerals on two prop-
erties in the far northwest corner of Costa Rica, near the Nicaraguan border.95
Subsequently, these properties were acquired by Lyon Lake Mines Ltd., another
Canadian company. In June 2000, Lyon Lake sold the rights to Vannessa Ven-
tures, also incorporated in Canada.96 The Crucitas project developed by Vannessa
92Speech by Cecilia Bannerman, Ghana Minister of Mines, at the Conference of Montreal’s CIDA/
IDRC International Forum Bringing the Best of the Private Sector to Development, 7 June 2004,
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-61467-201-1-DO TOPIC.html.
93Memorandum on the Minerals and Mining Bill 2005, Submitted by the National Coalition on Min-
ing to the Select Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Minerals, 8 June 2005.
94UNCTAD/Japan Bank for International Cooperation 2006, at 21.
95Doan 1998, at 1.
96Velasco 2000, at 2.
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consisted of 10 gold mining concessions covering an area of 176 square km.97
Vannessa set up a subsidiary in the country, Industrias Infinito, S.A., submitted a
feasibility report to the government in 2001 and received an exploitation permit in
2002, only days before a presidential election.98
Oil and mining were hot campaign issues in the elections. All three of the lead-
ing candidates for office voiced their opposition to oil exploration in the country.99
Abel Pacheo was elected in a close fought race, and in his inaugural address in
May, he declared “peace with nature.” On Earth Day, he placed a moratorium on
future oil and gas exploration as well as on large-scale open-pit mining projects.
Assuming that it would not be retroactively affected by the moratorium, Van-
nessa Ventures continued with the development of its project. The company con-
tracted a Costa Rican consulting company to produce an EIA, and submitted it to
country’s environmental agency (SETENA) in March 2002.100 In August of that
year, the Sala IV ruled on an appeal of the open-pit mining moratorium brought
by Franz Ulloa, a representative of the Costa Rican Chamber of Mines. While the
court upheld the moratorium, it affirmed the legality of concessions which were
issued before the moratorium was put in place. The Environment Minister said
that he would respect the decision, but also indicated that the government was
ill-equipped to properly regulate and monitor large scale gold mines.101
The Conflict
Vannessa Ventures was confident that its mining licence was valid, based on the
court decision, but it still faced a second hurdle: the approval of its EIA. In March
2003, a year after it had submitted the EIA, Vannessa filed an injunction to obtain
a resolution on its approval or rejection. SETENA responded that the EIA was be-
low standards and would not be approved. Vannessa subsequently filed an appeal
97
“Multi-Million Ounce Crucitas Gold Project Acquired,” Vannessa Ventures News Release, 17 May
2000, http://www.vannessaventures.com.
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with SETENA and requested that the Supreme Court review the decision.
The company declared that “the political environment that manifests itself in
the declarations and actions of the President and Minister may have involuntarily
influenced the legal and administrative process and resulted in unfair treatment of
Infinito and its shareholders.”102 As a result, the company felt it that the principles
of fairness, transparency, and non-discrimination, found in the Canada-Costa Rica
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA),103 had been vio-
lated.104 The definition of investment under the FIPA covers “rights, conferred by
law or under contract, to undertake any economic and commercial activity, includ-
ing any rights to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.”105 The
company also suggested that they had been discriminated against: “The negative
viewpoints of the President and the moratorium against mining singles out open
pit gold mining and excludes non-metallic mines altogether.”106 Erich Rauguth, a
senior mining consultant for Vannessa further stated that “[i]n reality we’ve been
expropriated.”107 The company noted in a news release that if it proceeded with in-
ternational arbitration under the FIPA, “[e]ffective compensation would be based
on the loss of return on investment that can reasonably be expected to materialize,”
which Vannessa estimated at the time to be approximately US$200 million.108
Despite its bold statements, the company continued to pursue a response from
SETENA on its appeal and took the issue to the local courts. The Sala IV found
in their favour, requiring SETENA to respond to Vannessa’s appeal within five
days.109 The permitting process thereafter recommenced and in March 2004 the
company appointed a technical commission to deal with additional issues raised
by SETENA.110
102Ibid.
103FIPA is the Canadian nomenclature for a BIT
104Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 18 March 1998, San Jose´.
105Ibid., at Art. 1(g)(vi).
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In late 2004, environmentalists brought a case to the country’s Constitutional
Court, arguing that Vannessa was awarded its Exploitation Permit prior to re-
ceiving the required environmental approvals and that, as such, it should be an-
nulled.111 In December 2004, the court upheld the injunction, finding that the min-
ing concession was in violation of the Central American Biodiversity Agreement
and Article 50 (on the right to a healthy environment) of Costa Rica’s Constitu-
tion.112 The court ordered the state to pay costs, damages and compensation to the
permit holder, but, to the confusion of Vannessa, apparently stated that the EIA
process should move ahead. The company once again began openly discussing the
option of international arbitration. John Morgan, president of Vannessa Ventures,
explained why the company was not going to give up without a fight: “These
projects are not that easy to find. When you look at whether we should persevere
with these existing projects versus the other option of going out and trying to find
another million ounce project, I’d take the former.”113
In April 2005, the company asked the Constitutional Court to reconsider, clar-
ify, and add to its ruling. Vannessa also filed a request to advance the international
arbitration process with ICSID in July 2005. In a news release, the company
stated that it sought restitution of its contractual rights and US$5 million in legal
and administrative costs. In lieu of restitution it sought lost profits of US$240
million, plus US$36 million in expenses and compound interest.114 The company
made it clear that it was advancing the arbitration process in order to protect its
claim under the time requirements of the FIPA, and that it would halt the process
if SETENA provided approval of the EIA in the interim.115
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Outcome
In September 2005, SETENA approved the EIA for the company, which could
thereafter proceed with mine development.116 Industrias Infinito CEO Jesus Car-
vajal noted that the arbitration request to ICSID had helped Vannessa’s case, stat-
ing that, “[t]his kind of pressure helped SETENA resolve the issue.”117 The com-
pany reported that the approval of the EIA was “sufficient reason for the investor
Vannessa Ventures, to consider the withdrawal of the arbitration presented before
the [ICSID].”118
As an aside, it is interesting to note that the US and Costa Rica have negotiated
a ‘Side-Letter’ to CAFTA-DR, which states that:
A nondiscriminatory indefinite moratorium on strip or open pit mining ac-
tivities declared in the territory of Costa Rica shall not be deemed to be a
non-conforming measure subject to the disciplines of Chapter Ten (Invest-
ment) or Eleven (Cross-Border Trade in Services).119
6.1.4 Offshore Oil Exploration in Costa Rica
The second case in Costa Rica involves an American oil company that held several
land and offshore concessions in the country. The oil company’s land concessions
were annulled and it encountered problems in the approval of its EIA for the off-
shore concessions. This latter issue led to a conflict with the government and a
filing to initiate investment arbitration under the terms of a state contract. The
company eventually withdrew its arbitration request.
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Background
In 1994, the Government of Costa Rica passed a Hydrocarbons Law as a part of a
series of measures designed to implement a structural adjustment program. This
law opened Costa Rica to foreign interests in oil and gas exploration. In 1997,
the Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE) opened a round of bidding for
oil and gas exploration concession blocks on land and offshore. In 1998, MKJ
Xploration, a Lousiana-based company, acquired four concession blocks - two on
land and two offshore.120 Texas-based Harken Energy later purchased an eighty
percent stake in the project under the subsidiary Harken Costa Rica Holdings (col-
lectively ‘Harken’). In 1999, protests began over the seismic tests that were being
carried out in one of Harken’s offshore concessions. Environmentalists expressed
alarm over the potential impacts on marine life, and noted that wildlife reserves
existed close by, including two sites registered under the Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands.121 Fisherman and members of the tourist industry also voiced concerns
about the impacts that oil exploration could have on their livelihoods.122
Meanwhile, communities in the area of the land concessions filed a peti-
tion with the country’s Constitutional Court, claiming that the bidding process
had been flawed as there had been no prior consultation with them.123 In 2000,
the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of the petitioners, citing irregularities
in the bidding process and a lack of public consultation.124 The decision an-
nulled Harken’s concessions and called on the government to consult with in-
digenous communities.125 Opposition groups, which had banded together under
the Accio´n de Ludia Anti-Petrolera (ADELA), celebrated the decision; however,
Harken maintained that the project was still viable as the Court had not made a
decision on the validity of oil exploration, but only on the way that the contract
120
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had been awarded.126 The company filed a motion for relief, claiming that it had
been denied the opportunity to make its case heard before the Court, and sub-
sequently the Court amended its decision so that only the two land concession
blocks held by Harken were annulled, leaving the marine concession blocks un-
affected.127 The company welcomed this decision, as it had conducted the bulk
of exploration work in the offshore blocks, and it later decided to give up its con-
tractual rights in the land blocks rather than proceed with consultations with the
indigenous communities.128
The Conflict
While Harken’s offshore concessions had not been annulled, the company still
had to obtain approval for its EIA. In 2001, SETENA outlined numerous legal
and technical elements that were missing from Harken’s EIA. These included the
failure to address the potential effects of an oil spill and to provide measures for
containment in the event of a spill.129 Environmentalists sought the assistance
of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), who in turn
hired two independent experts to review the EIA. The consultants also reviewed
an Addendum to the EIA which the company produced in response to SETENA’s
concerns, and found that it failed to adequately address the potential scope and
cumulative effects of oil exploration in the area.130
In February 2002, the Constitutional Court ruled that the part of the Hydro-
carbons Law relating to the EIA process was not in compliance with Article 50
of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced
environment. The main problem with the Law was that approval of a comprehen-
sive EIA was not required before a contract was signed.131 The court also noted
that SETENA was ill-equipped to deal with the review of these studies. A push
to repeal the law entirely began, which the CEO of Harken Costa Rica Holdings
126
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argued would “send a terrible, tragic and devastating message to the international
business community.”132
In late February, SETENA made its final decision, providing 55 reasons for
rejecting the Harken’s EIA. The reasons provided by SETENA relied heavily on
the precautionary principle, international agreements such as RAMSAR, the Con-
stitutional Court decisions, the lack of resources in the country to deal with oil
spills, and the deficiencies in the company’s application. Harken maintained that
the decision to reject the EIA was based on a lack of understanding about the
technology that would be employed in the operation and filed an appeal.133
In October 2003, the company filed an arbitration request with ICSID. Harken
claimed it had lost US$9-$12 million in exploration activity and costs related to
administrative and legal procedures, but the company sought US$57 billion in
damages and lost future profits. President Paceco flatly refused to consent to ar-
bitration and pointed out that Harken’s contract required the company to exhaust
local remedies.134 Furthermore, he argued that the company had not met its envi-
ronmental requirements, which was ground for termination of the contract. On the
other hand, Harken Costa Rica Holding’s CEO suggested that SETENA’s decision
had been politically motivated, that a fair hearing in Costa Rica would be impos-
sible, and that the company “would prefer to reserve the decision to the panel of
unbiased and fair international arbitrators.”135 However, a representative of the
NGO OilWatch Costa Rica put forth that the threat of arbitration was “a bluff in-
tended to give the company a stronger negotiating position,” and a lobbyist of the
company admitted that the company would be willing to back down for a US$10
million settlement.136
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Outcome
Only seventeen days after the initial request to ICSID, Harken dropped the case
as a “good faith” act and sought negotiations.137 President Pacheco called the
withdrawal a “triumph for reason and justice.”138 Negotiations ensued, and at one
point Costa Rica was apparently willing to pay Harken between US$3 and $11
million, as this was “cheaper than being sued” and “preferable to facing retal-
iatory sanctions from the US government.”139 In the end, the negotiations were
unsuccessful and in a resolution signed by the President in 2005, the government
of Costa Rica formally canceled Harken’s concession contract.140
For many American NGOs, the Harken case became a symbol of everything
that was wrong with the CAFTA-DR. Friends of the Earth US (FOE-US), Ox-
fam America, and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) wrote to the
US Congress in 2004 urging them to oppose the agreement, suggesting that the
Harken case demonstrated the risks of investment protection to the environment
and development.141 While Costa Rica had been able to refuse international ar-
bitration on the basis of the terms of its contract with Harken, the groups argued
that under CAFTA-DR the government would have been forced into international
arbitration.142
6.1.5 Analysis
The section assesses the role that the threat of arbitration played in the outcome
of each conflict. It also compares the factors that contributed to the efficacy of the
threat of arbitration in each case.
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The Threat of Arbitration
The role that a threat to arbitrate plays in the outcome of a conflict depends, first of
all, on the credibility of the threat. However, this is not always a straightforward
issue. There were clearly differing opinions in Indonesia on whether the CoWs,
as lex specialis, were exempt from the Forestry law. One interviewee in Ghana
suggested that many observers were not convinced that the threat of arbitration
was serious in the forest reserves case.143 In Costa Rica the threat from Harken
to arbitrate was taken by the government to be a hollow one, as the contract stipu-
lated a requirement to exhaust local remedies, and no BIT or regional investment
agreement was (yet) in place. If the CAFTA-DR had already been in place, it
is possible that the outcome of the conflict might have been different. Indeed,
the outcome was different in the Vannessa Ventures conflict, where the threat of
arbitration could be backed up by the Canada-Costa Rica FIPA.
A second issue is the confidence (or lack thereof) of a government that it could
win if it was taken to arbitration. NGOs in both Ghana and Indonesia expressed
considerable confidence that their governments would be successful in the event
of an arbitration. In Ghana they argued that it was clear in the country’s laws that
mining in forest reserves was not permitted, and that therefore both the former
government and the companies were at fault for breaching the law.144 In Indone-
sia, NGOs argued that the contracts stipulated that mining companies must comply
with environmental law.145 However, in both cases the governments appeared less
confident of a successful outcome.
The threat of arbitration appeared to have the greatest influence in Indonesia.
After having done little to resolve the conflict for a quite some time, the govern-
ment responded quite dramatically with the Perpu following the threat of arbitra-
tion. Furthermore, the fact that the companies that threatened arbitration were also
the ones which were exempted from the law is unlikely to be mere coincidence.146
The need to avoid arbitration was also mentioned by the Parliament in their dis-
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cussions on the issue and by the judges in the Constitutional Court decision.147
Furthermore, the fact that the government subsequently tried to move away from
the CoW system in the drafting of a new mineral law, and specifically tried to re-
move recourse to international arbitration for mineral investors, suggests that the
threat of a formal dispute was a serious concern of the administration (although it
also relates to efforts to decentralize oversight of mineral projects).
In Ghana, the role that the threat to arbitrate played in the outcome of the con-
flict is less clear-cut, particularly in light of a recent development. Following the
effective resolution of the mining in reserves debate, reports began to emerge that
Alcoa, a multinational bauxite mining company, was seeking access to explore
in the Atewa forest reserve.148 It was later confirmed that the government had
permitted the company to undertake exploration activities there.149 This develop-
ment suggests that the claim used by the government that its hands were tied by
its obligations to the initial five mining companies was an excuse used to quell
domestic and international opposition to the decision. It appears evident that the
Minerals Commission is keen to move ahead with more projects in forest reserves
despite the objections of the Forestry Commission and the concerns of the Ghana
EPA, and that it has benefited from the threat of arbitration in this regard.
Finally, in Costa Rica, the differing treatment of Harken and Vannessa Ven-
tures appears to correspond directly with the government’s assessment of the cred-
ibility of each company’s threat to arbitrate, suggesting that a threat does have
considerable influence when it has a firm basis. However, there are also alterna-
tive explanations for the discrepancy in the treatment of these two investors (see
below).
Factors that Contributed to the Efficacy of the Threat
The available evidence suggests that governments faced with a threat of arbitration
are primarily concerned with the financial consequences of losing in arbitration as
well as the reputational consequences of participating in arbitration. Additionally,
it would appear that divisions within a government can contribute to the efficacy of
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a threat. Finally, a threat of arbitration may be more disquieting for a government
that has had a negative experience with the process in a previous case.
In terms of financial concerns, it is the very substantial claims of compen-
sation that are particularly troubling for governments. The Indonesian Minister
for Environment, Nabiel Makarim, stated that the decision to allow the 13 com-
panies to mine in protection forests was “hard luck”150 and only taken to avoid
paying compensation for which funds were not available.151 The Indonesian gov-
ernment reportedly received legal advice that it could be sued for up to US$31
billion.152 While that is a very large sum compared to any of the awards reviewed
in Chapter 5, one has to remember that there were several companies involved in
the conflict. For any country such a sum would be significant, but particularly for
a country with a gross domestic product of US$364 billion (making the potential
award worth 8.5% of GDP). While it is clear from Chapter 5 that investors are
usually not awarded as much as they seek, even if this estimate were double or
triple what could foreseeable awarded, the cost would still be considerable. The
sum of more than US$275 million in compensation claimed by Vannessa Ventures
would also surely have been a daunting figure for the Costa Rican government, al-
though obviously less so than the US$57 billion claimed by Harken. It should be
noted that Costa Rica’s annual GDP at the time was only about US$17 billion, and
the government budget about US$5 billion. There were no reports in Ghana that
suggested a possible figure for the amount of compensation that the government
might be expected to pay, but it was implied that there had been significant invest-
ments made by the mining companies.153 One publication in Ghana argued that
“it is better for the government to refund the money to the companies, rather than
giving out concessions for them to destroy the remaining forest reserves in the
name of investment.”154 However, others suggested that the government simply
150
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could not afford to do so.155
In terms of reputational concerns, it should be noted that these will exist even
in the absence of investment protection; a conflict can be detrimental to the in-
vestment climate whether the investor is protected by a contract or IIA or not.
However, the elevation of a conflict to formal dispute resolution is considered to
be particularly damaging to a country’s image in the eyes of foreign investors.156
Concerns about reputation were particularly evident in Ghana and Indonesia. In-
donesia’s mineral sector ranked 27th out of 35 countries assessed for ‘attractive-
ness’ in a 2001/2002 industry survey.157 The low attractiveness ranking is not
based on resource limitations (minerals are in abundance in the country), but
rather relate to problems in the investment climate.158 The mining in protected
forests debate certainly affected investors perceptions of the country. Me´lanie et
al. suggest that:
The conflict between provisions of the Forestry Law of 1999 and the mining
industry has probably created more uncertainty for investors in Indonesia’s
mining sector than any other legal or regulatory provision and is one of the
key reasons for the decline in investment activity in recent years.159
Hence, the desire to keep existing mineral investments and attract further ones was
a likely factor in the Indonesian government’s decision to issue the Perpu. Even
greater concern about this issue was evident in Ghana, a country that is generally
perceived as quite ‘investor-friendly’. It has been suggested that the initial indeci-
sion over whether to open the forest reserves to mining contributed to dwindling
investment in the country.160 In addition, at least one company that was seeking a
concession inside a reserve made it clear that its other potential investments in the
country would be impacted by the government’s decision.161 Several interviewees
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suggested that the government feared arbitration not because they feared losing,
but because they feared the impact that denying the leases and proceeding to arbi-
tration would have on their reputation with foreign investors.162 In contrast, Costa
Rica was obviously not concerned about lost future investments in the extractive
industries. Unlike the bans in Ghana and Indonesia, the moratorium in Costa Rica
did not apply only to certain areas, but to the entire country. This is clearly a part
of Costa Rica’s broader strategy to focus on tourism, particularly eco-tourism, as a
source of economic development, rather than the exploitation of natural resources.
In terms of internal government politics, it is evident that there are often dis-
agreements on how conflicts with investors should be resolved, and how threats to
arbitrate should be dealt with. In both the Ghanaian and Indonesian cases, min-
istries responsible for mining and those responsible for forests and environment
were pitted against one another. This clearly would make the position of the gov-
ernment much weaker in an arbitration, and thus the threat of arbitration more
potent. While the government would have to present a united front if it proceeded
in arbitration, an investor would be able to refer to statements previously made by
its supporters in government. Ministries that are closely tied with foreign investors
often have more clout in the government, and can put substantial pressure on gov-
ernment leaders and legislatures. They also have more knowledge of contracts
and IIAs, which they can exploit to their advantage.
Finally, it is evident at least in the Indonesian case that the government’s past
experience with international arbitration may have been an important factor in the
outcome of the conflict. According to several observers, the government had been
“burned” in previous arbitrations and was not eager to try their luck again.163 The
Jakarta Post, in an article on the mining in forests case, noted that government
officials frequently referred to the Karaha Bodas dispute in particular (see Box
6.2 for further discussion of this dispute).
162Author’s confidential interviews with a non-governmental representative (#4), a representative of
an international organizations(#6), a government official (#13), and an academic (#18), Accra and
Kumasi, June 2005.
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resentative (#7), and a mining investor (#9), Jakarta, July 2005.
Conflicts Over Policy 295
296 Second-Order Outcomes
Alternative Scenarios
While it would appear that there is substantial evidence that the threat to arbitrate
played a significant role in the outcome of the cases discussed, other explanations
cannot be ruled out. For example, diplomatic pressure on governments, applied
by the home state of the investors, could have also contributed to the outcome in
each case. Indonesia was apparently subject to informal pressure applied by the
home governments of the investors through their embassies.164 Vannessa Ven-
tures enlisted the support of the Canadian Embassy “to encourage transparency
and due process from the Costa Rican government,”165 and there were reports that
the US Embassy had become involved in the Harken case. Although the US Am-
bassador to Costa Rica maintained that he was only assisting the company in so
far as to ensure that it was treated fairly by the government, activists remained
suspicious.166 Their suspicions were fueled by the fact that US President George
W. Bush was a former Harken board member. However, others believed that the
US pressure was actually on Harken to withdraw its arbitration request, as it could
have complicated the negotiations for the CAFTA-DR.167 Thus, the discrepancy
in the treatment of Harken and Vannessa Ventures might be explained by the fact
that Canada urged the government to resolve the conflict, while the US instead
might have pressured the investor to drop its arbitration request.
One can also not rule out the possibility that corruption was involved in the
outcome of these conflicts; it was certainly alleged to be a factor in the Indonesian
case.
6.2 Conflicts Over Domestic Court Proceedings
The two cases discussed in this section concern domestic court proceedings. More
specifically, each case relates to environmental liability claims brought by govern-
164See, e.g., “Indonesia: Mining and Forestry (Question No.1662),” Australian Senate Official
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ment ministries or individuals against foreign investors.
6.2.1 Liability for Marine Pollution in Buyat Bay, Indonesia
This case concerns a civil liability suit brought by the Indonesian Ministry of the
Environment against an American mining company for allegedly breaching envi-
ronmental law in the course of its operations. The suit was brought in an Indone-
sian court but was dismissed because the court found that all disputes between the
government and the investor should be resolved through investment arbitration, as
stipulated in the company’s contract.
Background
Newmont Mining Corporation’s 80%-owned subsidiary, PT Newmont Minahasa
Raya, operated the Mesel Gold Mine in North Sulawesi, Indonesia, from 1996
to 2004, when it was closed due to depletion of gold ore at the mine. In that pe-
riod, the company was authorized by the Indonesian government to use submarine
placement of tailings.168 The tailings were placed on the seabed at a depth of 82
meters via a pipeline that rested on the seabed. The pipeline extended 900 meters
into the sea at a location known as Buyat Bay.169 The tailings contained insoluble
mercury and arsenic compounds. Submarine tailings disposal is effectively illegal
in Canada, the US, and Australia.170
Local communities and NGOs claimed that the tailings had polluted Buyat
Bay and were responsible for adverse health effects experienced by local resi-
dents. Subsequently several studies were carried out, commissioned by both the
Indonesian government and Newmont. Local police found elevated levels of ar-
senic and mercury in the water; however a World Health Organization (WHO)
study found the levels to be within normal parameters.171 Finally, a study by the
168Tailings are finely ground rock from which minerals such as gold has been recovered.
169
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Indonesian Ministry of Environment found that the waste from the gold mine left
high levels of arsenic and mercury in the sediment on the floor of the bay, which
then entered bottom-feeding organisms known as benthos that provide food for
fish.172 For its part, Newmont claimed that the arsenic was not the kind that would
dissolve in water, and would not enter the food chain. Newmont admitted that it
released 17 tons of waste mercury into the air and 16 tons into the water over five
years, but argued that these releases were well within the range allowed under na-
tional law.173 The Ministry of the Environment countered that the company had
not been authorized to release that amount of waste.
The Conflict
On 9 March 2005, the Ministry of Environment filed a civil lawsuit against PT
Newmont Minahasa Raya in the South Jakarta District Court, seeking US$133.6
million in damages. The Ministry also filed separate criminal proceedings against
the company, and its President Richard Ness, for the pollution of Buyat Bay. The
Ministry stated that in the civil lawsuit it was seeking damages to pay for the
restoration of the environment in Buyat Bay and the relocation of local residents,
while the purpose of the criminal prosecution was to deter others from breaching
the country’s environmental laws.174
According to the legal representation for Newmont, in filing the civil suit
the Ministry had “not complied with the prevailing provisions under the Con-
tract of Work,” which “stipulates that all disputes between the parties will be set-
tled by conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the international arbitration
rules.”175 The company’s attorney went on to say that Newmont would “have
to consider filing for international arbitration to follow the CoW” and noted his
confidence that the company would win both the court case and the arbitration,
concluding that the Environment Ministry had “made a blunder.”176
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In October 2005, Newmont filed an objection to the court’s jurisdiction, con-
tending that the Indonesian government had previously agreed to resolve any dis-
putes through conciliation or arbitration.177 Prosecutors insisted that the dispute
resolution clause in the contract was only applicable in business disputes, but not
in a case of breach of environmental law.178
Outcome
In November 2005, the Jakarta District Court dismissed the Ministry of Environ-
ment’s civil claim against against Newmont on the grounds that the parties had
agreed, in the CoW, to settle disputes in investment arbitration. Newmont hailed
the court ruling as well reasoned, with President Richard Ness stating that the ver-
dict was both “fair” and “good for the investment climate.”179 Environmentalists
urged the Ministry to appeal the decision, arguing that the court had erred in find-
ing that a pollution case should be resolved in investment arbitration.180 WALHI
asserted that a provision in the Environment Law (23/1997) gave the government
the right to sue companies for environmental damage and suggested that the court
decision elevated commercial mining contracts over national law.181 WALHI later
lodged its own civil lawsuit against the company.182
On 16 February 2006, the government settled with Newmont for US$30 mil-
lion and entered into a ‘Goodwill Agreement’. In the Agreement, the Indonesian
government agreed that further scientific investigation into whether Newmont’s
operations had caused any adverse environmental impacts in Buyat Bay or ad-
verse health impacts in local residents would be undertaken by an independent
panel of six scientists over a period of up to ten years. Newmont agreed to the
establishment of a charitable foundation to oversee the dispersal of the funds to
177Newmont Mining Corporation Notes to Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements (Unaudited),
SEC Form 10-Q, 27 July 2006, http://sec.edgar-online.com.
178
“Court dismisses civil suit against Newmont,” Jakarta Post, 16 November 2005.
179Ibid.
180
“Environmentalists Urge Indonesia to Appeal Court Ruling on Newmont Lawsuit,” Associated Free
Press, 17 November 2005.
181
“WALHI Sues Newmont,” WALHI News Release, 22 March 2007, http://www.eng.walhi.or.id.
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support the scientific panel as well as other projects in the local community.183
State Minister of the Environment, Rachmat Witoelar, when defending the set-
tlement stated that: “If there’s someone who’s upset about the ruling, why don’t
they ask the presiding judge [in the original civil suit]? The settlement occurred
because the court dismissed our demand. I’ve suffered because the court trampled
on me.”184
Newmont and Richard Ness were acquitted of all criminal charges on 24 April
2007.185
6.2.2 Liability for Oil Pollution in the Ecuadorian Amazon
In this case, an American oil company attempted to take the Government of
Ecuador to arbitration to ensure that it would not be held liable for any com-
pensation awarded to the claimants in a class action lawsuit. The lawsuit was
brought by the residents of Ecuador’s Amazon region who had allegedly suffered
from the impact of oil pollution. Ecuador challenged the arbitration and success-
fully blocked the proceedings in the courts of New York. The class action lawsuit,
which was originally filed in the US but later refiled in Ecuador, was proceeding
at the time of writing. While the company argued against the suit being tried in
the US courts, it has recently suggested that the trial in Ecuador is unfair and that
it amounts to a denial of justice, in contravention of international law.
Background
Kimerling remarks that the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the Ecuado-
rian Amazon in the 1960s “was heralded as the salvation of Ecuador’s economy,
the product that would, at last, pull the nation out of chronic poverty and ‘un-
derdevelopment.”’186 Texaco was one of the companies that first discovered oil
in the region. The company began exploring for oil in Ecuador in 1964 under
183
“Buyat Bay: History and Status,” Newmont Brochure, May 2006, http://www.newmont.com.
184
“Rachmat Says $30 Million Newmont Deal No Slap in the Face,” The Jakarta Post, 18 February
2006.
185
“Indonesian Court Clears U.S. Mining Firm,” Associated Press, 25 April 2007.
186Kimerling 2006, at 414-5.
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a subsidiary called Texaco Petroleum Company, often referred to as ‘TexPet’. In
1965 Texaco signed a joint operating agreement (JOA) with the Gulf Oil Company
covering a block of land known as the Napo Concession.
In 1972, Ecuador’s military assumed control of the government and, in an ef-
fort to nationalize the state’s oil industry, issued Supreme Decree No. 430, which
required both TexPet, and the Gulf Oil Company to agree to relinquish a substan-
tial percentage of Napo Concession. In 1973, the government published Decree
No. 925, which established a new contract for the concession.187 The contract
was signed by Ecuador, TexPet and Gulf Oil, and mandated that Compania Es-
tatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, a state-run oil company later renamed Petroecuador
(which is the name that will be used hereafter in order to avoid confusion), be
given the option to purchase a stake in the Napo Concession. The 1973 Contract
did not contain an arbitration clause.188
While the 1973 contract did not anticipate Petroecuador’s participation in the
concession until 1977, the government sped up the process and in 1974 another
contract was signed, giving Petroecuador 25% of Gulf Oil’s stake in the conces-
sion. This contract did not contain an arbitration clause, but stated that “[t]he
totality of the activities that will develop in the Joint Operation will be regulated
by an operating agreement entered into by the parties.”189 Petroecuador subse-
quently assumed all Gulf Oil’s remaining interest in the concession in 1976.190
From that point on, Petroecuador had a majority (62.5%) interest in the consor-
tium, although Texaco remained the operational partner.191 Petroecuador never
signed the 1965 JOA, and while negotiations were held for the development of
a new JOA, they were never successfully concluded. In 1990, Texaco sold its
187The Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, Claimants, v. ChevronTexaco Corporation and Texaco
Petroleum Company, Defendants, and ChevronTexaco Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, v. The Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, Counterclaim Defendants,
United States District Court, South District New York, 27 June 2005. Reproduced in 376 Federal
Supplement Second Series, at 334. Subsequently referred to as ROE I.
188Ibid.
189Qtd. in ibid., at 340.
190
“Chevron Warns Ecuador on BIT Claim as Contract and Environmental Disputes Persist,” Invest-
ment Treaty News, 26 July 2006.
191
“Arbitration Proceedings,” ChevronTexaco website, http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador, ac-
cessed 4 January 2008.
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interest in the concession to Petroecuador.192
In the operation of the concession, Texaco used a controversial but cost-saving
method of bringing a mixture of oil and water to the surface before separating
the two, and leaving the water to run-off into rivers and streams.193 According
to one report Texaco intentionally dumped more than 19 billion gallons of toxic
wastewater into the region and was responsible for 16.8 million gallons of crude
oil spilling from the main pipeline into the forest.194 The resulting ecological
damage has been referred to as an “environmental disaster 30 times larger than
the Exxon Valdez spill,” and the NGO Amazon Watch has estimated the clean-up
bill at US$6 billion.195
In 1994, TexPet, Petroecuador, and Ecuador signed a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding, followed in 1995 by a contract, relating to the remediation of areas
that had been polluted by oil operations. Under this settlement, TexPet agreed to
perform specified environmental remedial work (for an estimated US$40 million)
in exchange for being released from liability for any claims by the Government
of Ecuador or Petroecuador.196 In 1998, following the remedial work, TexPet was
released of liability for such claims.
The Conflict
In 1993, two class action lawsuits were filed against Texaco under the Alien Tort
Claims Act in a federal court in New York on behalf of an estimated 30,000 Ama-
zon residents.197 The court determined that New York was not the most conve-
192
“ChevronTexaco and Texaco Petroleum company File Arbitration Claim to Enforce Petroecudor’s
Obligations under Joint Operating Agreement,” Chevron Texaco News Release, 15 June 2004,
http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador.
193
“Chevron Warns Ecuador on BIT Claim as Contract and Environmental Disputes Persist,” Invest-
ment Treaty News, 26 July 2006.
194The 1993 report “Crudo Amaznico” (Amazon Crude) by the environmental lawyer Judith Kimerling
is qtd. in “Chevron (CVX) in the Amazon: Oil Rights or Human Rights?” Amnesty International
USA website, http://www.amnestyusa.org.
195
“Embattled Chevron Executive to be put Under Oath Today in $6 billion Rainforest Lawsuit, Ama-
zon Watch Says,” PR Newswire, 8 November 2006.
196ROE I, at 341-2.
197Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 16 August 2002.
Reproduced in 303 Federal Reporter Third Series (2002), at 470; Jota v. Texaco, Inc., Court of
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nient forum for the cases, which was confirmed by a US appeals court in 2002.198
However, the judgment in the appeals court was subject to the condition that Tex-
aco agree to submit to the jurisdiction of Ecuador’s courts, and the claims were
subsequently refiled in Ecuador. President Rafael Correa has publicly sided with
the plaintiffs in their case.199
On 11 June 2004, ChevronTexaco200 filed a claim with the American Arbitra-
tion Association (AAA) under the terms of the arbitration clause in the 1965 JOA.
In the claim, the company asserted that Petroecuador is “responsible for all fees,
costs and expenses incurred by ChevronTexaco and TexPet related to the pend-
ing litigation against the companies, including any final judgments that may be
rendered against ChevronTexaco in Ecuador.”201 In ChevronTexaco’s view, even
though Petroecuador did not sign the 1965 JOA, it knowingly accepted benefits
from the agreement and behaved as if the agreement controlled its relationship
with TexPet. As such, the company argued that Petroecuador should be bound by
the arbitration clause within the 1965 JOA.202
Ecuador subsequently filed a suit with the New York Supreme Court to stop
the arbitration proceedings in the AAA. The case was later moved to the New
York Southern District Court. Chevron filed a counterclaim, arguing that the com-
pany had been released from all liability by the 1995 remediation agreement. In
response, Ecuador argued that Texaco concealed from the government the true
extent of the contamination in order to obtain an agreement at a lower cost than
what was actually necessary for the remediation.203
Appeals, Second Circuit, 5 October 1998. Reproduced in 157 Federal Reporter Third Series (1998),
at 53.
198
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199
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201
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On 19 June 2007, the New York Southern District Court ruled that the JOA
was not applicable to the Government of Ecuador or Petroecuador, because nei-
ther was a signatory to the agreement.204 The contract, as mentioned above, was
signed between the Gulf Oil Company and Texaco. Chevron claimed that the
terms of the JOA had been transferred to Petroecuador when it bought Gulf Oil’s
stake, but the Judge ruled that Ecuadorian law in the 1970s was too ‘unsettled’ to
assume that it would support this claim.205
According to the company:
The Court did not rule on the fundamental issue related to Chevron’s claim
for arbitration - that Petroecuador is obligated to indemnify TexPet (and
Chevron) for any claims against it. Rather, the Court simply ruled that, in
its opinion, this was not an issue that should be addressed by arbitration in
New York.206
Chevron subsequently filed a notice of appeal of the New York District Court
ruling.
Outcome
The arbitration proceedings in the AAA are under an injunction, and meanwhile
the liability case against ChevronTexaco in Ecuador continues. Despite having
pushed for the case to be heard in Ecuador, rather than the US, Chevron has been
very critical of the judicial process in the country and has indicated that it may
pursue investment arbitration on the basis of denial of justice and lack of due
process. According to Chevron’s managing counsel for Latin America, Ricardo
Viega, the company “will not hesitate to go to international tribunals to review
what we believe in an unfair trial and lack of due process in this country.”207 In
204Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, Plaintiffs, Counterclaim Defendants, v. ChevronTexaco
Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company, Defendants, Counterclaim Plaintiffs, United States
District Court, South District New York, 19 June 2007.
205
“New York Court Rules Against Chevron in Environmental Dispute with Ecuador,” Investment
Treaty News, 31 May 2006.
206
“Chevron Responds to Comments by Amazon Defense Front Regarding U.S. Court Decision,”
ChevronTexaco News Release, 22 June 2007, http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador.
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such a case, a question arises as to whether the company would have access to ar-
bitration through the US-Ecuador BIT, signed in 1993 and in force as of 1997.208
According to the BIT, the Treaty applies only to “investments existing at the time
of entry into force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter.”209 As al-
ready mentioned, Texaco left Ecuador in 1992, and even the settlement agreement
on remediation was signed before 1997.
Nevertheless, the company has been very vocal with its claims, and in October
2007, Chevron’s legal team submitted a petition to dismiss the case to the Pres-
ident of the Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja.210 The petition outlines a
long list of actions during the trial that when taken together, according to the com-
pany, constitute a denial of justice. An English translation of the petition states
that:
International law imposes on Ecuador, at a very minimum, an obligation to
maintain and make available to aliens such as Chevron a fair and effective
system of justice. A failure of this universal obligation to provide a capable
and impartial judiciary results in a denial of justice, an international vio-
lation by a State’s judiciary for which the State is held responsible. If this
Court continues on its present, unjust path and ultimately issues a final judg-
ment in the Plaintiffs’ favor, Chevron will take the necessary steps to seek
redress against Ecuador under international law.211
It goes on to state that the lawsuit, “as it has transpired, constitutes a flagrant and
grotesque violation of Ecuadorian law, a farce of the judicial system, as well as
a violation of the most basic and fundamental principles of universal justice to
which Chevron is entitled.”212
A lawyer for the Plaintiffs in the case, Alejandro Ponce, highlights that “[i]t
is ironic that Chevron, which argued in New York for over a decade that this trial
208Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the Encour-
agement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 27 August 1993, Washington, D.C.
209Ibid., at Art. XII.1.
210
“Chevron Calls for Dismissal of Ecuador Lawsuit,” Chevron News Release, 8 October 2007,
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211English translation of the original Spanish Petition, at 46, http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador.
212Ibid., at 46-7.
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should be held in Ecuador, is now trying to avoid responsibility by questioning the
fairness of the trial here.”213
6.2.3 Analysis
The section assesses the role that the threat of arbitration played in the outcome
of each conflict. It also compares the factors that contributed to the efficacy of the
threat of arbitration in each case.
The Threat of Arbitration
In these cases the threat of arbitration must be assessed by two different sets of
actors: judges and government officials.
In the Newmont case, the Indonesian judge was faced with the prospect of the
state being taken to arbitration if he did not dismiss the civil suit against the com-
pany. However, it cannot be stated definitively that the judge based his decision
on the threat of arbitration. It is possible that the judge found Newmont’s legal
argument (that arbitration was the proper forum) to be sound, even though NGOs
and officials from the Environment Ministry were of the opinion that it was not.
In the ChevronTexaco case there does not appear to be any evidence, as of yet,
that threats from the company to sue Ecuador for denial of justice and lack of due
process have impeded the progress of the class action case against the company.
This may be because the judge views the threat as lacking any substantial basis in
the absence of BIT.
As for the assessment of threats to arbitrate by government officials, it should
be emphasized that the Indonesian government was not faced with a typical threat
of arbitration in the Newmont case, as the company was not seeking damages.
The government was given the option to pursue its liability case in arbitration, but
chose instead to settle. In the ChevronTexaco case, government officials took the
threat of arbitration very seriously. However, rather than settling with the com-
pany or submitting to arbitration, the government initiated court proceedings in
213
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the State of New York. The government was successful in blocking the arbitra-
tion in this instance, but it is important to recognize that its victory was based
on technicalities; the status of the contract and the absence of an applicable BIT
or regional agreement barred ChevronTexaco from arbitration. Had there been a
contract signed by both parties, or had their been an IIA in place at the time of
investment, the outcome of the conflict could have been quite different.
Factors that Contributed to the Efficacy of the Threat
In these cases, concerns about the cost of compensating investors were not signif-
icant. In this Indonesian case it was the government that was seeking compensa-
tion, thus at most it would have been concerned with the cost of arbitration and
the potential that it would have to pay Newmont’s legal fees if suffered a defeat.
Similarly, the Ecuadorian government could not stop or interfere with the class
action lawsuit against ChevronTexaco, and would have likely faced the a compa-
rable compensation claim in a either a settlement or an arbitration (i.e. it would
be based on the amount that ChevronTexaco was found liable for in the lawsuit).
Hence, the potency of the threat was not enhanced by financial concerns.
In terms of reputational concerns, the story is less clear-cut than in the cases
related to environmental policy. In the Buyat Bay case, it was the government that
took the initiative to take Newmont to court, in both civil and criminal proceed-
ings. This move, in itself, might appear to negate any interest by the government in
achieving an investor-friendly reputation. In particular, many reports on the crim-
inal proceedings suggested that investors were closely watching the case, and the
chairman of the Indonesian Mining Association stated that a guilty verdict would
have sent a negative message to all investors.214 However, when one recognizes
that it was not the Indonesian government as a whole, but rather the Ministry of
Environment that took the case to court, then it becomes clear that domestic po-
litical factors explain the apparent incongruity. The Ministry of Environment is
chiefly concerned with its own mandate, which does not concern the attraction of
foreign investment, but this does not mean that other government departments and
ministries do not prioritize this issue.
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As for the Government of Ecuador, it arguably had no control over the reputa-
tional effect of the class action lawsuit against ChevronTexaco, as it was brought to
the local courts by individuals. Thus, regardless of whether the government was
concerned with the implications of the lawsuit for its reputation with investors,
there is very little that it could do to remedy the situation except to offer to pay the
company compensation in the event of a ruling in favour of the Plaintiffs. How-
ever, in any case, at this point the government does not appear to be particularly
interested in an investor-friendly image, but instead is aligning with other left-
ist governments in Latin America who have rebelled against neoliberal economic
policies (see 7.4.3). Thus, the decision of the government to fight Chevron’s move
to arbitrate is unsurprising in this regard.
In addition to the reputational concerns of governments, one could also hy-
pothesize that the judges in each case have concerns about their own reputations
and about the reputation of the country’s judicial system as a whole. To have
a ruling criticized by a respected group of international arbitrators could be em-
barrassing and damaging for a judge’s career. To have a proceeding deemed a
denial of justice could harm the reputation of the entire court system of a country.
Hence, it is possible that the judges in each case might have been influenced by
such concerns.
Finally, the domestic politics in each case should be emphasized. The Ecuado-
rian government was unified in its opposition to arbitration proceedings, and the
President even openly supported the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit against ChevronTex-
aco. This no doubt limited the efficacy of the threat to arbitrate. In contrast, the
divisions in the Indonesian government likely contributed to the decision to set-
tle with Newmont. The original case in the domestic courts was brought by the
Ministry of Environment. The Ministry of Mines was not in favour of litigating
against Newmont, but evidently it cannot stop the Ministry of Environment from
launching a case in the local courts. However, the arbitration process is signifi-
cantly different, and cannot be initiated by an individual ministry unless it has the
support of the whole government.
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Alternative Scenarios
As noted above, it is possible that the threat of arbitration was not a motivating
factor for the Indonesian judge to dismiss the case against Newmont: he may have
simply agreed with the legal argument. However, it is clear that the institution of
investment protection was central in this case. While the Buyat Bay civil law-
suit may have eventually been been either dismissed or amicably settled for any
number of reasons, the case would not have been dismissed for the reason that
the domestic courts were an incorrect forum had there not been a CoW which
stipulated that all disputes should be settled in arbitration. Even if corruption was
involved, the judge would not have been able to employ his particular reasoning
for the dismissal in the absence of a CoW.
As for the Ecuadorian case, it appears that the outcome in this case is a result
of the absence of investment protection. It is interesting to consider what might
have happened if the JOA had been applicable, or the US-Ecuador BIT had been
in force. In the case of the contract being valid, the dispute would have ended up
in the AAA, an arbitral body with much less transparency than ICSID. Ecuador
could have been held liable for any compensation awarded against Chevron. Had
a BIT been in place, Chevron’s threats to sue Ecuador for denial of justice would
also have been more substantial and might have influenced the courts.
6.3 Implications for Environmental Governance
While the concerns over tribunal decisions made in the investor-state disputes dis-
cussed in the previous chapter are merited, given the weak bargaining position
of many states, negotiated outcomes to conflicts may be as, or even more, un-
desirable from an environmental policy perspective. Furthermore, as threats of
arbitration are very difficult to track and may never even be made known to the
public, they represent, as MacArthur puts it, a “more insidious danger.”215
In some of the cases discussed in this chapter, governments did not bow to
pressure to settle or arbitrate (e.g., Costa Rica in the Harken case) or they actively
fought arbitration proceedings in the courts (e.g., Ecuador in the ChevronTexaco
215MacArthur 2003, at 945.
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case). However, the states in these cases were arguably successful because the
investors were not actually protected by contracts or treaties, and that this suggests
that similar cases could emerge under different circumstances with much more
significant implications.
This section explores further the potential implications of threats to arbitrate
for environmental governance, particularly in developing countries.
6.3.1 Maintenance of the Status Quo
Several of the cases illustrate that, in addition to fearing industrial flight as the
traditional regulatory chill hypothesis assumes, governments maintain the status
quo in environmental regulation out of fear of breaching commitments in contracts
and treaties, and that these two fears are tightly intermingled. The main factors
that contribute to regulatory chill appear to be the level of government concern
about the country’s reputation with investors, the potential cost of compensating
investors, and prior negative experience in arbitration.
It is not suggested here that regulatory chill occurs in all cases. On the other
end of the spectrum, governments arguably might use the existence of contractual
commitments as an excuse for to the maintenance of the status quo in environmen-
tal policy. The idea of ‘political cover’, a concept borrowed from the literature on
interstate disputes, may be useful in explaining the behaviour of government ac-
tors (see Section 3.3.2). This theory can be extended to suggest that a government
(or part of a government) could use the specter of international arbitration as po-
litical cover for a controversial decision - an ‘our hands are tied’, ‘we can’t afford
to be sued’ argument. The existence of a stability promise in a state contract with
binding arbitration clauses could be used quite effectively in this way, particularly
if a previous government was responsible for the negotiation and signing of the
contract.
Discerning when a government is being genuinely constrained by a contrac-
tual commitment (regulatory chill), and when it is instead using that this com-
mitment as a convenient defence for a politically unpalatable position (political
cover), is difficult in practice. For example, in the Ghanaian case it initially ap-
peared that the government had experienced regulatory chill, until it subsequently
began to offer new contracts in forest reserves. In either case, the end result re-
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mains negative from the perspective of environmental policy development.
6.3.2 Domestic Political Divides
While the cases in the previous chapter indicated that investment arbitration can
create tension between different levels of government (e.g., federal v. state or
provincial), the cases in this chapter illustrate that the complex relations between
departments and ministries within a level of government are also relevant. Each
ministry, agency, or even department within a ministry, may have an agenda that
is particular to its mandate. It is rare that the separate interests of various branches
of government are coordinated with one another to guarantee the perfect compat-
ibility of these agendas.216 In the context of investment protection, contracts and
IIAs are not likely to be negotiated by the ministries/agencies that make the social
and environmental policies that are affected by them. While environmental min-
istries may seek to be progressive in policy development and may seek to redress
environmental harm through court action, it may be in the interests of other min-
istries (mining, economic, foreign, etc.) to ensure the maintenance of the status
quo in order to secure a friendly investment climate.
Ministries involved in investment and economic development are likely to
hold a stronger position in the government hierarchy than environmental ones,
and the existence of a strong institution for investment protection may serve to
reinforce or even exacerbate these power structures. With their position ‘backed-
up’ by a strong international enforcement mechanism, these interest groups have
an advantage over environmental ministries, which can only point to the exis-
tence of vague and unenforceable commitments in MEAs. Furthermore, foreign
investors can strategically exploit these divides by targeting their lobbying efforts
at the specific ministries, departments, and agencies that are most likely to support
them.217
Internal political wrangling may also harm the state’s defence if a case pro-
ceeds to arbitration because counsel must represent a multitude of potentially con-
flicting policy interests, and this can lead to a lack of a cohesive strategy.218
216Leon and Terry 2006, at 71.
217Ibid.
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6.3.3 Environmental Liability
Several of the cases in this chapter, particularly the final two, illustrate how inter-
national arbitration can affect the domestic judicial process.
In the Buyat Bay case, the existence of a contract with an arbitration clause
determined the outcome of the civil court proceedings, despite the fact that the
case related to breach of the Indonesia’s national environmental law, rather than
breach of contract. As mentioned previously, a CoW specifies the environmental
obligations of the company in general terms; basically the company must comply
with laws and regulations. Thus, if an arbitration panel were expected to rule on
whether Newmont should be found liable for environmental damage in Buyat Bay,
they would have to look to, and interpret, Indonesian environmental law. This is
a significant outcome, regardless of what one makes of the merits of the Min-
istry of Environment’s case against Newmont. Aside from the fact that arbitrators
are generally experts in investment and commercial law, rather than environmen-
tal law (let alone the specific environmental law of Indonesia) one also has to
consider the additional consequences of this shift from domestic courts and to in-
ternational arbitration which entails significant costs for states and is customarily
non-transparent and closed to non-disputing parties.
The Ecuador case also has several important implications. The initial con-
flict over who (ChevronTexaco or Petroecuador) was liable for the pollution in the
Ecuadorian Amazon, was based on a contract and is perhaps less broadly appli-
cable to other situations. However, the later claims of ‘lack of due process’ and
‘denial of justice’ could have significant implications for environmental liability
cases in many developing countries. While there have been extensive discussions
in the literature about foreign direct liability and the problem of forum non con-
veniens, there does not appear to have been significant attention paid to the threat
of BITs and other IIAs to the pursuit of environmental liability claims in the host
state.
While courts in developing countries are often claimed to be biased and unreli-
able, it is worth noting that developed country courts have not escaped the scrutiny
of arbitral tribunals. In this respect, two NAFTA cases that were not discussed in
the previous chapter (as they did not directly relate to environmental regulation)
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, cited in Dodge 2001b, at 200.
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are worth mentioning. In the Mondev case, a Canadian real-estate development
corporation submitted a claim based in part on a decision by the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts.219 Although the Mondev Tribunal dismissed the
investor’s claims on the merits, Amirfar and Dreyer suggest that “its recognition
that liability may result from a breakdown of judicial function is itself notable.”220
In the Loewen case, an Canadian investor brought a suit against the US based on
the conduct and verdict of a Mississippi State Court.221 The Loewen Tribunal de-
termined that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute because the investor had
not exhausted local remedies. While under the NAFTA there is no general require-
ment to exhaust local remedies, it was determined by the Tribunal that in cases
where the measure concerned is a ruling of a lower court, the higher courts must
have an opportunity to review the case before it can be elevated to international
arbitration. Despite the fact that the Loewen Tribunal did not make a decision
on the merits of the case, they did express their opinion that, had domestic reme-
dies been exhausted, they would have had competence to review the Mississippi
court’s actions and likely would have found them in breach of the NAFTA. Hill
suggests that “the threat to domestic sovereignty presented by Loewen is difficult
to overstate.”222
Other arbitral tribunals outside of the NAFTA have also found states responsi-
ble for the losses suffered by foreign investors because they found domestic court
decisions to amount to a denial of justice.223 Although the standard of denial of
justice should be difficult to meet, it can be hypothesized that the threat of arbi-
tration may nevertheless influence a state or indeed a court, leading to judicial
chill.
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6.4 Summary
This chapter examined cases in which the threat of arbitration played a role in the
eventual resolution of investor-state conflicts. The first section explored conflicts
related to environmental regulation or the decisions of environmental agencies in
Indonesia, Ghana, and Costa Rica. The second section examined conflicts related
to environmental liability cases brought in the courts of Indonesia and Ecuador.
The cases illustrate that arbitration presents a viable threat to governments not
only because it is a costly and uncertain process but also because it raises con-
cerns about a country’s reputation with potential investors. However, the cases
also demonstrate that government responses to threats to arbitrate are varied. Fur-
thermore, the cases also show that it is crucial to examine the state not as a unified
actor, but as composed of multiple competing agents with often conflicting agen-
das.
The cases in this chapter indicate that regulatory chill may result when gov-
ernments are threatened with arbitration. However, it has also been argued that an
opposite trend, with equally negative implications for environmental governance,
may also occur; governments, or certain government agencies, may use the ex-
istence of commitments to investment protection as political cover, in order to
dispel political opposition to their decisions.
The cases in this chapter suggest that state contracts, which have been largely
neglected in studies of investment and the environment, can have significant im-
plications for environmental governance. The cases concerning environmental
liability also open up a new avenue of research. Much of the discussion in the
literature focuses on foreign direct liability and the problem of forum non conve-
niens. The cases presented here indicate that investment protection may present a
further obstacle to liability claims in the domestic courts of host states.
New Developments 7
The period over which this study was conducted was one of rapid development
in the field of investment law and arbitral practice. The substantial increase in
the use of investment arbitration has led to greater scrutiny of the regulative and
procedural norms and rules of investment protection, and in some cases, to a re-
evaluation of the purpose and function of these norms and rules. States, arbitral
supervisory bodies, arbitrators, and NGOs have all played a role in bringing about
change. This chapter describes the new developments in the field and assesses the
extent to which they may resolve the issues related to environmental governance
and to developing countries that have been raised in previous chapters. Several
proposals for more substantial reform, such as the creation of an appellate body
or a multilateral investment agreement for sustainable development, are also re-
viewed.
7.1 Transparency and Third Party Participation
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, the system of investment arbitration has been criti-
cized for adopting procedures that are well-established in the realm of commercial
arbitration, but that are thought to be inappropriate when applied to disputes in-
volving states and, thereby, issues of public concern. Since 2001, there have been
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a number of changes to the investment arbitration process (in certain contexts)
aimed at remedying the system’s failings in this regard. The two developments of
particular note are increased transparency and acceptance of third party participa-
tion in disputes.1
Transparency relates not only to the publication of awards but also to access to
pre-award submissions from the parties and to decisions made by the tribunal over
the course of the proceedings. Furthermore, it also relates to public admittance to
the tribunal hearings. As for third party participation, in international tribunals
this most commonly occurs through the submission of amicus curiae (‘friend of
the court’) briefs. Amicus curiae submissions generally contain “supplementary
information on the case, particularly the occurrence of events or technicalities
relating to the subject at hand.”2 Amici are different from expert witnesses as they
are not remunerated for their services and they are not in a contractual relationship
with the parties to the dispute.3 While historically there has been no role for amici
in investor-state disputes, in recent years a trend of such participation has been
emerging. The precedent4 for such participation was set within the context of the
NAFTA, but the idea has also spread to BITs negotiated by Canada and the US,
and was incorporated into the new ICSID Rules in 2006.
Transparency and third party participation are intimately linked. Without pub-
lic knowledge of the existence of disputes, amici will be precluded from making
submissions. Furthermore, it can be argued that without access to relevant docu-
ments and to the proceedings, third parties will be incapable of formulating effec-
tive and worthwhile submissions.
7.1.1 Methanex and the NAFTA FTC Guidelines
The substantive aspects of the Methanex case have already been discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2.5; therefore this section will only discuss procedural decisions made by
the Tribunal.
1An earlier version of this section was published in Tienhaara 2007.
2Bennaim-Selvi 2005, at 786.
3Mistelis 2005, at 231.
4The term ‘precedent’ is used here very loosely, as there is no formal stare decisis in investment
arbitration. See Section 4.2.2.
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In 2000, two requests were made by NGOs for permission to file amicus cu-
riae briefs, to make oral submissions and have observer status at oral hearings
in Methanex.5 The US and Methanex both filed submissions responding to the
Petitioners’ requests, as did the non-disputing parties of the NAFTA (Canada and
Mexico). Both Methanex and Mexico opposed the acceptance of amicus curiae
briefs, while Canada and the US showed support. The US also indicated its will-
ingness to open the proceedings and to disclose documents to the public.
In a groundbreaking decision, the Tribunal concluded that it had the power to
accept amicus curiae submissions, but no power to authorize access to materials or
to allow the Petitioners to attend hearings.6 The Tribunal found that UNCITRAL
Rule 15.1, which states that “the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in
such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with
equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full op-
portunity of presenting his case,” gave it the discretion to accept amicus curiae
submissions. However, the Tribunal made it clear that UNCITRAL Rule 25.4,
which requires hearings to be private unless otherwise agreed by the parties, lim-
its the flexibility of Rule 15.1. Furthermore, while indicating that it was minded
to accept amicus curiae submissions in this case, the Tribunal chose to delay its
final decision until a later stage in the dispute.
It is clear that one of the reasons the Tribunal was amenable to accepting
briefs was that it believed that this would improve the public image of investment
arbitration:
[the] arbitral process could benefit from being perceived as more open or
transparent; or conversely be harmed if seen as unduly secretive. In this
regard, the Tribunal’s willingness to receive amicus submissions might sup-
port the process in general and this arbitration in particular; whereas a blan-
ket refusal could do positive harm.7
On 7 October 2003, the NAFTA FTC, made up of representatives of the three
5Petition to the Arbitral Tribunal of the IISD, 25 August 2000, http://www.iisd.org; Amended Peti-
tion of Communities for a Better Environment, the Bluewater Network of the Earth Island Institute,
and CIEL to Appear Jointly as Amici Curiae, 13 October 2000, http://www.earthjustice.org.
6Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Par-
ties to Intervene as ‘Amici Curiae’, 15 January 2001, at para. 47, http://www.investmentclaims.com.
7Ibid., at para. 49.
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NAFTA countries, issued a statement on third party participation in Chapter 11
disputes.8 The statement stipulated that any non-disputing party that is a person
of a Party (a NAFTA state), or that has a significant presence in the territory of
a Party, could apply for leave to file a submission. The statement also outlined
guidelines for the acceptance of such submissions. According to these guidelines,
in the application for amicus status the person or organization should disclose any
affiliations or financial ties to either party in the dispute, indicate the nature of
their interest in the dispute, and provide reasoning as to why the tribunal should
accept the submission. Furthermore, the guidelines suggest that the tribunal, when
making its decision, should consider the extent to which:
a. the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination
of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by bringing a perspective, par-
ticular knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties;
b. the non-disputing party submission would address matters within the scope of the
dispute;
c. the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and
d. there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration.
It was also noted in the statement that in arbitrations to which they are a party,
Canada and the US would consent to open the hearings to the public (the consent
of the investor would also be required). Mexico announced its support for public
hearings in investor-state disputes the following year.9
Shortly after the 2003 NAFTA FTC statement was issued, Methanex wrote to
the Tribunal, on behalf of both disputing parties, to suggest that the FTC guide-
lines for the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions be adopted. The Tribunal
did so in January of the following year and issued a press release outlining the
procedures to be followed by potential amici. The original Petitioners submitted
8
“Celebrating NAFTA at Ten,” NAFTA Commission Meeting Joint Statement, 7 October 2003, Mon-
treal, http://www.ustr.gov.
9
“A Decade of Achievement,” NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement, 16 July 2004, San
Antonio, Texas, http://www.ustr.gov.
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their briefs in March 2004.10 It is notable that the Tribunal made reference to
the amicus curiae brief of the International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD) in its Final Award, describing it as “carefully reasoned.”11 The proceedings
in Methanex were also eventually opened to the public, but only with the consent
of both parties.
In the same period as Methanex was transpiring, another (NAFTA/UNCITRAL)
tribunal in the case United Parcel Service (UPS) v. Canada also found that it had
the power to accept amicus briefs, and more recently the (NAFTA/UNCITRAL)
tribunal in Glamis Gold v. United States has also done so (see Sections 5.3.1 and
7.1.5).12
7.1.2 Provisions in Recent BITs
In 2003 and 2004 respectively, the Governments of Canada and the US released
new versions of their model BITs.13 The Canadian government had been a strong
proponent of permitting third party participation in NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes,
and the government website notes that “[one] of the most significant improve-
ments” made in the new Model FIPA is the “institutionalisation” of amicus curiae
submissions.14 The Model follows the NAFTA FTC guidelines on amicus curiae
submissions quite closely.15 The Model also stipulates that hearings will be open
to the public and that all documents and awards will be freely available (with
10Submission Of Non-Disputing Parties Bluewater Network, Communities For A Better Environment
and CIEL, 9 March 2004, http://www.ciel.org; Amicus Curiae Submission by the IISD, 9 March
2004, http://www.iisd.org/.
11Methanex Final Award, at para. IV.B.27.
12United Parcel Service (UPS) v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and
Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001, http://www.naftaclaims.com.
13Agreement between Canada and ........ for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Canadian
Model FIPA), 2003, http://www.international.gc.ca; Treaty between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment (US Model BIT), 2004, http://www.state.gov.
14
“Canada’s Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (FIPAs) Negotiating Pro-
gramme,” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada website, http://www.international.gc.ca,
accessed 4 January 2008.
15Canadian Model FIPA, at Art. 39.
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certain limits to protect confidential information).16
The US Model BIT has a less detailed provision on participation, which states
that “[t]he tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus cu-
riae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”17 The
model also provides public access to all documents and awards and open pro-
ceedings.18 These provisions have already been incorporated into the US-Chile
FTA,19 the CAFTA-DR,20 the US-Morocco FTA,21 the US-Singapore FTA,22 the
US-Uruguay BIT,23 the US-Columbia Trade Promotion Agreement,24 and the US-
Peru Trade Promotion Agreement.25
7.1.3 ICSID’S Rules, Old and New
In 2006, ICSID updated its Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings. Changes
to two rules in particular are relevant to the issues of third party participation and
transparency. The most significant change was to Rule 37 (Visits and Inquiries),
where a second paragraph was added stipulating that, after consulting both par-
ties, a tribunal could allow a non-disputing party to submit a written brief if it
considered that:
a. the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different
from that of the disputing parties;
b. the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the
scope of the dispute;
16Ibid., at Art. 38.
17US model BIT, at Art. 28.3.
18Ibid., at Art. 29.
19US-Chile FTA, 6 June 2003, Miami, at Art. 10.19 and 10.20.
20CAFTA-DR, at Art. 10.20 and 10.21.
21US-Morocco FTA, 15 June 2004, Washington, at Art. 10.19 and 10.20.
22US-Singapore FTA, 6 May, 2003, Washington, at Art. 15.19 and 15.20.
23US-Uruguay BIT, 4 November 2005, Mar del Plata, at Art. 28 and 29.
24US-Columbia Trade Promotion Agreement, 22 November 2006, Washington, at Art. 10.20 and
10.21.
25US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, 12 April 2006, Washington, at Art. 10.20 and 10.21.
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c. the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding.
The Rule also states that the tribunal “shall ensure that the non-disputing party
submission does not disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly preju-
dice either party, and that both parties are given an opportunity to present their
observations on the non-disputing party submission.”
Rule 32 (Oral Procedure), which determines who may attend hearings, was
also slightly modified (see Table 7.1). However, the modification from the word-
ing of the former Rule - “The Tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the parties”
- to the new wording - “Unless either party objects” - is, in practice, very limited.
The bottom line is that not all proceedings will be opened to the public under the
new Rules.
Prior to the change in the ICSID Rules there were several cases that dealt with
the issue of third party participation, and since the adoption of the new Rules there
has been a further case in which NGOs have petitioned for amicus curiae status.
Decisions Under the Old Rules
Several cases involving water privatizations in South America have dealt with the
issue of amicus curiae submissions under the old ICSID Rules. The first was
Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia. This case dealt with the highly
publicized and highly controversial case of the privatization of water services in
the City of Cochabamba in Bolivia. After a 40-year concession was awarded
to the company Aguas del Tunari (a subsidiary of Bechtel Corporation), water
prices skyrocketed, leading to widespread public protest. In 2000, the company
abandoned the project and in 2001 filed a request for arbitration with ICSID.26
In 2002, several organizations and individuals petitioned for amicus curiae
status, requesting permission to make submissions as well as the right to attend all
hearings, to make oral presentations, to have immediate access to all submissions
made to the Tribunal, and to respond to arguments made by either party.27 In
addition, the Petitioners requested that the proceedings be opened to the public,
26Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respon-
dent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, http://icsid.worldbank.org.
27Petition of La Coordinadora Para la Defensa del Agua y Vida, La Federacion Departmental
Cochabamba de Organizaciones Regantes, Sempa Sur, Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Oscar
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and that there be public disclosure of the submissions to the Tribunal. Finally, they
requested that the Tribunal visit Cochabamba and hold public hearings concerning
the facts underlying the claim.
The arbitrators unanimously decided that it was beyond their authority to grant
the request.28 Absent agreement of the parties, the Tribunal reasoned that it could
not open the proceedings or provide access to documents. Furthermore, the Tri-
bunal stated that it did not see the need to request submissions from third parties
at that particular point in the case. The dispute was settled and the arbitration
proceedings were discontinued at the mutual request of the parties on 28 March
2006.
In two cases currently pending against Argentina, the openness of ICSID Tri-
bunals to amicus curiae briefs has also been tested. The cases, which relate to
sewage and water distribution services, concern the government’s freeze of public
utility rates following the abandonment in 2001 of the system that pegged Ar-
gentina’s currency to the dollar. In 2005, five NGOs filed a petition in the case of
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A.
v. The Argentine Republic (hereinafter ‘Suez/Vivendi’).29 In June of the same year,
in a second case - Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Inter-
Aguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic (hereinafter
‘Suez/InterAguas’) - one NGO and three individuals filed a similar petition.30 In
both cases, the Tribunal was made up of the same members, and the orders in
response to the petitions are substantively similar.
In both cases, the Tribunal determined that the Petitioners’ request was com-
posed of three parts: (i) permission to submit an amicus curiae brief; (ii) access to
Olivera, Omar Ferdandez, Father Luis Sanchez, and Congressman Jorge Alvarado to the Arbitral
Tribunal, 29 August 2002, http://www.investmentclaims.com.
28See the letter from the President of the Tribunal responding to the petition, 29 January 2003,
http://www.investmentclaims.com.
29Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae of Centro de Estudios Legales y So-
ciales, Asociacin Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia, Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de
Provisin de Servicios de Accin Comunitaria, Unin de Usuarios y Consumidores, and CIEL, 27 Jan-
uary 2005, unofficial translation from Spanish original, http://www.cels.org.ar/english/index.html.
30Peticin de Participacin como Amicus Curiae (Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae) of Fun-
dacin para el Desarrollo Sustentable, Professor Ricardo Ignacio Beltramino, Dr. Ana Mara Herren,
and Dr. Omar Daro Heffes, June 21, 2005.
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documents; and (iii) admittance to hearings.31 In both cases, the claimants asked
the Tribunal to reject the petition while Argentina made no objection.
The Tribunal determined first that it was not able to open the hearings to third
parties or to the public because of the requirement under ICSID Rule 32.2 for
the consent of both parties.32 In both the Methanex and the UPS cases there was
explicit consent to open the hearings, but in Suez/Vivendi and Suez/InterAguas
it was lacking. Next, the Tribunal moved on to the issue of amicus curiae and
determined that it did have the authority to accept briefs. Interestingly, in its
explanation of this decision, the Tribunal noted that:
The acceptance of amicus submissions would have the additional desir-
able consequence of increasing the transparency of investor-state arbitration.
Public acceptance of the legitimacy of international arbitral processes, par-
ticularly when they involve states and matters of public interest, is strength-
ened by increased openness and increased knowledge as to how these pro-
cesses function.33
In Suez/Vivendi, the Tribunal set out conditions by which the NGOs could apply
for leave to make submissions, and in Suez/InterAguas, the Tribunal determined
that the Petitioners had not met those same conditions, but could provide the Tri-
bunal with further information in order to do so. In both cases, the decision as
to whether to provide the Petitioners with access to documents was deferred until
leave was granted to file amicus curiae briefs.
In December 2006, the Petitioners in the Suez/Vivendi case filed with the Tri-
bunal a second petition, again requesting the opportunity to submit a written am-
icus submission and access to documents.34 The Claimant asked the Tribunal to
reject the petition, while Argentina made no objection.
31Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to a Petition for
Participation as Amicus Curiae (Suez/InterAguas Order), 17 March 2006; Suez, Sociedad General
de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus
Curiae (Suez/Vivendi Order), 19 May 2005, http://icsid.worldbank.org.
32See ibid., para. 6-7 in both Orders.
33Suez/InterAguas Order, at para. 21, and Suez/Vivendi Order, at para. 22, emphasis added.
34Petition for Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission of Centro de Estudios Legales y So-
ciales, Asociacin Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia, Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Pro-
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In February 2007, the Tribunal made its Order in response to the petition.35
Following the guidelines that it had laid out in its initial Order in 2005, the Tri-
bunal first assessed the suitability of the Petitioners to act as amici, based on their
expertise, experience, and independence. It found that the NGOs had provided
sufficient information to prove that they met these criteria. The Tribunal also
found that there was a sufficient public interest in the case to justify third party
participation. Finally, it found that the submission would not unduly impede the
proceedings, although it did restrict the Petitioners to a 30-page brief. Turning
next to the issue of access to documents, the Tribunal noted that even the new
ICSID Rules (which did not apply to the dispute) provided no guidance on this
issue. The Tribunal noted that:
As a general proposition, an amicus curiae must have sufficient information
on the subject matter of the dispute to provide ‘perspectives, expertise and
arguments’ which are pertinent and thus likely to be of assistance to the
Tribunal. Otherwise the entire exercise serves no purpose.36
However, the Tribunal went on to suggest that in this particular case, the Peti-
tioners appeared to have access to sufficient information that was available in the
public domain, and were therefore capable of making a useful brief without fur-
ther access to arbitral documents. The Tribunal emphasized in this respect that
the proper role of an amicus curiae “is not to challenge arguments or evidence put
forward by the Parties” but to “provide their perspective, expertise, and arguments
to help the court.”37 The Petitioners made their submission in April 2007.38
visin de Servicios de Accin Comunitaria, Unin de Usuarios y Consumidores, and CIEL, 1 December
2006, unofficial translation from Spanish original http://www.cels.org.ar/english/index.html.
35Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. The Ar-
gentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-
Governmental Organizations for Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission, 12 February
2007, http://icsid.worldbank.org.
36Ibid., at para. 24.
37Ibid., at para. 25.
38Amicus Curiae Submission of Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, Asociacio´n Civil por la Igual-
dad y la Justicia, Consumidores Libres Cooperativa Ltda. de Provisio´n de Servicios de Accio´n
Comunitaria, Unio´n de Usuarios y Consumidores, and CIEL, 4 April 2007, http://www.ciel.org.
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Testing the Water: Biwater and the Application of the New Rules
The Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania case is also worth review-
ing, as it displays some of the limitations of the changes to ICSID’s Rules, as well
as the tension between transparency and confidentiality in proceedings.
In 2005, the Government of Tanzania canceled a contract of the private utility
City Water, owned by British company Biwater. The contract was to supply water
to the country’s commercial capital, Dar es Salaam. The Government claimed that
the reason for the cancellation was that the residents have had to cope with erratic
supplies and water shortages.39 In August of 2005, the company filed a request for
arbitration based on a UK-Tanzania BIT and under ICSID Rules. By the time that
the case had begun, the new ICSID Rules had come into effect and the Tribunal
determined that they would govern the proceedings.
In July 2006, Biwater wrote a letter to the Tribunal claiming that the Govern-
ment of Tanzania had unilaterally disclosed certain documents to an ‘unrelated’
third party.40 Subsequently a procedural order and the minutes of the first session
were published on the Internet. According to Biwater, the dispute was attracting
public interest which had led to, for example, a campaign by the World Develop-
ment Movement (an NGO based in London) to discontinue the proceedings. In a
second letter, the company filed a request to the Tribunal for provisional measures
on confidentiality.41 The request, which according to the company was based
on the need to preserve the procedural integrity of the proceedings and to avoid
aggravation or exacerbation of the dispute, called for the following:
• Discussion on a case-by-case basis of the publication of all Decisions other than
the Award (if mutual agreement cannot be reached then Tribunal should make the
decision);
• No disclosure of the pleadings to third parties;
• No disclosure of any documents produced in the first and second rounds of disclo-
sure to third parties; and
39
“Tanzania Ditches Private Water Supplier,” BBC News, 18 May 2005.
40Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order
No. 3 (Biwater Procedural Order No. 3), 29 September 2006, http://icsid.worldbank.org.
41The letter, dated 17 July 2006, is referred to in ibid.
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• No disclosure of any correspondence between the parties and/or the Tribunal in
respect of the arbitral proceedings to third parties.
The Tribunal noted that Biwater considered these measures to be necessary as they
concerned the company’s “ability to rely on the private nature of the oral hearings,
and its ability to present its case and accompanying evidence without the threat of
increased harassment and interference from third parties.”42
In its Decision on Provisional Measures, the Tribunal suggested that what was
required was “a careful balancing between two competing interests: the need for
transparency and the need to protect the procedural integrity of the arbitration.”43
It commented that, “[w]ithout doubt, there is now a marked tendency towards
transparency in treaty arbitration’, which is reflected in the changes to ICSID’s
Rules.”44 The Tribunal reasoned that the provisions that continue to limit the
publication of documents apply to the actions of the ICSID Secretariat, rather
than to the parties themselves. However, the Tribunal also agreed with Biwater
that:
... the prosecution of a dispute in the media or in other public fora, or the
uneven reporting and disclosure of documents or other parts of the record in
parallel with a pending arbitration, may aggravate or exacerbate the dispute
and may impact the integrity of the procedure.45
Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that placing restrictions on disclosure for the
duration of the dispute is not necessarily inconsistent with the objective of trans-
parency, as these restrictions can be removed upon the conclusion of the dispute.46
The Tribunal determined that decisions on the publication of certain docu-
ments during the proceedings (decisions, orders, or directions) would be made
on a case-by-case basis. Minutes or records of hearings would not be disclosed
unless agreed by both parties or directed by the Tribunal and, furthermore, any
documents produced by one party would not be disclosed by the opposing party.
Pleadings, written memorials, witness statements and expert reports (which could
42Biwater Procedural Order No. 3, at para. 38.
43Ibid., at para. 112.
44Ibid., at para. 114.
45Ibid., at para. 136.
46Ibid., at para. 140.
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all contain details of the contents of other non-disclosed documents) would also be
kept confidential pending the conclusion of the proceedings. Finally, correspon-
dence between the parties and/or the Tribunal would not be disclosed as these
documents “will usually concern the very conduct of the process itself, rather
than issues of substance, and as such do not warrant wider distribution.”47 The
Tribunal emphasized that parties were permitted to “engage in general discussion
about the case in public” as long as this was “restricted to what is necessary” and
not used to “antagonise” or “unduly pressure” the other party or exacerbate the
dispute, or make the resolution of the dispute more difficult.
In November 2006, five NGOs (three Tanzanian and two international) collec-
tively petitioned for amicus curiae status in this case.48 In doing so, they referred
to the decisions in the Suez/Vivendi and Suez/InterAguas cases on the criteria for
accepting such petitions, and also to the new ICSID Rules. They argued that the
arbitration “raises a number of issues of vital concern to the local community in
Tanzania, and a wide range of potential issues of concern to developing countries”
and “also raises issues from a broader sustainable development perspective and is
potentially of relevance for the entire international community.”49
Interestingly, the Petitioners appear to have anticipated some of the possible
objections to their participation in the dispute, pointing out that by acting together
they had reduced the burden of additional amicus curiae submissions on the pro-
ceedings. The Petitioners also argued that without greater transparency, it would
not be possible for them to meaningfully participate in the dispute, nor would it be
possible for the Tribunal to even determine whether they passed the amicus curiae
test provided by the ICSID Rules:
it is not possible for the Petitioners to fulfill all the conditions necessary to
allow the Tribunal to fully apply this test. The reason for this impossibility is
the impact of the confidentiality order contained in Procedural Order No. 3
of the Tribunal. By precluding the release to the public of the documents that
detail the facts and legal issues in dispute, the Petitioners cannot describe the
47Ibid., at para. 161.
48Petition for Amicus Curiae Status of the Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team, the Legal and Hu-
man Rights Centre, the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, CIEL, and IISD, 27 November
2006, at 7, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Tanzania Amicus 1Dec06.pdf.
49Ibid.
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scope of their intended legal submissions, and hence the extent to which the
tests set out in Rule 37.2 are fully met.50
The Petitioners, therefore, suggested that the Tribunal could either accept the pe-
tition and provide them with the legal documents needed to make a submission, or
provide them with the legal documents in order that they might be able to prove
that they meet the requirements of the amicus curiae test.
In response, Biwater argued that the Petitioners had mistakenly assumed that
the arbitration should concern them simply because the dispute related to water.51
Biwater disagreed that environmental issues and issues of sustainable develop-
ment were relevant to the case.
The Tribunal’s decision on amicus curiae was issued in February 2007.52 In
line with previous decisions, submissions were allowed but access to documents
and hearings was not permitted. The Tribunal reasoned that the Petitioners had “a
sufficient interest” in the proceeding, and that their submission had the potential
to assist the Tribunal in the proceedings, by providing a perspective or knowledge
that was different from that of the disputing parties. The Tribunal also noted “that
allowing for the making of such submission by these entities in these proceedings
is an important element in the overall discharge of the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate,
and in securing wider confidence in the arbitral process itself.”53 In terms of
access to documents, the Tribunal suggested that the dispute had been very public
and widely reported, and that the “broad policy issues” that the Petitioners would
address in their brief did not require access to documents from the arbitration.54
However, it was also noted that the issue might be revisited in the future, given the
fact that the limitations on disclosure were put in place to preserve “procedural
integrity” and not necessarily to ensure confidentiality per se.55 Finally, with
regard to the request to open the proceedings, the Tribunal reasoned that Rule
50Ibid., at 11.
51The Claimant’s response is referred to in Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5 (Biwater Procedural Order No. 5), 2 February 2007,
http://icsid.worldbank.org.
52Biwater Procedural Order No. 5.
53Ibid., at para. 50.
54Ibid., at para. 65.
55Ibid., at para. 66.
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32.2 was very clear on this matter. As the Claimant had voiced its objection to
opening the proceedings, the Tribunal had no option but to reject the request.56
7.1.4 UNCITRAL: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?
Although it was under UNCITRAL Rules that the Tribunal in Methanex first de-
termined that it had the power to accept amicus curiae submissions, it is important
to remember that Rule 15.1 which provides this power is discretionary and is sub-
ordinated to other provisions in the Rules (the requirements that hearings will be
held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise,57 and that the award may only
be made public with the consent of both parties58). Some observers argue that the
power to consider amicus curiae submissions should be made explicit, mandatory,
and coupled with increased transparency.59
In 2006, at its thirty-ninth session, UNCITRAL agreed that its Working Group
II on International Arbitration and Conciliation should prioritize the revision of
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In a Note prepared by the Secretariat, several
possible amendments were contemplated. Of relevance here are the following
options for consideration: an express provision on third party intervention; explicit
rules regarding the confidentiality of the proceedings as such, or of the materials
(including pleadings) before an arbitral tribunal; and rules addressing the situation
where a party is under a legal duty to disclose an award or its tenor (for example
under access to information legislation).60 It would seem from this Note that it is
possible that the revision of UNCITRAL Rules could make them more, or less,
transparent.
In September of the same year, an unofficial report was released by UNCITRAL,
authored by two investment arbitration experts, with more specific recommenda-
tions for the revision of the Rules.61 In terms of the express provision on third
56Ibid., at para. 70-2.
57UNCITRAL Rules, at Rule 25.4.
58Ibid., at Rule 32.5.
59See Marshall and Mann 2006.
60United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group II (Arbitration) Forty-fifth
session Vienna, 11-15 September 2006, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.143, http://www.uncitral.org.
61Paulsson and Petrochilos 2006.
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party access, the report recommended inserting a new Rule 15.5 that would read:
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the Arbitral Tribunal may, after
having consulted with the parties, and especially in cases raising issues of
public interest, allow any person who is not a party to the proceedings to
present one or more written statements, provided that the Tribunal is sat-
isfied that such statements are likely to assist it in the determination of a
factual or legal issue related to the proceeding by bringing a perspective,
particular knowledge or insight which the parties are unable to present. The
Arbitral Tribunal shall determine the mode and number of such statements
after consulting with the parties.62
With regard to the inclusion of an explicit confidentiality clause, the authors noted
that there had been substantial discussion on this issue during the revision of the
ICC Rules in 1998. In that case, it was decided that a general clause should not be
included and that tribunals should make these decisions on a case-by-case basis.
However, with regard to the documents and evidence produced in the course of
the arbitration, the authors did feel the need to propose a new clause, which would
state that:
Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, all materials in the proceedings
which are not otherwise in the public domain, including materials created
for the purpose of the arbitration and all other documents or evidence given
by a party, witness, expert, [or any other person,] shall be treated as confi-
dential, save and to the extent that disclosure may be required of a party by
legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right, and in bona fide legal proceed-
ings before a state court or other judicial authority in relation to an award.63
Finally, the report suggested an amendment to the clause on the publication of the
award to allow for publication with the consent of both parties (as before) or when
“disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right
or in relation to [bona fide] legal proceedings before a State court or other judicial
authority.”64 This clearly does not go as far as the ICSID Rules, where either party
is permitted to publish the award unilaterally.
62Ibid., at 72.
63Ibid., at 79, emphasis added.
64Ibid., at 135.
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Two NGOs, which have been involved as amici in several investor-state dis-
putes, also made a proposal to UNCITRAL, in which they argued that a separate
set of arbitration rules should be developed to govern disputes that involve a state
as a party. One of their suggestions was that in this separate set of rules, accep-
tance of amicus curiae briefs should be made explicit through a new Rule 15.4
along the lines of Rule 37.2 of the new ICSID Rules and the NAFTA FTC guide-
lines.65 The NGO report also strongly cautioned against the adoption of a confi-
dentiality clause, stating that in the case of proceedings involving a state, such a
clause “would fly in the face of principles of good governance and human rights,
and thus undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the arbitral proceedings.”66
Furthermore, the report argued that such a restraint on transparency would render
effective third party participation impossible:
... a non-disputing party requesting leave to submit an amicus curiae brief
to a tribunal could not elaborate on whether its perspective, knowledge or
insight is different from the disputing parties’ or useful to the tribunal, if the
record remains secret. Likewise, it would be impossible for a non-disputing
party to prepare a submission within the scope of the dispute when access
to pleadings is denied.67
In February 2007, member-governments rejected the idea of including a gen-
eral provision on confidentiality in the UNCITRAL Rules, but delayed the deci-
sion on whether or not to develop a separate set of rules for disputes involving
states.68 The revision of the UNCITRAL Rules is expected to be finalized in
2008.69
7.1.5 Not Only for NGOs
It is important to understand that third party participation is not restricted to envi-
ronmental or other advocacy groups. An ICSID discussion paper has noted this:
65CIEL and IISD 2007, at 4.
66Ibid., at 10.
67Ibid.
68
“Governments Punt Discussion of Special UNCITRAL Rules for Investor-State Disputes,” Invest-
ment Treaty News, 14 February 2007, http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn.
69Ibid.
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There may well be cases where the process could be strengthened by sub-
missions of third parties, not only civil society organizations but also for in-
stance business groups or, in investment treaty arbitrations, the other states
parties to the treaties concerned.70
A currently-pending NAFTA Chapter 11 case - Glamis Gold v. United States (see
Section 5.3.1) - illustrates this. Four amicus curiae submissions have been filed
in this case: the first by the Quechan Indian Nation in August 2004; the second, a
joint submission of two NGOs (FOE-Canada and FOE-US), in September 2005;
the third by the National Mining Association in October 2006; and the fourth,
another joint submission of two NGOs (Sierra Club and Earthworks), also in Oc-
tober 2006.71
The power of the Tribunal to accept amicus curiae submissions was never
in question, as the proceedings began following the release of the NAFTA FTC
guidelines on third party participation. What is worthy of note about this case is
that, for the first time, a business association (rather than a labour, environmental,
or other social organization) requested permission to submit a brief. The National
Mining Association is comprised of more than 325 corporations from the Amer-
ican mining sector, and its purpose is to advocate “public policies designed to
protect and expand domestic mining opportunities that are of vital importance to
the United States’ economic prosperity and national security.”72 While generally
amicus curiae submissions are thought to be impartial and intended to provide
perspective, expertise and arguments rather than direct support for either party,
the National Mining Association application to file a submission states outright
that it is “in support of the Claimant.”73 The Association also has direct ties with
the Claimant, as Glamis Gold Ltd. is an Association Member.
70ICSID 2004, at 9.
71All of the petitions and submissions can be found on the NAFTA Claims website,
http://www.naftaclaims.com.
72Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Application for Leave to File a Non-
Disputing Party Submission by the National Mining Association, 13 October 2006, at 1,
http://www.naftaclaims.com
73Ibid.
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7.1.6 Discussion
Those who argue in favour of increased transparency and third party participation
suggest that due to the public-interest nature of investor-state disputes, the confi-
dentiality that applies to private firm-firm disputes is inappropriate. As Legum
notes, there are in fact a number of different kinds of ‘interest’ implicated in
investor-state disputes, including:
... specific interest in the measure that is challenged in the case; general in-
terest in the appropriate functioning of the investment protections; interest
in the domestic law analogues of the treaty provision invoked [e.g., regula-
tory takings]; interest in the appropriate interaction between federal, state
and local government authorities; and many others.74
There are also several different types of ‘public’. Mistelis argues that in ad-
dition to the “general public,” which has an interest in investment disputes, there
is also the “specialist public” (practicing lawyers and academics), which also has
an interest in knowing how treaty provisions are interpreted by arbitration tri-
bunals.75 Limiting disclosure effectively privileges a small subset of the special-
ist public (arbitrators and lawyers participating in cases) whilst increasing trans-
parency would expand the range of actors which could potentially participate in
and report on disputes.
Some observers take issue with the notion that the existence of a ‘public in-
terest’ justifies third party participation. In this view, it is the respondent state that
should act in the public interest, and there is no further need for any other actor
to do so. Some take this argument even further by questioning the legitimacy of
NGOs to act in the public interest in the first place. Brower, for example, suggests
that “many NGOs have very specific agendas and are not accountable to their own
members, much less to the general public.”76
However, even if NGOs do not represent the public interest, other arguments
have been made in favour of third party participation. One is that third party
participation can improve arbitral decisions by adding an extra layer of expertise
74Legum 2003, at 145.
75Mistelis 2005, at 230.
76Brower 2003, at 73. See also Knahr 2007, at 327.
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or perspectives on issues that would not be provided by the disputing parties.77
The counter-argument to this is that interested third parties can petition the parties
to the dispute directly to make claims on their behalf. However, there does seem
to be a value in maintaining the independence of non-state actors in the process.78
One of the most salient claims of those who support third party participa-
tion is that it may help to allay public disquiet about ‘secret trade courts’,79 and
contribute to a higher level of accountability in the arbitration process. Many au-
thors believe that investment arbitration is either in, or is heading for, a serious
legitimacy crisis.80 In several of the cases discussed above, the tribunals noted
the potential benefits of providing greater openness as well as the potential neg-
ative implications of not doing so. While this argument may hold when one is
defending increased transparency in arbitration, it may be questioned whether the
participation of private actors (which are not accountable to the public) actually
increases the legitimacy of investment arbitration.
There appears to be a significant amount of support for the participation of
amici, and for increased transparency, from states and outside observers. Nonethe-
less, there are still those who do not view the trends in this area as positive. Cook
notes that confidentiality serves the parties’ interests in several ways:
By keeping proceedings confidential, parties are able to keep allegations of
bad faith and bad business practices from the public, thus enabling the party
to maintain a good business reputation. Furthermore, the public remains
unaware of losses suffered resulting from adverse tribunal decisions. In
addition, party autonomy inherent in arbitral proceedings allows parties to
agree on the level of confidentiality so that they are able to keep from the
public, and sometimes the other party, information critical to the livelihood
of a business like trade secrets and other sensitive business information.81
However, it can be argued that information about bad business practices is pre-
cisely what the public should have privy to, and that ‘trade secrets’ can be dealt
77Buckley and Blyschak 2007, at 360.
78See Mistelis 2005, at 223.
79As an editorial famously termed them; see “The Secret Trade Courts,” New York Times, 27 Septem-
ber 2004.
80Afilalo 2004; Atik 2004; Brower 2003; Franck 2005.
81Cook 2007, at 1100.
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with quite easily, as it is in other fora, by redaction in documents released to the
public and in camera restrictions when discussions of this nature arise in the pro-
ceedings.
Another criticism of third party participation is that it will increase the length
and cost of arbitration.82 Investor-state disputes already run, on average, several
years and entail substantial costs for both claimants and respondent states. How-
ever, there are two counter-arguments here: (i) the cost and delay in proceedings
can be minimized by clear procedures for when and how amici may participate
(e.g., only in the merits phase, limits to length of submission, etc.); and (ii) the tri-
bunal is receiving additional information at no direct cost to either party (as amici,
unlike experts, are not remunerated for their services).83
Related to the issues of the cost and the time burden to the parties is the notion
that allowing third party participation will ‘open the floodgates’ to a large number
of submissions. However, this is unlikely to occur in practice; there has been no
flood of submissions in the WTO or in other bodies that accept amicus curiae
briefs, and the experience thus far in investment disputes suggests that, in fact,
NGOs are likely to make joint submissions rather than duplicative ones.
A further argument that has been made against the participation of third par-
ties is that it is unfair and that it may upset the balance between the positions of
the respondent and claimant by favouring one side. Again there are several key
counter-arguments: (i) in theory, amici are meant to provide information which
is impartial, and not to intentionally support one party to the dispute;84 (ii) even
if, in practice, amicus curiae submissions do support the position of one of the
parties, this does not mean that the tribunal will necessarily give more weight to
that party’s position;85 and (iii) while it is usually argued that the participation of
amici unfairly favours the respondent state, the Glamis Gold case illustrates that,
in practice, amici may intervene to support the claimant as well.
The position of the Claimant in Biwater indicates a further argument against
greater transparency and disclosure. This is the notion that opening up arbitration
82Knahr 2007, at 351-2.
83See Bennaim-Selvi 2005, at 804.
84Judge Posner, qtd. in Ford 2005, at 239, states that, “[t]he term ‘amicus curiae’ means friend of the
court, not friend of a party.”
85Bennaim-Selvi 2005, at 805.
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to the ‘court’ of public opinion will lead to the ‘re-politicization’ of investor-state
disputes.86 While in Biwater it was the investor that was concerned about neg-
ative publicity, Rubins suggests that the re-politicization of disputes is likely to
be most costly for the host state, which runs the risk of losing credibility as an
investor-friendly country.87 This is likely to be an issue of particular concern for
developing countries. Egonu notes that in Amco v. Indonesia, an early ICSID
case, Indonesia requested confidentiality because the government was concerned
that negative publicity related to the case might discourage foreign investment in
the country.88 In Metalclad, the respondent country (Mexico) also argued for con-
fidentiality in the proceedings.89 However, an obvious counter-argument is that
some information about investor-state disputes is likely to reach the public do-
main whether investment arbitration is open or not. Increased transparency will
result in the public having access to more accurate and balanced information, thus
decreasing the opportunity for smear campaigns against either the respondent state
or the claimant.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the notion of permitting amicus curiae
submissions has also been viewed with some skepticism in the developing world,
and not only because of concerns about the increased burden on the parties to
the dispute in terms of the financial and reputational costs of arbitral proceedings.
The South Centre, an intergovernmental body of developing countries, argues that
“[p]ermitting amicus submissions effectively disadvantages developing countries
because the civil society and industrial organisations in the developed countries
are more experienced, better organised and equipped as well as better funded.”90
A counter argument would be that, as was the case in both the Argentinean and
Tanzanian examples, local NGOs can benefit from support and cooperation with
Northern-based NGOs, which can provide expertise in the highly specialized area
of investment arbitration.
Table 7.2 summarizes the main arguments for and against transparency and
the participation of third parties in investor-state disputes, as well as the counter-
86Rubins 2006.
87Ibid.
88Egonu 2007, at 485.
89Ibid.
90South Centre 2005, at 10.
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arguments to each.
7.2 ‘Re-Modeled’ Agreements
As mentioned previously, several countries have recently introduced new versions
of their model BITs and have negotiated agreements based on these revised mod-
els. In addition to including changes to arbitration procedures, several agreements
also incorporate substantive changes relevant to the issues of concern in this study.
According to UNCTAD, the increase in investor-state disputes is “one of the main
reasons why some countries seek to clarify individual BIT provisions with a view
to reducing the risk of disputes in the future.”91 Similarly, Gagne´ and Morin argue
that the changes to the US Model BIT reflect that the government has learned from
its experience in the NAFTA, and now aims “to reach a better balance between the
protection of investment and the protection of state sovereignty.”92
7.2.1 Preambles
There are several ways in which concerns about the protection of the environment
have been incorporated into the texts of agreements. Preambular statements are
one way. For example, the US Model BIT states in the preamble that the Parties
are: “Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the protec-
tion of health, safety, and the environment.”
However, this practice is not widespread, even in recent treaties. Newcombe
reviewed 71 BITs dated between 2001 and 2005 and found very limited reference
to sustainable development or the environment in the preambles of these agree-
ments.93 However, he notes that FTAs are more likely to have such preambular
statements.94
91UNCTAD 2007, at 1.
92Gagne´ and Morin 2006, at 359.
93Newcombe 2007a, at 399.
94Ibid.
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Table 7.2: Arguments and Counterarguments For and Against Transparency and
Third Party Participation
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7.2.2 Consistency and Pollution Havens Provisions
General statements on the adoption and/or enforcement of environmental laws
generally come in two forms, which are referred to here as ‘consistency provi-
sions’, and ‘pollution havens provisions’.
Consistency provisions are statements which reiterate that governments are
not prevented from adopting or enforcing environmental regulations which are
otherwise consistent with the rest of the agreement. For example, the US Model
BIT states that:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopt-
ing, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this
Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.95
This provision is not novel; it copies Article 1114.1 of the NAFTA. The ‘otherwise
consistent’ wording has led some observers to conclude that this type of provision
is solely tautological, and has no practical meaning whatsoever.96 Baughen also
notes the weakness of the phrase “sensitive to environmental concerns.”97 An
UNCTAD report concludes that these types of provisions are mainly explanatory
and meant as “a tool for sending a message to civil societies that the contracting
parties take environmental concerns into account.”98
Pollution havens provisions are statements discouraging countries from low-
ering environmental standards to attract investment. For example, the 2003 Cana-
dian Model FIPA states that:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly,
a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
other-wise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the es-
tablishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an invest-
ment of an investor. If a Party considers that the other Party has offered such
95US Model BIT, at Art. 12.2. This provision has been incorporated into all new US BITs and FTAs,
including the: CAFTA-DR, at Art. 10.11; US-Chile FTA, at Art. 10.12; US-Uruguay BIT, at Art.
12.2; and US-Australia FTA, at Art. 11.11.
96Newcombe 2007a, at 400; Freedman 2003, at 94.
97Baughen 2006, at 222.
98UNCTAD 2007, at 89.
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an encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the
two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.99
Again, this text has been drawn from the NAFTA (Article 1114.2). The CAFTA-
DR has slightly stronger wording:
a. A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws,
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a
manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into
force of this Agreement.
b. The Parties recognize that each Party retains the right to exercise dis-
cretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and
compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation
of resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental mat-
ters determined to have higher priorities. Accordingly, the Parties un-
derstand that a Party is in compliance with subparagraph (a) where a
course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such dis-
cretion, or results from a bona fide decision regarding the allocation
of resources.100
It is further stated in the CAFTA-DR that:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or invest-
ment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic envi-
ronmental laws. Accordingly, each Party shall strive to ensure that it does
not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise dero-
gate from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the protections
afforded in those laws as an encouragement for trade with another Party,
or as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, or
retention of an investment in its territory.101
The 2004 US Model BIT contains the same wording.102 Interestingly, the pro-
posed FTAA additionally provides that:
99Canadian Model FIPA, at Art. 11.
100CAFTA-DR, at Art. 1017.1.
101Ibid., at art. 1017.2.
102US model BIT, at Art. 12.1.
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[For smaller economies, a commitment not to relax domestic environmental
laws should be allied with compensating access to the Hemispheric Cooper-
ation Program for the purpose of introducing more modern machinery and
industrial practices that would better protect the environment.]103
Freedman comments that the use of the terms such as ‘should’ in pollution
havens provisions “denotes a precatory, non-binding commitment, whose breach
can give rise to no more than consultations among the Parties.”104 Hasic similarly
argues that the language in the NAFTA pollution havens provision “is simply not
forceful enough to convey the impression of a serious commitment.”105 Finally,
Cle´menc¸on, commenting on the Draft MAI pollution havens provision, also ex-
presses doubts about the value of such statements:
It is important to recognize the limitation of such a provision - binding or
non-binding. It would, in most cases, be impossible to prove that a country
in effect had lowered environmental standards for the sole purpose of ac-
commodating a particular foreign investor. Furthermore, such a provision
does not address the problem that adequate environmental standards have
still not been developed in many countries.106
7.2.3 Chapters on the Environment
The US has recently negotiated several FTAs which, in addition to containing
chapters on investment, also contain chapters on the environment. In relation to
investment, these environment chapters generally contain pollution havens type
provisions, but unlike standard BITs, these provisions are backed up by an en-
forcement mechanism. Parties may request the establishment of an arbitration
panel to consider instances of a breach of the obligation to enforce environmen-
tal laws, which can impose an annual monetary fee of up to US $15 million per
year, payable into a bilateral fund for environmental initiatives.107 The FTAs also
103Draft FTAA, at Art. 1719.2.
104Freedman 2003, at 94.
105Hasic 2005, at 154.
106Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 218.
107US-Singapore FTA, at Art. 20.7; US-Chile FTA, at Art. 22.16; US-Australia FTA, at Art. 21.12;
CAFTA-DR, at Art. 20.17; Morocco FTA, at Art. 20.12.
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provide that in the event of inconsistency between the investment chapter of the
agreement and the environment chapter, the latter shall prevail.108 However, as
Gagne´ and Morin are quick to point out:
It is still unclear when an inconsistency between the two chapters can occur
because a state can be forced under the labour and environment chapters to
enforce a law discriminating against foreign investments and, at the same
time, be forced under the investment chapter to offer monetary damages to
foreign investors.109
The authors hypothesize that the environment chapter may at least influence ne-
gotiations between an investor and a host state, because states will not want to risk
an international dispute with another state over the non-enforcement of a environ-
mental law. However, this claim seems somewhat dubious. One can question
whether states will be willing to bring other states before arbitration for non-
enforcement of environmental law, when they risk the mechanism being used
against them in turn. Much like the side agreement to the NAFTA, the environ-
ment chapters in recent FTAs are largely an exercise in public relations, intended
to dispel some of the disquiet which surround the negotiations of trade and invest-
ment agreements.
7.2.4 Clarifications
Clarifications flesh out some of the detail of vaguely worded regulative norms and
rules of investment protection. They are an attempt to reduce uncertainty about
how government or court actions, including those related to the protection of the
environment, will be interpreted by arbitrators.
As noted previously, the NAFTA Parties published the Notes of Interpretation
to clarify the meaning of the international minimum standard/fair and equitable
treatment. The clarification of this provision has also been carried over into Cana-
dian and American BITs and FTAs. The US Model BIT clarifies that the minimum
standard of treatment does not entail anything beyond that provided for in custom-
ary international law. It further defines fair and equitable treatment as including
108US-Singapore FTA, at Art. 15.2; US-Chile FTA, at Art. 10.2; US-Australia FTA, at Art. 11.2;
CAFTA-DR, at Art. 10.2; US-Morocco FTA, at Art. 10.2.
109Gagne´ and Morin 2006, at 379-81.
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“the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the prin-
cipal legal systems of the world,” and explicitly spells out that a “determination
that there has been a breach of another provision of this Treaty, or of a separate
international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this
Article.”110 In addition, an annex is included in the Model, which defines custom-
ary international law as resulting “from a general and consistent practice of States
that they follow from a sense of legal obligation” and specifies that the minimum
standard refers “to all customary international law principles that protect the eco-
nomic rights and interests of aliens.” The Canadian Model FIPA also stipulates
that the minimum standard only requires treatment in line with customary interna-
tional law, and that a breach of another provision or agreement does not establish
a breach of the standard, although it does not have an annex on the issue.111
In terms of clarification of expropriation provisions, the US Model BIT and
the Canadian Model FIPA both have an annex on the issue, which lays out a three-
part test for the determination, on a case-by-case basis, of whether an indirect ex-
propriation has occurred. The factors that are to be considered are: the economic
impact of the government action; the extent to which the government action inter-
feres with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and the character
of the government action.112 The three-part test is drawn from American takings
jurisprudence.113 The US Model BIT Annex has a provision which states that
Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a
Party that are designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare ob-
jectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, and the environment,
do not constitute indirect expropriations.114
The Canadian Model FIPA contains a similar statement.115
Gantz views the annexes as a “truly remarkable effort to provide detailed guid-
ance to future tribunals seeking to distinguish compensable expropriations from
110US Model BIT, at Art. 5.2 and 5.3.
111Canadian Model FIPA, at Art. 5.
112US Model BIT, at Annex B.4(a); Canadian Model FIPA, at Annex B.13(1).
113Muse-Fisher 2007, at 509; Parisi 2005, at 417.
114US Model BIT, at Annex B.4(b).
115Canadian Model FIPA, at Annex B.13(1)(c).
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valid government regulations,” and suggests that they “unquestionably will make
it more difficult for a foreign investor to claim successfully that any sort of govern-
ment regulatory action is an expropriation, particularly if the regulatory action has
any environmental or public health nexus.”116 Others are less optimistic, and ar-
gue that the three-part test is too vague, and is outdated in relation to both domestic
and international jurisprudence.117 In respect of the latter, it has been pointed out
by Edsall that “the language of the annex implies that the factors to be taken into
account must be balanced against each other, rather than considered in the hierar-
chical analysis that the Methanex Tribunal applied.”118 Similarly, Parisi suggests
that the annex misses:
... critical limitations stating that an investor’s expectations are a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for liability, that an investor’s expectations must
be evaluated as of the time of the investment or that an investor must expect
that health, safety, and environmental regulations often change and become
more strict over time.119
It has also been suggested that the use of the broad and vague “rare circumstances”
terminology will only encourage lawyers to develop creative arguments to test the
boundaries of the exception, which will increase, rather than limit, uncertainty.120
7.3 Environmental Impact Assessments
The new generation of BITs and FTAs described above, have been negotiated
under increased scrutiny. In the US and Canada, this scrutiny has included formal
assessments of the environmental impacts of the agreements.
7.3.1 United States
The development of the 2004 US Model BIT, and the subsequent negotiation of
BITs and FTAs following this model, was within the broader framework of a
116Gantz 2004, at 744-5.
117Muse-Fisher 2007, at 509.
118Edsall 2006, at 957.
119Parisi 2005, at 421-2.
120Edsall 2006, at 958-9.
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new Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA). The TPA was de-
veloped, in part, to address concerns relating to the investor-state dispute settle-
ment process in trade agreements like the NAFTA. Investment provisions, and the
question of the appropriate balance between investment protection and the ability
of government to regulate, were reportedly “a matter of intense debate” during
Congress’ consideration of the TPA.121
The TPA established a number of negotiating objectives and other priorities
relating to the environment. Under the TPA and following a framework outlined in
Executive Order 13141, all new investment and trade agreements are to undergo
an EIA.122 It is stipulated that “as a general matter, the focus of environmental
reviews will be impacts in the United States, [but] [a]s appropriate and prudent,
reviews may also examine global and transboundary impacts.”123 Generally, re-
views address two types of questions: (i) the extent to which positive and nega-
tive environmental impacts may flow from economic changes estimated to result
from the prospective agreement; and (ii) the extent to which proposed agreement
provisions may affect US environmental laws and regulations (including, as ap-
propriate, the ability of state, local and tribal authorities to regulate with respect
to environmental matters).
The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) conducted a number of
FTA environmental reviews in 2004. All of the reports emanating from the as-
sessments concluded that there would be no significant impact of the investment
provisions of the agreements on the environment. For example, the authors of
the review of the CAFTA-DR claim that they, “were unable to identify any con-
crete instances of US environmental measures that would be inconsistent with
the Agreement’s substantive investment obligations.”124 Furthermore, the report
notes that the innovations in the agreement’s substantive obligations and investor-
state dispute settlement procedures, “should provide coherence to the interpreta-
tion of the FTA’s investment provisions.”125 The reviewers do acknowledge that
121Final Environmental Review of the CAFTA-DR, 22 February 2005, at 29, http://www.ustr.gov.
122Environmental Review of Trade Agreements, 64 Fed. Reg. 63169, and the Associated Guidelines,
65 Fed. Reg. 79442, http://www.ustr.gov.
123Executive Order 13141, at Section 5(b).
124CAFTA-DR Final Environmental Review, at 2.
125Ibid.
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the CAFTA-DR might have a greater impact on the other states party to the agree-
ment, but suggest that the specific environmental implications cannot currently be
predicted. Similarly, the review of the US-Chile FTA concluded that the agree-
ment, “would not significantly affect the ability of U.S. governmental entities to
regulate in order to meet domestic health, safety, and environmental policy objec-
tives,” and noted that the revisions of the investment provisions:
provide greater clarity to the substantive investment obligations, signifi-
cantly increase the transparency of the procedures for arbitrating investor
claims, and help ensure that arbitral tribunals will interpret the investment
provisions in accordance with the Parties’ intent.126
The same conclusions are reached in the review of the US-Singapore FTA, and
the US-Morocco FTA.127
7.3.2 Canada
In 1999, a Cabinet Directive on Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and
Program Proposals was promulgated, leading to the development of the 2001
Framework for the Environmental Assessment of Trade Negotiations. This frame-
work covers Canada’s FIPA program. According to the government website:
The Canadian government is committed to integrating sustainable develop-
ment into domestic and foreign policy, and the environmental assessment
of trade and investment negotiations is one mechanism for doing so. We
are therefore committed to conducting environmental assessments (EAs) of
trade negotiations using a process that requires interdepartmental coordina-
tion along with public and stakeholder consultations, including provincial
and territorial governments.128
126Final Environmental Review of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 2003, at 5,
http://www.ustr.gov.
127Final Environmental Review of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 2003; Final
Environmental Review of the United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, July 2004,
http://www.ustr.gov.
128
“Regional and Bilateral Initiatives,” Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade website, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca, accessed 29 August 2007.
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Increased coordination between ministries and agencies may be the most signifi-
cant outcome of the program. As noted in Sections 5.5.3 and 6.3.2, investor-state
disputes can create tension between levels and sectors of governance. Involving
environmental ministries and provincial and municipal governments in the IIA
negotiation process reduces the risk of this to some degree. Furthermore, if ef-
fective, it could contribute to increased policy coherence, which will decrease the
likelihood that investor-state conflicts will arise in the first place.
The FIPA with Peru was the first to be evaluated under the program. Nego-
tiations on the agreement re-commenced in December 2003, following a hiatus
of several years, and were based on the new Model FIPA. An initial EIA was re-
leased for public comment in 2005.129 The methodology of the assessment is to
identify “the likely economic effects of the FIPA and, on this basis, [draw] conclu-
sions about the potential environmental impacts in Canada.”130 The report notes
that Peru’s total investment in Canada is small, at only CDN$1 million in 2003,
and suggests that the FIPA is not likely to change this situation significantly. On
the other hand, the stock of Canadian foreign investment in Peru is significant,
totaling CDN$1,790 million in 2003. The majority of this investment was in the
mineral sector, an industry well-known for its environmental impact. While the
assessment does not rule out the possibility that Canadian investment in Peru may
increase, it suggests that the protection of existing Canadian investment in the
country is likely to be the main effect of the FIPA.
As noted in the report, “it is outside of the scope” of the study “to assess the
potential for positive or negative environmental impacts that could occur in Peru
because of these negotiations, or to judge the measures in place within Peru to
enhance or mitigate such impacts.” The Initial Environmental Assessment con-
cludes that “significant changes to investment flows into Canada are not expected
as a result of these negotiations” and therefore “the economic effects and result-
ing environmental impact in Canada are expected to be minimal to non-existent.”
The assessment also concludes that the FIPA “will not have a negative effect on
Canada’s ability to develop and implement environmental policies and regula-
129Initial Environmental Assessment of the Canada-Peru Foreign Investment Protection Agreement
(FIPA), 2005, http://www.international.gc.ca.
130Ibid., emphasis added.
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tions.” The reasoning on this issue is based partly on the belief that the adjust-
ments to the Model FIPA (used as a template for the Peru agreement) deal effec-
tively with this issue, as well as the fact that it is not anticipated that the FIPA will
result in significant inflows of investment into Canada from Peru (i.e. there will
be no Peruvian investors to challenge Canada’s laws under the agreement).
Despite the fact that it is repeatedly emphasized throughout the Peru assess-
ment that the only aim of the EIA is to consider environmental impacts occurring
within Canada, or transboundary impacts that can be shown to impact Canada’s
environment, the majority of public comments received by the committee respon-
sible for the EIA pertained to the environmental impact of Canadian investment in
Peru. While these comments were acknowledged, the negotiations for the Canada-
Peru FIPA were concluded successfully on 14 November 2006, with no modifica-
tion to the environment-related provisions of the FIPA model.
NGOs have expressed concern that the FIPA-EIA process is ignoring the fun-
damental issue of the impacts of Canadian investors abroad, but there has been
no change as of yet in the protocol. The most recent FIPA to be evaluated (with
India) came to largely the same conclusions as the Peru assessment; no significant
investment flows to Canada, and therefore no significant environmental impact for
Canada.131
7.4 Proposals for Moving Beyond Moderate Reform
Many observers who are critical of the institution of investment protection would
not be satisfied with the types of moderate reform outlined above (acceptance of
amicus curiae, clarifications, etc.). As such, proposals for more substantial reform
have emerged in recent years. The section addresses several of these proposals
and also examines the decision of some governments to opt out of the institution
altogether.
131Initial Environmental Assessment (EA) of the Canada-India Foreign Investment Protection and Pro-
motion Agreement (FIPA), 2007, http://www.international.gc.ca.
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7.4.1 An Appellate Body or International Investment Court
While hardly revolutionary, the development of a system for appeals of invest-
ment arbitration awards would require significant initiative. It is perhaps the most
frequently-recommended reform in the literature on investment arbitration, though
it is not a universally-supported concept.132
A permanent appellate body could ensure consistency in tribunal decisions
and provide some predictability for regulators. As mentioned in Section 4.2.2,
the only remedies that can be sought at present under ICSID, for example, are
the interpretation of the meaning or scope of an award, the revision of an award
based on the discovery of new information, or the annulment of an award. An
annulment is only possible in rather extreme circumstances. The purpose of an
appeal is also fundamentally different from that of annulment. In an appeal, a
tribunal may reverse or substitute a new decision for the one appealed against,
whereas in an annulment the tribunal may only nullify or invalidate a decision.
An annulment committee is only concerned with the process leading to a tribunal
decision, whereas an appellate panel is additionally concerned with the substantive
correctness of an award.133
Under other arbitration rules, review is possible in the courts in the seat of
arbitration, but again, awards can only be overturned in a limited number of cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, for some observers, it is the role of domestic courts in
the review of awards that needs to be curtailed. Unhappy with what they view as
interference in the arbitration system, proponents of an appellate mechanism argue
that it would reduce or eliminate the ablity of domestic courts to review awards.134
For others observers, the aim of an appellate body is to deal with possible ‘rogue’
arbitral decisions.135
The push for an appellate body appears particularly strong in the US. The TPA
put an appellate mechanism on the list of negotiating objectives for future trade
132In support see: Wells and Ahmed 2007; Franck 2005; Brower 2003; Dodge 2001a; Knull III and
Rubins 2000.
133Ekwueme 2006, at 187.
134However, court review would also be eliminated by universal accession to the ICSID Convention.
See: Coe 2002, at 206; Brower 2002, at 484-5.
135Gantz 2006, at 43, referring to the reason for US Congress support for an appellate mechanism.
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agreements, and recent FTAs like the US-Chile FTA, the US-Singapore FTA, and
the US-Morocco FTA provide that the parties will consider the establishment of
an appellate body within three years after the date of entry into force of the agree-
ment.136 The CAFTA-DR has a much more detailed provision on the development
of an appellate mechanism, requiring the establishment of a negotiating group on
the issue within three months of entry into force of the agreement.137 Gantz notes
that a CAFTA-DR appellate mechanism could be a “significant first step” toward
a broader appellate body.138 The CAFTA-DR also has a novel procedure for re-
view in the absence of an appellate body; the parties may request that the tribunal
submit to them its proposed award, prior to issuance, for comment.139 As Cook
notes, “[a] tribunal is more likely to be accommodating to the parties’ critiques of
an award before it has been officially issued, and the parties will be less likely to
challenge an award that they had a hand in shaping.”140
ICSID also raised the issue of the development of an appellate body in a 2004
Discussion Paper.141 However, the comments that the ICSID Secretariat received
from governments, business and civil society groups, generally indicated that the
establishment of such a mechanism was premature.142
One of the main problems with developing an appellate mechanism is that, if
it is going to have any chance of enhancing the consistency of awards, it should
bring all, or at least most, existing IIAs under its umbrella. With the prospects
for a multilateral agreement on investment exceedingly dim, it is difficult to imag-
ine how broad negotiations on the development of such a body could be initiated.
Gantz notes further legal and practical challenges such as: the choice of the ap-
propriate standard of review; the power of the appellate mechanism to confirm,
set aside, and remand; issues relating to choice of law; the relationship of the
appellate mechanism process to national court review; and transparency consider-
136US-Chile FTA, at Annex 10-H; Side Letter to the US-Singapore FTA; US-Morocco FTA, at Annex
10-D.
137CAFTA-DR, at Annex 10-F.
138Gantz 2006, at 48.
139CAFTA-DR, at Art. 1020.9.
140Cook 2007, at 1125.
141ICSID 2004.
142Gagne´ and Morin 2006, at 378.
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ations.143
As mentioned above, not all observers view an appellate mechanism as a so-
lution to all, or even most, of the important problems with investment arbitration
and it has been argued by some that such a mechanism will create new problems.
From the perspective of investors, the main objection to an appellate mechanism
is that it will slow the arbitration process down and give the outcome of a dispute
less finality.144 As Werner notes:
While it was recognized by the business community that arbitrators were
just humans who could fail in their decisions, the consensus was that it
was more important to have a one-stop shop, enabling the parties to put the
disputes behind them once and for all without having to go through lengthy
appeal proceedings.145
Finality of awards may also be an issue for states, particularly in the NAFTA
context where several awards have been decided in favour of states, and the US
has yet to lose even one claim.146 Furthermore Foy suggests that, in the NAFTA
context at least, agreeing to an appellate body would require some further ceding
of authority, given that at present the Parties possess the ability to issue their own
interpretations of the agreement.147
If the other problems inherent in investment arbitration (transparency, ac-
countability etc.) are not dealt with prior to, or in concordance with, the develop-
ment of an appellate body, it is hard to imagine that the issues for environmental
governance that have been raised in this study would disappear. Rulings would
likely become more predictable, but that doesn’t mean that they would be consis-
tent with the objectives of sustainable development. In this respect, Van Harten
has a far more interesting proposal. Rather than advocating an appellate body, he
suggests the adoption of a multilateral code that would establish an international
investment court with comprehensive jurisdiction over the adjudication of invest-
ment claims.148 In this model, judges would be appointed for set terms, which
143Gantz 2006, at 57.
144Goldhaber 2004.
145Werner 2003, at 783.
146Amirfar and Dreyer 2007, at 54.
147Foy 2003, at 104-5.
148Van Harten 2007a, at 180.
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Van Harten attests is critical for making them independent, and they would be ap-
pointed by states, which is “essential to make them accountable.”149 Van Harten
counters the critics of state appointments, arguing that given “the experience of
many other courts – which are staffed by talented and responsible jurists – we
shall have to trust that states will not appoint nincompoops to an international
investment court.”150 He suggests that an international investment court would
benefit both capital-importing and capital-exporting states:
For capital-importing countries, an international court in which they have
some say in the appointment process is much preferable to a system of pri-
vate arbitration, biased against host governments, in which they have little
say at all. For the major capital-exporting states and their firms, the pro-
posal asks them to sacrifice little in exchange for an international judicial
body that us more likely to have political staying power than the current
system.151
7.4.2 An Investment Agreement for Sustainable Development
While the proposal for an appellate body or investment court is intended to deal
with the procedural failings of investment arbitration, other proposals for reform
aim more squarely at addressing the imbalance between the rights and duties of
investors, host states, and home states. There are two main approaches to ad-
dressing this imbalance, the ‘complementary approach’ of developing codes of
investor conduct in parallel with IIAs, and the ‘consolidated approach’, which in-
stead incorporates provisions on the responsibilities of foreign investors directly
into IIAs.152
While the complementary approach has largely prevailed in the modern period
(see Section 2.2.3), the consolidated approach now appears to be gaining favour
in some quarters. For example, Cle´menc¸on notes that “a multilateral investment
149Ibid., at 182.
150Ibid.
151Ibid., at 183.
152Shan 2007, at 656-7.
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agreement offers many opportunities for linking the pursuit of economic and de-
velopment objectives directly with environmental protection objectives.”153
The IISD has gone so far as to develop a Model International Investment
Agreement for Sustainable Development.154 The IISD Model Agreement makes
many clarifications of the standard provisions on investment protection, several of
which are similar to those mentioned above, but in addition there is clarification
of ‘like circumstances’ with respect to national and most-favoured-nation treat-
ment, requiring that the tribunal must take into account certain factors, including
the effects of the investment on the environment.155 The Model Agreement also
delves into issues of procedural reform, and goes much further in this respect than
the NAFTA or any other agreement. Importantly, it calls for the development of a
standing roster of arbitrators, an appellate body, and a legal assistance centre.
However, far more innovative than the textual clarifications and procedural re-
forms in the IISD Model is the addition of a section on investor obligations as well
as one on home state obligations. With regard to the environment, the obligations
include compliance with environmental screening criteria and EIA procedures,
and maintenance of an environmental management system (e.g., ISO 14000).156
Such measures are, of course, open to criticism (see discussion in Section 2.2.3).
On the most fundamental level one has to question whether these provisions will
achieve anything more than the status quo. Many corporations already hold ISO
14000 certification, and EIAs are common procedures in many developing coun-
tries and are requirements in any projects funded or insured by the World Bank
Group. As Leubuscher points out, EIAs in developing countries are typically car-
ried out by private consultancies paid for by the investor, in some cases with lim-
ited reference to peer-reviewed literature and questionable methodology.157 Dif-
ficulty also lies in the monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations
after the project has been initiated.158 As an NGO report points out, the IISD
153Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 205.
154IISD Model International Investment Agreement for Sustainable Development, 2005,
http://www.iisd.org/investment/model agreement.asp.
155IISD Model Agreement, at Art. 5E.
156Ibid., at Art. 12 and 14.
157Leubuscher 2004, at 281.
158Onwuekwe 2006, at 121.
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model also fails to give civil society any significant new powers and only requires
that governments set up national contact points for investigations into concerns
raised by individuals or civil society groups about investor conduct.159
A writer from the NGO Public Citizen has stated that the IISD Model “is an
attempt to create a ‘kinder, gentler’ version of the same bad rules.”160 But even if
one makes a less harsh assessment of the IISD Model, a further crucial question
to be raised is whether it is realistic. As Wade points out, “[i]t is easy to say that
‘the international economic regime must be changed, developing countries should
be given...” but “[t]he politics are another matter.”161 History tells the same story;
given the fate of both the UNCTC and the MAI, one would have to expect that
there would be a concerted lobbying effort on the part of the business community
to tank the proposal for a sustainable investment agreement if one were ever seri-
ously contemplated. William A. Reinsch, President of the National Foreign Trade
Council, has commented that the requirement in the IISD Model to exhaust do-
mestic remedies before accessing arbitration would create a formidable hurdle to
foreign investors, since “the domestic judicial system in many developing coun-
tries is corrupt, inefficient, and/or inexperienced.” He further states that “it is not
a corporation’s responsibility to act as a shadow government, as it would have to
under this model agreement.”162
Given the position of the business lobby, there is likely to be opposition from
developed countries to any new project for the adoption of a sustainable invest-
ment agreement, but a further stumbling block is the current position of develop-
ing countries. Cho and Dubash argue that the posture of developing countries in
the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on investment in the WTO is “strictly
defensive” and suggest that “the refusal to negotiate is a tactic that may miss
potential opportunities for integrating investment into a sustainable development
agenda.”163 In addition to the poor prognosis for the IISD Model being adopted,
there is also the issue of whether, if it were adopted, it would actually replace
the existing bilateral and regional arrangements, or rather add yet another layer of
159Anderson and Grusky 2007, at 25.
160Ibid.
161Wade 2005, at 98.
162Qtd. in Anderson and Grusky 2007, at 25.
163Cho and Dubash 2005, at 175-6.
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governance to an already complex and confusing system.
Salgado concludes that the IISD Model is “not a panacea to all legal chal-
lenges in international investment law,” but is certainly “the best alternative cur-
rently available.”164 Most significantly, while it is unlikely to be adopted at the
multilateral level in the near future, it may have value as a template for the devel-
opment of more balanced bilateral and regional agreements.165
While the IISD Model is perhaps the best known initiative in the area, it is not
the only one. The Venezuelan government has also proposed its own alternative
trade and investment agreement. The Alternativa Bolivariana para las Ame´ricas
(ALBA) is an international cooperation organization based upon the idea of social,
political, and economic integration between the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean. Largely a vision of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, the ALBA
was initially proposed as an alternative to the FTAA. As a first step toward greater
integration a trade agreement, known as the People’s Trade Agreement (PTA or
TCP in Spanish), has been signed by Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba. The PTA
is aimed not at liberalizing trade or reducing tariffs, but at lowering poverty rates
and spurring sustainable development.166 The agreement “reasserts public control
over the economy and attempts to recast the role of the corporation from that of
‘master’ to ‘partner’ in a process of sustainable development.”167 As one would
expect, there is no recourse to international arbitration for investors provided in
the agreement; disputes are to be resolved in local courts. On a broader level, the
agreement addresses the issue of state capacity through the transfer of resources to
the most underdeveloped countries through a Compensatory Fund for Structural
Convergence.168
164Salgado 2006, at 1066.
165According to the IISD, cited in Anderson and Grusky 2007, at 25, a number of developing countries
are looking carefully at the Model, with a view to incorporating the provisions into BITS.
166
“Bolivia Advocates Alternative Vision for Trade and Integration,” Upside Down World website, 11
July 2006, http://upsidedownworld.org.
167Ibid.
168
“What is the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean?” Venezuelan Bank of
External Commerce, 5 February 2004, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com.
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7.4.3 Opting Out?
It has been argued by Werner that:
One of the great fallacies of international relationships is a determinist belief
that economic and political circumstances in fact dictate countries’ policies,
leaving them with no real choice. Quite to the contrary. Countries, like
people, always have choices even if some are more difficult and painful
than others, and countries dissatisfied with the way investment arbitration
functions can opt out of it.169
In the past year, several governments have indicated that they may do just that. A
significant degree of unease with the institution of investment protection has arisen
in several states, largely a result of the precipitous rise in investor-state disputes.
However, in some areas of the world, such as Latin-America, this development
also reflects broader political and ideological shifts that have taken place.
Argentina has faced more arbitration cases, and awards against it, than any
other country in the world. It is therefore unsurprising that the government has
begun to assess the options for avoiding the payment of current awards, and pre-
cluding the possibility of future ones.170 At first the government adopted a legal
strategy, canceling the national decree that authorized the submission of disputes
to international arbitration and proposing a bill that would give ultimate control
of cases to the national courts.171 The country is also now adopting a diplo-
matic strategy and has announced that it will request that the US, the home-state
of a number of investors currently pursuing arbitration, “formally recognize Ar-
gentina’s right to declare its 2001-2002 financial meltdown an emergency event
that permitted it to break contracts otherwise protected by a U.S.-Argentine in-
vestment treaty.”172
In Bolivia, there is an effort to lobby the Constitutional Assembly, which is
currently rewriting the country’s Constitution, to make it explicit that foreign in-
169Werner 2003, at 769, emphasis added.
170As of October 2007, awards against the country totalled US$750 million and more than 30 claims
remained outstanding. See “Argentina Seeks Diplomatic Exit From ICSID Suits,” Dow Jones
Newswires, 12 October 2007.
171Shan 2007, at 643. See also Alfaro 2004.
172
“Argentina Seeks Diplomatic Exit From ICSID Suits,” Dow Jones Newswires, 12 October 2007.
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vestors must obey national laws and resolve their disputes in domestic courts.173
The government has also announced its desire to renegotiate investment treaties
with 24 countries, including the US, Brazil, and France.174 Bolivia is also the first
country to formally withdraw from the ICSID Convention.175 In explaining the
withdrawal, the country’s trade ambassador Pablo Solon was quoted as stating that
international arbitration through the World Bank is expensive and biased against
developing countries.176
The Bolivian President, Evo Morales, has also been encouraging his neigh-
bours, particularly Venezuela and Ecuador, to follow suit. In a statement made
at a meeting of the leaders of the three countries, Morales stated: “[We] emphati-
cally reject the legal, media and diplomatic pressure of some multinationals that ...
resist sovereign rulings of countries, making threats and initiating suits in interna-
tional arbitration.”177 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has vowed to withdraw
from ICSID, as well as from the rest of the World Bank and the IMF, although
the move is currently on hold while the finance ministry analyzes the impact on
the country’s outstanding debt.178 Ecuador’s former President Alfredo Palacio
very vocally rejected arbitration in a case with a US oil company.179 The US
froze talks on a free trade agreement with the country as a result 180 and the IMF
expressed “concern” about the economic impacts of the move.181 In May 2007,
the new President Rafael Correa announced that he would not renew the BIT be-
tween Ecuador and the US. The country’s Foreign Minister said that the treaty had
173
“Peru, Columbia Trade Deals Would Lock in More Bad Investment Rules,” Foreign Policy in Focus
Report, 18 December 2006.
174
“Bolivia Plans to Renegotiate Investment Protection Pacts with 24 Countries,” Forbes, 9 May 2007.
175According to the ICSID website, the World Bank received a written notice of denunciation of the
Convention from the Republic of Bolivia on 2 May 2007. In accordance with Art. 71 of the
ICSID Convention, the denunciation takes effect six months after the receipt of a party’s notice of
withdrawal, which in this case was 3 November 2007.
176
“Bolivia Will Withdraw from Dispute Panel, Solon Says,” Bloomberg, 31 May 2007.
177
“Latin Leftists Mull Quitting World Bank Arbitrator,” Reuters, 30 April 2007.
178
“World Bank Withdrawal Latest Latin Headache for Big Oil,” MarketWatch, 30 May 2007.
179
“Ecuador Prez: No Oxy Arbitration,” Prensa Latina, 9 September 2006; “Ecuador Rejects Arbitra-
tion Demand by Occidental,” MarketWatch, 23 May 2006.
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caused problems for the country and did not respect national interests.182 More
recently, the country notified ICSID that it would not submit to the jurisdiction of
the Centre in any future oil or mining disputes.183
Countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia have also been the target of
numerous arbitral claims. In 2006, the Czech Republic announced its intention
to terminate or renegotiate its investment agreements with other EU members, as
well as some 40 BITs with non-EU countries.184 In November 2006, a website
of the government of Uzbekistan reportedly stated that the government would
not recognize rulings made by international arbitral tribunals. The Constitutional
Court apparently adopted an amendment to the 1994 law on foreign investment
that would invalidate rulings made outside the country and without the consent
of the government. The move followed a threat of arbitration from the American
mining company Newmont.185
There are also several examples of states refusing to pay damages awarded
to investors, and state courts refusing to enforce awards. As noted in Box 6.2,
Indonesia fought against the enforcement of the Kahara Bodas award in several
courts. Chung notes that Pakistan and Russia have also had such cases, and that
their efforts to have awards annulled or set aside “have consequently drawn criti-
cism for undermining international investment as a whole.”186
However, it is not only developing and transition countries that are increas-
ingly concerned about arbitration. Shan argues that there has been a resurgence
of the Calvo doctrine and a weakening of the neoliberal high standard investment
protection agenda, particularly in Latin America, but also in other parts of the
world, including, surprisingly, in the US Congress.187 Gagne´ and Morin also point
out that in the negotiations for the recent US-Australia FTA, the Australian gov-
ernment “consistently rejected US demands for an investor-state mechanism,” and
182
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183The notification was received on 4 December 2007, http://icsid.worldbank.org.
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360 New Developments
apparently the US conceded to this position without much resistance.188 Shan ar-
gues that the debate has shifted in recent years from “‘strong states’ versus ‘weak
states’ (i.e., a ‘North-South divide’), towards ‘state sovereignty’ versus ‘corpo-
rate sovereignty’ (i.e., a ‘Private-Public debate’)” and reasons that this shift offers
an opportunity for states to agree to a deal that strikes a better balance between
investment protection and investment regulation.189 However, others suggest that
the North-South divide remains, and that what is in fact emerging is a double stan-
dard; in developed countries, arbitration is still viewed as ‘good’ when it corrects
misbehavior by foreign (developing) host states, but as undesirable when their
own behaviour is challenged.190 The absence of an investor-state mechanism in
the US-Australia FTA appears to exemplify this double-standard.
Finally, multinational corporations may also be starting to question the value
of international arbitration. Peterson argues that Bechtel, which was involved
in Bolivia’s ‘Water War’ (see brief discussion of case in Section 7.1.3), “bought
themselves at least $25 million worth of bad publicity.” 191 When the suit became
known to the public, the company was “bombarded with thousands of emails and
letters, facing scores of protests outside their headquarters along with receiving
largely negative coverage in the international media.”192 A UK supermarket chain
that pursued arbitration against the impoverished country of Guyana dealt with a
similar backlash, and eventually dropped its case as a result.193 As civil society
becomes more aware of international investment arbitration, the negative implica-
tions of bringing claims, particularly for large multinationals, is likely to increase.
188Gagne´ and Morin 2006, at 372.
189Shan 2007, at 664.
190Alvarez and Park 2003, at 368-9.
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193The Big Food Group sought compensation for a sugar business that was nationalized in 1975. See
Hamilton and Rochwerger 2005, at 22-3.
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7.5 Implications for Environmental Governance
This section addresses the issue of whether the new developments discussed in
this chapter will remedy the problems raised in earlier chapters with respect to
environmental governance, particularly in developing countries.
7.5.1 Cosmetic Changes
As noted above, there have been efforts in recent BITs and FTAs to clarify certain
substantive provisions that in theory would make it less likely that environmental
regulations will be challenged in investor-state arbitration. However, these adjust-
ments are relatively minor and fail to address many of the issues raised in this
study.
Firstly, the changes do not make investment arbitration more predictable. While
many awards are now published, confidentiality is still pervasive and nothing has
been done to make arbitrators more accountable. Furthermore, the clarifications
to regulative rules, such as fair and equitable treatment and expropriation, remain
open to a significant degree of interpretation. As such, even under re-modelled
BITs, threats to arbitrate will remain potent.
Secondly, the new generation of BITs represents only a small subset of exist-
ing IIAs, and Europeans have failed to follow the North American lead in adjust-
ing their models.194 Gantz notes that as a result the American business community
now feels that they are at a disadvantage compared to their European competi-
tors.195 Some arbitrators and authors have also taken exception with the changes
introduced in the new generation of IIAs, in particular with the modifications to
the fair and equitable treatment standard, arguing that it is an “exercise which,
in the large, constitutes a regressive, rather than progressive, development of in-
ternational law.”196 If there is a negative reaction to the rather minor substantive
changes made in recent BITs and FTAs, a multilateral agreement along the lines
of an IISD Model seems very unlikely indeed.
194Van Harten 2007a, at 164.
195Gantz 2004, at 764-5.
196Schwebel 2006, at 7.
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Thirdly, tinkering with the existing models may go some way toward reduc-
ing the number of disputes, but it will not redress the fundamental imbalance
between investor rights and responsibilities. Cle´menc¸on, for example, argues that
the “elimination of legal compatibility problems alone is not a panacea for making
an investment agreement compatible with sustainable development.”197 Similarly,
Shan notes that the new generation of BITs:
demonstrate only small changes...[and] do not alter the fundamental charac-
ter of these investment treaties as quintessential liberalist instruments, which
only protect and ‘empower’ investors without sufficient consideration of the
rights of host states and the duties of the investors.”198
Shan therefore concludes that, “[t]o fully address the problem of the imbalance
of rights and obligations between investors and states, a more radical, and even
revolutionary solution is needed.”199
Finally, what is striking about all of the reforms that have been made and about
the major proposals that have been suggested for further reform is that they appear
to be motivated solely in response to developed country concerns and do little
to address the disparities between developed and developing countries that are
faced with disputes. This is particularly evident in the EIAs conducted by the US
and Canada, which fail to even consider the environmental impacts of American
and Canadian investments abroad, making them little more than a public relations
exercise. Only the IISD model addresses developing country issues, for example,
in proposing the development of a legal assistance centre, an idea that will be
revisited in Section 8.2.2.
7.5.2 The Voice of NGOs: Counterhegemonic or Co-Opted?
With the initiatives of NGOs and the subsequent support of some states, there
have been changes in the arbitration process to allow for greater transparency and
participation by third parties in investor-state disputes. Thus far, the reforms have
been largely ad hoc, though it seems unlikely that future tribunals will go against
197Cle´menc¸on 2000, at 215.
198Shan 2007, at 656.
199Ibid.
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the general trend in this area. While there is no formal stare decisis in investment
arbitration, tribunals often refer to past decisions made in other cases, and diverg-
ing sharply from the reasoning of the numerous tribunals that have laid out guide-
lines for the submission of amicus curiae briefs would require strong justification.
Furthermore, it is evident that there is a fervent desire within the international ar-
bitration community to dispel the popular concerns about the secretive nature of
the investment arbitration process.
From a neo-Gramscian perspective, the permitting of NGO participation in in-
vestment arbitration could seen be an attempt at transformismo. Since the demise
of the MAI in 1998, it has been recognized that NGOs could play an important role
in opposing the negotiation of IIAs and pressuring investors to back down from
controversial disputes. Furthermore, arbitrators have recognized that the public
perceives the arbitration process as secretive and lacking legitimacy. In allowing
NGOs to be directly involved, arbitrators may hope to achieve both a silencing of
counterhegemonic voices and increased public acceptance of arbitration.
Because submitting an amicus curiae brief generally requires familiarity with
the complex and technical legal aspects of investment law, only a small group of
(generally legally-oriented international) NGOs will be able to participate effec-
tively. Local NGOs will likely participate only with assistance from this group,
and it is possible that their voices will be diluted in the process. Furthermore, it
is notable that the group of NGOs that most actively participates in arbitration as
well as in other relevant fora (e.g., UNCITRAL sessions) are very moderate in
their approach. These NGOs take pains to argue that they see foreign investment
as essential for the achievement of sustainable development and that they do not,
in principle, oppose investor-state dispute settlement.
The question is not whether these NGOs are well-intentioned, as they most
certainly are. The question is whether their efforts are actually affecting the out-
come of disputes, or are simply helping to sustain the system of arbitration by
reducing the public unease which surrounds it. In a discussion of amicus curiae
briefs at a seminar at the University of Amsterdam, one participant dismissively
remarked that “nobody reads them.”200 However, the Methanex Tribunal’s refer-
ral to the IISD’s submission, albeit brief, suggests that such a conclusion may be
200Seminar on Investment Law, University of Amsterdam, 12 February 2007.
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premature. Further research is required to establish the impact that amicus curiae
briefs have on the outcome of specific cases and to assess how the participation of
third parties affects public perceptions of the legitimacy of investment arbitration
(see Section 8.3.3).
7.5.3 Discontent in the Periphery
As Sornarajah points out, “[i]n matters relating to foreign investment, events move
in a cyclical fashion. The period of euphoria for foreign investment and liberaliza-
tion of regimes is usually followed by disenchantment.”201 The last two decades of
the 20th Century were certainly a euphoric period for foreign investment. How-
ever, at least in some parts of the world, disenchantment has now firmly set in.
This is most evident in Latin America, where several countries are actively rene-
gotiating contracts with large TNCs, and in some cases even carrying out nation-
alization programs (e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela). These countries have
had experience with investment arbitration, and have decided that it is an unfair
and biased system. However, at the same time many countries in Africa, such as
Ghana, are increasing investment protection, for example, by providing commit-
ments to stability (see Section 6.1.2). Thus, it would appear that the hegemony
of the transnational historic bloc is uneven. In some parts of the world it retains
a fairly firm grip, while in other parts there is evidence of a counterhegemonic
movement.
It is worth emphasizing that the disputes that have garnered the most signif-
icant attention and the most vocal responses in developing countries have con-
cerned politically salient issues (e.g., over privatization of utilities). When an
investor challenges an issue ‘at the heart of a government’s mandate’, the govern-
ment is less likely to acquiesce then when it challenges an issue of lesser concern.
When the rejection of disciplinary neoliberalism is only a response to economi-
cally significant and politically sensitive disputes, then the benefits may not spill
over into the environmental arena. In fact, a negative experience in arbitration may
make a government more prone to settle ‘less important’ conflicts with investors
(e.g., see Section 6.1.5). However, if a state more broadly denounces investment
201Sornarajah 2003, at 178.
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protection (e.g., non-renewal of BITs, withdrawal from ICSID) then all disputes,
including those that relate to environmental issues, will be returned to local courts.
7.6 Summary
This chapter has discussed recent developments (e.g., changes to arbitral rules
and model agreements) that have occurred as a response to widespread criticism
that investment arbitration is unaccountable and secretive, and to concerns that
investment protection may unduly restrain the regulatory power of states.
The most dramatic changes have occurred in the procedures of investment
arbitration. Many arbitral awards are now made publicly available, and amicus
curiae submissions to tribunals are becoming more frequent. Some countries, par-
ticularly Canada and the US, have also revised their model BITs and have taken up
the practice of conducting EIAs of new investment agreements. However, these
changes are largely cosmetic and fail to address the key issues of accountability,
predictability, and the capacity of developing countries to handle disputes. Fur-
thermore, the involvement of NGOs in the arbitration process may only serve to
lend the institution of investment protection an unmerited air of legitimacy.
More substantial proposals for reform, such as the development of an appellate
body or a multilateral investment agreement for sustainable development, were
also discussed. These proposals are limited in both scope and viability. In partic-
ular, it is unlikely in the current political climate that a multilateral agreement on
investment - sustainable or not - could be negotiated.
Finally, it was argued that there are indications that disciplinary neoliberalism
is falling out of favour with some peripheral governments, particularly in Latin
America. However, the backlash against investment protection will only have
implications for environmental governance if it is uniform, and not restricted to
disputes over the economic returns from natural resource exploitation.
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Conclusions 8
In this concluding chapter, it is argued that with the advent of the institution of
investment protection and the expansion of substantive norms and rules within
this institution to cover aspects of environmental protection, elements of environ-
mental governance have been taken over, or expropriated, by international arbitral
tribunals. It is further argued that the institution of investment protection lacks
balance and proportionality, and consequently several proposals to bring symme-
try to the institution are made. Reflections on the implications of the study for
international relations theory and suggestions for areas of future research are also
provided.
8.1 The Expropriation of Environmental Governance
Traditionally, the resolution of environmental conflicts between investors and states
has been kept largely within the purview of the political and judicial organs of the
state. With the advent of the institution of investment protection, and with the
expansion of substantive norms and rules of this institution to cover aspects of
environmental protection, elements of environmental governance have arguably
been expropriated by international arbitral tribunals. While the term expropria-
tion is most commonly associated with the actions of states, its plain meaning
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refers to any action to deprive another of a possession (including intangibles such
as rights or ideas).1 To expropriate is to annex, to appropriate, to commandeer, to
confiscate, to dispossess, to sequester, to take, or to take over.2 Arbitral tribunals
have expropriated the authority to determine when an environmental policy or
court decision is legitimate. This is not necessarily a role that was freely bestowed
upon them; in fact, this study submits that some of the effects of the institution of
investment protection were unintended and unanticipated by states.
Some observers suggest that the concerns of environmentalists over invest-
ment arbitration are unnecessarily alarmist, and liken them to those of Chicken
Little, who declared that the sky was falling when it was not.3 By focusing on
individual cases and arguing either that the tribunal made a good decision or that
the dispute was not really about the environment, these observers tend to miss the
bigger picture. As Sornarajah has pointed out in the context of the trade regime,
the fact that a decision in a given case is supportable from an environmental per-
spective is immaterial: “The point is whether the dispute was one which should
have been disposed of by a trade tribunal when it raised issues which transcended
trade matters and implicated interests of concern to the international community
at large.”4 A fortiori, this concern also exists with regard to the institution of in-
vestment protection where issues of accountability are manifold. Arbitrators in
the WTO system are not chosen by the parties to the dispute and cannot act as the
legal representation for the parties in other arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, in
the trade regime, disputes can only be brought by states who bear an equal risk of
having disputes brought against themselves, unlike the one-way system of invest-
ment arbitration, which only allows for states to be punished and private actors to
be rewarded.
Three claims are made in this section. First, it is argued that the expropriation
1
“Expropriation,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary.
2Roget’s New Millennium Thesaurus, First Edition, 2007.
3Lilley 2002, at 728; Laird 2001. See also Behrens 2007, at 178, who notes that the “popular
fears that host states who have tied their hands by investment protection treaties might be limited
to promote, e.g., environmental protection only at the cost of compensating foreign investors, are
entirely unjustified.”
4Sornarajah 2002, at 99.
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of environmental governance by arbitral tribunals has led, or will lead, to a loss of
democratic accountability in environmental decision-making. Second, it is argued
that the institution of investment protection has shifted a significant degree of the
risk that is inherent in foreign investment from investors to host states and has
created considerable uncertainty for regulators. Finally, it is argued that the direct
disciplining of states in arbitration, and the indirect influence that arbitration has
on regulators, will lead to a decrease in the amount, and/or the effectiveness, of
environmental regulation produced in developing countries. It is concluded that
there is insufficient evidence that states have been compensated for these losses by
increased flows of foreign investment that will support sustainable development.
8.1.1 Less Democratic Accountability
The expansion of the institution of investment protection to the point where it may
interfere with public policy development has not only taken environmental regu-
lators unawares, it has also shocked the general public, who expect their govern-
ment to be accountable to them rather than to foreign corporations and enigmatic
tribunals. Traditionally, in international law and international relations states are
considered the loci of power and authority. The protection of foreign investment
through international, regional, and bilateral agreements and through state con-
tracts shifts some of this power and authority to arbitral tribunals. That arbitrators
are resolving disputes of great public importance is not novel per se; they have had
a long and significant role in the resolution of both inter-firm (commercial) and
inter-state disputes. However, what is novel is the ease by which private actors,
vested with international legal rights, but not responsibilities, are able to directly
initiate arbitration against sovereign states. Of further significance is the breadth
of the investment arbitrators’ jurisdiction and the elevation of dispute resolution
to a governance system aimed at ‘regulating the regulators’.5
It is acceptable in democratic countries for domestic courts to check the power
of the legislature, because the judiciary is considered reasonably free from politi-
cal influence.6 On the other hand, as a governance system, investment arbitration
is fundamentally undemocratic and its neutrality is questionable. The procedural
5Head 2007, at 515.
6Van Harten 2007a, at 168.
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rules and norms of investment protection were established to deal with commer-
cial disputes where confidentiality was considered paramount, and consistency
irrelevant. Such a system is inappropriate when states are involved in disputes
and especially when sensitive issues of public policy, such as environmental reg-
ulation, are at stake. How can a system that is itself experiencing a ‘legitimacy
crisis’ possibly be suited to making decisions on the legitimacy of democratically
elected governments and domestic judicial systems? Supporters may argue that
the system of investment arbitration is, despite having existed for decades, still
in its infancy (or at most early childhood) given that it has only been frequently
put to use in the last ten to fifteen years. However, while some procedural flaws
may be eliminated with time, and while the reasoning of tribunals may become
more nuanced with the increased scrutiny that awards are likely to receive, a ‘wait
and see’ attitude is cold comfort for states faced with the prospect of (numerous)
economically significant awards being decided against them.
While there has been considerable focus on the lack of transparency and par-
ticipation in the arbitration process in this study, it must also be emphasized that
these elements are absent or limited in other areas as well. As noted, state con-
tracts are frequently negotiated and signed without the involvement of parliament
or the disclosure of the agreement to the public. The typical justification given by
governments for confidentiality of contracts is that disclosure would negatively
affect their bargaining power in future contract negotiations. However, as a guide
produced by the IMF notes, the terms of a contract are likely to be widely known
within the industry soon after signing, and:
Little by way of strategic advantage thus seems to be lost through publica-
tion of contracts. Indeed, it could be argued that the obligation to publish
contracts should in fact strengthen the hand of the government in negoti-
ations, since the obligation to disclose the outcome to the legislature and
the general public increases pressure on the government to negotiate a good
deal.7
In fact, in some sectors, such as petroleum and gas, contracts are available through
expensive subscription services.8 This type of system ensures that companies and
7IMF 2007, at 17.
8See, e.g., http://www.barrowscompany.com.
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elite law firms will have access to contracts, while civil society and academic re-
searchers will not. As a result, there is reduced accountability of both governments
and foreign investors. As one NGO report points out:
Without public scrutiny of foreign investment contracts, it is impossible for
citizens to judge whether or not their elected governments are acting in their
best interests and effectively pursuing or meeting public policy goals. It is
also impossible for them properly to hold their governments to account for
consequences of foreign direct investment.9
In addition to being negotiated in fundamentally undemocratic ways, IIAs and
state contracts also bind governments for long periods of time. Hence, the min-
istries that sign these agreements are ‘locking-in’ other ministries and future gov-
ernments to the institution of investment protection. Governments may therefore
be legitimately constrained in their responses to democratic demands. However,
commitments to investment protection also give governments a way to avoid do-
mestic political backlash to unpopular decisions. The ability of governments to
utilize commitments to investment protection as political cover, which is enhanced
when the details of commitments are not publicly disclosed from the outset, ar-
guably reduces the democratic accountability of government decisions.
8.1.2 Less Certainty for Regulators
While it is certainly not possible to predict with perfect accuracy the outcome
of dispute resolution in any context – if it were, we would not need judges –
uncertainty in the system of investment arbitration is particularly pronounced.
The regulative rules and norms of investment protection are ambiguous, and
vary in their specific wording from treaty to treaty. When arbitral tribunals attempt
to throw light upon the meaning of these rules and norms, their interpretations are
controversial and inconsistent. Transparency is increasing, but confidentiality is
still ubiquitous, making it more difficult for states to evaluate how disputes have
been treated in arbitration. Furthermore, states may not even be aware when an
investor is actually protected by an IIA, as opposed to when a threat of arbitration
9Ayine et al. 2005, at 3.
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is a bluff. While state contracts are made directly with a specific investor, regard-
ing a specific project, IIAs cover a vast number of unknown potential investors.
With mergers, frequent changes in ownership, and TNCs able to relocate to take
advantage of ‘flags of convenience’, states may be understandably uncertain about
the validity of investor claims.
As a result of decreased certainty, a substantial portion of the risk that is asso-
ciated with investing abroad, particularly in developing countries, has been shifted
to regulators. Of course, investors cannot be certain that they will succeed in ar-
bitration or that, if they are successful, the level of compensation will be fair and
promptly paid. Arbitration is also risky for investors who wish to continue op-
erating in a specific country, or region: just as governments can acquire a bad
reputation with investors, so too can investors acquire a bad reputation with gov-
ernments. However, clearly the risks of investing have been diminished. It is,
after all, the main purpose of the institution of investment protection to promote
investment flows by reducing political risk. Risks for foreign investors are also
minimized by investment insurance and other mechanisms. On the other hand,
states that already risk the loss of resources (with often unfair returns), and serious
environmental harm, now additionally risk being sued in international arbitration.
When the outcome of arbitration is uncertain, states that are faced with a threat of
arbitration are more likely to settle, often at the expense of public policy.
8.1.3 Less (Effective) Environmental Regulation
Environmental regulators appear to be particularly susceptible to conflicts with
investors because environmental standards do, and must, constantly change and
evolve, and because the implementation of environmental policy often involves
significant costs. The institution of investment protection does not categorically
reject the right of states to regulate investment for the protection of the environ-
ment, and in fact, many IIAs explicitly confirm this right. However, arbitral tri-
bunals have taken on the role of deciding how and when a government should
enforce this right. In the view of many tribunals, governments should only adopt
policies that are least inconsistent with investment protection, have been devel-
oped through a process that is predictable and transparent, when a substantial
amount of scientific evidence supports action. These criteria do not hold universal
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acceptance amongst arbitrators, but governments that do not follow this formula
risk being disciplined in arbitration.
Additionally, investment protection, and stabilization clauses in particular may
limit the number of tools in the ‘policy toolbox’. For example, stability of the fis-
cal regime might preclude the use of a market mechanism to tackle environmental
pollution. If investment protection limits the range of instruments available to reg-
ulators, then this may in turn result in a reduction of the effectiveness or efficiency
of the policies produced.
Finally, in addition to directly castigating states, arbitrators also influence reg-
ulators and judges. Just as any good judicial system will prevent as well as punish
crime, the system of investment arbitration dissuades regulatory or judicial mis-
conduct by states. The problem is that it may also deter policy development and
court proceedings that are in the interests of the public good. Environmental min-
istries, agencies, and even domestic courts may be voluntarily giving up some
degree of responsibility for the governance of the environment out of fear that
their policies and decisions will be challenged in arbitration (regulatory and ju-
dicial chill). Those wishing to maintain the status quo in environmental policy,
whether it be investors or non-environmental government agencies, can exploit
these fears to their advantage.
8.1.4 Compensation?
One could nevertheless conclude that the transfer of some authority to interna-
tional tribunals is a “small price, if any price at all, to pay for the numerous
benefits of international trade and investment.”10 But where is the proof of the
benefits of investment protection? Establishing a causal connection between the
conclusion of IIAs and increased foreign investment flows is riddled with diffi-
culty and remains contested in the literature (see Section 1.1.1). Furthermore, any
gains made by developing countries in attracting investment through IIAs will be
largely at the expense of other developing countries, because the system is based
on competition, and thus overall welfare will not improve even if specific flows
increase.11
10Laird 2001, at 229.
11Guzman 1998, at 688.
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Then there is the question of the actual benefit to the host state of increased
inflows of foreign investment if they do materialize. In particular, there is the
issue of the value of foreign investment in the form that is promoted in IIAs and
state contracts, given the fact that these agreements seem to emphasize the encour-
agement of foreign investment as if it were an end in itself, rather than a means
to achieving sustainable development.12 It is suggested here that it cannot be as-
sumed that foreign investment will generally promote sustainable development,
particularly as long as the fundamentally asymmetrical institution of investment
protection remains in place.
8.2 Bringing Symmetry to the Institution of Investment
Protection
In this section, it is argued that the institution of investment protection produces or
exacerbates power differences between certain individuals and groups in both the
global context and within a state.13 Following this, recommendations that would
bring a greater degree of symmetry to the institution are made.
8.2.1 The Asymmetry of Investment Protection
The asymmetry of investment protection is most evident in the comparison of the
benefits and consequences of the institution for:
• Foreign investors and states;
• Foreign investors and ‘everyone else’;
• Arbitral tribunals and governments;
• National and lower levels of government within a state;
• Economic and environmental ministries within a state; and
• Developed and developing countries.
12Garcı´a-Bolı´var 2005, at 754.
13For an alternative view of the asymmetries of investment arbitration, see Wa¨lde 2007, at 54-67.
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Foreign Investors and States
The first asymmetry produced, between foreign investors and states, concerns an
imbalance between rights and obligations. In this study, the numerous IIAs, state
contracts, and the system of investment arbitration have been classified as com-
posing the institution of investment protection because this title conveys the fun-
damental one-sidedness of protecting investors but not obliging them to take on
any responsibilities, and conversely obliging states to behave in a given manner,
but not protecting them from harm that an investor may cause. This asymmetry is
often justified as a means to redress the existing imbalance between the power of
states and the power of investors. In this view, the state as ‘leviathan’ can easily
crush the unsuspecting foreign investor. However, in reality the picture is quite
dramatically different; over one third of the world’s 100 largest economies are
corporations, not states. Developing countries are especially vulnerable because
they are desperate to attract investors in order to finance development.
Wa¨lde argues that large corporations rarely use investment arbitration because
they don’t need to (i.e. they have leverage to negotiate and expertise in the man-
agement of risks) and they don’t want to (i.e. because it may poison their relations
with host states).14 However, he does admit that arbitration can be useful as a
“bargaining card” for multinationals. The fact that large multinationals may only
use investment protection as a bargaining card does not eliminate this asymmetry.
Indeed, the cases discussed in this study have shown that the threat of arbitration
can be as, or more, obstructive to policy development than its actual use.
As a result of the incongruence between rights and obligations, investors do
not face a strong risk of counterclaims being brought against them and are, there-
fore, more likely to abuse the arbitration system and make spurious allegations
against states. Arbitration is expensive, but just initiating a claim, or threatening
to do so, costs very little.
Foreign Investors and Everyone Else
The second fundamental asymmetry that is brought about by investment protec-
tion occurs between foreign investors and everyone else, including domestic in-
14Wa¨lde 2007, at 62.
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vestors. Domestic investors are not offered the same level of protection as foreign
investors who are entitled to fair and equitable and most favoured nation treat-
ment in addition to national treatment. Domestic investors are also not offered
stability agreements, which arguably could give foreign investors a significant
competitive advantage. Finally, domestic investors are not provided with access
to international arbitration in the event of a conflict. Thus for all the emphasis on
non-discrimination, the institution of investment protection clearly discriminates
against domestic investors in favour of foreign ones. Again, the arguments to jus-
tify this, that domestic investors are familiar with the local court system and will
therefore fare better in it, or that domestic investors are more likely to curry favour
with their own government, and in any case have the right to vote in general elec-
tions, are not particularly convincing. Xenophobia may certainly work against
foreign corporations, but domestic companies also face their own challenges and
are generally smaller and less powerful than TNCs. Furthermore, domestic com-
panies do not have the option of exit and therefore must rely solely on the strategy
of voice.
However, it is not only domestic investors who are disenfranchised in interna-
tional law. Even more significantly, indigenous peoples, local communities and
other individuals who suffer human rights abuses (including the denial of the right
to a healthy environment) at the hands of either a state or a corporation, lack the
necessary means to redress the wrongs that are committed against them. Human
rights treaties are nowhere near as prevalent as IIAs, are much more difficult for
individuals to access, require the exhaustion of local remedies, and do not hold
non-state actors accountable for violations.15 While it is not suggested here that
the institution of investment protection should be designed to redress all wrongs
done to all peoples, greater balance – achieved either through a strengthening of
the rights of others or a reduction of the rights of investors – would contribute
to the maintenance of a stable international order. The current asymmetry leaves
open the question of why one class of individuals are singled out for preferen-
tial treatment. Furthermore, if the institution of investment protection results in
regulatory or judicial chill, or decreases the efficiency and effectiveness of en-
vironmental regulation, then it is not only that foreign investors are given more
15Kriebaum 2007, at 186; Sornarajah 1997, at 134.
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favourable treatment, it is that this treatment is given at the expense of the well-
being of others.
Arbitral Tribunals and Governments
A third asymmetry exists in what is expected of arbitral tribunals and of govern-
ments in the institution of investment protection. It has frequently been argued
that the obligations of states under the institution of investment protection are the
“ingredients of good governance.”16 Such an analysis is appealing. Who, after
all, can argue with the need for greater accountability and transparency in gover-
nance? However, a more critical evaluation reveals that the ingredients of good
governance are selectively applied in the institution of investment protection. In
particular, it does not appear that the principles of transparency, accountability and
participation must apply in contexts that would be disadvantageous to investors,
such as in the negotiation of state contracts or, crucially, in the resolution of dis-
putes.
As Van Harten points out:
Governments are often required to make difficult and controversial decisions
when exercising public authority and their policy choices may in some cases
appear to misapprehend facts, apply misguided theories, emphasize wrong-
headed priorities, or create more problems than they solve. This is in many
ways inherent to the dilemmas of governing.17
It is also the case that, as governors themselves, arbitrators make mistakes, inter-
pret the rules and norms of investment protection in controversial ways, and apply
theories about international law that are not universally accepted. However, while
states are to be held accountable to tribunals, it would appear that arbitrators are
accountable to no one. While states must govern in a transparent and predictable
manner, tribunals may operate behind closed doors and do not have to ensure that
their decisions are consistent with those made is substantively similar cases.
16Dolzer 2005, at 972. See also Newcombe 2007a, at 393; Schill 2007, at 285; Gutbrod and Hindelang
2006, at 82; ILA 2006, at 16; Wa¨lde 2004, at 475.
17Van Harten 2007a, at 89.
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Levels and Sectors of Government within a State
The fourth and fifth asymmetries that are produced, or perhaps more accurately
exacerbated, by the institution of investment protection occur between different
levels and sectors of governance within a state. The national government repre-
sentatives that negotiate state contracts and IIAs are unlikely to be knowledgeable
on environmental issues or sympathetic to the concerns of environmental agencies
and ministries.18 Most environmental regulators will be unaware of the implica-
tions of these agreements until a conflict arises. The already complex balance of
power that exists between various levels and sectors of governance is upset by the
the investment arbitration system that targets one level (national) and reinforces
the power of one sector (economic/industrial).
While state, provincial and municipal levels of government are often accorded
a significant degree of competence over environmental matters, and although de-
centralization is a process occurring in many developing countries, only national
governments have standing in international law. This creates difficulties for both
upper and lower levels of government. Although they are uninvolved in the ne-
gotiations of state contracts and IIAs, unaware of the policy implications of these
agreements, and potentially unable to participate in arbitration, lower levels of
government may be pushed to reverse policies or to pay compensation to foreign
investors who claim breach of treaty or contract. Despite the potential negative
implications for multilevel governance, it must also be acknowledged that it is un-
derstandable that national governments are concerned about being held account-
able in international arbitration for the actions of lower levels of government over
which they may have little control.
In addition to creating tension between levels of governance, conflicts with
investors may also result in ministries and agencies being pitted against one an-
other. A savvy foreign investor will exploit such divisions to his advantage. The
existence of the institution of investment protection gives the investor and his gov-
ernment supporters a distinct advantage over the opposition; even if environmental
regulators are well-advised on the nuances of investment law, they are provided
with little certainty that their policies will stand up under the scrutiny of an ar-
bitral tribunal. Without strong and enforceable international agreements on the
18Tabb 2004, at 27.
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environment or on the conduct of TNCs, environmental regulators are left with no
comparable clout to bolster their position and must rely solely on public pressure
and NGOs for support.
Developed and Developing Countries
The final, and perhaps most significant asymmetry relates to the implications of
the institution of investment protection for developed and for developing coun-
tries. While arguably such asymmetry will exist in any international arrangement
involving developed and developing countries, it is much more conspicuous in
IIAs. This is particularly true for those IIAs that are negotiated bilaterally, leaving
developing countries in the weakest possible bargaining position.19
Developing countries are far more likely to face conflicts with investors over
environmental issues than are developed countries for several reasons. First, en-
vironmental policy is more likely to change in developing countries. Continuous
change is an integral part of environmental governance in any country, but it is
commonly accepted that developing countries, in general, have a lower base-line
of environmental regulation. As a result, there is a greater likelihood of rapid,
and possibly radical, regulatory change in these countries, as awareness increases
and as governments are asked by the international community to ‘catch up’ with
developed country standards. At the same time, it has been emphasized by experts
that change in policy, rather than its absolute level, is the most significant problem
for investors. Thus, change in policy is likely to lead to conflict. A statement by a
Chilean trade official exemplifies this predicament:
Chile is a country where probably there will be quite a lot more regulatory
changes in the future. There is still a lot of work to be done in that area, and
to expose ourselves to the kind of demands by U.S. investors like what has
happened with NAFTA, where the investors say regulatory changes have
been tantamount to indirect expropriation and have demanded huge com-
pensation involving many millions of dollars, well that would be very diffi-
cult for Chile.20
19Ekwueme 2006, at 170-1.
20Qtd. in Been and Beauvais 2003, at 126.
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Secondly, there is less policy coherence in developing countries, meaning that
effective communication between different ministries and different levels of gov-
ernment is often lacking. Policy incoherence may certainly also exist in developed
countries, but it is commonly acknowledged that government agencies in devel-
oping countries are especially underfunded and overstretched, particularly in the
environmental sector. Developing countries that are undergoing a process of de-
centralization are also likely to experience a number of glitches (governance gaps
and overlaps) before the process of multilevel governance starts running smoothly.
Policy incoherence inevitably leads to conflict. If an investor’s ‘legitimate expec-
tations’ are based on the assurances of one governing body, which has not con-
sulted with other relevant bodies, then these expectations are unlikely to be met.
Thirdly, there is a higher instance of corruption in developing countries. Cor-
ruption can result in investors receiving very favourable treatment, particularly
under state contracts that are negotiated in the absence of transparency.21 The
country is subsequently locked-in to this standard of treatment by the institution
of investment protection, even if a new (less corrupt) government is elected. Cor-
ruption, or even the perception of corruption, can also inflame public hostility to
investment projects, which may lead to public protests and, subsequently, conflicts
between the investor and the host state.
Finally, the courts in developing countries are less respected and trusted by
the international community. This is arguably the primary justification for the
development of international investment arbitration in the first place. As a result,
claims brought against foreign investors in domestic courts, for environmental
liability for example, are more likely to be challenged in investment arbitration
for a lack of due process or denial of justice.
In addition to the fact that developing countries are more likely to be con-
fronted with conflicts related to the environment than are developed countries,
it is also argued here that it is more likely that these conflicts will be resolved
in investment arbitration, or that their resolution will be influenced by the threat
of arbitration. Because they are more desperate for capital, developing countries
make more commitments to investment protection, in the hopes that it will foster
increased FDI flows. Furthermore, these commitments are categorical, while de-
21Ayine et al. 2005, at 3, suggest that a “[l]ack of transparency is a breeding ground for corruption.”
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veloped country commitments are illusory so long as IIAs are only negotiated on
the basis of asymmetric flows of FDI. In this respect, the NAFTA is an anomaly.
Developing countries are more likely to be influenced by the threat of arbitration
because of concerns about the cost of arbitration, both in terms of actual financial
costs of lawyer and arbitrator fees and in terms of the cost to their reputation as an
investor-friendly host, and because of their lower technical capacity to deal with
arbitration. For these reasons, developing countries are also more likely to lose
the cases that are brought against them in arbitration.
The discrepancy in the obligations of developed and developing countries un-
der IIAs has been justified by supporters of investment protection by the fact that,
in theory, developed countries already possess a ‘civilized’ system of law and
therefore do not have to be held accountable under international law. Aside from
the extreme arrogance of this claim and the lack of deference that it indicates for
the special situation of developing countries, it also appears to be disproved by the
fact that foreign investors appear eager to pursue arbitration claims against ‘civi-
lized’ countries such as Canada and the US, in the rare instances when they have
the opportunity to do so.
8.2.2 Recommendations
The reforms that have already been adopted or have been proposed by other schol-
ars were analyzed in Chapter 7. In this section, some further recommendations are
made, with a particular view to the asymmetry of investment protection as outlined
above.
With regard to the content of IIAs and state contracts, it is recommended that
states:
• Omit access to investor-state arbitration;
• Omit reference to the international minimum standard/fair and equitable treatment;
• Omit stabilization clauses; and
• Add reference to principles of environmental law.
Additionally, states should increase transparency and participation in con-
tract and treaty negotiation. Developing countries should also make efforts to
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cooperate to a greater extent on investment issues to avoid the bidding wars that
competition for investment can create. Finally, international organizations, re-
search institutions, lawyers, NGOs, and states should collaborate to create a legal
assistance centre for developing countries. Each of these recommendations is
briefly outlined below.
Omit Access to Investor-State Arbitration
Absent the creation of an entirely new mechanism of investor-state dispute set-
tlement, such as the investment court proposed by Van Harten and mentioned in
Section 7.4.1, it would seem that the most sensible option for governments is to
restrict access to arbitration to states only, and provide investors recourse to only
domestic remedies. Such a statement will undoubtedly be met with great conster-
nation from the majority of writers in the investment arbitration field. However, if
it is acceptable for Australia to refuse investor-state arbitration with the US, then
it should be equally acceptable for any developing country to do so. In response,
a supporter of investment protection could argue that the courts in Australia are
equipped to deal fairly and justly with investor-state disputes, while the courts of
many developing countries are not. Even if one accepts this claim, it does not
justify circumventing domestic courts with a completely inadequate international
system. If anything it suggests that countries concerned about how their investors
will be treated in foreign courts should, for example, invest in targeted aid to sup-
port legal education in developing countries.
Omit Reference to the Minimum Standard/Fair and Equitable Treatment
In addition to (or in lieu of) avoiding the current system of investment arbitra-
tion, reference to the international minimum standard/fair and equitable treatment
should not be included in new IIAs. The standard is simply too broad and has
been interpreted too expansively by tribunals. Providing an interpretation of the
standard, as done by the NAFTA Parties, may not eliminate this problem. Equat-
ing the standard with customary international law only opens the door to debate
on what constitutes custom. Given the widespread support, evidenced in the ILA
discussions, for the idea that fair and equitable treatment is essentially equivalent
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to a requirement for good governance, the potential for future claimants to rely
on this standard is significant.22 Furthermore, it does not seem unreasonable to
recommend avoidance of the standard, given that not all IIAs presently include it.
Omit Stabilization Clauses
State contracts, if they are to be employed by states, should not include stabi-
lization clauses or be stabilized through enactment into law. Given the fact that
in many developing countries environmental regulation of foreign investment is
minimal to begin with, agreeing to general or specific commitments to stability of
the environmental regulatory framework could lock a country into deteriorating
environmental conditions. If a developing country is determined to adopt stabil-
ity commitments, then it should, at the very least, frame the clause or agreement
in such a way as to favour renegotiation rather than arbitration. Furthermore, if
investors are really only concerned with the predictability of legislation, and not
with the strictness of it, then they could conceivably agree to stabilize their envi-
ronmental commitments at a higher level (e.g., home country standards) from the
beginning of the contract.
Add Reference to Principles of Environmental Law
When drafting IIAs and state contracts, governments should ensure that it is ex-
plicitly stated that the purpose of these agreements is to promote and protect in-
vestment that contributes to sustainable development. However, considering the
amorphous nature of this concept, governments should also incorporate in the
text of IIAs the most important and relevant principles of international environ-
mental law. It is essential that the precautionary principle be included in IIAs
to ensure that governments will not be punished for being ‘first movers’ on an
issue when scientific evidence remains inconclusive. Additionally, the adoption
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities would support the
acceptance that developing countries, particularly when they face extreme cir-
cumstances (e.g., debt, financial crises), should be given greater leniency. This is
not to say that poor countries should never have to compensate investors, but it
22ILA 2006.
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does signify that factors, such as the country’s ability to pay, should be taken into
consideration. The common but differentiated responsibilities principle, coupled
with the polluter pays principle, is essentially the modern day equivalent of the
appropriate compensation doctrine. However, given the broad acceptance of these
principles by the international community, there is little justification not to include
them in IIAs. In fact, a majority of the delegates that negotiated the Draft MAI
favoured explicit mention of the polluter pays and precautionary principles in the
preamble of that agreement.23
Increase Transparency and Participation in Contract and Treaty Negotiation
The way in which state contracts and IIAs are negotiated must also be reformed.
It is ironic that transparency (on the part of governments) is touted as a key in-
gredient of a friendly investment climate, and yet state contracts with investors
are frequently confidential documents, and negotiations remain a remarkably se-
cretive affair in most countries. While IIAs are public documents, that does not
mean that negotiations are carried out transparently or with the participation of
environmental ministries and agencies and lower levels of government.
Transparency and participation in the negotiation of all state contracts and
IIAs would decrease corruption and policy incoherence, lessening the chance that
investor-state conflicts will arise. In recent years, there have been several inter-
national efforts aimed at increasing transparency in the natural resources sector
(e.g., Publish What You Pay and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive). However, the focus has primarily been on the issue of royalties and the
management of public revenues derived from the sector, rather than on the overall
transparency of contractual and international legal commitments made by govern-
ments.24
23The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1, 22
April 1998, at 8, http://www.oecd.org.
24For information on Publish What You Pay, see www.publishwhatyoupay.org, and on the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative, see www.eitransparency.org
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Promote Cooperation, Rather than Competition
The problem with recommending that developing countries not provide investors
with access to arbitration, and that they eliminate the fair and equitable treatment
standard and stabilization clauses is, of course, that they do not have significant
bargaining power in negotiations with other states or directly with investors. Even
absent any proof of IIAs fostering greater flows of FDI, it is still the case that the
conclusion of an IIA may be tied to other benefits for the host country, such as
preferential trade access or economic aid. In such situations, it is understandable
that developing countries will succumb to pressure to accept the terms offered in
standard developed country models. The bilateral nature of the majority of IIAs
exacerbates this problem. When developing countries cooperate, such as in the
WTO context, they are often successful. However, as long as the prevailing ide-
ological paradigm is that states must compete for foreign investment, developing
countries will be trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.25 In this regard, Beck’s pro-
posal that states pursue policies of cooperation, aiming to establish comparable
conditions of production in different host countries and establishing ‘host cartels’
is intriguing.26 Beck argues that in addition to benefiting from an exchange of in-
formation, host countries will limit the risk of being played off against one another
in a competition for FDI.27
Greater collaboration among developing countries has also been called for in
the area of trade, where developing countries have been relatively successful in
multilateral fora, but not coordinated in their response to an increasing number
of bilateral trade agreements. Braithwaite suggests that a more organized and
structured response, based on a visionary agenda that will attract support from
within developed states (e.g. NGOs), is the best, if not only, option for developing
countries to resist the divide-and-conquer strategy of the US and Europe.28 Drahos
further expands on this idea, arguing that greater collaboration should, to start
25In a competitive environment, it is optimal for developing countries to collectively reject strong
rules and norms of investment protection, but to agree to them on a bilateral basis. See Guzman
1998.
26Beck 2005, at 202.
27Ibid.
28Braithwaite 2004, at 313-4.
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off with, be aimed at developing high quality analytical resources and strategy.29
Drahos suggests that collaboration should cover multiple issues, eliminating the
current reliance on ad hoc veto coalitions that emerge in different fora. This type
of long-term strategy resembles Gramsci’s ‘war of position’.
Another way to achieve some degree of harmonization and to reduce com-
petition among host states is through an international binding code of corporate
conduct. However, given the apparent reluctance of developed countries to engage
in negotiations for such a code, it would appear that developing countries have a
greater chance of success if they focus on collaboration with other developing
countries.
Create a Legal Assistance Centre
All of the above recommendations relate generally to the future. It is clear that
given the large number of existing disputes and agreements that will not expire
for a decade or more, action is also needed to deal with the immediate situation.
In this regard, this study echoes Gottwald’s call for a legal assistance centre.30
Wa¨lde also advocates a legal aid mechanism, suggesting the WTO Legal Advisory
Centre as a model, and the IISD included a provision on a legal assistance centre
in its Model Investment Agreement (see Section 7.4.2).31 Such a centre could
offer states access to relevant documents, training courses for both the negotiation
of agreements and the settlement of disputes, specific legal advise on cases, and
even representation in arbitration.32
Efforts to remedy issues of technical and financial capacity of developing
countries have thus far been limited. In 2005, UNCTAD launched a pilot course
with “a view to equip especially developing country governments with the neces-
sary capacity to manage investor-to-State disputes and to be able to mobilize the
necessary expertise to assist in the proper conduct of such procedures.”33 The IC-
29Drahos 2003, at 2.
30Gottwald 2007.
31Wa¨lde 2007, at 67. Legal assistance centres have also been advocated in other areas, e.g., climate
change, but the focus is generally only on preparing countries for negotiations. See Gupta 1997.
32Gottwald 2007, at 269.
33Joubin-Bret 2005, at 2.
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SID Secretariat has also cooperated with UNCTAD and organizations such as the
International Development Law Organization in training programs for officials of
developing countries.34 The South Centre has recommended that the ICSID Sec-
retariat should additionally consider the establishment of a fund for developing
countries that could contribute to facility costs.35
It is argued here that a new centre, independent of UNCTAD or any arbitra-
tion supervisory body, should be established. Such a centre could be maintained
by government contributions, or alternatively through a network of NGOs, law
offices and academic institutions. Individuals already contribute significantly to
fostering information exchange through websites devoted to publishing tribunal
awards and decisions,36 and the e-newsletter Investment Treaty News has substan-
tially increased public awareness about disputes.37 Furthermore, many NGOs,
particularly those involved in submitting amicus curiae briefs, have acquired sub-
stantial legal knowledge in the area. A new legal assistance centre should not
reinvent the wheel; it should instead build on all of these commendable efforts.
8.3 Theoretical Reflections and Areas for Future Research
This section addresses what has been learned in the course of this study about
the nature of conflicts between investors and states. It furthermore reflects on
the value of a neo-Gramscian framework of inquiry, and identifies key areas that
require further research.
8.3.1 State Strategies to Deal with Conflicts with Investors
In Chapter 1, it was argued that investors have three strategies that they can employ
when faced with a conflict with a host state regarding an environmental policy or
34ICSID 2004, at 14.
35South Centre 2005, at 14.
36The Investment Claims website edited by Todd J. Grierson-Weiler and Ian A. Laird,
http://www.investmentclaims.com, and the Investment Treaty Arbitration website edited by Andrew
Newcome, http://www.ita.uvic.ca, are worthy of particular note.
37The newsletter is edited by Luke Eric Peterson and supported by the IISD,
http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn/.
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decision of a court: accept the policy or decision and associated costs; exit the
jurisdiction; or exercise voice. Considerable focus has been given in academic
literature to the fact that “states have roots while investors have wings.”38 While
this is certainly an important observation, it is nevertheless the case that when
investors have a choice between fight or flight, they may often opt for the former.
This is particularly the case in capital intensive investments with large sunk costs,
such as mining and oil operations, and in situations in which investors have the
institution of investment protection to support their voice.
The cases in this study have illustrated that a threat to arbitrate can be an
effective tool for an investor who has adopted a strategy of voice. However, they
also indicate that states do not uniformly capitulate to investor demands when
faced with the prospect of arbitration. While states faced with a conflict with an
investor clearly do not have the option of exit, they can exercise their voice through
third party dispute settlement (TDR) (arbitration and litigation), negotiation, and
indirect measures (naming and shaming), just as investors do.
In terms of TDR, a state faced with a threat can opt to agree to arbitration
and proceed to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal and the merits of the in-
vestor’s claims (the strategy adopted by each state involved in the first-order cases
presented in Chapter 5). Alternatively, states can utilize foreign or domestic courts
to attempt to block arbitration proceedings, as Ecuador did in the ChevronTexaco
case (Section 6.2.2). If an arbitration does not proceed favourably, a state may opt
to discontinue the proceedings in favour of settlement, as Canada did in the Ethyl
case (Section 5.1.1). Finally, if an unfavourable award is delivered by a tribunal,
the state can challenge it in the courts in the seat of arbitration, as occurred in
Metalclad, and S.D. Myers (Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4), or commence annulment
proceedings (if it is an ICSID award). The state may also endeavour to block
enforcement of the award in domestic and foreign courts.
If a state chooses not to proceed with arbitration and instead opts to negotiate
with the aggrieved investor, it may end up paying the investor compensation, of-
fering alternatives (e.g., proposing a different site for a landfill), or retracting the
offending policy or decision. In the latter strategy, the state may roll-back policy
completely, or make an exception, for example, to exclude application of a law
38Beck 2005, at 72.
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to existing investments. The government may attempt to offset the negative envi-
ronmental effects of such a strategy by imposing certain conditions on investors
who are exempted from the application of a law, for example, as occurred in the
Indonesian and Ghanaian forest cases (Sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2).
Finally, just as investors can employ naming and shaming tactics against a
state, so too can states garner support from NGOs and the international commu-
nity. As mentioned in Section 7.4.3, investors that have initiated or threatened to
initiate arbitration proceedings, especially against poor countries, have often re-
ceived bad press and have even been the subject of protests and NGO campaigns.
Although susceptibility to such tactics will vary from industry to industry, and
even company to company, a government that can garner the support of NGOs,
and even the support of other states, may be in a better position to negotiate with
an investor.
When will a state decide to adopt one or more of these strategies? The like-
lihood of success of a given strategy will be an important factor, as will be the
anticipated consequences of the strategy (e.g. financial and reputational costs). It
would also seem logical that states will also consider the consequences of settling
with an investor. If a conflict concerns an issue that is politically salient, for exam-
ple, access to drinking water, it is more likely that a government will defend the
case in arbitration than if it deals with a less volatile subject such as the protection
of biodiversity. Governments may also fear the loss of revenue from other areas
(e.g., ecotourism) or a loss of credibility on the domestic or international stage if
they are seen to be ‘giving in’ to the demands of foreign corporations. Therefore,
domestic politics will be a significant factor in any decision.
It can be hypothesized that states confronted with a threat of arbitration that
are considering how to proceed have three main ‘decision filters’, based on the
potential:
• Outcome of the case if it proceeds to arbitration (or is challenged in the courts);
• Consequences of arbitration (or litigation to challenge proceedings); and
• Consequences of a settlement that includes compensation or policy change.
Each filter is based on government perceptions, which will vary from state to
state. For example, a government that has had previous negative experience in
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arbitration might perceive the outcome of a case differently than one which has
had no past experience. A state with significant financial resources will perceive
the consequences of arbitration differently than a poor country. Ideology can also
be a significant factor, as evidenced by the current movement in several Latin
American countries: leaders such as Hugo Chavez are not particularly preoccu-
pied with their country’s reputation amongst investors. Finally, a government fac-
ing a pending election will likely be especially concerned with the consequences
of settlement in a politically sensitive conflict.
Running a decision through all of these filters may point to one obvious solu-
tion, or may instead suggest conflicting strategies (see Table 8.3). For example, if
a government perceives that it will lose in arbitration, and that arbitration will be
costly in both financial and reputational terms, but that a settlement will produce
little in the way of political repercussions, then the obvious choice is to negotiate
with the investor. On the other hand, if a government perceives that it will lose
in arbitration, and that arbitration will be costly in both financial and reputational
terms, but that a settlement will produce significant political repercussions (e.g.,
loss in pending election), then the state may choose to arbitrate. These filters are
complex and therefore only have explanatory, rather than predictive, value.
8.3.2 The Value of a Neo-Gramscian Approach
The relationship between the institution of investment protection and environmen-
tal governance has most often been studied from a legal perspective. Legal re-
search on the topic is valuable and necessary, but there is also a need for greater
consideration of the political side of conflicts between investors and states. This
study has shed light on the significance of the threat of arbitration, an issue that
would not attract attention from legal researchers who are predominantly inter-
ested in the interpretation and development of legal norms and rules.
When addressing the politics of investor-state conflicts, a number of approaches
could be adopted. In this study a neo-Gramscian perspective was chosen. While
many of the critical insights in this study could have been made without the use
of neo-Gramscian terminology, the framework lent cohesion to the broad range of
topics and cases that were addressed. Perhaps the most relevant neo-Gramscian
observation, in relation to this study, is the emergence of the new constitutional-
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ism. The new constitutionalism encompasses the structural and ideological con-
straints that are imposed on states by the transnational historic bloc and helps to
explain why they are voluntarily ceding authority to tribunals. It also captures the
way in which these constraints can be ‘locked-in’, resulting in a loss of democratic
accountability.
The transnational focus of the neo-Gramscian perspective was also crucial in
this study, particularly in the analysis of the second-order cases. If the state had
been viewed as a unit, key insights on the way that domestic politics factor into
government responses to threats of arbitration would have been missed.
The approach also called for a critical assessment of the role of NGOs in
the institution of investment protection. The concept of transformismo helped
to explain the changing nature of NGO involvement in, and perspectives on, the
institution of investment protection. The analysis suggests that further critical
research on the impact of amicus curiae briefs is required in order to determine
whether certain NGOs are key counterhegemonic voices or have instead been co-
opted by the transnational historic bloc.
This study has benefited from the application of neo-Gramscian insights and
it has also, in turn, contributed to neo-Gramscian scholarship. While the major
writings in the field are largely focused at the macroeconomic and macropolitical
level, this study focused on one specific area and gave considerable attention to
domestic interactions. The study also drew links between neo-Gramscian theory
and other theories/hypotheses (e.g. regulatory chill, political cover). These hy-
potheses and theories are consistent with neo-Gramscian thought and both enrich
and help to operationalize a neo-Gramscian framework.
8.3.3 Avenues for Further Inquiry
In recent years, interest in the relationship between investment law and environ-
mental law in academia has increased significantly. This interest has been focused
largely on three fora: (1) disputes that have taken place within the context of the
NAFTA’s Chapter 11; (2) the failed negotiations for a MAI under the auspices of
the OECD; and (3) the ongoing attempts to develop a similar agreement in the
WTO. Attention now appears to be turning to the vast multitude of BITs, which
mainly affect countries in the developing world.
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Still largely neglected in discussions of investment and environment are unilat-
eral commitments to investment protection made by developing country govern-
ments, through either national legislation or contracts with individual investors.
These commitments are unilateral in the sense that they are made by a host state
without a reciprocal arrangement, be it bilateral or regional, with the investor’s
home state. As shown in this study, such unilateral commitments may equal, or
even surpass, those commitments made in international treaties and may have sig-
nificant implications for the regulation of the environment. Stabilization clauses
and agreements, in particular, constitute an emerging and complex issue in in-
ternational investment law, and to date have largely escaped scrutiny. Further
research is required on commitments to stability, particularly in environmentally
relevant sectors such as resource extraction. Unfortunately, such research will be
greatly complicated by the lack of access to information concerning state con-
tracts.
While greater attention should be paid to unilateral commitments, there is also,
of course, a need to keep track of emerging developments in IIAs. In particular,
it will be important to assess pending and new cases in investment arbitration to
determine whether an informal system of precedent has emerged with regard to
the key regulative norms and rules of investment protection, and to assess the
implications of evolving interpretations. Special attention should also be given to
any cases that develop under the new generation of IIAs that contain clarifications
of the key regulative rules and norms. These cases will provide some indication
as to the strength of these reforms.
Procedural reforms should also be more closely scrutinized. Now that third
party participation has occurred in several environmentally relevant cases, a new
area of research has opened up. The focus of research in this area should be on the
impact that amicus curiae briefs have on the outcome of specific cases, as well
as the broader awareness-raising value that they may provide. Also required is
an assessment of how the participation of third parties affects perceptions of the
legitimacy of international investment arbitration.
Finally, while this study has provided a first glimpse into the complexities of
investor-state conflicts that are resolved in the shadow of investment protection,
there is a need for much more research in this area. Unlike tribunal awards, settle-
ments that result from a threat of arbitration can include policy roll-back or non-
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implementation. They can also set dangerous precedents, encouraging investors
to threaten arbitration whenever an unfavourable policy or decision emerges. It
is recommended that future research projects delve even further into the domes-
tic political interactions that result from threats to arbitrate. Longer-term studies
could also assess the impacts on policy-making following the resolution of a con-
flict. Research in this area will continue to hampered by limited access to infor-
mation, at least in the near-term. Nevertheless, this study has shown that empirical
research can be fruitful and can contribute significantly to an understanding of the
complex relationship between investment law and environmental governance.
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